DETJEN, J.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County entered in favor of defendants and respondents Yurosek Farms, LLC,
Plaintiff and appellant Jason Monroe (Monroe) was driving an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) on real property controlled by the Yurosek entities when he collided with a cable, sustaining multiple injuries. He pled causes of action for negligence, premises liability, and negligent infliction of emotional distress while his wife, plaintiff and appellant Amanda Monroe, pled a cause of action for loss of consortium.
Appellants make four contentions on appeal. First, the Yurosek entities admitted in answers to interrogatories that they lacked any interests in the property where Monroe was injured and should not have been allowed to claim recreational use immunity as an affirmative defense. Second, whether respondents held qualifying interests was a question of fact that should have been determined by the jury. Third, the trial court erroneously excluded relevant evidence. Fourth, the modified special verdict form and the court's clarifying instructions during deliberations improperly suggested to the jury that the willful misconduct exception applied only if respondents subjectively intended to harm Monroe.
We conclude: (1) the Yurosek entities did not admit in answers to interrogatories that they lacked any qualifying property interests; (2) the trial court properly decided as a matter of law that respondents were licensees; (3) the court did not erroneously exclude relevant evidence; and (4) the modified special verdict form and the court's clarifying instructions fairly and clearly stated the standard for the willful misconduct exception. We affirm the judgment.
Jedessa Partners (Jedessa) owned real property in the unincorporated area of Kern County,
In 2008, Jeffrey converted Yurosek Farms into three limited liability companies: Yurosek Farms, LLC, Yurosek Farming, and Y & Y Management.
In or around February 2008, Jeffrey installed pipe gates and cable gates
Jeffrey was aware that the cables were difficult to see and had them marked with flagging tape to improve their visibility and reduce the risk of collision. Because the tape could fade after a few months or be blown off by the wind, he and his workers carried extra tape and replaced any faded or missing strands they came across. In addition, wooden pallets flanked each cable gate and displayed "No Hunting" and "No Trespassing" signs.
Two days before the opening of dove season on September 1, 2008, David and Carranza inspected each cable gate and ensured each cable was marked with flagging tape. On September 1, 2008, at or around 7:00 a.m., they again inspected each cable gate and ensured each cable was still marked. Sometime after 9:00 a.m., Monroe, a manager at Warren Farms, and two coworkers drove ATV's in the vicinity and examined various objects, including pistachio bushes, a boat, horse statues, a steamer trunk, a "burnt-out" car, and the body of a deceased dog. While they were passing through the Tong parcel en route to the reservoir and "Mr. Yurosek's new shop," Monroe collided with an unmarked cable.
In general, a property owner owes a duty of reasonable care to any person coming upon the land. (See § 1714; Ornelas v. Randolph (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1095, 1099 (Ornelas).) Section 846, however, provides the following immunity:
Two elements must be established as a precondition for recreational use immunity. First, the defendant must be the owner of an estate or any other possessory or nonpossessory interest in real property. Second, the plaintiff's injury must result from the entry or use of the premises for any recreational purpose.
Section 846 presents an "`exceptionally broad and singularly unambiguous' definition of protected property `interests.'" (Miller v. Weitzen (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 732, 736 (Miller), quoting Ornelas, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 1102-1103; accord Hubbard v. Brown (1990) 50 Cal.3d 189, 192 (Hubbard).) As originally enacted, section 846 only exempted from liability "`owner[s] of any estate in real property.'" (Hubbard, supra, at p. 194, quoting Stats. 1963, ch. 1759, § 1, p. 3511.) The Third Appellate District then ruled in Darr v. Lone Star Industries, Inc. (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 895 and O'Shea v. Claude C. Wood Co. (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 903 that the statute only immunized holders of possessory interests in real property. (Hubbard, supra, at p. 194.) In 1980, however, the California State Legislature amended section 846 by inserting the phrases "`or any other interest'" and "`whether possessory or nonpossessory'" into the opening sentence, thus "remov[ing] the Darr and O'Shea limitations" and "immuniz[ing] the owner of any interest in real property regardless of whether the interest includes the right of exclusive possession." (Hubbard, supra, at pp. 194, 195, original italics.) For instance, a license, which confers only "`a personal, revocable and unassignable permission to do one or more acts on the land of another without possessing any interest therein'" (Beckett v. City of Paris Dry Goods Co. (1939) 14 Cal.2d 633, 637; accord San Jose Parking, Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1321, 1329), constitutes a qualifying interest under section 846 (see Hubbard, supra, at pp. 194-197). Independent contractors, on the other hand, who "work[] on the property of another in the interest of that other or the party in control of the premises" and "may be entitled to be present on the property during such time as the work is being performed" are merely business invitees and cannot invoke recreational use immunity. (Jenson v. Kenneth I. Mullen Inc. (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 653, 658 (Jenson).)
