BOREN, P.J.
Appellants Robert and Charles Parker appeal from a judgment entered on January 26, 2011, in favor of respondents Sean Rooks, Robert Berry, Steve Smolinski, Robert LaSota, Martha Medrano, Salvador Medrano, and Carlos Medrano. We affirm the judgment.
The Parkers' appeal suffers from a woefully inadequate record and nearly incomprehensible briefs. Because no coherent statement of facts or references to relevant trial court proceedings have been presented, we cannot confidently discern what occurred. Nevertheless, from our review of the limited record and briefs, we summarize what appear to be the most pertinent facts as follows:
The bar was a horrible failure, losing money from start to finish. Attempting to keep the bar afloat, Robert Parker may have loaned Old Town a significant amount of money. His possible attempts to save the business were unsuccessful. Eventually, however, Old Town was able to sell the business, while continuing to own the real property.
In November 2006, apparently without giving any notice to the limited partners, the Parker Group caused Old Town to sell the property at a significant profit. The same day as the sale, Old Town transferred at least $1.25 million to the Parker Group, and this money was immediately paid out to the Parkers. While some of this money may have been legitimately used to repay loans made by Robert Parker, a significant amount was characterized as payment for fees and commissions purportedly earned by the Parker Group.
Respondents apparently sued the Parker Group for breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and breach of contract and alleged that Robert and Charles Parker were jointly and severally liable as alter egos of the Parker Group. The matter was tried to the court. The first phase of the trial resulted in an interlocutory judgment finding the Parker Group liable for breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and breach of contract. When the second phase concluded, the trial court found Robert and Charles Parker to be alter egos of the Parker Group.
"Rulings on submitted matter" were issued by the court after the completion of each phase. They do not appear in the record.
Now, Robert and Charles Parker attempt to appeal from the judgment. Their main contention appears to be that some, or perhaps all, of the trial court's rulings were not supported by substantial evidence.
We are unable to reverse. Appellants have failed to provide an adequate record on appeal. The clerk's transcript contains a copy of the judgment, but little else that is relevant. The most obvious omission in the record is the trial court's two rulings on submitted matters; doubtless, many other important documents are also missing. "It is well settled, of course, that a party challenging a judgment has the burden of showing reversible error by an adequate record." (Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574.) Appellants have completely failed in this task.
In addition, appellants' briefs contain essentially no citation to the record or legal argument. "We are not bound to develop appellants' arguments for them. [Citation.] The absence of cogent legal argument or citation to authority allows this court to treat the contentions as waived." (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830.) Appellants' status as appearing in propria persona does not allow us to overlook these deficiencies. (First American Title Co. v. Mirzaian (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 956, 958, fn. 1; Bianco v. California Highway Patrol (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1125 ["`a litigant appearing in propria persona . . . is entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration than other litigants and attorneys'"].)
Appellants face a high hurdle arguing that the judgment is not supported by substantial evidence. (See Ortega v. Pajaro Valley Unified School Dist. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1043; Rupf v. Yan (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 411, 429, fn. 5.) Without legal argument or an adequate record to support their appeal, they cannot clear that hurdle.
The judgment is affirmed.
DOI TODD, J. and CHAVEZ, J., concurs.