A company lawfully acquires a competitor. Can the activities of the two companies in anticipation of the merger constitute a conspiracy in restraint of trade under the Cartwright Act, the California antitrust statute (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16700 et seq.)?
Asahi is a Japanese corporation which develops and markets pharmaceutical products and medical devices. One of its products is Fasudil, a Rho-kinase
In order to market Fasudil in the United States (U.S.) for treatment of PAH, Asahi, on June 23, 2006, entered into a licensing agreement (the Licensing Agreement) with CoTherix, a California-based biopharmaceutical company focused on developing and commercializing products for the treatment of cardiovascular disease. CoTherix had previously obtained regulatory approval for its own inhaled PAH treatment drug, Ventavis. Under the terms of the Licensing Agreement, CoTherix agreed to obtain regulatory approvals for Fasudil, and to develop and commercialize it in North America and Europe. CoTherix was to develop oral and inhaled formulations of Fasudil for treatment of PAH, and an oral formulation of Fasudil for treatment of stable angina. It was required to use commercially reasonable efforts to develop Fasudil, and to obtain U.S. regulatory approvals for Fasudil as soon as reasonably practicable.
On January 9, 2007, Actelion, through an intermediate subsidiary, acquired all of the stock of CoTherix, pursuant to a tender offer under a November 19, 2006 "Agreement and Plan of Merger" (the Acquisition Agreement). Actelion concurrently notified Asahi that it was discontinuing development of Fasudil for "business and commercial reasons."
On November 19, 2008, Asahi filed suit against CoTherix and Actelion.
Asahi contends that Actelion was concerned about immediate threats to its Tracleer market share from the launch of competing products and feared that Fasudil would compete directly with Tracleer, causing potential pricing issues which would cost Actelion hundreds of millions of dollars in lost net revenue. Therefore, Asahi asserts, one of Actelion's goals in acquisition of CoTherix was to terminate the development of Fasudil. In pursuit of this goal, Actelion purportedly directed CoTherix Chief Executive Officer Don Santel to falsely reassure Asahi, after the CoTherix acquisition was announced, that "CoTherix continues to operate in the ordinary course of business, which includes the development of Fasudil." In reality, according to Asahi, Actelion never had any intention of permitting CoTherix to continue development of Fasudil, and CoTherix began halting and delaying work on Fasudil's development prior to close of the acquisition. Had it known the true facts, Asahi insists that it would have pursued contractual remedies against CoTherix and could have sued for injunctive relief under the Licensing Agreement, thereby delaying or
On August 18, 2009, CoTherix and the other U.S. subsidiaries of Actelion (Actelion U.S. Holding Company, Actelion Pharmaceuticals US, Inc.) filed a motion for summary adjudication challenging, inter alia, Asahi's Cartwright Act claim. CoTherix argued that the Cartwright Act is inapplicable to corporate acquisition transactions; that there were no triable issues of material fact as to whether CoTherix and Actelion had conspired to interrupt the development of Fasudil; and that Asahi lacked antitrust standing.
On December 22, 2009, the trial court entered its order granting summary adjudication of Asahi's Cartwright Act claim as to CoTherix and the other U.S. subsidiaries of Actelion.
On March 19, 2010, defendants moved for summary adjudication of Asahi's seventh claim for violation of the unfair competition law. On May 21, 2010, the trial court granted the motion as to CoTherix.
A motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication is properly granted "if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) We review an order granting or denying a motion for summary adjudication de novo. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 860 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493] (Aguilar).) In our review, we are required to liberally construe, and draw all reasonable inferences from, the evidence in favor of the party opposing the motion. (Miller v. Department of Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446, 460, 470 [30 Cal.Rptr.3d 797, 115 P.3d 77].) We strictly scrutinize a defendant's showing. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 617, 23 P.3d 1143].) "In applying this exacting standard of review, we are also mindful that both California and federal decisions urge caution in granting a defendant's motion for summary judgment in an antitrust case." (Fisherman's Wharf Bay Cruise Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 309, 321 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 628].) Nevertheless, "summary judgment is available, and always remains available, even in complex cases," including antitrust actions for an unlawful conspiracy under the Cartwright Act. (Aguilar, at pp. 860-861.) "If a party moving for summary judgment in any action, including an antitrust action for unlawful conspiracy, would prevail at trial without submission of any issue of material fact to a trier of fact for determination, then he should prevail on summary judgment." (Id. at p. 855.)