Section 846 "does not limit the liability which otherwise exists . . . for willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity." Regarding the phrase "willful or malicious," the First Appellate District detailed:
"`Unlike negligence, which implies a failure to use ordinary care, and even gross negligence, which connotes such a lack of care as may be presumed to indicate a passive and indifferent attitude toward results, willful misconduct is not marked by a mere absence of care. Rather, it "`"involves a more positive intent actually to harm another or to do an act with a positive, active and absolute disregard of its consequences."'" [Citations.]'" (Id. at p. 940.)
"`[W]illfulness generally is marked by three characteristics: (1) actual or constructive knowledge of the peril to be apprehended; (2) actual or constructive knowledge that injury is a probable, as opposed to a possible, result of the danger; and (3) conscious failure to act to avoid the peril. [Citations.]'" (Manuel, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 940.) Willful misconduct "`does not invariably entail a subjective intent to injure. It is sufficient that a reasonable person under the same or similar circumstances would be aware of the highly dangerous character of his or her conduct. [Citations.]'" (Ibid.)
Intervenors (ante, at fn. 2) propounded to Yurosek Farms, LLC, the following special interrogatories dated October 13, 2011:
In a response dated November 14, 2011, respondent objected to Special Interrogatory No. 6 on the basis that the phrase "`property interest'" was "vague, ambiguous and overly broad." It objected to Special Interrogatory No. 12 on the grounds that the question was compound and the phrase "`nature of your activities and/or responsibilities'" was "vague, ambiguous and overly broad," but stated "[w]ithout waiving the foregoing objections":
On November 21, 2011, Richard Kern, representing intervenors, sent an e-mail to Kevin Piekut, representing the Yurosek entities. Kern detailed that Special Interrogatory No. 6 was propounded "in response to the affirmative defense raised by each of the [] defendants in which they cite . . . section 846 as a basis for immunity under the recreational use statute" and designed to elicit "whether the defendants have a `property interest' in the real property so as to enjoy the benefits of the immunity. . . ." Regarding the objections to the phrase "`property interest,'" he pointed out that section 846 immunized owners of "`any estate or any other interest in real property, whether possessory or nonpossessory'" and quoted language in Miller, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th 732, holding the definition of "`property interest'" to be "`exceptionally broad and singularly unambiguous'. . . ." Kern warned that "failure to respond with an answer that can be used to discover the defendants['] actual possessory or nonpossessory interest is not appropriate. . . ." On November 22, 2011, Piekut replied, "One of the problems was how the term `property interest' was being used. I see from your email that it is being used in the strict legal sense, in terms of ownership or possessory rights. . . ."
In a supplemental response dated December 5, 2011, Yurosek Farms, LLC, answered regarding Special Interrogatory No. 6, "Assuming that `property interest' means ownership or possessory interest, the answer is no." Regarding Special Interrogatory No. 12, it replied, "This entity is simply engaged in the sales of product which may or may not have come from the property. It also does shelling, but it has nothing what[so]ever to do with the ownership, control or operation of the subject parcel except in the sense that what it sells may (or may not) have come from there."
Appellants propounded to Yurosek Farming the following special interrogatory:
In a response dated November 27, 2011, respondent objected to the interrogatory on the basis that the phrase "`or other ownership interest'" was vague and ambiguous and, "[w]ithout waiving said objection, ... identif[ied] the January 1, 2005, Agricultural Lease between Jedessa Partners and `Yurosek Farms'" as proof of an interest in the Tong parcel. It explained, "Before Yurosek Farming Company LLC officially existed, said lease was entered into under the name `Yurosek Farms.'"
