NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

FLIER, J.

Danning, Gill, Diamond & Kollitz, LLP appeals from a summary judgment in favor of respondent Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Capital LLC. This is the second time this matter has been before this court.

In Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Capital v. Danning, Gill, Diamond & Kollitz (Nov. 2, 2009, B211584 [nonpub. opn.] (Credit Suisse I )), we reversed a summary judgment in respondent's favor because we determined there was an issue of fact whether the underlying transaction involved a letter of credit. We noted that because the record before us did not unequivocally show a letter of credit was involved, "[i]t would not be appropriate for us as an appellate court to compel a party to take a position on a factual question of considerable importance." We remanded the case with directions for further proceedings consistent with our opinion. We clearly stated, however, that in any such proceedings our prior opinion "constitutes the law of the case."

Following remand, the trial court conducted further proceedings and issued a judgment in favor of respondent, from which appellant appeals. As we explain below, the trial court properly granted respondent a summary judgment, and we affirm.

FACTS

To place the matter in proper context, we briefly summarize the facts as set forth in our prior opinion.

On September 30, 2004, respondent obtained a judgment against Ronald Anson and others. Respondent registered the judgment in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. On October 31, 2004, respondent served Anson with an order to appear at a judgment debtor examination pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 708.110.1

Pursuant to subdivision (d) of section 708.110, service of the notice to appear created a lien (ORAP lien) on the personal property of the judgment debtor, Anson. As of October 31, 2004, Anson had an account of at least $1 million at Value Home Loan. The law firm of Bird, Marella, Boxer, Wolpert, Nessim, Drooks & Linceberg, PC (Bird, Marella) held a security interest in this account. On or about November 30, 2004, Anson instructed Value Home Loan to pay Bird, Marella $300,000 from Anson's account. On or about December 9, 2004, Bird, Marella in turn paid appellant $150,000. As of November 30, 2004, however, Anson owed appellant only $3,458, and so the $150,000 was deposited in appellant's client trust account.

On or about July 12, 2005, Anson instructed Value Home Loan to wire $50,000 to appellant; Bird, Marella released its lien on Anson's Value Home Loan account to the extent of this payment. Appellant applied this sum to fees and costs incurred by Anson.

It is undisputed that sometime between October 31, 2004, and December 1, 2004, appellant learned of the existence of respondent's ORAP lien.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Respondent filed this action for conversion against appellant to recover the money paid appellant at Anson's direction for services rendered in representing Anson and his wife with respect to various lawsuits. Both sides filed a motion for summary judgment. At that time, the parties agreed that "a central issue, if not the central issue, in the case was whether [appellant] could assert the exemption from the ORAP lien set forth in subdivision (j) of section 697.740."2 Appellant claimed it had a right or interest in "money" because of the work it performed on Anson's behalf. Respondent in turn argued that the "money" referred to in the subdivision (j) exemption had to be "`currency and coin and not rights to payment of checks or the proceeds of a wire transfer.'"

The trial court ruled that under the subdivision (j) exemption, appellant became entitled to a right or interest in "money" only upon having performed services, but not before. The trial court thus distinguished between legal fees for services already rendered from a retainer for services to be rendered in the future. The trial court, however, rejected respondent's contention that "money" means currency and coins.

Appellant argued in Credit Suisse I that the $200,000 it received was not subject to the ORAP lien because it was subject to the subdivision (j) exemption. In Credit Suisse I, however, we explained the term "money" in the subdivision (j) exemption, i.e., "person who acquires any right or interest in letters of credit, advices of credit, or money," cannot be read in isolation, but must be read in conjunction with the terms "letters of credit" and "advices of credit." (Italics added.) That is because, in the usual letter of credit transaction, before the presentment of documents, the beneficiary has an interest in the "letter or credit" or in the "advice of credit"; after the presentment of documents, the beneficiary has an interest in receiving "money" from the issuer of the letter of credit. As we noted, the reference to "money" in subdivision (j) is meant to cover the situation in which there has been a presentation of documents, triggering the issuing bank's obligation to pay the beneficiary "money." We held that the subdivision (j) exemption must be read as referring to the three phases of a letter of credit transaction. We requested supplemental briefing in Credit Suisse I on whether subdivision (j) of section 697.740 is limited to letter of credit transactions. We also informed the parties it did not appear to us that there was a letter of credit transaction in the case, and we asked the parties to state whether that was so. Respondent answered the second question by stating this court's conclusion was correct; appellant failed to answer the second question at all. We concluded it was inappropriate for this court to compel a party to take a position on such an important issue of fact. Expressing no view on whether there was or was not a letter of credit transaction, we reversed the judgment and remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed in our opinion.

