BIGELOW, P.J.
A Florida car dealer purported to sell or transfer the same Rolls Royce to two unrelated individuals, Donald Price and Charles Swack. After Price took possession of the car it was impounded in California. Price filed an in rem complaint for "turn over, quiet title, [and] declaratory relief." Swack cross-complained for conversion, replevin, and quiet title. Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded Swack was the rightful owner of the car, but the court rejected his claim for damages. On appeal, Swack challenges the trial court ruling denying him loss of use damages in connection with his replevin claim. We find no error and affirm.
In November 2009, Swack purchased a 2000 Rolls Royce Corniche (the Corniche) from Cars Internationale, a Florida dealership, for $120,000.
As it turned out, in November 2009, Cars Internationale was also dealing with Price. In November 2009, Price agreed to sell a 2000 Rolls Royce Silver Seraph through the dealership on consignment. After selling the car, Cars Internationale owed Price $60,000. Price was told the dealership was waiting for the money to pay him. Several weeks passed. While Price was waiting to be paid, one of the dealership principals, Danny Swan, offered to sell Price a 2002 Rolls Royce Silver Seraph. Price agreed to buy the 2002 Silver Seraph and paid Cars Internationale an additional $16,500. However, in December 2009, after Price took possession of the 2002 Silver Seraph, Swan called Price to report there were problems with the title on the car. Swan represented that the DMV needed to inspect the car personally. Price also wanted Cars Internationale to make a few repairs on the car, so he allowed the dealership to take it back. The dealership never returned the 2002 Silver Seraph. Price was told the dealership was unable to secure "clean title" on the car and it would refund his money. However, the dealership did not refund the money. In January 2010, the dealership issued Price a check for over $75,000 and asked him to wait a few days before depositing it. After a few days, Price called the issuing bank and learned the bank would not honor the check.
At trial, Price testified that by February 2010, he was concerned about the situation but thought it might be remedied. Swan suggested Price might be interested in the Corniche. Price agreed to buy the Corniche, even though he preferred to have his money back. Cars Internationale gave Price the title to the Corniche, but Price did not take possession of the car for several months. Price testified he was still hoping to get his money back.
However, the evidence at trial established that in mid-February 2010, Price sent the dealership an e-mail asserting it had engaged in "criminal fraud." According to the e-mail, Cars Internationale sold Price's 2000 Silver Seraph and received money for it; "traded him into" a 2002 Silver Seraph and collected $16,450 from him; took the 2002 Silver Seraph back and never returned it; returned the 2002 Silver Seraph to the original owner without Price's approval; wrote him a bad refund check for $75,840; and when Price demanded a refund, the dealership gave him title to the 2000 Corniche and a bill of sale in the amount of $76,000 "as security for the soon return of my money." The e-mail asserted three weeks had passed and $76,000 had not been deposited in Price's attorney's trust account, as the dealership had promised. Price demanded that the dealership either return his money or immediately deliver the 2000 Corniche to him.
In March 2010, a Cars Internationale mechanic alerted Price that the dealership was attempting to sell the Corniche. Price then took possession of the car. Price turned the Corniche over to another dealer or reseller who gave him $60,000 for the car.
In April 2010, Price filed a complaint against Cars Internationale, Swan, and related individuals. In May 2010, Price filed an in rem complaint for "turn over," quiet title, and declaratory relief. Price sought a judicial declaration that he was the lawful owner of the car. Subsequently, Price sought and received a trial court order releasing the Corniche to Price's counsel. In early June 2010, Swack filed a cross-complaint in the in rem action, alleging causes of action for conversion and quiet title. Swack filed an amended complaint later that month which included a claim for replevin. After Price's failure to post a bond so that the Corniche could remain in his counsel's custody, the car was instead stored at a "neutral party storage facility." The parties filed competing motions for summary adjudication regarding ownership of the Corniche. According to representations made in Swack's motion, "[c]ounsel agreed that they would file cross-motions for summary adjudication to be heard July 29, 2010, and that the side that then prevails will take possession of the car." After the court granted Price's motion for summary adjudication, it declared Price the owner of the Corniche, but upon Swack's motion for an order restraining Price from selling the car until a motion for reconsideration was heard, the court issued an order restraining any sale of the car. In September 2010, the parties agreed Price would store the Corniche. In November 2010, the trial court granted Swack's motion for reconsideration and denied both motions for summary adjudication.