In 1907, the California Legislature enacted the Cartwright Act
The focus of the Cartwright Act is "on the punishment of violators for the larger purpose of promoting free competition. (See Stats. 1907, ch. 530, p. 984
As we discuss further post, federal antitrust laws prohibit anticompetitive mergers. (See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (Sherman Act); 15 U.S.C. § 18 (Clayton Act).) A merger is illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act if it effects an unreasonable restraint of trade, while section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolies. (See Alaska Airlines v. United Airlines, Inc. (9th Cir. 1991) 948 F.2d 536, 540-541 [each Sherman Act section "focus[es] on different problems": "concerted conduct is subject to sanction [under § 1] if it merely restrains trade, unilateral conduct is subject to sanction [under § 2] only if it either actually monopolizes or threatens monopolization"].) A merger may be attacked under the Clayton Act if it has the potential to substantially lessen competition. (Texaco, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 1165, fn. 18.)
"[T]he Cartwright Act is not derived from the Sherman Act, but rather from the laws of other states, and the Cartwright Act and the Sherman Act differ in wording and scope." (Cal. Antitrust & Unfair Competition, supra, § 1.05, p. 24.) The Cartwright Act bans combinations, but single firm monopolization is not cognizable under the Cartwright Act. (Texaco, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 1163; Freeman, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 200, fn. 32; but cf. Lowell v. Mother's Cake & Cookie Co., supra, 79 Cal.App.3d at p. 23 [holding that "monopoly is a prohibited restraint of trade" under the Cartwright Act].) To maintain an action for a combination in restraint of trade under the Cartwright Act, "the following elements must be established: (1) the formation and operation of the conspiracy; (2) illegal acts done pursuant thereto; and (3) damage proximately caused by such acts. [Citation.]" (Kolling v. Dow Jones & Co. (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 709, 718 [187 Cal.Rptr. 797].)
Also relevant to our discussion is the determination by the U.S. Supreme Court that the coordinated acts of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary do not constitute a combination or conspiracy under section 1 of the Sherman Act. (Copperweld, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 777.) Rejecting prior cases suggesting the possibility of "intra-enterprise" liability in this context, the Supreme Court held that "[T]he coordinated activity of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary must be viewed as that of a single enterprise for purposes of § 1 of the Sherman Act. A parent and its wholly owned subsidiary have a complete unity of interest. Their objectives are common, not disparate; their general corporate actions are guided or determined not by two separate corporate consciousnesses, but one. They are not unlike a multiple team of horses drawing a vehicle under the control of a single driver. With or without a formal `agreement,' the subsidiary acts for the benefit of the parent, its sole shareholder. If a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary do `agree' to a course of action, there is no sudden joining of economic resources that had previously served different interests, and there is no justification for § 1 scrutiny." (Id. at pp. 772, 771; see also American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League (2010) 560 U.S. ___, ___ [176 L.Ed.2d 947, 130 S.Ct. 2201, 2212] (American Needle).)
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the focus of section 1 of the Sherman Act on concerted behavior "leaves a `gap' in the Act's proscription against unreasonable restraints of trade. . . . An unreasonable restraint of trade may be effected not only by two independent firms acting in concert; a single firm may restrain trade to precisely the same extent if it alone possesses the combined market power of those same two firms. Because the Sherman Act does not prohibit unreasonable restraints of trade as such—but only restraints effected by a contract, combination, or conspiracy—it leaves untouched a single firm's anticompetitive conduct . . . that may be indistinguishable in economic effect from the conduct of two firms subject to § 1 liability." (Copperweld, supra, 467 U.S. at pp. 774-775, citation omitted.)
Our own Supreme Court has not yet directly addressed the application and scope of Copperweld to the Cartwright Act. At least one appellate district has applied Copperweld in rejecting a Cartwright Act price-fixing claim brought against a corporate real estate multiple-listing service and its local real estate association shareholders. (Freeman, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th 171; see also Eddins v. Redstone (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 290, 341-343 [35 Cal.Rptr.3d 863] [applying Copperweld in sustaining summary adjudication of a claim of collusion under the Unfair Practices Act between commonly controlled companies]; Drum v. San Fernando Valley Bar Assn. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 247, 255-256 [106 Cal.Rptr.3d 46] [applying Copperweld principles to claim
Absent contrary direction from our Supreme Court, we believe that the rationale of Copperweld is entirely consistent with the approach of Texaco, and the established teaching of our own cases that an indispensable element of any action under the Cartwright Act is proof of a "`combination of resources of two or more independent interests for the purpose of restraining commerce and preventing market competition . . . .' [Citation.]" (G.H.I.I. v. MTS, Inc. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 256, 266 [195 Cal.Rptr. 211], italics added.)