Upon remand, the parties jointly proposed that the trial court set a hearing and briefing schedule on the scope of the remand, a procedure the trial court adopted and ordered. After briefing by the parties, the trial court ruled that "[t]he narrow issue left to be determined following remand is the letter of credit issue." The court adopted respondent's suggested procedure whereby respondent would rely on the showing made in its original noticed motion for summary judgment, with appellant having the right to file a supplemental opposition addressing the issue whether the transaction involved a letter of credit and respondent having the right to file a reply. The only objection appellant voiced to this procedure was an assertion that the scope of the matters open to litigation should be expanded to include whether respondent had established its prima facie case for conversion with regard to the "tracing issue," i.e., whether respondent had adequately traced the funds subject to the ORAP lien from the Value Home Loan account to appellant's trust account. The court overruled appellant's objection.

In its supplemental points and authorities, appellant argued that respondent had not established its right to immediate possession of the funds sufficient to support a claim for conversion. Appellant also argued that respondent should not be awarded prejudgment interest. Importantly, appellant's supplemental memorandum conceded it was unaware of any letter of credit as part of the underlying transaction.

In view of appellant's statement that it was not aware of any letter of credit transaction respecting the underlying transaction, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent and found no letter of credit was involved in the transaction. Hence, the transfer of the $200,000 violated the ORAP lien and appellant was indebted to respondent in that amount. The court further awarded respondent prejudgment interest on the sums transferred to appellant.

Following a hearing on the form of judgment, the trial court accepted respondent's submitted form of judgment and entered judgment accordingly. Appellant timely appealed from the judgment.

CONTENTIONS

Appellant contends this court's prior opinion in Credit Suisse I was a general reversal limited by the law of the case, which set the case at large as if it had never been tried. Appellant argues in particular that respondent was obliged to establish a prima facie case by tracing the funds from Anson to appellant. Appellant also contends it is entitled to litigate 16 other affirmative defenses raised in answer to the complaint. In addition, appellant argues that once the summary judgment was reversed no procedural mechanism existed under which the trial court could enter judgment. Appellant further asserts there was insufficient evidence before the trial court upon which to base or sustain a judgment. Finally, appellant contends that the trial court erred in not providing a statement of reasons as requested by appellant and purportedly required by section 437c, subdivision (g). We disagree.

DISCUSSION

When the appellate court remands a cause "for proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein," such wording is not a phrase of art that contains only a single meaning; the phrase must be read with the appellate opinion as a whole. (Puritan Leasing Co. v. Superior Court (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 140, 147-148.) In context, the phrase may indicate no more than on retrial the trial court is to apply the law of the case, or it may indicate the trial court is directed to take action consistent with directions set forth in the body of the opinion. (Id. at p. 148.)

Our reversal of the summary judgment in the case at hand was of the latter variety. Our opinion in Credit Suisse I reversed the judgment and remanded the case "for further proceedings that are consistent with the views expressed in this opinion." In the body of our opinion, we had discussed the possibility a subdivision (j) exemption might be available to appellant as a defense; however, on the record presented, it did not appear to us that there was a letter of credit transaction in this case. We therefore requested that the parties file supplemental briefs indicating whether our tentative conclusion was right or wrong.

Respondent responded that our conclusion was correct, and appellant failed to address our inquiry. Because we found the issue of fact to be of "considerable importance," we expressed no view on whether there was or was not a letter of credit transaction in this case and remanded "for such additional proceedings as may be initiated by the parties." We cautioned, however, that our opinion in Credit Suisse I "constitutes the law of the case."

Contrary to appellant's contentions, the reversal with directions upon remand was not intended to and did not set the case at large for relitigation. We remanded in Credit Suisse I solely to resolve the factual issue whether a letter of credit was involved in the parties' transaction such that appellant could invoke a subdivision (j) exemption in its defense. The trial court properly grasped the nature of our limited remand and afforded the parties a limited opportunity to present evidence on the issue within the framework of the summary judgment motion. (See 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Appeal, § 879 et seq.)

When, as here, there is a reversal with directions upon remand, "[t]he trial court is empowered to act only in accordance with the direction of the reviewing court; action which does not conform to those directions is void." (Hampton v. Superior Court (1952) 38 Cal.2d 652, 655 (Hampton); see also People v. Lewis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 214, 228; In re Justin S. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1434-1435.) The trial court had no discretion but to act as it did upon remand. (Hampton, supra, at p. 656.)

Had appellant genuinely contended that any issues (such as its 16 other affirmative defenses) were unresolved by the prior appeal, the appropriate remedy was a petition for rehearing in Credit Suisse I. "`If a court of review inadvertently omits to include in its instructions to a trial court upon the reversal of a judgment essential elements within the issues necessarily determined on the appeal, the aggrieved party has his remedy in a petition for rehearing. A trial court may not exceed the specific directions of a court of review in remanding a cause after a reversal of the judgment on appeal and add thereto conditions which it assumes the reviewing court should have included.'" (Hampton, supra, 38 Cal.2d at p. 656; see Butler v. Superior Court (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 979, 982.) Had appellant felt unaddressed issues remained after our opinion in Credit Suisse I, its proper remedy was a petition for rehearing.

It is unfair to the opposing party, the trial court and this court for a party to remain quiescent in face of supposed unaddressed issues and to mount a stealth attack after remand.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is to recover costs on appeal.

BIGELOW, P. J. RUBIN, J., concurs.