NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

McDONALD, J.

Defendants Kip Carter and Liquid Innovations, LLC appeal a judgment following a bench trial in favor of plaintiff Distinctive Plastics, Inc. (DPI) on its action against them for misappropriation of trade secrets under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (Civ. Code, § 3426 et seq.)1 (UTSA). On appeal, defendants contend: (1) DPI did not prove its trade secret misappropriation cause of action because the trial court found DPI did not prove it suffered any damages; and (2) the evidence is insufficient to support the court's finding that the misappropriation was willful and malicious.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

DPI manufactures plastic products, including plastic spa jets and other parts for swimming pools, spas, and hot tubs. Carter was employed as DPI's business development manager for several years. During his employment with DPI, he applied for a patent for a plastic-molded "plumbing fixture with light pipe illumination." He developed that invention in part during his normal working hours at DPI and used its equipment, supplies, and facilities in developing the invention. Pursuant to his employment agreement with DPI, he was required to assign to DPI the rights to any inventions and intellectual property he created during his employment with DPI. However, he kept his plumbing fixture patent application secret from DPI while he was employed with DPI. During his employment with DPI, he also formed a new business, Liquid Innovations, LLC (LI), to market his new plumbing fixture.

Following the termination of his employment with DPI, Carter retained on his personal computer a copy of DPI's electronic database list of customers, potential customers, and vendors. He used that list in his efforts to establish LI as an ongoing business. However, as of the time of trial, LI remained a shell company with no assets and no income. After the termination of his employment, the United States Patent Office issued a patent to Carter for his plumbing fixture invention.

DPI filed an action against defendants, alleging various causes of action, including a cause of action for misappropriation of trade secrets under the UTSA. DPI sought damages and injunctive relief for the misappropriation of its trade secrets. The trial court conducted a six-day bench trial on DPI's action against defendants. DPI presented evidence attempting to show it had suffered $220,075 in damages from the misappropriation of its trade secrets. In their closing brief, defendants argued DPI had not proved its cause of action for misappropriation of trade secrets because it had not shown it suffered any damages or was entitled to unjust enrichment.

On May 8, 2013, the trial court rendered its decision in the form of a minute order (Order).2 The court found DPI sustained its burden of proving its UTSA misappropriation claim. It found DPI's electronic database list of customers, potential customers, and vendors was a "trade secret" under the UTSA, and Carter misappropriated that trade secret by keeping a copy of at least portions of it on his personal computer and using it in his efforts to establish LI as an ongoing business. It further found the misappropriation by Carter was "willful and malicious." The court found DPI was entitled to injunctive relief for the misappropriation of its trade secret prohibiting Carter from making any further use of that trade secret and requiring him to permanently erase from his and LI's computers all electronic copies of that trade secret. The court also found DPI was damaged by the misappropriation, but disagreed with DPI's assertion that $220,075 was a reasonable amount of damages and awarded DPI nominal damages in the amount of $1.

On June 5, 2013, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of DPI, holding that defendants violated the UTSA by misappropriating its database list of customers, prospective customers, and vendors. The judgment ordered defendants "to refrain from any further use of [DPI's] database/list of customers, prospective customers and vendors," "to permanently erase all electronic copies of [DPI's] database/list of customers, prospective customers and vendors," and "to destroy all hard copies of all or any portion of the database/list." The judgment also awarded DPI compensatory damages in the amount of $1 against LI and $10,031 against Carter.3 The court also held DPI was entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and costs for the misappropriation of its trade secret in an amount to be determined by a subsequent noticed motion. Defendants timely filed a notice of appeal. Defendants did not appeal the award of attorney fees to DPI.

DISCUSSION

I

Misappropriation of Trade Secrets Generally

In 1984, the Legislature adopted the UTSA, creating a statutory cause of action for the misappropriation of a trade secret. (Altavion, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Systems Laboratory, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 26, 41; Brescia v. Angelin (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 133, 143; Cadence Design Systems, Inc. v. Avant! Corp. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 215, 221 (Cadence).) Section 3426.1 of the UTSA sets forth definitions for the terms "misappropriation" and "trade secret."4 (§ 3426.1, subds. (b), (d).) Under the UTSA, "a successful trade secret plaintiff is entitled to the full panoply of remedies, including injunctive relief against further misappropriation (§ 3426.2), damages for actual loss (§ 3426.3), and relief from unjust enrichment (ibid.)." (Cadence, at p. 226, fn. omitted.) Alternatively stated, "[r]emedies under the UTSA for the misappropriation of trade secrets include injunctive relief, damages, royalties, punitive damages, and attorney fees." (Ajaxo Inc. v. E*Trade Group Inc. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 21, 61.) The California Supreme Court has stated:

The UTSA also allows a successful trade secret plaintiff to recover "damages for the actual loss caused by misappropriation," as well as "for the unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation that is not taken into account in computing damages for actual loss." (§ 3426.3, subd. (a).) However, if neither damages nor unjust enrichment are provable, the court may order the misappropriator to pay a reasonable royalty. (§ 3426.3, subd. (b).) Furthermore, if the misappropriation is willful and malicious, the court may award exemplary damages in an amount not exceeding twice any award made for damages, unjust enrichment, or reasonable royalty. (§ 3426.3, subd. (c).) A court may also award a successful trade secret plaintiff reasonable attorney fees if the misappropriation was "willful and malicious." (§ 3426.4.)

