WELCH, J.

Rob R. Dunaway, in his capacity as the executor of the estate of Ira Dunaway, Jr. and the executor of the estate of Wilda Carter Dunaway, appeals a judgment of the trial court declaring the notarial testaments of both Ira and Wilda Dunaway null. Finding no error in the judgment of the trial court, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Ira and Wilda Dunaway were married on April 8, 1950, and had four children during their marriage: Rob Dunaway, Tim Dunaway, Dannie Gaye Dunaway Tassin and Ira Lynn Dunaway Vampran. Ira Lynn Vampran died on November 23, 2009, and was survived by one child, Jessica Vampran.

Ira Dunaway died on June 7, 2010, and less than sixty days later, on August 3, 2010, Wilda Dunaway died. On August 24, 2010, Rob Dunaway filed, in separate proceedings, petitions seeking to probate the notarial testaments of his parents that were dated February 18, 1999, and to be designated as the executor of the estates of his parents in accordance with those testaments. That same date, the trial court ordered that the testaments of Ira and Wilda Dunaway be given the effect of probate and executed in accordance with law, granted the administration of the estate, and confirmed Rob Dunaway as the executor of the succession of both Ira and Wilda Dunaway.

On September 8, 2010, Rob Dunaway filed, in both succession proceedings, a petition for declaratory judgment seeking a determination of the status of certain bank accounts, an interpretation of certain clauses used in the dispositive portion of both February 18, 1999 testaments1, and the consolidation of the two suits.2 Following a hearing, the trial court rendered declaratory judgment that the children of Ira and Wilda Dunaway who survived them (i.e., Dannie Tassin, Rob Dunaway, and Tim Dunaway) would inherit the entirety of the estates of Ira and Wilda in equal shares.3

Thereafter, Jessica Vampran filed a petition to annul the February 18, 1999 testaments of both Ira and Wilda Dunaway on the basis that the testaments were not valid under Louisiana law because the attestation clauses of the testaments failed to satisfy the requirements of La. C.C. art. 1577. She also sought to have earlier testaments of Ira and Wilda Dunaway dated October 19, 1992, and of Wilda Dunaway dated June 14, 1993, declared null on the same basis. On April 15, 2011, the matter was heard before the trial court and taken under advisement. The trial court then issued written reasons for judgment declaring that the testaments of Ira and Wilda Dunaway dated October 19, 1992, and February 18, 1999, and the testament of Wilda Dunaway dated June 14, 1993, were null based on the inadequacy of the attestation clauses. A written judgment in conformity with the trial court's written reasons was signed on May 3, 2011, and it is from this judgment that Rob Dunaway now appeals, contending that the trial court erred in declaring that the wills were invalid and arguing that the attestation clauses met the requirements of La. C.C. art. 1577.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

At the outset, we note that all of the testaments at issue are virtually identical, with the only difference being the dates on which they were executed, the designation of the executor/executrix for the succession, and the correction of a typographical error in Ira Dunaway's name. We also recognize that the testaments at issue purport to be notarial testaments, which are governed by the requirements of La. C.C. art. 1577.

Louisiana Civil Code article 1577 provides:

Thus, in order to be valid as to form, (1) the testator must declare or signify in the presence of a notary and two witnesses that the instrument is his last will and testament; (2) the testator must sign his name at the end of the testament and on each separate page; and (3) the notary and two witnesses must sign a declaration in the presence of each other and the testator attesting that the formalities of La. C.C. art. 1577(1) have been followed. Succession of Siverd, 2008-2383, 2008-2384 (La.App. 1st Cir.9/11/09), 24 So.3d 228, 230. The primary purpose of the statute authorizing this type of will is to afford a simplified means of making a testament whereby the authenticity of the act can be readily ascertained and fraudulent alteration of it will be most difficult. Succession of Richardson, 2005-0552 (La.App. 1st Cir.3/24/06), 934 So.2d 749, 751, writ denied, 2006-0896 (La.6/2/06), 929 So.2d 1265.

