Plaintiffs, Lawrence Galle and Eliza Eugene, appeal the trial court's September 3, 2014 judgment denying their petition to disqualify Samuel Davenport as a candidate for the office of United States Representative of Louisiana's Second Congressional District. For reasons that follow, we affirm.

On August 22, 2014, Samuel Davenport filed a notarized "Notice of Candidacy" for the office of United States Representative of Louisiana's Second Congressional District. On August 29, 2014, plaintiffs filed an "Objection to Candidacy and Petition to Disqualify Candidate" in Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans. In that petition, plaintiff Galle alleged that he is a registered voter and qualified elector in the Parish of Orleans, and plaintiff Eugene alleged that she is a registered voter and qualified elector in the Parish of St. John the Baptist. Both plaintiffs alleged that they are qualified electors in Louisiana's Second Congressional District.

Plaintiffs based their objection to Davenport's candidacy on La. R.S. 18:492(A)(1), which states:

Plaintiffs alleged that Davenport's Notice of Candidacy form was defective and fatally flawed for the following reasons:

Based on these allegedly false statements, plaintiffs maintain that Davenport must be disqualified as a candidate on the November 4, 2014 ballot.

In response to plaintiffs' petition, Davenport raised the declinatory exception of insufficiency of service of process and the peremptory exception of no cause of action. In support of his exception of insufficiency of service of process, Davenport argued he was not served with citation after service was made on the Clerk of Court, and that there was no "diligent effort" to effect personal service on him as required by La. R.S. 18:1408. In support of his exception of no cause of action, Davenport states that plaintiffs' petition does not state a valid cause of action because there is no allegation that he does not meet the requirements to serve in the United States House of Representatives as set forth Article I, 2, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution.

Following the hearing on plaintiffs' objection to candidacy, the trial court rendered judgment denying the petition to disqualify Davenport and denied the requests of both plaintiffs and Davenport for attorneys' fees and costs. In reasons for judgment,1 the trial court stated that plaintiffs failed to prove that they had standing2 to object to Davenport's candidacy, and that their failure to submit any evidence to support this element of their case was fatal to their action. Although plaintiffs alleged in their petition that they were registered voters and qualified electors in the Second Congressional District, their petition was unverified and no stipulation or testimony was offered at the hearing in support of this allegation. Because the trial court found that lack of standing is dispositive of this matter, the court stated that it did not need to reach the remaining issues raised by the parties. Plaintiffs now appeal.

In their sole assignment of error, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in denying plaintiffs' Objection to Candidacy and Petition to Disqualify Candidate based solely on standing and in not addressing the merits of plaintiffs' election challenge. Plaintiffs argue that the ruling of the trial court should be reversed.

In an election contest, the person opposing the candidacy bears the burden of proving the candidate is disqualified. Becker v. Dean, 2003-2493, p. 7 (La.9/18/03), 854 So.2d 864, 869. The laws governing the conduct of elections must be liberally construed so as to promote rather than defeat candidacy. Id. Any doubt as to the qualifications of a candidate should be resolved in favor of allowing the candidate to run for public office. Id.

Plaintiffs argue that the proper procedure to object to standing is a peremptory exception of no right of action, which could have been raised by Davenport or by the trial court on its own motion. Because the issue of standing was not raised by Davenport or the trial court at any time prior to or during the hearing of the matter, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' suit for lack of standing without allowing the plaintiffs to cure any alleged deficiencies on this issue.

In Howard v. Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund, 2007-2224 (La.7/1/08), 986 So.2d 47, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated the following rules regarding an exception of no right of action:

Id., pp. 16-17, 986 So.2d at 59-60; (footnote omitted).

In this case, although the trial court had the right to notice an exception of no right of action on its own motion, the record shows that at no time prior to the final judgment in this matter were plaintiffs made aware that there was any issue as to their standing to bring this action. As a result, plaintiffs had no opportunity to introduce evidence to controvert any objections to their right to bring this action.