The court conducted a bench trial in late January 2013. Both Price and Swack sought a determination of the ownership of the car. Swack additionally sought $594,000 in loss of use damages, calculated as the reasonable rental value of the Corniche for 33 months.
However, the court rejected Swack's claim of "damages for Replevin based upon his inability to use his car for the last 3 years while this case has been in litigation." The court explained: "Mr. Price did not possess the car when the case was initiated. In fact, the case was originally set to allow Mr. Price to recover the car that had been impounded due to the theft report. From that moment on, the court has been in constructive possession of the vehicle. Although Mr. Price has better access to the car, neither side has been entitled to use or operate the vehicle while it has been in the court's possession." The court entered judgment for Swack and further ordered: "The plaintiff [Price] is ordered to release the vehicle to Mr. Swack as part of the judgment at a mutually convenient time, but no later than March 31, 2013. All previously imposed conditions remain, until Mr. Swack takes possession of the vehicle." Swack timely appealed.
Swack's sole argument on appeal is the trial court erred in refusing to award him loss of use damages in connection with his replevin claim, which he now calculates as $846,000. Swack asserts the trial court ruled in his favor on his replevin claim, but improperly declined to award him commensurate damages to which he was entitled. Price counters that the court did not, in fact, find Swack prevailed on the replevin claim. We conclude the trial court rejected Swack's replevin claim.
Florida law provides a statutory claim for replevin. Under Florida Statute section 78.01, "[a]ny person whose personal property is wrongfully detained by any other person or officer may have a writ of replevin to recover said personal property and any damages sustained by reason of the wrongful taking or detention as herein provided." The Florida Supreme Court has described the cause of action as follows: "The action lies to recover possession of personal chattels that are unlawfully detained, and for damages for the detention. And to sustain replevin the defendant must have actual or constructive possession or control of the property, and the plaintiff must be entitled to the immediate possession thereof when the action is brought." (Evans v. Kloeppel (Fla. 1916) 73 So. 180, 183 (Evans).)
In Senfeld v. Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Co. (Cayman) (Fla.App. 1984) 450 So.2d 1157, the court elaborated, while contrasting replevin with conversion: "It is well settled that a conversion is an unauthorized act which deprives another of his property permanently or for an indefinite time. . . . [T]he essence of conversion is not the possession of the property by the wrongdoer, but rather such possession in conjunction with a present intent on the part of the wrongdoer to deprive the person entitled to possession of the property, which intent may be, but is not always, shown by demand and refusal." (Id. at. pp. 1160-1161, fn. omitted.) "Unlike conversion, the essence of an action for replevin is the `unlawful detention of personal property from plaintiff at the commencement of the action, regardless of whether defendant acquired possession rightfully or wrongfully. . . .' [Citations.] Thus, the cause of action for replevin first arises with the refusal to return the property upon demand." (Id. at p. 1161, fn. 5, italics added; see also Brown v. Reynolds (Fla. App. 2004) 872 So.2d 290, 294 (Brown).)
These authorities set forth two propositions relevant to this case. To establish a replevin claim, "the defendant must have actual or constructive possession or control of the property," (Evans, at p. 183), and there must be "unlawful detention of personal property from plaintiff at the commencement of the action." (Brown, supra, 872 So.2d at p. 294.) Similarly, Florida Jurisprudence Second explains with respect to the proper defendant in a replevin action: "A person who does not have either actual or constructive possession of the goods or chattels sought in replevin is neither a necessary nor a proper party defendant in a replevin action even though he or she claims an interest in the property." (12 Fla.Jur.2d (2014) Conversion and Replevin, § 56.) A Florida treatise likewise explains: "The person who has actual or constructive possession of the property is the proper defending party. If the property has been taken by a sheriff, he is the proper defending party, not the person who caused the sheriff to take possession of it." (Trawick, Fla. Prac. & Proc. (2011-2012 ed.) § 34:1; see also Main v. Miami Money Store, Inc. (Fla.App. 1995) 655 So.2d 148, 149-150 (Miami Money Store) [statute authorizing action for replevin and attorney fees against a secondhand dealer in possession of stolen goods did not apply where city had seized diamond from store and secondhand dealer was neither in actual, physical possession of diamond, nor had constructive possession of diamond]; Brescher v. Associates Financial Services Co., Inc. (Fla.App. 1984) 460 So.2d 464, 465-467 [after default by debtor, secured party may seek replevin from sheriff who has taken possession of the property under valid execution].)