Intervenors propounded to Yurosek Farming the following special interrogatories dated October 13, 2011:
In a response dated November 14, 2011, respondent objected to the interrogatories on the basis that the phrase "`property interest'" was "vague, ambiguous and overly broad." Following receipt of Kern's e-mail (ante, at pp. 10-11), it provided a supplemental response dated December 3, 2011. Regarding Special Interrogatory No. 6, Yurosek Farming answered, "Assuming by `property interest' you mean ownership or possessory interest, the answer is no," Regarding Special Interrogatory No. 11, it stated:
Appellants propounded to Y & Y Management the following special interrogatory dated October 11, 2011:
In a response dated November 22, 2011, respondent objected to the interrogatory on the basis that the phrase "`or other interest'" was vague and ambiguous and, "[w]ithout waiving said objection," specified that it "did not have an ownership interest in the property" and "[i]ts interest was the management of the property."
Intervenors propounded to Y & Y Management the following special interrogatory dated October 13, 2011:
In a response dated November 14, 2011, respondent objected to Special Interrogatory No. 6 on the basis that the phrase "`property interest'" was "vague, ambiguous and overly broad." Following receipt of Kern's e-mail (ante, at pp. 10-11), it stated in a supplemental response dated December 3, 2011, "Assuming that `property interest' means ownership or possessory interest, the answer is no." In an amended response dated March 26, 2012, Y & Y Management explained:
On December 1, 2011, appellants moved for judgment on the pleadings and asked for an order "precluding [the Yurosek entities] from relying on [the recreational immunity defense provided by section 846] as they do not own any estate or any other interest in the real property where this accident occurred." On December 13, 2011, appellants requested, pursuant to Evidence Code sections 452 and 453, "judicial notice of admissions . . . [made by the defendants in] answers to interrogatories," namely those of Yurosek Farms, LLC, to intervenors' Special Interrogatories Nos. 6 and 12, Yurosek Farming to intervenors' Special Interrogatories Nos. 6 and 11, and Y &Y Management to intervenors' Special Interrogatory No. 6.
On July 16, 2012, appellants moved in limine "[f]or an order preventing evidence, testimony and/or argument concerning recreational immunity from (1) any defendant having previously denied ownership of an estate or other interest in the real property where the accident occurred and (2) any defendant failing to prove such ownership." They reiterated that respondents admitted in answers to certain interrogatories (ante, at pp. 9-13) "that they do not own any . . . interest in the land where the accident occurred." On July 30, 2012, the court denied the motion without prejudice:
On August 20, 2012, appellants submitted a trial brief arguing the Yurosek entities' answers to intervenors' Special Interrogatory No. 6 constituted admissions that they lacked any qualifying interests and such admissions were "conclusive and binding" and "preclude[d] any recreational immunity defense as a matter of law." The court remarked:
On August 22, 2012, before jury deliberations, the court "denied . . . the plaintiffs' motion on the preclusive effect of the defendants' answers to the intervenor[s'] three interrogatories" because the answers "were not sufficiently conflicting with the trial testimony or the entire scope of the discovery responses" and the interrogatories "did not refer to the nonpossessory rights."
The parties do not dispute the words offered in response to the aforementioned interrogatories. Appellants maintain, however, that these words must be interpreted as admissions by the Yurosek entities that they lacked any property interests in the Tong parcel, thus precluding recreational use immunity. We review de novo the legal significance of these words (cf. In re Alanna A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 555, 562) and reject appellants' argument.
