GUIDRY, J.
The disabled victim of a motorcycle accident, through her curator, appeals a judgment denying claims for reimbursement of certain expenses from a fund established to pay medically-necessary expenses related to her injury.
While riding as a passenger on a motorcycle on June 13, 2005, Patricia Lathrop-Paulsell was involved in an accident, which caused her to sustain traumatic brain injuries that left her in a minimally-responsive, vegetative state. As a result of the injuries she sustained, a judgment of interdiction was entered against Patricia on February 14, 2006, whereby her mother, Juanita Christine Paulsell, was appointed her curator. Following her appointment as Patricia's curator, Ms. Paulsell filed a petition for damages against various defendants, including the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development ("DOTD"),
Less than two years later, on November 29, 2010, Ms. Paulsell filed a "Petition to Enforce Judgment," contending that the
A hearing on the various exceptions filed by the DOTD and the ORM and the motion filed by Ms. Paulsell was held on October 24, 2011. The trial court rendered judgment sustaining the objections of no cause of action, improper cumulation of actions, and lack of subject matter jurisdiction raised in the exceptions filed by the DOTD and the ORM. The trial court denied Ms. Paulsell's motion to enforce consent judgment and for declaratory relief as moot. It is from this judgment that Ms. Paulsell now appeals, asserting that the trial court erred in sustaining the objections of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, no cause of action, and improper cumulation of actions to dismiss her petition to enforce judgment.
The April 6, 2009 consent decree rendered judgment against the DOTD "in the full sum of one million seven hundred fifty thousand ($1,750,000.00) Dollars, in cash and one million two hundred fifty thousand ($1,250,000.00) Dollars, to be paid as incurred from the Future Medical Care Fund with no legal and/or judicial interest to accrue...." In conjunction with this award, the consent judgment further orders that "the amount paid for future medical expenses ... in the amount of one million two hundred fifty thousand ($1,250,000.00) Dollars, are to be paid as incurred from the Future Medical Care Fund, as authorized by LSA-R.S. 39:1533.2, and that said funds will be paid directly to the medical provider as said expenses are incurred pursuant to LSA-R.S. 13:5106(B)(3)(c)."
The Future Medical Care Fund, as established in La. R.S. 39:1533.2, consists of "such monies transferred or appropriated to the fund for the purposes of funding medical care and related benefits that may be incurred subsequent to judgment rendered against the state or a state agency as provided by R.S. 13:5106 and as more specifically provided in R.S. 13:5106(B)(3)(c)." As for administration of the fund relative to personal injury claims against the state, La. R.S. 13:5106(B)(3)(c) provides:
The consent judgment rendered in this case complies with the provisions of La. R.S. 13:5106(B)(3)(c); therefore, Ms. Paulsell is entitled to payment for all "medical care and related benefits" incurred on behalf of Patricia. Such "medical care and related benefits" are defined under La. R.S. 13:5106(D) to mean "all reasonable medical, surgical, hospitalization, physical rehabilitation, and custodial services, and includes drugs, prosthetic devices, and other similar materials reasonably necessary in the provision of such services." It is Ms. Paulsell's contention that she has submitted several claims for such "medical care and related benefits" for Patricia,
In sustaining the various objections raised by the DOTD and the ORM, the trial court essentially found that Ms. Paulsell's complaints were administrative in nature, and as such, she first had to pursue administrative review prior to seeking judicial relief. Based on the record before us and the governing statutes, we disagree.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the legal power and authority of a court to hear and determine a particular class of actions or proceedings, based on the object of the demand, the amount in dispute, or the value of the right asserted. La. C.C.P. art. 2. Except as otherwise provided by the Louisiana Constitution, a district court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil and criminal matters. La. Const. art. V, § 16. The term "original jurisdiction" designates the adjudicative tribunal in which the initial adjudication is made. When the original jurisdiction allocated to the various courts is circumscribed by the Louisiana Constitution, the Legislature may not alter such jurisdiction by statute. Moore v. Roemer, 567 So.2d 75, 79 (La.1990).
Objections of failure to exhaust administrative remedies are usually premised on one of two grounds: (1) that exclusive original jurisdiction over certain subject matter is granted to an administrative agency
The distinction between primary jurisdiction and the exhaustion rule (exclusive jurisdiction) is that primary jurisdiction applies when concurrent jurisdiction exists between the courts and the administrative agency; and the exhaustion rule applies when exclusive jurisdiction exists in the administrative agency, and the courts have only appellate, as opposed to original, jurisdiction to review the agency's decisions. Daily Advertiser v. Trans-La, a Division of Atmos Energy Corporation, 612 So.2d 7, 27 (La.1993). Stated another way, primary jurisdiction applies when a claim is originally cognizable in a court. The rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies when a claim is cognizable in the first instance only in an administrative agency. In exhaustion cases, judicial proceedings are premature until the administrative process has been completed, while in primary jurisdiction cases the judicial process is suspended pending referral to the administrative agency of issues, which under a regulatory scheme, are within the agency's special competence. Daily Advertiser, 612 So.2d at 27 n.31.
