KEATY, Judge.

Plaintiff appeals from a judgment granting an exception of insufficiency of citation and service of process filed by Defendant, State of Louisiana, through the Department of Transportation and Development (the DOTD). For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 17, 2009, Timothy Hill was ejected from his 2008 Toyota Tundra pick-up truck in a single-car accident on a temporary road near a construction zone on Highway 90 near its intersection with Highway 675 in Iberia Parish. He was severely injured and later died from his injuries. Plaintiff, Norma Marcel, is Hill's mother. She filed a wrongful death and survival action on April 16, 2010, naming as defendants Toyota Motor North American, Inc., Toyota Motor Engineering & Manufacturing North America, Inc., Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc. (collectively referred to as "Toyota"), and the DOTD.1

The DOTD filed a declinatory exception of insufficiency of citation and service of process2 asserting that citation and service had not been effectuated in accordance with La.R.S. 13:5107(A) & (D)3 and La.R.S. 39:1538.4 After a hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement. By judgment dated January 3, 2011, the trial court granted the exception and dismissed Plaintiff's suit against the DOTD without prejudice. Plaintiff now appeals, alleging that the trial court erred in sustaining the exception and dismissing her suit against the DOTD.

DISCUSSION

In the interval between the taking of this appeal and the time when the parties' appellate briefs were due in this court, the Louisiana Supreme Court decided the companion cases of Burnett v. James Construction Group, 10-2608 (La.7/1/11), 66 So.3d 482 and Whitley v. State, Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University Agricultural Mechanical College, 11-40 (La.7/1/11), 66 So.3d 470.

In Whitley, the supreme court held, as a matter of first impression, that a medical malpractice plaintiffs request for service of citation on the university head, for the alleged negligent medical care rendered to her and her unborn child at the university hospital, without also requesting service on the attorney general or the office of risk management satisfied the statutory service requirements of La.R.S. 13:5107 due to "the legislature's use of the permissive word `may.'" Whitley, 66 So.3d at 481. It then observed that:

Id. at 482-83.

Burnett was factually similar to the instant case in that it arose from an automobile accident and the plaintiff therein, like Plaintiff in the instant matter, timely requested and obtained service on the attorney general, but not on the head of the DOTD nor on the office of risk management. The following is an excerpt from Burnett, 66 So.3d at 483:

For the reasons assigned in Whitley, 66 So.3d 470, the supreme court held that "[a] double request for service is not necessary [under La.R.S. 13:5107]" and that "[c]learly, Burnett's request for service on the attorney general alone satisfied the service requirements" of the statute. Id. at 485. Next, the supreme court considered whether Burnett's claims should nonetheless be dismissed for her failure to comply with La.R.S. 39:1538(4). Because that statute does not impose a time constraint on the service required nor does it provide for dismissal for the failure to effectuate such service, the supreme court ruled that Burnett's failure to request service on the DOTD's secretary and the office of risk management within ninety days from the filing of his suit did not give the DOTD the right to have her claims against it dismissed. Thus, the supreme court found that while the appellate court was correct in sustaining the DOTD's exception of insufficiency of service, it erred in not allowing Burnett time to cure the service defects.

Relying on this recent jurisprudence, Plaintiff herein avers that this court should reverse the judgment sustaining the DOTD's exception and dismissing her claims against it. In contrast, the DOTD acknowledges the holdings of Burnett and Whitley but claims that this court should affirm that portion of the judgment sustaining its exception, reverse that portion of the judgment dismissing Plaintiff's claims against it, and remand this matter with instructions that the trial court set a reasonable time within which Plaintiff may cure the defect in service.

We are unable to discern any meaningful distinction between the pertinent facts present in Burnett and in the instant case; therefore, we find its holding dispositive of the issues before us today. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly sustained the DOTD's exception of insufficiency of citation and service of process for Plaintiffs failure to effectuate service of the head of the DOTD and the office of risk management. Nevertheless, because Plaintiff can cure this defective service by requesting and obtaining service on those entities, the trial court erred in dismissing her claims without allowing her time to do so.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm that portion of the judgment sustaining the DOTD's exception of insufficiency of citation and service of process, reverse that portion of the judgment dismissing Plaintiff's claims against the DOTD, and remand for further proceedings with instructions that the trial court set a reasonable time within which Plaintiff may cure the defects in service. All costs of this appeal are to be shared equally amongst the parties.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.