Appellants believe the facts of this case parallel those of Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 722 and Estate of Luke (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1006. We disagree. In the first case, Universal Underwriters (Universal) issued to Lynch Motors a policy "insuring the persons covered therein against liability incurred through the ownership and use of certain automobiles" and requiring Universal to "defend any actions brought against its insured to establish liability within the terms of the policy." (Universal Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Superior Court, supra, at pp. 724-725.) The driver of a vehicle owned by Lynch Motors was involved in an accident and Pacific Indemnity Group (Pacific), the driver's insurance company, sought indemnity. (Id. at p. 725.) Universal claimed the policy did not extend coverage to the driver because an endorsement to the policy limited its liability. (Ibid.) Pacific propounded to Universal the following interrogatories:
Universal answered "`No'" to Interrogatory No. 4 and "`Yes'" to Interrogatory No. 5. (Id. at pp. 725-726.) Because Universal "did not contend that there was any legal consideration passing from [it] to Lynch Motors for the endorsement[]" and "contend[ed] that no legal consideration was necessary in order to make the endorsement effective," the court found "no issue as to the matter involved remained to be determined at the time of trial, and no further discovery was necessary." (Id. at p. 729.)
In the second case, the decedent died intestate in 1984, six years after his wife. (Estate of Luke, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d at p. 1010.) The wife's heirs wanted to share in the decedent's estate and had to trace his assets to the couple's community property. (Id. at pp. 1012, 1019.) They propounded to the decedent's heirs the following interrogatories:
The decedent's heirs answered "`Not at the present time'" to each interrogatory. (Id. at pp. 1020-1021.) The court determined the decedent's heirs "did not contend [the decedent]'s estate had a source other than the assets owned by [the couple]" and therefore "no issue as to the source of the assets in [the decedent]'s estate remained to be determined at the hearing." (Ibid., original italics.)
Whereas the succinct answers of the responding parties in Universal Underwriters and Estate of Luke set a triable issue at rest, those of respondents in the instant case did not.
Prior to jury deliberations, the trial court decided the issue of whether the Yurosek entities held qualifying property interests:
The court then rejected appellants' requests for two special instructions, titled "Pre-Condition to Affirmative Defense—Recreation Immunity" and "No Recreational Immunity Under Civil Code § 846 For Agents or Business Invitees" (boldface omitted), respectively:
An issue of law must be decided by the trial court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 591; Evid. Code, § 310, subd. (a); see also Lysick v. Walcom (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 136, 158, citing Huebotter v. Follett (1946) 27 Cal.2d 765, 770 ["It [is] error . . . to submit to the jury as a question of fact an issue that on the record was one of law."].) Where the evidence bearing on the issue is undisputed and permits only one reasonable conclusion, the issue is one of law for the court to resolve. (See Curcic v. Nelson Display Co. (1937) 19 Cal.App.2d 46, 53; see also People v. Great American Ins. Co. (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 552, 554-555 [where facts essential to the determination of a legal issue are not in dispute, a trial court's determination as to the issue is a conclusion of law and not binding on an appellate court].)
We conclude the trial court properly found as a matter of law that the Yurosek entities were licensees.
Appellants counter that the Yurosek entities were business invitees akin to the defendants in Jenson, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d 653. We disagree. In Jenson, the landowner hired the defendants to excavate and perform percolation tests on his property in contemplation of development. While the plaintiff was driving a motorcycle on the landowner's property, he crashed into an excavation. (Id. at pp. 655-656.) In determining the defendants did not have an interest that triggered recreational use immunity under section 846, the court emphasized that the agreement between the landowner and the defendants did not confer a privilege on defendants. Instead, "the import of the contract in this regard was simply to give defendants permission to enter and be on [the landowner]'s property solely for the purpose of performing their contractual obligation, i.e., perform percolation tests, which included excavating the subject hole, for the sole benefit of [the landowner]." (Jenson, supra, at p. 657.) By contrast, respondents were not hired to perform manual labor on the Tong parcel for the sole benefit of Jedessa: they utilized and protected the property in furtherance of their own enterprise.
On examination of Jeffrey as an adverse witness,
Piekut objected to the question on the basis of relevance. The trial court sustained the objection. Immediately thereafter, Wegis asked:
Piekut again objected on the basis of relevance. The court sustained the objection.