We have not discovered nor has the DOTD or the ORM identified any constitutional provision wherein exclusive original jurisdiction has been granted to an administrative agency over claims involving the Future Medical Care Fund. In the absence of constitutional authority expressly granting exclusive jurisdiction to an administrative agency or other tribunal, the district court cannot be held to lack subject matter jurisdiction over Ms. Paulsell's claims. See La. Const. art. V, § 16.
Still, the Legislature, of course, is free to enact procedures for initial submission of claims to an administrative agency for review, as long as the action of the administrative agency does not constitute the exercise of exclusive, original jurisdiction. See Pope v. State, 99-2559, p. 12 (La.6/29/01), 792 So.2d 713, 720. And in such cases where the regulatory scheme demonstrates that the subject matter has been legislatively determined to be within the special competence and expertise of an administrative agency, then a court should defer to the administrative agency and suspend the judicial process pending the deferral. See Daily Advertiser, 612 So.2d at 27 n. 31; Steeg v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation, 329 So.2d 719, 722 (La. 1976).
In Kelty v. Brumfield, 93-1142 (La.2/25/94), 633 So.2d 1210, 1215 the Louisiana Supreme Court held that "the determination of whether an administrative
Specifically, La. R.S. 40:1299.43 provides in pertinent part:
Further, La. R.S. 40:1299.44(D)(2)(a) and (3) respectively provide:
A review of La. R.S. 39:1533.2 and La. 13:5106 does not reveal a similar regulatory scheme as outlined under the medical malpractice act. Louisiana Revised Statutes
According to La. R.S. 39:1535, the ORM has the following, non-exclusive duties and responsibilities:
As observed by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Hampton v. Greenfield, 618 So.2d 859, 863-64 (La.1993), missing from the statutory scheme outlined in La. R.S. 39:1527-1547 "is clear authority requiring the Office of Risk Management to pay final judgments against the state." As we find there is no established administrative remedy in place that applies to the claim for future medical care benefits asserted by Ms. Paulsell, we conclude that the trial court erred in holding that Ms. Paulsell must pursue unavailable administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial relief. See Cheron v. LCS Corrections Services, Inc., 04-0703, p. 15 (La.1/19/05), 891 So.2d 1250, 1259-60; compare Steeg, 329 So.2d at 722; Louisiana Patient's Compensation Fund Oversight Board, 39,149 at pp. 6-7, 891 So.2d at 89. We therefore reverse that portion of the trial court's judgment sustaining the declinatory exception raising the objection of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Consequently, as we have found that no available administrative remedies exist for Ms. Paulsell to pursue, we
Finally, we must consider the correctness of that portion of the trial court's judgment sustaining the peremptory exception asserting no cause of action as to the DOTD.
A cause of action, when used in the context of the peremptory exception, is defined as the operative facts that give rise to the plaintiff's right to judicially assert the action against the defendant. State, Division of Administration, Office of Facility Planning and Control v. Infinity Surety Agency, L.L.C., 10-2264, p. 8 (La.5/10/11), 63 So.3d 940, 945. The issue at the trial of the exception is whether, on the face of the petition, the plaintiff is legally entitled to the relief sought. The exception is triable solely on the face of the petition and any attached documents. Baton Rouge Computer Sales, Inc. v. Miller-Conrad, 99-1200, p. 5 (La.App. 1st Cir 5/23/00), 767 So.2d 763, 765. The pertinent question is whether, in the light most favorable to plaintiff and with every doubt resolved in plaintiffs behalf, the petition states any valid cause of action for relief. State, Division of Administration, Office of Facility Planning and Control, 10-2264 at p. 9, 63 So.3d at 946.
In the petition to enforce judgment, Ms. Paulsell alleged:
The consent judgment at issue in this matter specifically recites "that there be judgment herein ... against the defendant, [the DOTD]...." While the judgment further recites that the obligation for future medical expenses in the amount of $1,250,000.00 is "to be paid as incurred from the Future Medical Care Fund," we do not construe this language as releasing the DOTD from liability for this award under the judgment. Instead, the language clearly conveys an obligation by the DOTD to see that the terms of the judgment are fulfilled.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we find that the trial court erred in sustaining the objections of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, improper cumulation, and no cause of action to dismiss Ms. Paulsell's petition to enforce judgment. We reverse the judgment and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings. All costs of this appeal, in the amount of $2,297.01, are assessed to the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Transportation and Development and the Division of Administration, Office of Risk Management.