PERREN, J.
Lorraine Asher and Cindy Reid Dart appeal a judgment of dismissal entered after an order sustaining the demurrer of respondents J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, California Reconveyance Co., and Bank of America to a first amended complaint seeking to set aside a foreclosure sale and damages. They appeal on the sole ground that the trial court erred in denying their request to amend their first amended complaint to add a claim of promissory estoppel. We affirm.
Appellants purchased a residence in Port Hueneme as tenants in common in September 2005. They made a down payment of $20,400 and borrowed a total of $612,000 from Washington Mutual Bank to finance the purchase. The loans were secured by deeds of trust. Subsequently, Washington Mutual went into receivership and its assets were sold to J.P. Morgan Chase Bank (Chase).
Appellants sought a loan modification. Chase allegedly told them that they could qualify for a loan modification by not making payments for several months. Appellants followed Chase's instructions and were qualified for both a loan modification and a short sale.
On or about March 2, 2009, appellants were sent a notice of default and election to sell under deed of trust. The notice advised appellants that a sale would take place in three months if they did not make past due payments in the amount of $12,754.08. The notice was rescinded, and a new notice of default was sent to appellants on or about April 22, 2009. By the time the second notice was sent, appellants were in arrears in the amount of $15,811.42. Appellants did not make any past due payments, and a notice of trustee's sale was issued or about August 6, 2009, setting a date of sale for September 4, 2009. The sale did not take place on that date because appellants and Chase were in the process of negotiating a short sale of the property for $300,000. Chase failed to follow through on the short sale and instead resumed nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. On April 8, 2010, the property was purchased by a third party at a trustee's sale for $260,000.
Appellants filed a complaint alleging wrongful foreclosure under Civil Code sections 2923.5 and 2923.6
Appellants' sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in not granting leave to amend the first amended complaint to state a claim based on promissory estoppel.
When reviewing dismissal of a complaint after a demurrer has been sustained without leave to amend, we accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true and review the pleading de novo to determine whether the facts as pleaded state a cause of action. (Medina v. Hillshore Partners (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 477, 481.) If we determine that an amendment would cure the defect, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion and reverse. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081.) The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the complaint could have been amended. (Campbell v. Regents of University of California (2005) 35 Cal.4th 311, 320.) "[W]here the nature of the plaintiff's claim is clear, and under substantive law no liability exists, a court should deny leave to amend because no amendment could change the result." (City of Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 445, 459.)
Appellants assert the trial court abused its discretion in denying their request for leave to amend the first amended complaint to state a cause of action for promissory estoppel.
Moreover, as the trial court ruled, appellants cannot establish prejudice. Appellants owed more on the property than the short sale would have brought. Even if a short sale had occurred, appellants would have gained nothing. Therefore, the property's disposal by trustee's sale was not prejudicial to them.
Appellants did not meet their burden of establishing that the complaint could be amended to state a cause of action. According to the declaration of respondents' attorney attached to respondents' brief,
We conclude that there is no reasonable possibility the defects in the first amended complaint could be cured by amendment. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by sustaining defendants' demurrer without leave to amend. (See, e.g., City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 747 [if plaintiff has not had a chance to amend the complaint in response to a demurrer, leave to amend is liberally allowed as a matter of fairness, unless the complaint shows on its face it is incapable of amendment].)
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover costs on appeal.
GILBERT, P.J. and YEGAN, J., concurs.
Civil Code section 2923.6 provides that lenders should endeavor to offer homeowners loan modifications. The statute does not impose a duty on a lender to modify a home loan. (Mabry v. Superior Court, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 222.)