Wegis proffered an unsigned declaration dated May 2011 that was given to Demetrio Garcia (see ante, at p. 5). The declaration read:
Garcia did not sign the document and wrote the following remarks on March 16, 2012:
Wegis made the following offer of proof:
Piekut objected to the evidence on the basis that it lacked foundation, inter alia. The trial court excluded the unsigned declaration and handwritten remarks:
"We review a trial court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion." (See Shaw, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 281; see also People v. Tafoya (2007) 42 Cal.4th 147, 165 [a trial court's ruling on the sufficiency of foundational evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion].) "Discretion is abused only when in its exercise, the trial court `exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being considered.' [Citation.] There must be a showing of a clear case of abuse and miscarriage of justice in order to warrant a reversal. [Citation.] A trial court will abuse its discretion by action that is arbitrary or `"that transgresses the confines of the applicable principles of law."'" (Shaw, supra, at p. 281.)
First, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sustained respondents' relevancy objections to questions regarding whether Jeffrey or Carranza checked and made sure other cable gates were marked with flagging tape after Monroe's accident. The court could reasonably infer from the appearance of these questions that Wegis sought to elicit testimony that either Jeffrey or Carranza took subsequent remedial measures. Such evidence would have been inadmissible to prove culpable conduct and therefore irrelevant. (See Evid. Code, § 1151; see also Ault v. International Harvester Co. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 113, 118, fn. 3 [the phrase "culpable conduct" in Evid. Code, § 1151 encompasses wanton and reckless misconduct and other faulty conduct besides negligence].) Furthermore, when these objections were raised and sustained, Wegis did not explain the relevance of these questions even though circumstances indicated the court was likely unaware of another material purpose. (See People v. Coleman (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 722, 730-731.)
Second, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sustained respondents' lack-of-foundation objection to Garcia's unsigned declaration and handwritten remarks. "Relevant evidence includes evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness." "Whether or not evidence tendered to affect the credibility of a witness is admissible depends on a preliminary ruling by the trial court that such evidence would be sufficient to sustain a finding that the witness' credibility is, indeed, affected thereby." (Granville v. Parsons (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 298, 304, citing Evid. Code, §§ 210, 403.) Here, Wegis proffered Garcia's unsigned declaration and handwritten remarks for the purpose of impugning the Yurosek entities' credibility, explaining Piekut, their agent, attempted to procure false testimony. The court expressed reasonable reluctance to admit purported evidence of Piekut's misconduct in litigation as evidence relevant to respondents' credibility. Attorneys retained to conduct litigation in the courts are independent contractors and "`not subject to the control and direction of their employer over the details and manner of their performance.'" (Channel Lumber Co. v. Porter Simon (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1229.) In view of the latitude afforded to attorneys over their work, the trial court justifiably required preliminary facts showing the Yurosek entities directly endorsed the alleged misconduct before it would admit the unsigned declaration and handwritten remarks. Absent this showing, it excluded these items.
The trial court prepared CACI No. VF-1001 (Premises Liability—Affirmative Defense—Recreation Immunity). Question No. 7 of this special verdict form originally read, "Did Yurosek Farms, LLC knowingly fail to protect others from the dangerous structure?" Respondents asked the court to modify Question No. 7 by replacing "knowingly" with language that mirrored either section 846 or Special Jury Instruction Nos. 6 and 7 (at p. 27, post). Appellants deemed the revision unnecessary. The court sided with respondents:
Thereafter, Question No. 7 of the modified special verdict form read, "Did any defendant willfully or in conscious disregard of the safety of others fail to protect others from the dangerous condition?"
The court issued CACI No. 1010 (Affirmative Defense—Recreation Immunity (Civ. Code, § 846)):
The court then issued Special Jury Instruction No. 6 (Willful Misconduct):
Last, the court issued Special Jury Instruction No. 7 (Recreational Immunity Exceptions):
The jury asked the court for clarification of the phrases "`willfully or in conscious disregard'" in the special verdict form and "`willfully and deliberately'" in Special Jury Instruction No. 7. Wegis requested "very, very clear guidance" from the court that "`[c]onscious disregard['] . . . does not require an intent to injure[]" and proposed that the parties be given an opportunity to brief the issue. The court determined that "th[e] matter is resolved by the instructions that the jury already has." It subsequently advised the jury:
Appellants claim the trial court's instruction that "willfully" and "deliberately" in Special Jury Instruction No. 7 were identical in meaning compelled the jury to read Question No. 7 of the modified special verdict form as follows: "`Did any defendant deliberately or with a conscious disregard of the safety of others fail to protect others from the dangerous condition?'" This, in turn, led the jury to believe that the willful misconduct exception applied only if the Yurosek entities possessed a subjective intent to harm Monroe. We must address this argument piecemeal.
