AARON, J.
The trial court entered judgment in favor of respondents Ridgecrest Community, LLC and Baldwin Pacific Group Corporation against Richard Harvey. Although the complaint is not in the record, it appears that Harvey filed this action seeking to recover damages for personal injuries that he claims to have suffered after being struck by a vehicle driven by respondents' agent, Dennis Hanson. The matter was referred to a judicial referee pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 638,
On appeal, Harvey, acting in propria persona, filed a largely incomprehensible brief. Harvey's brief lacks any cognizable legal argument, contains numerous references to evidence presented at the hearing without any explanation as to the relevance of such evidence, and refers to materials not before this court. Accordingly, we conclude that Harvey has failed to demonstrate that the trial court committed any reversible error.
It appears that Harvey filed a complaint against respondents in which he claimed that on May 24, 2007, respondents' agent, Hanson, was driving a vehicle and struck Harvey while Harvey was walking in the street.
Pursuant to section 638 and a provision in a lease entered between Harvey and respondents,
In April 2012, pursuant to section 644, subdivision (a),
Harvey timely appeals.
Harvey claims that the trial court erred in entering judgment in favor of respondents. It is difficult to discern the precise nature of Harvey's claim or claims from his brief. However, certain fundamental rules of appellate practice govern our consideration of Harvey's appeal.
Most fundamentally, "As with any civil appeal, we must presume the judgment is correct, indulge every intendment and presumption in favor of its correctness, and start with the presumption that the record contains evidence sufficient to support the judgment." (Steele v. Youthful Offender Parole Bd. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1251.)
In order to defeat this presumption and obtain a reversal of a judgment, an appellant must comply with several basic rules. Compliance with such rules is necessary in order for this court to meaningfully perform its role as a reviewing court. To the extent that an appellant's brief fails to comply with these fundamental rules, this court is required to employ the presumption of correctness and affirm the judgment.
It is not this court's role to construct theories or arguments that would undermine the judgment and defeat the presumption of correctness. Rather, an appellant is required to present a cognizable legal argument in support of reversal of the judgment. "When an issue is unsupported by pertinent or cognizable legal argument it may be deemed abandoned and discussion by the reviewing court is unnecessary." (Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 691, 699-700.) "Issues do not have a life of their own: if they are not raised or supported by argument or citation to authority, [they are] . . . waived." (Jones v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 92, 99.) Further, an appellant is required to explain the relevance of facts cited in his brief. This court is not "obligate[d] . . . to cull the record for the benefit of the appellant." (Bains v. Moores (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 445, 455.)
An appellant is also required to provide proper citations to the record, by citing to "either the clerk's or reporter's transcript." (Critzer v. Enos (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1258, fn. 12 [noting brief did not comply with Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) in that it failed to contain "proper citations to the appellate record"].) Further, to the extent that an appellant wants this court to review arguments premised on exhibits offered at trial, the appellant must request that the exhibits be transmitted to this court. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.224.)
Harvey's brief fails to comply with these basic rules. As noted, Harvey's brief lacks any cognizable legal argument. For example, Harvey summarizes his legal argument, in part, as follows:
In addition, as the quotation above suggests, Harvey's brief contains numerous references to evidence that is purportedly in the record, without any coherent explanation as to the relevance of such evidence to Harvey's appeal. Harvey's brief is also replete with citations that fail to comply with the California Rules of Court. Further, Harvey's brief includes many references to trial exhibits that Harvey has failed to transmit to this court.
In sum, Harvey has failed to present this court with a brief that provides a legal or factual basis for reversing the trial court's judgment. Harvey "is not exempt from the . . . rules [of appellate procedure] because he is representing himself on appeal in propria persona. Under the law, a party may choose to act as his or her own attorney. [Citations.] `[S]uch a party is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys. [Citation.]'" (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247.)
To the extent that Harvey's brief may be read as contending that there is insufficient evidence in the record to support the judgment, we note that Hanson testified that his vehicle did not make contact with Harvey. In addition, an investigating law enforcement officer testified that he had concluded that Hanson's vehicle had not struck Harvey. While Harvey contends that these witnesses "lied," this court does not make credibility determinations on appeal (see, e.g., In re Marriage of Boswell (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1172, 1175) or reweigh the evidence (see, e.g., Quintanilla v. Dunkelman (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 95, 113). Rather, we "`determine whether, after resolving all conflicts favorably to the prevailing party, and according the prevailing party the benefit of all reasonable inferences, there is substantial evidence to support the judgment.'" (Ibid.) That is because, "When a judgment is attacked as being unsupported, the power of the appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the judgment." (Id. at p. 114.) Thus, even assuming that Harvey's appeal was sufficiently comprehensible to enable us to consider his claims on the merits, Harvey has failed to demonstrate that the record lacks substantial evidence to support the judgment.
Accordingly, we conclude that because Harvey has failed to adequately raise any trial error requiring reversal and has not demonstrated that the record lacks substantial evidence to support the judgment, the judgment must be affirmed.
The judgment is affirmed. Harvey is to bear costs on appeal.
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J. and NARES, J., concurs.