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McDONALD, Acting P. J.

Darwin Sanez appeals his convictions of rape of an unconscious person (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(4)),1 rape by foreign object of an unconscious person (§ 289, subd. (d)), and misdemeanor sexual battery (§ 243.4, subd. (e)(1)).

On appeal, Sanez contends the court deprived him of a fair trial and due process of law by permitting victim X.B. to testify that Edelmira Gomez told her Sanez raped X.B. while she was asleep. Sanez contends the testimony was not relevant to any matter in dispute, was double hearsay not within any hearsay exception, and the error was prejudicial and requires reversal. We affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In December 2011, X.B. attended a party at the home of Lercy Zillman. Around 8:00 a.m., after X.B. consumed approximately eight to 10 alcoholic drinks, Zillman took her to rest on a couch upstairs on the second floor. Zillman left and returned with a blanket to cover X.B. When Zillman returned, X.B. was asleep facing the back of the couch.

After covering X.B., Zillman went into the kitchen on the second floor to make coffee. Sanez was also in the kitchen and began talking to Zillman. Unexpectedly, Sanez pinched Zillman's buttocks, which she interpreted as a sexual advance. When Zillman jumped and moved away from Sanez, he asked, "Don't you like it when I touch you? Why did you jump when I touched you? Don't you like it?"

Zillman looked into the living room to check on X.B. and saw Sanez touching X.B.'s arm by moving his hand from her right shoulder down to her right hand. Wanting Sanez to know she was watching him, Zillman asked him if he was waiting for the bathroom, which he replied he was. Zillman subsequently left the house around 8:30 a.m. and returned at 9:45 a.m. X.B. was sleeping in the same position when Zillman returned.

Around 10:15 a.m., Concepcion Diaz walked upstairs to the second floor to use the restroom. Diaz saw a man wearing a purple shirt and a light-colored cap lift X.B.'s dress, pull down her underwear, and insert his fingers into her vagina. Diaz assumed the man was X.B.'s husband and went into the bathroom. Approximately 10 minutes later, Diaz walked out of the bathroom and saw the man hunched over X.B. having sexual intercourse with her. When Diaz approached the couch, the man attempted to close his pants, but struggled because his penis was erect. The man wiped his hands on a nearby blanket, walked away from the couch, and outside to the balcony. Diaz pulled up X.B.'s underwear, pulled down her dress, and covered her with the blanket. When Diaz shook her fingers at the man and told him, "No more," he went downstairs. Diaz subsequently told her daughter, Maribel Mayers, and X.B.'s friend, Gomez, that she saw a man having sex with X.B., and identified Sanez to Mayers.

Shortly thereafter, Zillman walked upstairs and noticed X.B. lying in a fetal position with her buttocks hanging off the sofa. In addition, she observed X.B.'s dress was hanging off her shoulders and "she had something draped over her waist." Zillman found this strange because "she'[d] been asleep for hours in the same position" and now she was "partially disrobed" and lying in a different position than she had originally been in.

The next day, Gomez informed X.B. that Sanez raped X.B. while she was asleep, and suggested she take precautions. The following day, X.B. went to a health clinic for a sexual assault examination. The examination revealed X.B. had a laceration, known as a mounting injury, near the opening of her vagina—an injury that commonly occurs during nonconsensual sex.

An information charged Sanez with three counts: (1) rape of an unconscious person (§ 261, subd. (a)(4)); (2) rape by foreign object of an unconscious person (§ 289, subd. (d)); and (3) misdemeanor sexual battery (§ 243.4, subd. (e)(1)).

On October 30, 2012, a jury found Sanez guilty on all three counts. His motion for a new trial was denied. The court sentenced Sanez to a total term of six years: the middle term of six years on count 1; the middle term of six years on count 2 to run concurrent to count 1; and six months to run concurrent on count 3. Sanez filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

The trial court has broad discretion to determine the admissibility of evidence. We review the trial court's decisions on the admissibility of evidence under the abuse of discretion standard. (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 196-197 ["[o]n appeal, a trial court's decision to admit or not admit evidence . . . is reviewed only for abuse of discretion"]; People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 264 ["abuse of discretion . . . test is proper when . . . the determination under attack concerns the admissibility of evidence"].) A trial court's ruling will not be overturned "unless [it] exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice." (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1113.)

B. Inadmissible Hearsay

Sanez contends the court abused its discretion in allowing X.B. to testify about Gomez's statement to her that she had been raped by Sanez. He contends the statement was irrelevant for any nonhearsay purpose, and thus was inadmissible.

At trial, X.B. testified she received a telephone call the day after the party from Gomez, stating she wanted to meet X.B. in person and talk to her alone about an incident at the party. X.B. testified Gomez told her Sanez raped her while she was asleep, and she should be cautious. Although defense counsel objected to the testimony on the basis of hearsay, defense counsel did not object on relevancy grounds.2

Out-of-court statements offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted are hearsay and are inadmissible unless they fall within an exception to the bar on hearsay evidence. (Evid. Code, § 1200, subds. (a) & (b).) However, an out-of-court statement need not be excluded as hearsay if it is offered for a purpose other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted. (People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 820-821.) For example, evidence of an out-of-court statement that explains the reaction of the listener may be properly admitted. (People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 189-190, overruled on other grounds in People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 555, fn. 5; People v. Scalzi (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 901, 906-907.) Evidence of a person's then-existing state of mind is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule when that evidence is relevant to prove or disprove a material fact in the case. (Evid. Code, § 1250; People v. Rowland, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 262.)