We review de novo the correctness of the modified special verdict form. (See Saxena v. Goffney (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 316, 325.) To the extent appellants assert the revised Question No. 7 containing the phrase "willfully or in conscious disregard of the safety of others" was improper, we disagree. A special verdict is "that by which the jury finds the facts only, leaving the judgment to the Court." (Code Civ. Proc., § 624.) It must present conclusions of fact in such a manner that "nothing shall remain to the Court but to draw from them conclusions of law." (Ibid.) Question No. 7 of the special verdict form originally asked whether respondents "knowingly" failed to protect others from the dangerous condition. (See ante, at p. 26.) In view of Manuel, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th 927, this iteration did not accurately reflect the standard for the willful misconduct exception. (Cf. Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.1050(b) ["The Judicial Council endorses these instructions for use and makes every effort to ensure that they accurately state existing law. The articulation and interpretation of California law, however, remains within the purview of the Legislature and the courts of review."].) Manuel defined willful misconduct as "`"intentional wrongful conduct, done either with a knowledge that serious injury to [another] probably will result or with a wanton and reckless disregard of the possible results." [Citations.]'" (Manuel, supra, at p. 939, italics added.) In other words, willful misconduct "`"`"involves a more positive intent actually to harm another or to do an act with a positive, active and absolute disregard of its consequences."'"' [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 940, italics added.) The revised Question No. 7, which encompassed the Manuel test, was more accurate.
Next, we review de novo the propriety of the jury instructions. (See Miller, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 736, fn. 3.) "`Instructions must be considered in their entirety, and, if, as so considered, they state the law of the case fairly and clearly, then they are, as a whole, unobjectionable, even though by selecting isolated passages of single instructions they may in some respects be amenable to just criticism.'" (Eagar v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 116, 120; see also Hom v. Clark (1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 622, 643 ["The instructions must be considered together and as a whole, because `[s]emantic analysis of a single line, sentence or instruction without regard to the whole charge can only result in misleading distortion.'"].) We recognize that the term "deliberately," which was mentioned once in Special Jury Instruction No. 7, cannot be found in pertinent statutory or case authority. Nevertheless, we find the instructions, as a whole, fairly and clearly stated the standard for the willful misconduct exception.
Finally, we review the court's clarifying instructions during deliberations for abuse of discretion. (See People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 745-746.) "After the jury ha[s] retired for deliberation, if there be a disagreement between them as to any part of the testimony, or if they desire to be informed of any point of law arising in the cause, they may require the officer to conduct them into Court. Upon their being brought into Court, the information required must be given in the presence of, or after notice to, the parties or counsel." (Code Civ. Proc., § 614; cf. Pen. Code, § 1138.) Here, in response to the jury's request for guidance, the trial court first advised that "willfully" and "deliberately" in Special Jury Instruction No. 7 were synonymous. We consider the harmonizing of these terms to be a sensible attempt to preserve instructional uniformity.
We do not conclude the jury was led to believe that the willful misconduct exception applied only if the Yurosek entities possessed a subjective intent to harm Monroe.
The judgment of the superior court is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to respondents.
CORNELL, Acting P.J., and HOFF, J.
To the extent appellants contend the trial court should have granted its motions to preclude all evidence, testimony, and argument concerning recreational use immunity on the basis that respondents "admitted" that they lacked any property interests in the Tong parcel, we find no abuse of discretion. (See Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229, 281 (Shaw) ["We review a trial court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion."]; Pellegrini v. Weiss (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 515, 530, quoting People ex rel. Lockyer v. Sun Pacific Farming Co. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 619, 640 ["`The trial court's "discretion is only abused where there is a clear showing [it] exceeded the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered."'"].)