A similar situation was presented in the case of Eubanks v. Hoffman, 96-0629 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/11/96), 685 So.2d 597. In Eubanks, the trial court dismissed a plaintiff's claim for no right of action, and plaintiff argued on appeal that he was not given an opportunity in the trial court to present evidence to show his right of action. Agreeing with the plaintiff's argument, this Court stated:

Id., pp. 4-5, 685 So.2d at 599.

Although this Court, in Eubanks, vacated the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim for no right of action, and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing as to plaintiff's right of action, such action is not necessary in the instant case. The trial court's statements regarding plaintiffs' failure to prove standing are part of the reasons for judgment, which are not controlling and do not constitute the judgment of the court. Kaufman v. Adrian's Tree Service, Inc., 2000-2381, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/31/01), 800 So.2d 1102, 1104. Furthermore, even assuming that plaintiffs have standing, we find no error in the trial court's denial of plaintiffs' objection to Davenport's candidacy based on our conclusion that Davenport's exceptions of insufficiency of service of process and no cause of action have merit.

In support of his exception of insufficiency of service of process, Davenport cites La. R.S. 18:1407 and 18:1408. La. R.S. 18:1407 states:

La. R.S. 18:1408(A) states:

As noted by the trial court in reasons for judgment, the record shows that on August 29, 2014, Arthur Morrell, Clerk of Court for Orleans Parish Criminal District Court, was served with this lawsuit in his capacity as Davenport's agent for service of process pursuant to La. R.S. 18:1407. However, there is no evidence or allegation in the record that Davenport was ever served with process, or that any effort was made, diligent or otherwise, to make personal service on him at his domiciliary address listed on his qualifying form, as is required under La. R.S. 18:1408(A). Significantly, plaintiffs have not presented any argument to the contrary, either at the hearing in this matter, in their response to Davenport's post-trial brief or in their appeal brief.

Plaintiffs do not dispute the statement of Davenport's attorney made at the hearing that Davenport first learned of the lawsuit challenging his candidacy on the morning of the hearing when a friend told him about it. Considering that the laws governing the conduct of elections must be liberally construed so as to promote rather than defeat candidacy, Becker v. Dean, supra, we conclude that the failure to attempt to serve Davenport with this lawsuit is sufficient reason alone to affirm the trial court's denial of plaintiffs' objection to Davenport's candidacy. Additionally, we find no error in the trial court's judgment because plaintiffs' petition fails to state a valid cause of action.

The U.S. Const. Art. I, 2, cl. 2 sets forth qualifications for membership to the United States House of Representatives as follows:

See also La. R.S. 18:1275. On the subject of qualifications for membership to the United States House of Representatives, the United States Supreme Court, in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969), further stated:

Id. at 521, 89 S.Ct. at 1963, fn. 41. In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 805, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 1856, 131 L.Ed.2d 881 (1995), the Court stated: "[i]n the absence of any constitutional delegation to the States of power to add qualifications to those enumerated in the Constitution, such a power does not exist."

The States cannot add to this exclusive list of qualifications. Plaintiffs' petition makes no allegation that Davenport does not meet the qualifications set forth in the United States Constitution to be elected and serve as a member of the United States House of Representatives.

We are mindful of this Court's opinion in Williams v. Fahrenholtz, 2008-0961 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/25/08), 990 So.2d 99, but find that it is distinguishable from the instant case. In Fahrenholtz, this Court was equally divided on the correctness of the trial court's ruling disqualifying James Fahrenholtz as a candidate in the Second Congressional District for the United States House of Representatives. Pursuant to La. Const. Art. V, § 8(B) and Parfait v. Transocean Offshore, Inc., 2007-1915, 2007-1998, p. 1 (La.3/14/08), 980 So.2d 634, 635, this Court issued a per curiam decree stating that the judgment of the trial court was affirmed in that the Court could not render a majority decree.

In Fahrenholtz, a petition was filed to disqualify the candidacy of Fahrenholtz based on the allegation that the candidate made a false representation on his Notice of Candidacy in that he stated that he did not owe outstanding fines, fees or penalties to the Campaign Finance Oversight Board, when in fact he did. Fahrenholtz filed an exception of no cause of action asserting that candidates for the United States House of Representatives were exempt from the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act ("CFDA.") Fahrenholtz argued that the qualifications set forth in U.S. Const. Art. I, § 2, cl. 2 are exclusive and that state law cannot add or take away from the stipulated qualifications therein. In finding that the trial court correctly overruled Fahrenholtz's exception of no cause of action, the five judges of this Court voting to affirm the trial court found that the CFDA did not impose substantial qualifications upon the right to hold the office of a member of the United States House of Representatives.

