NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BOREN, P.J.

Helen M. Harris-Scott sued singer Michael Jackson for allegedly harassing, stalking and threatening her for two decades. Based on plaintiff's admissions that she has no personal knowledge of Jackson's alleged misconduct, the trial court granted Jackson's motion for summary judgment. We affirm the judgment. Plaintiff has not raised any triable issues of material fact.

FACTS

This is the second appeal in this case. Previously, we reinstated plaintiff's lawsuit after it was improperly dismissed. Plaintiff attempted to serve Jackson many times without success. The trial court refused her request to serve summons by publication, granted Jackson's request to quash the summons, and dismissed the case with prejudice. We reversed. (Harris-Scott v. Jackson (Aug. 7, 2008, B200107) [nonpub. opn.].)

Plaintiff alleges that she has suffered emotional distress "through death threats, and an invasion of privacy—breaking into the plaintiff's house many times—hooking up surveillance and wiretapping equipment. Other harassment included[] automobile and brake tampering, preventing the plaintiff from getting to work. In addition, this defendant has hindered the professional success of the plaintiff—spreading vicious lies to potential employers—and hindering opportunities—causing the plaintiff income loss and earning capacity." Plaintiff seeks an award of $100 million. Jackson answered and denied the allegations.

In June 2009, Jackson moved for summary judgment.1 The basis for his motion is that: (1) psychiatric testimony shows that plaintiff's claims are the product of paranoid ideation; (2) expert testimony shows that there is no wiretapping or surveillance equipment in plaintiff's home; and (3) plaintiff admits to having no personal knowledge that Jackson committed any of the misconduct alleged in her complaint.

During her deposition, plaintiff was questioned about specific incidents of alleged misconduct by Jackson. Plaintiff revealed that she has no actual knowledge that Jackson is linked to any suspicious activity at her home or work. Rather, it is her "belief" that Jackson has a hand in everything that happened to her. For example, she testified that "someone would call and say hello and hang up. Could have been him. Had a light voice." Plaintiff speculated that Jackson was involved in the calls, noting that "For certain, I can't say it was him." Plaintiff believes Jackson caused equipment-damaging power surges at her home, without any proof that Jackson was capable of causing electrical surges, and she blames him for causing the "popping sounds" that she hears inside her home. Plaintiff believes Jackson was sending her a message when she saw people walking around with bandages on their faces.

Plaintiff sometimes hears "Helen" being paged on the intercom when she shops in department stores. While terming this to be harassment by Jackson, she admits that "who's to say it's me or some other Helen?" She was unable to locate a GPS tracking device on her vehicle, though she believes that Jackson is tracking her. Further, plaintiff asserted—without proof—that Jackson undermined her bail bond business by helping people to escape while out on bail. She has filed suit against the City of Los Angeles, the State of California, and the federal government, for their failure to stop Jackson from harassing her and covering up his alleged misdoing.

A psychiatrist hired by the defense examined plaintiff. During the examination, plaintiff admitted that she has never met Jackson. She believes that Jackson is imprisoned and that an imposter makes his personal appearances. Plaintiff has difficulty sleeping, fears for her life, and has a constant sense of apprehension. While plaintiff's distress is genuine, it is the result of paranoid delusions about Jackson, and her claims against him are "the product of her paranoid ideation." A private investigator examined plaintiff's home to detect electronic surveillance or wiretapping devices. Nothing was found. A computer expert examined plaintiff's home computers and found no software that would indicate keystroke monitoring.

In her opposition to Jackson's motion, plaintiff countered with no legally admissible evidence showing that Jackson was responsible for any of the problems she perceives—whether it be power surges, department store intercom pages, telephone calls, popping sounds or anything else. There is no proof of any surveillance, harassment or stalking. Plaintiff offered her own beliefs and speculation about a world of possibilities, not proof.

The trial court granted Jackson's motion. On April 5, 2010, the court signed a judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff filed her appeal on April 28, 2010.

DISCUSSION

1. Procedural Deficiencies in Plaintiff's Appeal

Plaintiff failed to submit a proper record. She provided a clerk's transcript consisting of (1) the order granting summary judgment; (2) her notice of appeal; and (3) her designation of the record on appeal. Plaintiff did not include her complaint, Jackson's motion for summary judgment, the evidence in support of the motion, plaintiff's opposition to the motion, the separate statement of facts, or the court's judgment. A transcript that includes only the court's ruling is inadequate for reviewing the issues presented by the case. (Hernandez v. California Hospital Medical Center (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 498, 502.)

Having failed to designate an adequate record, plaintiff has no evidence to cite in her brief. She provides no statement of facts and no citations to the record. A judgment is presumed to be correct, and the appealing party must affirmatively show error. (Hernandez v. California Hospital Medical Center, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 502.) Without citations in her opening brief to a proper record, Harris-Scott fails to show trial court error.2 "If a party fails to support an argument with the necessary citations to the record, that portion of the brief may be stricken and the argument will be deemed to have been waived." (Moulton Niguel Water Dist. v. Colombo (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1220.)

2. The Motion for Summary Judgment

The judgment is final and appealable. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (m)(1).) A motion for summary judgment "shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." (Id., subd. (c).) "The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute." (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) A plaintiff cannot rely solely on the allegations in her complaint to prove that the case is meritorious, on a motion for summary judgment. (Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 176, 181; College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 720, fn. 7.) Review of the ruling on summary judgment is de novo. (Kahn v. East Side Union High School Dist. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 990, 1003.)

The motion for summary judgment demonstrated that plaintiff admittedly has no personal knowledge that Jackson was responsible for any of her alleged problems, as shown in her answers to discovery questions. Plaintiff's belief that Jackson is persecuting her is based on pure speculation and "possibilities" that are unsupported by any proof. Just because plaintiff believes something is amiss does not make it so. She must prove that Jackson wiretapped her house, or telephoned her and hung up, or damaged her car, or tampered with her food, or interfered with her employment. Proof comes in the form of admissible evidence.

To give an example, it is not enough for plaintiff to say that "Mr. Jackson is watching her inside her apartment, because a Sears commercial appeared on her television screen, just as she was writing out a check to Sears," one of the undisputed facts in this case. There is no proof that Jackson had any control over the timing of television commercials. All plaintiff has shown is a common coincidence, not evidence of wrongdoing.

Plaintiff contends in her appellate briefs that there is "room for proven evidence." She states that "[a]nything is possible." Plaintiff had to supply admissible evidence when she opposed Jackson's motion for summary judgment. Without it, she cannot show the existence of disputed issues of fact, worthy of a trial. Speculating that "anything is possible"—including the conjecture that the FBI knows of plaintiff's difficulties—does not meet the applicable standards of law. No miscarriage of justice occurred when the trial court dismissed plaintiff's case. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)

3. Plaintiff's Claim of Judicial Bias

Plaintiff did not seek to disqualify the trial judge at any point before judgment was entered. (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.3.) She did not preserve a claim of bias by objecting to any alleged impropriety. (Moulton Niguel Water Dist. v. Colombo, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 1218.) In any event, there is no indication in the record that the trial court was biased against Harris-Scott, as she claims in her brief. In fact, this was a different judge than the one who initially dismissed her case after quashing service of process. The court did not—and could not—accept plaintiff's feelings of persecution as proof that Jackson did anything wrong. Absent the requisite proof of wrongdoing sufficient to sustain plaintiff's allegations, the court properly dismissed plaintiff's case.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

DOI TODD, J. CHAVEZ, J., concurs.