The trial court, in granting summary adjudication, found Texaco controlling. Asahi, acknowledging the continuing vitality of Texaco in the context of corporate mergers, seeks to narrowly interpret its scope and contends that Texaco has no application to premerger activities during the period that the acquired and acquiring entities maintain separate identities. We find the distinctions that Asahi attempts to draw unpersuasive.
Asahi argues that, unlike the Attorney General in Texaco, it does not seek to challenge the Actelion/CoTherix merger, but instead targets an anticompetitive premerger combination or conspiracy resulting when "CoTherix and its executives . . . joined with Actelion to frustrate Asahi's rights under the [Licensing] Agreement so that the path would be clear for Actelion to prevent a vibrant competitive offering in the markets for PAH and [stable angina] treatments."
Asahi's theory of the case is premised on provisions of the Licensing Agreement anticipating potential change in control of CoTherix. Section 11.2(f) of the Licensing Agreement permitted Asahi to terminate the agreement in the event that CoTherix was acquired by a "Competitive Company,"
Some federal circuits appear to have at least implicitly recognized a potential cause of action under section 1 of the Sherman Act for a premerger
In Vollrath, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, a subsidiary, and another later-acquired subsidiary violated the Sherman Act through a predatory pricing scheme for imported stainless steel mixing bowls. (Vollrath, supra, 9 F.3d at p. 1457.) The matter was submitted to a jury on theories including both an attempt and conspiracy to monopolize in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act, as well as conspiracy to restrain trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, but the trial court granted a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. (Vollrath, at pp. 1457-1459.) The Ninth Circuit affirmed, and found, among other things, that the district court properly held that under Copperweld there could be no conspiracy following an acquisition of one of the defendants by another. (Id. at p. 1463.) Asahi asserts that Vollrath nevertheless recognized that the existence of a premerger conspiracy was an issue properly considered by a trier of fact. The conspiracy factually alleged in Vollrath, however, was an agreement to engage in below-cost pricing so as to monopolize the stainless steel mixing bowl market, a violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act (Vollrath, at p. 1463), for which there is no analog in the Cartwright Act. Further, under federal law, anticompetitive mergers are subject to scrutiny under both sections of the Sherman Act, as well as under the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 18 [expressly prohibiting an acquisition or merger "where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition . . . may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly"]). (United States v. First Nat. Bank (1964) 376 U.S. 665, 669-673 [12 L.Ed.2d 1, 84 S.Ct. 1033].)
In Lantec, the plaintiff alleged that a merger between Novell and WordPerfect was unlawful as a vertical combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act, and that Novell conspired with WordPerfect to monopolize the relevant software market in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. (Lantec, supra, 306 F.3d at pp. 1022-1023.) Following presentation of the claims to a jury, the trial court granted judgment for the
Asahi also directs our attention to Omnicare, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Group, Inc. (N.D.Ill. 2007) 524 F.Supp.2d 1031 (Omnicare), a federal trial court decision in the Seventh Circuit denying a motion to dismiss a section 1 Sherman Act claim based on alleged premerger price fixing by two prescription drug providers. This is the only case cited by Asahi that expressly discusses antitrust liability for concerted action between merging companies. The court found that the claim could not be dismissed at the pleading stage because "[i]t is at least plausible that two competitor corporations that are going through a process of merger continue to retain separate economic interests." (Omnicare, at p. 1039.) However, the plaintiff had alleged "that the decision to enter into a merger agreement on certain [anticompetitive] terms was itself an unlawful agreement" (id. at pp. 1037-1038), and the trial judge relied not on any controlling case authority, but rather scholarly argument that combining firms should be continued to be treated as separate actors until a merger is fully consummated (id. at p. 1039, citing to an argument now found in 7 Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application (3d ed. 2010) § 14E, ¶ 1464h, pp. 227-228 (hereafter, Areeda & Hovenkamp)).
Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp, in their multivolume treatise, address this specific point in a single sentence within a far more extensive analysis of "Intraenterprise Conspiracy" (Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra, § 14E, ¶¶ 1462-1478, pp. 199-377)—a doctrine that the U.S. Supreme Court has since characterized as "defunct." (American Needle, supra, 560 U.S. at p. ___ [130 S.Ct. at p. 2210].) Their analysis and comment is, of course, also focused entirely on application of federal law, including sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, and does not purport to address the scope of our Cartwright Act. The argument relied upon by the federal trial court in Omnicare and by Asahi here, begins with an observation that, "Acquisitions are tested under the antitrust laws under a prophylactic standard that reaches most mergers that have any significant anticompetitive potential. Once we presume that a merger is lawful, the additional deterrence afforded by a continuing intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine is unnecessary and unwise. . . . Any increment in anticompetitive potential that resulted from the merger should be challenged in a lawsuit challenging the merger itself. Assuming its legality, the post-merger firm must thereafter be regarded as a single entity. [¶] The flip side of
In NWA, a tour operator sued Northwest Airlines, Inc., and affiliated companies, claiming violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, and the Clayton Act, together with state law breach of contract and fraud claims. The jury found that Northwest Airlines did not conspire with a subsidiary prior to a merger, but found for the plaintiff on its claims that the defendants had monopolized and attempted to monopolize through predatory pricing. (NWA, supra, 991 F.2d at p. 1392.) On a cross-appeal, the plaintiff contended that the trial court had improperly instructed the jury, arguing that the rule announced by the Supreme Court in Copperweld—"that a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary `are incapable of conspiring with each other for purposes of § 1 of the Sherman Act,'—[could not] properly be applied to insulate from Sherman Act liability joint actions by two previously independent competitors taken after they had agreed to merge but before the merger had been consummated."
What the cited federal authorities suggest is that section 1 of the Sherman Act may, at least under some circumstances, reach premerger anticompetitive conduct, dependent upon the economic reality of the acquired and acquiring entities as independent actors. This approach appears to be generally consistent with the requirement of our own cases that an antitrust plaintiff must plead and prove that separate entities maintaining separate and independent interests, combined for the purpose of restraining trade. (See Freeman, supra,
Asahi directs our attention to no California case, however, and we have found none, applying the Cartwright Act to penalize conduct during the merger process that would unquestionably be exempt from antitrust scrutiny upon consummation of the merger. Copperweld teaches that where the entities possess an inherent unity of economic interest and purpose, they are not separate entities capable of conspiring. Even legally distinct entities do not conspire if they "pursue[] the common interests of the whole rather than interests separate from those of the [group] itself . . . . Because [such] coordination . . . does not represent a sudden joining of two independent sources of economic power previously pursuing separate interests, it is not activity that warrants [Sherman Act section 1] scrutiny." (Copperweld, supra, 467 U.S. at pp. 770-771.)
"[S]ubstance, not form, should determine whether a[n] . . . entity is capable of conspiring under § 1." (Copperweld, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 773, fn. 21.) "[T]he question is not whether the defendant is a legally single entity or has a single name; nor is the question whether the parties involved `seem' like one firm or multiple firms in any metaphysical sense. The key is whether the alleged `contract, combination . . ., or conspiracy' is concerted action—that is, whether it joins together separate decisionmakers. The relevant inquiry, therefore, is whether there is a `contract, combination . . . or conspiracy' amongst `separate economic actors pursuing separate economic interests,' . . . such that the agreement `deprives the marketplace of independent centers of decisionmaking,' . . . and therefore of `diversity of entrepreneurial interests,'. . . and thus of actual or potential competition. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [T]he inquiry is one of competitive reality . . . ." (American Needle, supra, 560 U.S. at pp. ___ _ ___ [130 S.Ct. at pp. 2211-2212], citations omitted.)
