In this action under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.),
On appeal, plaintiffs contend the City's EIR (1) improperly found it was infeasible for the Project to contribute its fair share mitigation for "Year 2030" cumulative traffic impacts along eight intersections of Oroville Dam Boulevard (hereafter Oroville Dam Blvd.), (2) inadequately analyzed the Project's hydrological impacts, (3) inadequately analyzed the Project's greenhouse gas emissions, and (4) violated CEQA's notice requirements. We find merit in plaintiffs' third contention (in pt. III.A. of this opinion), agree on a
The Project is a Wal-Mart Supercenter to replace an existing Wal-Mart store in the City. The Project comprises a nearly 200,000-square-foot building and garden center (about twice the size of the existing Wal-Mart store) and will provide 24-hour retail and grocery services to the City and surrounding areas.
In January 2010, prior to the City's release of the draft environmental impact report (DEIR), the City adopted resolution No. 7471. This resolution interpreted the City's general plan to allow roadway segments, rather than intersections, to determine the acceptable level of service for traffic along Oroville Dam Blvd.
Plaintiffs earlier filed an action for writ of mandate challenging resolution No. 7471. In response, the City repealed the resolution, and this necessitated a revision of the DEIR's traffic section, which was undertaken in a partially recirculated draft environmental impact report (PRDEIR).
In October 2010, the City released the final EIR, which included responses to public and agency comment.
On November 10, 2010, the City's planning commission held a public hearing and approved the EIR and the Project.
Plaintiffs appealed the planning commission's decision resulting in a de novo public hearing before the City's city council. This hearing took place on December 2, 2010, and was extended to December 14. On December 14, 2010, the city council approved the Project by denying plaintiffs' appeal, certifying the EIR, approving a mitigation program, and adopting findings of fact and a statement of overriding considerations (for significant impacts that could not be mitigated or mitigated fully).
We will set forth specific facts pertinent to the issues on appeal when we discuss those issues.
"In reviewing ... CEQA issues on appeal, we determine, independently from the trial court, whether [the] City prejudicially abused its discretion either
The substantial evidence standard — i.e., enough relevant information and reasonable inferences to support a fair argument-based conclusion, even if other conclusions might also be reached — is applied in reviewing factually based findings, conclusions and determinations. (Anderson, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 1178; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15384, subd. (a) [CEQA's regulatory guidelines; hereafter CEQA Guidelines].)
In reviewing the adequacy of an EIR's environmental analyses, a reviewing court does not pass upon the correctness of the EIR's environmental conclusions, but only upon its sufficiency in providing informed decisionmaking and informed public participation, thereby meeting the statutory goals of the EIR process. (Anderson, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 1178.)
Plaintiffs raise four contentions on this subject.
Plaintiffs have two concerns here.
The first concern is with "Mitigation Measure HYD-4" (MM HYD-4), which specifies that, prior to issuance of grading permits for the Project, Wal-Mart shall retain a qualified civil engineer to prepare and submit a drainage plan for City's approval that identifies onsite drainage facilities to ensure that runoff from the Project site is released at a rate no greater than that of the "pre-development condition."
Plaintiffs claim the EIR fails to analyze existing water percolation rates through the highly permeable mining tailings on the Project site and, without that information, it cannot be determined whether there is a feasible drainage solution that will ensure the runoff rate is no greater than pre-development conditions, as MM HYD-4 requires.
Plaintiffs' second concern centers on "Mitigation Measure HYD-2a" (MM HYD-2a). That mitigation measure specifies that prior to issuance of building permits for the Project, Wal-Mart shall submit a storm water management plan for the City's approval that identifies pollution prevention measures to prevent polluted runoff from leaving the Project site, that accounts for the Project's net increase of nearly 21 acres of impervious surface area, and that ensures that water quality in downstream water bodies is not degraded. MM HYD-2a specifies 11 pollution prevention measures that this plan must include, but is not limited to; in a response to comments on storm water quality, the EIR notes that these prevention measures have been "widely employed and ... demonstrated to be effective means at controlling and preventing pollution from entering downstream waterways."
Plaintiffs claim the EIR fails to include information about the baseline water quality conditions at the Project site and the receiving water body, the nearby Feather River.
As for existing water quality, the EIR states, however, that "[t]here are no water bodies in [the City] area listed on the 2006 [federal] Clean Water Act['s] ... list of impaired water bodies. As such, no [pollution-remedial] Total Maximum Daily Load requirements are in effect for any surface water bodies in the Oroville area." Furthermore, as with percolation rates, existing runoff from the Project site will be part of the study for the MM HYD-4 drainage plan.