Moreover, although the intention of the testator as expressed in the testament must govern, the intent to make a testament, although clearly stated or proved, will be ineffectual unless the execution thereof complies with codal requirements. Succession of Hendricks, 2008-1914 (La.App. 1st Cir.9/23/09), 28 So.3d 1057, 1060, writ not considered, 2010-0480 (La.3/26/10), 29 So.3d 1256. A material deviation from the manner of execution prescribed by the code will be fatal to the validity of the testament. Id. The formalities prescribed for the execution of a testament must be observed or the testament is absolutely null. La. C.C. art. 1573. Although its form is not sacrosanct, there must be an attestation clause, or clause of declaration signed by the witnesses and the notary. Succession of Richardson, 934 So.2d at 751. Where a will is merely notarized, such as a notary's signature under a general "sworn and subscribed" clause, but there is no declaration signed by the notary, such a clause is not in compliance with La. C.C. art. 1577. Succession of Seal, 2010-0351, p. 4 (La.App. 1st Cir.9/10/2010) (unpublished), 46 So.3d 284, writ denied, 2010-2294 (La.1/28/11), 56 So.3d 964.

The dispositive portions of both of the testaments are contained on the first pages and were signed, respectively, by Ira and Wilda Dunaway, and the propriety of these portions of the testaments is not at issue in this appeal. Instead, the trial court, relying on this court's decision in Succession of Seal,4 found that the notary's attestation clause (like the attestation clauses at issue in Succession of Seal) failed to comply with La. C.C. art. 1577, and therefore, the testaments were null. Specifically, the trial court reasoned that the attestation clauses have "the witnesses being sworn and the witnesses (not the notary) making the declaration," the attestation clauses said that "the testator, witnesses and `a [n]otary [p]ublic witnessed the testator signing[,] [b]ut only the witnesses appear and make that declaration, not the notary,'" and the testator never "declare[d] that he[/she] signed and declared that the document [was] his[/her] last will and testament `in the presence of a notary and two competent witnesses.'"

The attestation clauses of the testaments herein follow Ira and Wilda Dunaway's signatures after the dispositive portions of their testaments. The first attestation clause is contained on the first page of the testament, and provides:

Although this clause sets forth that the testament was signed by the testator in the presence of the witnesses and declared to be the testator's last will and testament, this clause fails to state that the testament was signed by the testator in the presence of a notary or that the witnesses themselves signed in the presence of the notary. Therefore, this clause fails to meet the requirements of La. C.C. art. 1577.

The next attestation clause is contained on the second page of the testament, which is entitled "AFFIDAVIT OF EXECUTION AND ATTESTATION," and it provides:

While this clause states that the testator has been "duly sworn" (presumably by a notary) and that the testator is signing and declaring the will to be his own, it does not state that it was actually signed in the presence of a notary and two witnesses, and is therefore, insufficient to meet the requirements of La. C.C. art. 1577.

An additional paragraph follows, which provides:

This clause states that the testator signed the testament in the presence of the witnesses and declared the testament to be his last will and testament to the witnesses. It also states that the witnesses signed the testament in the presence of the notary. However, this clause does not state that the testator signed the will in the presence of the notary, nor does it state that the testator specifically declared the testament to be his last will and testament to the notary or to the notary in the presence of two witnesses. Therefore, this clause fails to meet the requirements of La. C.C. art. 1577.

Furthermore, the "[subscribed, sworn, and acknowledged" clause appears to be simply a general notarization of the will, rather than an attestation clause of the notary because the clause does not clearly state that the testator declared that the testament was his/her last will and testament in the presence of the notary or that the necessary signatures were signed in the presence of all persons, including the notary. As such, this clause is not in compliance with La. C.C. art. 1577.

Louisiana Civil Code article 1577 requires that the notary "shall sign" a declaration that: (1) the testator signed or declared in his presence that the instrument is his testament, (2) that the testator has signed the testament at the end and each other separate page, and (3) in the presence of the testator and each other, the notary has signed his name. See La. C.C. art. 1577(2). The attestation clauses in testaments at issue before us do not contain all of these requirements. Accordingly, we must conclude that the testaments are null, and the trial court's judgment declaring the testaments of Ira and Wilda Dunaway dated October 19, 1992 and February 18, 1999 and the testament of Wilda Dunaway dated June 14, 1993 null is affirmed.

CONCLUSION

For all of the above and foregoing reasons, the May 3, 2011 judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

All costs of this appeal are assessed to the appellant, Rob Dunaway.

AFFIRMED.