DREW, J.

On November 4, 2008, Wayne Stringfellow, through retained counsel, filed a proper request for a medical review panel, contending that he was the victim of medical malpractice committed by Dr. Lawrence Johnson and Willis-Knighton Medical Center ("WKMC").

On September 14, 2011, almost three years later, the panel rendered its conclusion that the applicable standard of care had not been violated. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff's lawyer terminated his representation of the plaintiff.

On December 21, 2011, Stringfellow filed a pro se medical malpractice suit against these defendants, requesting service on each in the prayer of the petition, asking to proceed as a pauper, and adding service instructions.

On January 3, 2012, he was denied pauper status, without reasons.1

On May 23, 2012, advance court costs were paid.

On June 1, 2012, putative service was made on Dr. Johnson through an employee at his office. Dr. Johnson responded by filing a declinatory exception of insufficiency of service, contending that the service was improper, and even if service was sufficient, it was untimely.

On June 13, 2012, WKMC was served.

On June 25, 2012, attorney Young formally enrolled for plaintiff.

On June 27, 2012, WKMC answered, alleging that it had not been served within 90 days of filing of the petition as required by La. C.C.P. art. 1201(C). WKMC did not seek a dismissal or other relief at that time.

On July 2, 2012, WKMC filed a motion for involuntary dismissal predicated upon plaintiff's failure to make a timely request for service.

On July 26, 2012, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of each defendant, dismissing the suit without prejudice. Plaintiff now appeals.

DISCUSSION

Pauper Status

Apparently pauper status was denied because of the lack of a third party affidavit of indigency. Stringfellow's own affidavit revealed that he owned no movable or immovable property, had $4 in a checking account, received $1,113 per month, and had monthly expenses of $1,380. He clearly would have been able to establish his pauper status, had he provided the missing affidavit.

Plaintiff cites Tenney v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 2003-1260 (La.1/21/04), 863 So.2d 526, where the supreme court held that when a pro se litigant's request to proceed in forma pauperis is denied, the court should:

• provide a reasonable period in which to cure the defect in the pauper application or to pay advance court fees; and

• state the consequences if the litigant failed to respond timely.2

Defendants distinguish Tenney from the present facts, as that case dealt with La. R.S. 13:850 and the facsimile ("fax") filing of a lawsuit. That court held that the requirement to pay filing and transmission fees within five days of the fax filing can be satisfied by filing a request for pauper status within five days, and that if the request was denied, then the trial court should issue an order granting a reasonable delay to pay the fax filing fee. Defendants argue that, in contrast, Stringfellow had 90 days to pay the filing fee, which should have been more than enough time in which to cure any defects.

Plaintiff also cites Roy v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 307 So.2d 758 (La.App. 3d Cir.1975), where the Third Circuit concluded that a motion to proceed in forma pauperis that was missing a third party affidavit3 could be confirmed and/or ratified retroactively by the later filing of the missing affidavit.

Defendants argue that Roy merely held that when a clerk of court issued an order allowing a plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis, even though required affidavits were not attached to the petition, the order was a relative nullity that could be confirmed later by filing the requisite affidavits at the time the court ruled on pauper status. Defendants argue that Stringfellow had not supplied an affidavit by the time the court denied the request for pauper status.4

Stringfellow responds that he should have been informed of:

• the fact of and the reason for the denial;

• the consequences of his not taking timely corrective actions; and

• a reasonable time frame to correct the error or advance costs.5

Fairness militates in favor of liberally construing code provisions authorizing pauper status in favor of affording an indigent litigant his day in court.6 Nothing here shows that Stringfellow abused this privilege.

Service Issues

La. C.C.P. art. 1201(C) requires that service shall be requested on all named defendants within 90 days of commencement of the action. Stringfellow complied with art. 1201(C) by requesting service on both defendants in his prayer and by providing service instructions.7 He argues that even if the Johnson service and return were defective, these mistakes would be imputable to the sheriff, not the plaintiff.

WKMC relies on Ayers v. Goodwill Industries, 2003-1576 (La.App. 4th Cir.3/10/04), 870 So.2d 348, in support of its motion, but that case is distinguishable. Ayers, who was at all times represented by counsel, filed a lawsuit on October 4, 1999, along with an application for in forma pauperis status, which was denied four days later. The petition contained service information, but advanced no costs, so no service was effected until February of 2003, following a service request made only three days earlier. Ayers contended that she was unaware of the denial of pauper status, but her petition was nonetheless dismissed without prejudice. The appellate court affirmed, holding that no good cause existed for the failure to pay costs and request service for a period of over three years after the denial of pauper status, during which lengthy time frame neither Ayers nor her attorney made any effort to inquire as to her pauper status.8

Defendants also urge that we affirm the dismissal based on the holdings in Tranchant v. State, 2008-0978 (La.1/21/09), 5 So.3d 832.9 This reliance is misplaced, in that there are three stark differences between Tranchant and this case:

1. At all times, Tranchant was represented by counsel;

2. Tranchant's attorney initially requested that service be withheld, and

3. The core issue in Tranchant was whether the 90-day time limit could be satisfied by mailing the request, or whether there actually had to be communication with the clerk before the 90-day deadline.

La. C.C.P. art. 1672(C) states that a judgment dismissing an action with prejudice shall be rendered for a defendant for whom service has not been requested within the time period prescribed by art. 1201(C), unless good cause is shown why service was not requested. Stringfellow made a timely request on day one. Stringfellow's attorney paid the advance costs and requested service five months after Stringfellow filed his initial pro se petition. Under these unique facts, we find good cause10 for the delay.11

This is admittedly a troubling area in our jurisprudence, and we see no clearly outlined path to follow.12

OUR REASONING

We must reverse the trial court's dismissal, though we certainly understand that rules are rules and defendants have the right to be promptly advised of adverse lawsuits. These unusual facts require, however, that we must exercise some equity in the furtherance of justice. This plaintiff deserves his day in court.

The trial court should have notified the plaintiff:

• that it had denied the request for pauper status;

• the reasons for the denial;

• the ramifications of ignoring this denial; and advising of

• a time frame during which he could either resubmit his application for pauper status, or post advance costs.

Most importantly, the trial court abused its great discretion, under these peculiar facts, by dismissing the lawsuit.

We reverse the judgment of dismissal, and order that the trial court reconsider the application for pauper status, if a proper application is made.

DECREE

At the cost of defendants, the judgment of dismissal is REVERSED. The trial court is ordered to reconsider an application for pauper status, should a request in proper form be filed.