We conclude that the EIR's description of the challenged baseline hydrological information is adequate.
Plaintiffs contend that MM HYD-2a (i.e., the storm water management/pollution runoff plan) and MM HYD-4 (i.e., the drainage plan) improperly defer formulation of specific mitigation strategies until after the Project's approval. We disagree.
MM HYD-2a states that prior to the issuance of building permits Wal-Mart must submit for the City's approval a storm water management plan that contains, but is not limited to, 11 specified pollution prevention measures to prevent polluted runoff from leaving the Project's site. These specified measures, the EIR notes, have been "widely employed and ... demonstrated to be effective means at controlling and preventing pollution from entering downstream waterways," and implement "Best Management Practices" in controlling storm water runoff quality.
MM HYD-4 provides that prior to the issuance of grading permits Wal-Mart shall retain a qualified civil engineer to prepare and submit for the City's approval a drainage plan "that will ensure that runoff from the [P]roject site is released at a rate no greater than that of the pre-development condition." This standard seeks to avoid any project-related increase in flooding of adjacent properties during storm events, a standard, as noted, ascertainable from pre-development flood information.
Plaintiffs raise two basic issues relating to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The first one is:
We agree.
The EIR primarily analyzed the environmental impact of the Project's GHG emissions according to a CEQA Guideline that was adopted around the same time the DEIR was completed — CEQA Guidelines section 15064.4, entitled "Determining the Significance of Impacts from Greenhouse Gas Emissions." This Guideline provides in pertinent part:
"(a) The determination of the significance of greenhouse gas emissions calls for a careful judgment by the lead agency consistent with the provisions in [CEQA Guidelines] section 15064 [(§ 15064, subd. (b) requires lead agencies to evaluate potential environmental effects based on scientific and factual data, to the extent possible)]. A lead agency should make a good-faith effort, based to the extent possible on scientific and factual data, to describe, calculate or estimate the amount of greenhouse gas emissions resulting from a project. A lead agency shall have discretion to determine, in the context of a particular project, whether to:
"(1) Use a model or methodology to quantify greenhouse gas emissions resulting from a project, and which model or methodology to use ...; and/or
"(2) Rely on a qualitative analysis or performance based standards.
"(b) A lead agency should consider the following factors, among others, when assessing the significance of impacts from greenhouse gas emissions on the environment:
"(1) The extent to which the project may increase or reduce greenhouse gas emissions as compared to the existing environmental setting;
"(2) Whether the project emissions exceed a threshold of significance that the lead agency determines applies to the project[;]
"(3) The extent to which the project complies with regulations or requirements adopted to implement a statewide, regional, or local plan for the reduction or mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions. Such requirements must
Besides the formal Scoping Plan, the EIR also analyzed the Project's GHG emissions under the following informal/voluntary guides for mitigating GHG emission impacts: the State Air Resources Board's "Early Action Measures" (which focus on cool roofs and pavements, and shade trees); the California Attorney General's Web site list of "CEQA Mitigations for Global Warming Impacts" (which focus on water and energy conservation; recycling promotion; waste reduction; and nonvehicular accessibility); and a 2008 "white paper" from the California Air Pollution Control Officers Association (which focuses on matters similar to the previous two guides).
The EIR found the following.
Nearly all of the Project's GHG emissions will be in the form of carbon dioxide, except for refrigerant use which does not emit that gas (refrigerant use will comprise about 17 percent of the Project's total GHG emissions).
At buildout, the Project's (operational) GHG emissions will constitute nearly 15,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalents per year, which is
The mitigation measures adopted for the Project's GHG emissions comprise solar reflective paving and roofing materials (MM AIR-8a, MM AIR-8d); the turning off of truck engines in the loading docks (MM AIR-8b); refrigerant measures that reduce leaks and increase recycling (MM AIR-8c); energy efficiency measures, principally involving lighting, heating, cooling, and refrigeration (MM AIR-8d); and a landscaping plan, emphasizing shade trees in the parking lot (MM AIR 8-e).
Based on this mitigation, the EIR concluded that, since the Project's contribution to California's GHG emissions is less than significant (literally, miniscule), the Project would not significantly hinder or delay California's ability to meet the GHG reduction targets contained in Assembly Bill 32, and, therefore, the Project's environmental impacts from GHG emissions are less than significant.