As such, we understand the trial court's conclusion that Swack was not entitled to replevin damages because Price did not have constructive possession of the Corniche to be a rejection of the replevin claim itself.
In addition, "[o]n appeal, a judgment of the trial court is presumed to be correct. [Citation.] Accordingly, if a judgment is correct on any theory, the appellate court will affirm it regardless of the trial court's reasoning. [Citations.] All intendments and presumptions are made to support the judgment on matters as to which the record is silent. [Citation.] We presume the trial court followed applicable law. [Citation.] When no statement of decision is requested and issued, we imply all findings necessary to support the judgment." (Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956.)
With these principles in mind, we must reject Swack's interpretation of the trial court's ruling. Swack insists the trial court "granted replevin," but inexplicably denied loss of use damages based on an incorrect theory that a lack of possession disentitled Swack to such damages, even though Swack prevailed on the essential elements of the claim. We find the far more reasonable interpretation of the order is that the court in fact rejected the replevin claim itself. As explained above, under Florida law, a replevin action cannot be sustained against a defendant who does not have actual or constructive possession of the property to be replevied when the action is commenced. The trial court's analysis focused on Price's lack of actual or constructive possession. The above Florida authorities indicate the defendant's lack of actual or constructive possession of the property to be replevied bars a plaintiff from sustaining a replevin claim against that defendant. Thus, when considered as a whole, it is clear the trial court was in fact rejecting the replevin claim itself, and it did not grant the replevin claim but deny attendant damages. The court's conclusion was consistent with the above authorities, which explain that a replevin action cannot be sustained against a defendant who does not have actual or constructive possession of the property to be replevied when the action is commenced.
We note substantial evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that at the time the action was commenced, Price did not have actual or constructive possession of the Corniche. Price instituted the legal proceedings precisely because he had been deprived of actual and constructive possession of the Corniche when law enforcement in California impounded the car. After the car was impounded, Price did not have actual or constructive possession of the car, including at the time Swack amended his cross-complaint to add a replevin claim. While the Corniche was for a time released to Price's counsel, this was pursuant to court order and court-ordered restrictions.
Swack asserts Price's actions which led to police impounding the Corniche—taking possession of the car and turning it over to a reseller—were all that was needed to render him liable for replevin damages to Swack. This argument is inconsistent with Florida law. As explained above, to sustain a replevin claim against a defendant under Florida law, the defendant must have actual or constructive possession of the property at the commencement of the action. It was not enough that Price asserted an interest in the Corniche, or that Price took possession of the Corniche well before any litigation began. (See Miami Money Store, supra, 655 So.2d at pp. 149-150; Brown, supra, 872 So.2d at p. 294.) As the court explained in Bush v. Belenke (Fla.App. 1980) 381 So.2d 315, 316, "in a replevin action, although possession by the defendant of the subject property is essential, actual manual possession is not necessary. It is sufficient if a defendant has constructive possession, that is has such control over the property that he may deliver the possession of it, if he so desires, as for example, where an agent holds property for his principal." Before any litigation, and before Swack asserted a replevin claim against Price, Price had lost actual and constructive possession of the Corniche. The car was first impounded, then subject to court orders, such that the evidence supported the court's determination that at no period relevant to the litigation was Price free to deliver possession of the Corniche to Swack.