The instant case does not involve alleged violations of the CFDA as in Fahrenholtz, and is therefore distinguishable from that case. The plaintiffs' main argument in this case is that Davenport should be disqualified because he falsely certified that he was domiciled and registered to vote in St. John the Baptist Parish, when he was in fact domiciled and registered to vote in Jefferson Parish. Plaintiffs' arguments regarding Davenport's incorrect listing of the election date are clearly without merit because that statement was obviously a mistake rather than a false certification.

With regard to the qualifications for membership in the United States House of Representatives set forth in the United States Constitution, it is undisputed that Davenport is currently over twenty-five years of age, and has been a United States citizen for more than seven years. Although it is also undisputed that he is currently an inhabitant of the State of Louisiana, that requirement only exists as of the time of election. Because a State cannot impose additional qualifications for becoming a member of the United States House of Representatives, questions on the Notice of Candidacy as to parish of domicile and parish in which a candidate is a qualified elector are irrelevant as to candidates seeking election to that office.

Given the fact that plaintiffs' petition does not include any allegation that Davenport does not meet the qualifications for membership in the United States House of Representatives as set forth in the United States Constitution, we conclude that plaintiffs' petition fails to state a valid cause of action for disqualifying him as a candidate for that office.

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court's judgment denying plaintiffs' petition to disqualify Samuel Davenport as a candidate for the office of United States Representative of Louisiana's Second Congressional District.

AFFIRMED.

McKAY, C.J., concurs in the result.

BAGNERIS, J., concurs in the result.

BELSOME, J., concurs in the result with reasons.

BONIN, J., concurs in the result with additional reasons DYSART, J., concurs, with reasons.

LOVE, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

LOMBARD, J., dissents for reasons assigned by judge LOVE JENKINS, j., dissents and assigns reasons.

BELSOME, J., concurs in the result with reasons.

I concur with the result reached by the majority, but write separately to discuss one issue: may a state impose additional qualifications upon a candidate seeking a federal office other than those qualifications contained in the United States Constitution? The answer is no. Has the State of Louisiana attempted to impose greater qualifications on a candidate seeking to qualify for federal office? Yes. Specifically, the State legislature has enacted La. R.S. 18:463,1 which has manifested itself in an administrative form filled out by candidates when registering to run for office. The statute and correlating form, commonly termed the "Qualifying Form," does promote a legitimate state interest in assisting the Secretary of State and local electors in properly categorizing candidates for the ballot. However, due to numerous amendments, La. R.S. 18:463 has exceeded the scope of an administrative function and evolved into a list of qualifications/disqualifications that would compel the exclusion of otherwise constitutionally qualified candidates. Consequently, the form proposes additional qualifications not established in our Constitution.

The United States Constitution in Article I, Section 2, Clause 2, establishes only three qualifications. The representative must be twenty-five years of age, a United States Citizen for seven years, and an inhabitant of the State when elected. Id. These qualifications are exclusive, and neither a state constitution nor state law can add to or take away from such qualifications. See Strong v. Breaux, 612 So.2d 111, 112 (La.App.1st Cir.1992) (citation omitted). See also, Williams v. Fahrenholtz, 08-961 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/25/08), 990 So.2d 99,106 (Murray, J., dissenting). Additionally, the State legislature has enacted identical qualifications for this office, and has further provided that the enumerated qualifications are exclusive.2 La. R.S. 18:1275(B) and (C).

The plaintiffs' objection to the defendant's candidacy primarily involves whether he failed to comply with the directives set forth in La. R.S. 18:463. In particular, the plaintiffs allege that his Qualifying Form included incorrect and/or false information regarding the date of the election and the plaintiff's address, which are grounds for disqualification under La. R.S. 18:492(A)(1).3 Such clerical errors should not defeat candidacy. As already discussed, these statutes cannot serve to incorporate additional qualifications for candidacy beyond those required under the United States Constitution and La. R.S. 18:1275. Since the defendant meets the constitutional qualifications for office, I find no error in the trial court's judgment denying the plaintiff's petition to disqualify the defendant. For these reasons, I concur in the result.