The problem is the City improperly applied this proper standard in concluding that the Project's environmental impacts from GHG emissions are less than significant. Citizens, again, exemplifies the model, showing us a proper way to apply the Assembly Bill 32 threshold-of-significance standard.
As Citizens explains, the GHG analysis there "listed the [GHG] emissions for `business as usual' for the existing Target store and the proposed store at 8,280 metric tons per year and 10,337 metric tons per year, respectively. Thus, under `business as usual' the proposed Target store would increase greenhouse gas emissions by 2,057 metric tons. However, through the implementation of energy saving measures, the ... greenhouse gas emissions for the proposed store are reduced to 7,381 metric tons per year, or 2,956
Drawing from Citizens, we conclude the City misapplied the Assembly Bill 32 threshold-of-significance standard in two related ways: (1) by applying a meaningless, relative number to determine insignificant impact and (2) by failing to ascertain the existing Wal-Mart's GHG emissions and the impact on GHG emissions from the Project's mitigation measures.
First, the City noted that the Project, at buildout, would emit operationally about 15,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalents yearly, which is 0.003 percent (i.e., just 3 one-thousandths of 1 percent) of California's 2004 GHG emissions. This relative comparison is meaningless, though, in determining the Project's environmental impact regarding GHG emissions. It conjures a comparison worse than apples to oranges. Of course, one store's GHG emissions will pale in comparison to those of the world's eighth largest economy. The relevant question to be addressed in the EIR is not the relative amount of GHG emitted by the Project when compared with California's GHG emissions, but whether the Project's GHG emissions should be considered significant in light of the threshold-of-significance standard of Assembly Bill 32, which seeks to cut about 30 percent from business-as-usual emission levels projected for 2020, or about 10 percent from 2010 levels. (See Communities for a Better Environment v. California Resources Agency (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 98, 118-120 [126 Cal.Rptr.2d 441] [discussing an analogous issue of how to determine whether a project's relatively small, additional environmental impact is significant in an area already highly impacted].)
Second, the City misapplied the Assembly Bill 32 threshold-of-significance standard by failing to calculate the GHG emissions for the existing Wal-Mart and failing to quantitatively or qualitatively ascertain or estimate the effect of the Project's mitigation measures on GHG emissions (MM AIR-8a through MM AIR-8e). (See CEQA Guidelines, § 15064.4, subd. (a).) Without these determinations, ascertaining whether Assembly Bill 32's target reductions are being met is difficult if not futile. The EIR quantified the GHG emissions for the proposed Project (precisely 14,817 metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalents per year for operational emissions) and the sources comprising those
Wal-Mart, in claiming the EIR properly applied the Assembly Bill 32 threshold-of-significance standard, relies primarily on two factors: (1) the measures set forth in the Assembly Bill 32 Scoping Plan to reduce GHG emissions and (2) a particular traffic study and conclusion.
The Assembly Bill 32 Scoping Plan, as noted, was developed by the State Air Resources Board and outlines measures (transportation-, energy-, and environment-related measures) to achieve the threshold-of-significance standard of Assembly Bill 32, which, according to the EIR, seeks to cut about 30 percent from business-as-usual emission levels projected for 2020 or about 10 percent from 2010 levels. The EIR recognizes, however, that "most of the reduction measures [specified in the Scoping Plan for reducing GHG emissions] are not applicable to the [P]roject." As Wal-Mart explains in its respondent's brief on appeal: "The City considered the provisions of `Scoping Plan Measures' ... to achieve [Assembly Bill] 32 targets. Those that related to transportation were inapplicable to the Project because they had to be implemented at a statewide level." Thus, while the energy- and environment-related measures of the Scoping Plan may apply to the Project, the transportation-related measures do not; and, as we have seen, transportation-related GHG emissions comprise nearly 70 percent of the Project's GHG emissions.
We conclude there is insufficient evidence to support the City's finding that the Project's GHG emissions will have a less than significant environmental impact after mitigation.
We reverse the judgment to the extent it denied plaintiffs' petition for writ of mandate — and we remand this matter to the trial court to grant the petition — as to the following two EIR issues: (1) to ensure Wal-Mart has paid or will pay "all transportation-related fees to [the City] in accordance with the latest adopted fee schedule," as required by MM TRANS-2a of the EIR approved by the City and (2) to ensure the Project's GHG emissions constitute a significant or a less than significant environmental impact in light of a proper application of the threshold-of-significance standard of Assembly Bill 32, which, according to the EIR, seeks to cut about 30 percent from business-as-usual emission levels projected for 2020 or about 10 percent from
Mauro, J., and Murray, J., concurred.