Bringley v. C.I.T. Corp. (Fla. 1935) 160 So. 680, does not suggest a different result. In Bringley, the plaintiff filed a replevin action against two individual defendants to recover possession of a vehicle. The defendants sought to substitute Bringley as a defendant on the ground that they were only bailees of the property and "claimed no title or right of possession to it except through Bringley." (Id. at p. 531.) Although a lower court granted the motion, and later found Bringley was entitled to possession of the vehicle at the time the action was instituted, the Florida Supreme Court concluded it was error to allow the substitution of Bringley. (Id. at p. 538.) The court's conclusion was based on the distinction between rights to possession and title or ownership. The court explained a "plaintiff must have a right to the present possession of the property at the time the action is commenced. A temporary right to possession may prevail against an absolute legal title to the property where that title and the right of immediate possession have become separated. [Citations.] [¶] . . . If the person in possession claims the right to such possession adversely to the asserted claim of a third person it in no wise affects the issue as between the defendant and the plaintiff who must establish his right to the immediate possession of the property. So it is generally held that third persons who claim an interest in the property, but have no possession, are neither necessary nor proper parties defendant. [Citations.] [¶]. . . [¶] . . . [W]hether Bringley was the owner of the property sought to be recaptured or not was not the question presented by the action brought as it related only to the plaintiff's right to the possession of it when the action was brought. By the substitution of Bringley as defendant the issue was sought to be shifted from the question vel non of plaintiff's right to immediate possession when the action was brought to a question of ownership of the chattel which was incidental only." (Id. at pp. 536-538, italics added.)
Thus, although Bringley had an ownership interest in the subject car he did not have possession of it, and therefore was not a proper defendant in the replevin action. While Swack correctly asserts the Bringley court indicated the focus of a replevin claim is on the plaintiff's right to immediate possession, he ignores that the issue to be decided was whether Bringley, as the alleged owner of the car but not its possessor, was a proper party in the replevin action. The Bringley court concluded he was not. Here, Price was in a similar position to Bringley. He asserted an ownership interest in the Corniche, but he could not deliver immediate possession to Swack because the car was no longer under his control. We can find no error in the trial court's rejection of the replevin claim.
Finally, Swack argues the court must have granted his replevin claim because Price was ordered to turn the car over to Swack. We disagree that this order mandates the conclusion that the trial court found Swack's replevin claim meritorious. The court quieted title in the Corniche, as both Swack and Price had requested. (See Ellis v. Dixie Highway Special Road & Bridge Dist. (Fla. 1931) 138 So. 374, 375 [under exceptional circumstances, quiet title may be used for personal property where there is no adequate remedy at law]; see e.g., DGG Development Corp. v. Estate of Capponi (Fla.App. 2008) 983 So.2d 1232, 1234-1235 [analysis of "bona fide purchaser for value" in connection with quiet title claim]; Pacific American Ins. Co. v. Red Door Motors, Inc. (Fla.App. 1986) 497 So.2d 721 [action to quiet title in a vehicle].) Under Florida law, a court may issue a judgment awarding possession of the property as relief in a quiet title action. (Fla. Stat. Ann. § 65.061(1); Price v. Tyler (Fla. 2004) 890 So.2d 246, 252 [by Florida statute, court has jurisdiction to enter judgment quieting title and awarding possession to the party entitled thereto]; see e.g., Top Dollar Pawn Too, Inc. v. King (Fla.App. 2003) 861 So.2d 1264, 1265 [trial court quieted title in car and authorized sheriff to give possession of it to successful plaintiff].) We assume the court's order that Price release the Corniche to Swack as part of the judgment was such an order.
Under the circumstances of this case, we reject Swack's assertion that "[a] party who not only wants to clear title on property, but also get the property back, must resort to replevin rather than merely an action to quiet title." In a case such as this one, where there are two parties claiming exclusive ownership in the same property, they plead and seek to prove competing quiet title claims, but the court is in constructive possession of the property at the commencement—and for the duration—of the litigation, replevin against the other party seeking to quiet title in the property is not available. Swack could not "get the property back" from Price, since Price did not have actual or constructive possession of the Corniche. In a case such as this, an order awarding possession to the party in whom the court quiets title is appropriate.
In light of the requirements of a replevin action, it is apparent the trial court rejected the replevin claim, not simply one form of damages. Substantial evidence supported the court's conclusions rejecting the replevin claim. Swack demands that we construe the trial court's order and judgment so as to find error, when no such construction is warranted. We decline to do so, consistent with the fundamental principal of appellate review that "[a] ruling by a trial court is presumed correct, and ambiguities are resolved in favor of affirmance." (Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 631.) We thus find no error in the trial court's denial of loss of use damages in connection with the replevin claim.
The trial court judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover his costs on appeal.
RUBIN, J. and GRIMES, J., concurs.