We have difficulty seeing how application of the Cartwright Act in the context presented here would further the policy of "`unrestrained interaction of competitive forces'" that the antitrust laws seek to advance. (Marin County Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Palsson (1976) 16 Cal.3d 920, 935 [130 Cal.Rptr. 1, 549 P.2d 833].) The "`central evil' addressed by Sherman Act § 1" is "the cartel eliminating competition that would otherwise exist." (Areeda & Hovenkamp,
And the combination resulting from a merger may well have anticompetitive effects, whether intended or incidental. As the Supreme Court observed in Copperweld, "[a]n unreasonable restraint of trade may be effected not only by two independent firms acting in concert; a single firm may restrain trade to precisely the same extent if it alone possesses the combined market power of those same two firms." (Copperweld, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 775.) But in Texaco, our high court expressly concluded that the Legislature "did not intend the Cartwright Act to regulate the bona fide purchase and sale of one firm by another," and that it applied only to those who "continue as separate, independent, competing entities during and after their collusive action." (Texaco, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 1163, italics added.)
A merger is definitionally a combination of formerly separate interests. It is necessarily effectuated by "collusion" of the parties. The separate entities "possess an inherent unity of economic interest and purpose" in consummation of the merger, and the ultimate interests of the subsidiary and the parent are identical thereafter. (NWA, supra, 991 F.2d at p. 1397; see Copperweld, supra, 467 U.S. at pp. 771-773 & fn. 18; Texaco, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 1152-1153 [in a bona fide merger "the entities lose forever their separate identities, and become a new, independent entity"].) Alignment of the business objectives of the acquired company with the new parent is the inevitable result. The "competitive reality" is that independent economic decisionmaking is compromised, even if not eliminated, once companies have formally agreed to merge. That compromise is exemplified by the Acquisition Agreement executed here by Actelion and CoTherix. CoTherix, for example, on signing the Acquisition Agreement, surrendered its freedom of action in the conduct of its business affairs as an independent entity by obligating itself to numerous contractual covenants and conditions, including limitations on its
The coordinated or concerted action between Actelion and CoTherix alleged by Asahi, and the focus of its evidentiary showing, was that the principals of the two entities, in preparation for the proposed acquisition, agreed to give false assurances to Asahi that development of Fasudil would continue, while planning to do otherwise once Actelion controlled CoTherix. But the resulting loss of independent decisionmaking by CoTherix on the development of Fasudil, and the ultimate implementation of business objectives defined entirely by Actelion as the parent, were inherent in the combination between the two companies. It is difficult to see how our antitrust policies are furthered by saying that parties may not, in the process of merging, reach agreement to do that which the combined entity may freely do. The rationale of Texaco—that the Cartwright Act was intended to apply "only to situations in which the parties improperly collude and continue as separate, independent entities, and not to situations in which, by virtue of purchase and sale, or merger, one or more of the entities ceases to exist" (Texaco, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 1167, some italics added)—would seem equally applicable in these circumstances.
But even if we were to conclude (or find a triable factual issue) that Actelion and CoTherix remained capable of conspiring in the period between execution of the Acquisition Agreement and the consummation of the merger, we find that Asahi fails to present a viable claim here.
Asahi's theory of the case can best be summarized as follows: at least one of Actelion's purposes in acquisition of CoTherix was to eliminate Fasudil as a competitive threat to Tracleer; CoTherix was aware of Actelion's purpose; as part of an agreed "strategy" Actelion directed CoTherix and its principals to give false assurances to Asahi that development of Fasudil would continue under the Licensing Agreement; in reliance on those assurances, Asahi did not pursue available remedies which would have allowed it to impede or halt the Actelion/CoTherix merger.
Asahi protests that it was not required to produce evidence of a shared common purpose or motive, but only the existence of a combination resulting in an anticompetitive effect. The anticompetitive effect that Asahi complains of, however, results not from any premerger agreement between the parties, but from ultimate consummation of the merger. Asahi's theory hinges on what it posits as its ability to impede or prevent the merger. Nothing in the Licensing Agreement provides for such a remedy. Citing section 13.10(b) of the Licensing Agreement, Asahi contends that, had it known the true facts, it "would have investigated all legal means to require the continued development of Fasudil" and that it "could have sued for injunctive relief, and thereby delayed or even caused a breakdown of Actelion's planned acquisition." While Asahi had the right to declare a material breach of the Licensing Agreement, and to terminate it, if it failed to receive reasonable assurances of continued development of Fasudil, nothing in the Licensing Agreement purports to give Asahi the right to prevent a "Change of Control," and Asahi fails to suggest how it could have successfully enjoined the merger. Certainly, as Texaco makes clear, it could not have done so under the Cartwright Act.
The judgment is affirmed.
Jones, P.J., and Simons, J., concurred.