We reject Sanez's contention that the evidence of Gomez's statement to X.B. was inadmissible hearsay. Here, the testimony was not offered to prove the truth of any facts stated in the message—that Sanez raped X.B. while she was unconscious—but rather to explain how she learned she was raped and her subsequent conduct of going to the health clinic for a sexual assault examination.

Moreover, the testimony was relevant because it went to X.B.'s state of consciousness, a "disputed fact . . . of consequence to the determination of the action" (Evid. Code, § 210), and essential to proving the prosecution's charge that Sanez raped X.B. while she was unconscious. At trial, the parties did not stipulate X.B. was unconscious at the time she was raped. While Zillman testified she saw X.B. lying in the fetal position when she returned from the store—a position different from X.B.'s initial position—defense counsel argued X.B. actually changed her body position herself.3 Whether or not X.B. was unconscious was essential to explain how she learned about the rape and her subsequent behavior in response to that information. (See People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 777 (Ervine) [finding no abuse of discretion in admitting officer's testimony about out-of-court statement because not offered for its truth, but rather to explain officers' actions following receipt of the information].) Further, like the court in Ervine,4 the judge provided limiting instructions to the jury and explained they were to consider the testimony only for the purpose of explaining what behavior X.B. engaged in following receipt of that information.5

X.B.'s testimony was properly admitted for the nonhearsay purpose to explain the effect the hearsay had on X.B. rather than to prove the truth of the matter asserted. In addition, it was relevant to prove the prosecution's charge that X.B. was unconscious during the rape. (See Evid. Code, § 210.) Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting X.B.'s hearsay testimony.

C. Prejudicial Error

Sanez contends the court prejudicially erred when it admitted X.B.'s hearsay testimony. He contends the error was not harmless because the original declarant, the eyewitness Diaz, is not credible and tends to fabricate sexual assault stories.6 In addition, he contends the jury did not consider X.B.'s testimony for the limited purpose to show its effect on the listener, but rather accepted her testimony identifying Sanez as her rapist as true because it confirmed Diaz's testimony about seeing Sanez rape X.B.

Even if the court erred in admitting X.B.'s testimony, we conclude the error was not prejudicial. Given the substantial corroborative evidence to support Sanez's convictions, it is not reasonably probable a more favorable verdict would have resulted had the testimony been excluded. (See People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836-837 [reversal required only if it is reasonably probable the defendant would have obtained a more favorable result had the error not occurred].)

At trial, Diaz provided eyewitness testimony that Sanez raped an unconscious X.B. (See People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181 [noting the uncorroborated testimony "of a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction"], citing People v. Allen (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 616, 623.) Diaz testified she identified Sanez at the party to Mayers as the man who raped X.B. and she identified him again at trial. She testified about what Sanez was wearing when she saw him sexually assault X.B.—a purple shirt and a light-colored cap—corroborated by a photograph taken at the party depicting Sanez wearing a purple shirt and light-colored cap. In addition, Diaz specifically testified she saw Sanez first digitally penetrate X.B. with his fingers before proceeding to rape her while she was unconscious.

Zillman also provided corroborative testimony of Sanez's guilt at trial. She testified Sanez made sexual advances toward her when he pinched her buttocks, caressed her arm and, when she jumped away, asked her, "Don't you like it when I touch you?" Further, she testified to watching Sanez sexually touch X.B. while she slept by running his hand from X.B.'s shoulder down to her hand while moaning in a sexual manner. Like Diaz, Zillman also testified X.B.'s "buttocks were on the edge of the sofa," her dress was off her shoulder, and her legs were exposed.

Lastly, the nurse who examined X.B. at the health clinic testified X.B.'s sexual assault examination revealed a laceration near the opening of her vagina called a "mounting injury," consistent with nonconsensual sexual activity.7 The nurse's testimony provided evidence X.B. was not anticipating sexual activity when she received the injury, which corroborates Diaz's testimony that X.B. was raped while she was unconscious.

Considering the strong direct and circumstantial evidence against Sanez and the court's limiting instruction to the jury to only consider X.B.'s testimony of Gomez's statement to her for a limited purpose, we conclude it is not likely Sanez would have received a better result had the testimony been excluded, and thus any error in admitting X.B.'s hearsay testimony was harmless. (See People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)

However, Sanez contends the court should apply the more stringent test of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, which requires reversal unless we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt the error was harmless, because X.B.'s testimony was unreliable hearsay precluded by the due process clause. (See Chapman, at p. 24.) The out-of-court statement was properly admitted for the limited purpose to explain X.B.'s subsequent behavior and to explain how she learned about the rape. (See People v. Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 189-190.)

In any event, even were we to apply the Chapman standard of prejudice, we would still conclude the court's alleged error in admitting X.B.'s hearsay testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As previously noted, the record provides substantial direct and corroborative evidence to support Sanez's conviction.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

O'ROURKE, J. and IRION, J., concurs.