II

Trial Court's Finding of Misappropriation

Defendants contend the judgment against them on the UTSA cause of action must be reversed because misappropriation cannot be found without proof of actual harm (i.e., damages) or unjust enrichment. We disagree with the premise of this argument and conclude a plaintiff can prevail on a UTSA misappropriation cause of action without proving actual damages or unjust enrichment.

Under the UTSA, a plaintiff, like DPI, can prevail on a trade secret misappropriation cause of action without proving it suffered any actual damages or is otherwise entitled to monetary relief. As discussed above, the California Supreme Court has stated the UTSA provides a "full panoply of remedies, including injunctive relief against further misappropriation (§ 3426.2), damages for actual loss (§ 3426.3), and relief from unjust enrichment (ibid.)." (Cadence, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 226.) Therefore, a successful trade secret misappropriation plaintiff may obtain remedies that are monetary and/or nonmonetary (i.e., injunctive). A plaintiff that obtains only injunctive relief under the UTSA is considered to have prevailed on its misappropriation cause of action even without seeking and/or being awarded monetary damages. (See, e.g., DVD Copy, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 875 [plaintiff sought and obtained only injunctive relief for misappropriation of trade secret under UTSA].)

Although successful trade secret misappropriation plaintiffs often obtain awards of monetary relief in addition to injunctive relief (see, e.g., Morlife, Inc. v. Perry (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1514, 1519, 1527-1529; Vacco Industries, Inc. v. Van Den Berg (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 34, 45, 53-54), defendants do not cite, and we are unaware of, any case or other authority that concludes a plaintiff cannot prevail on a trade secret misappropriation cause of action under the UTSA unless, as they assert, the plaintiff proves it suffered actual monetary damages or is entitled to an unjust enrichment award. Unilogic, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 612, cited by defendants, is inapposite because it addresses a cross-complainant's failure to prove its claim for unjust enrichment based on the misappropriation of its trade secret and does not make any statements that support defendants' position. (Id. at pp. 625-629.)

Likewise, although defendants cite standard jury instructions (i.e., CACI No. 4401) that set forth the requirements for an award of monetary relief for misappropriation of trade secrets, those instructions apply only in cases in which relief is sought for actual damages or unjust enrichment. Because injunctive relief can be granted only by a trial court in the exercise of its equitable powers, a jury cannot make the determination whether to issue injunctive relief in a UTSA case. Therefore, jury instructions, like CACI No. 4401, do not support defendants' assertion that a plaintiff cannot prevail on a cause of action for trade secret misappropriation unless it proves actual damages or unjust enrichment.

Furthermore, based on our review of the UTSA scheme, there is no statutory language suggesting any legislative intent to disallow claims for misappropriation of trade secrets unless a plaintiff can allege, and prove, actual damages or unjust enrichment. On the contrary, a successful trade secret misappropriation plaintiff may be entitled to one or more of the "full panoply of remedies," including injunctive relief, damages for actual loss, and/or relief from unjust enrichment. (Cadence, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 226.) Therefore, based on the express language of the UTSA's provisions, a plaintiff can prevail on a UTSA cause of action for misappropriation of a trade secret by seeking, and obtaining, only injunctive relief. (Cf. DVD Copy, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 875 [plaintiff sought and obtained only injunctive relief for misappropriation of trade secret under UTSA].)

Because the trial court found defendants misappropriated DPI's trade secret and awarded DPI injunctive relief as a remedy, we conclude DPI clearly succeeded in proving its UTSA cause of action. DPI was not required to prove it suffered actual damages or was entitled to unjust enrichment to prevail on its UTSA cause of action.5 We reject defendants' assertion the trial court erred by finding they misappropriated DPI's trade secret.

III

Substantial Evidence to Support Finding of "Willful and Malicious" Misappropriation

Defendants contend the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's finding that their misappropriation of DPI's trade secret was "willful and malicious," thereby presumably precluding an award to DPI of attorney fees under section 3426.4. However, defendants elected to request only the clerk's transcript as the record on appeal and expressly elected to proceed without a reporter's transcript of the oral proceedings at trial. By so doing, they have, in effect, forfeited any contention on appeal based on the insufficiency of the evidence at trial to support the trial court's findings. (Nielsen v. Gibson (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 318, 324; Oliveira v. Kiesler (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1349, 1362.) We conclusively presume the evidence is sufficient to sustain the trial court's findings. (Ibid.; Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 992; Ehrler v. Ehrler (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 147, 154.) Therefore, we conclude there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that defendants' misappropriation of DPI's trade secret was "willful and malicious" within the meaning of the UTSA, including section 3426.4. Defendants have not carried their burden on appeal to show otherwise.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. DPI is entitled to costs on appeal.

McCONNELL, P. J. and HALLER, J., concurs.