BONIN, J., concurs in the result with additional reasons.

I concur in affirming the trial court judgment. I write separately, however, to express three aspects of the majority opinion with which I may differ.

First, I agree with the concurring opinion of JUDGE DYSART that neither plaintiff offered any proof whatsoever at the trial that either was a qualified elector as a precondition to maintaining a challenge under La. R.S. 18:491 A and, accordingly, failed to establish an essential element of the cause of action to disqualify Mr. Davenport.

Second, by failing to timely file a declinatory exception of insufficiency of service of process and by appearing and participating in the expedited summary proceedings before the trial court, Mr. Davenport waived the objection of insufficiency of service of process. See La. C.C.P. arts. 925 C, 2593; see also Reed v. St. Charles General Hospital, 08-0430, p. 22 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/6/09); 11 So.3d 1138, 1153.

Third, with respect to the evenly split decision as well as the rationales expressed in Williams v. Fahrenholtz, 08-0961 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/25/08), 990 So.2d 99, I view the so-called "dissenting" opinions of JUDGES MURRAY, TOBIAS, BELSOME, AND LANDRIEU1 as dispositive of the issues presented in this case and find no need to distinguish Fahrenholtz in order to reach the result.

DYSART, J., concurs, with reasons.

I join in the result reached by the majority, but write separately to provide my reason for reaching the same conclusion.

The fundamental prerequisite in a suit to object to the qualifications of a candidate is that the plaintiff(s) must be a qualified elector. Here, as found by the trial court, petitioners did not file a verified petition, nor was there testimony, affidavits or any stipulation offered that they were qualified electors. Absent proof petitioners were qualified to vote in the election, they are not qualified to object to the candidacy of an individual running in that election. See Booth v. Jefferson, 34,446 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/6/00), 765 So.2d 1249.

LOVE, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

I respectfully dissent from the majority's opinion regarding standing and the merits of the plaintiff's objections to the qualification of Mr. Davenport.

The plaintiffs' Objection to Candidacy and Petition to Disqualify Candidate provided the following:

La. R.S. 18:491 does not place a burden upon a plaintiff objecting to candidacy to prove by affidavit or otherwise that he/she is a registered voter qualified to vote in the election wherein the candidate is seeking elected office.

The proper procedural vehicle to object to a plaintiff's standing is through the usage of a peremptory exception of no right of action, which can be urged by the defendant or raised by the court sua sponte. Howard v. Administrators of Tulane Educ. Fund, 07-2224, p. 16 (La.7/1/08), 986 So.2d 47, 59. "A proper analysis of a no right of action exception requires a court to determine whether the plaintiff belongs to the class of persons to whom the law grants the cause of action asserted in the suit." Id., 07-2224, p. 17, 986 So.2d at 60. "If the pleadings state a right of action in the plaintiff, the exceptor may introduce evidence to controvert the pleadings on the trial of the exception, and the plaintiff may introduce evidence to controvert any objections." Id., 07-2224, pp. 16-17, 986 So.2d at 59.

Counsel for Mr. Davenport did not include an exception of no right of action based on the plaintiffs' standing with the exceptions of insufficiency of service of process and no cause of action. The trial court never raised the issue of standing during the hearing on the merits. Accordingly, neither party was afforded an opportunity to introduce evidence to controvert the opposition, as standing did not become a known issue in the present matter until the trial court rendered its judgment. Although a trial court's reasons for judgment are not controlling upon this Court, the reasons are nonetheless procedurally helpful, in that the record demonstrates that the plaintiffs were never permitted to contest the trial court's beliefs as to standing. See Kaufman v. Adrian's Tree Serv., Inc., 00-2381, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/31/01), 800 So.2d 1102, 1104. Thus, pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 9341, I would remand the present matter to the trial court to afford the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their petition and defend against the trial court's assertion that they lack standing. See Eubanks v. Hoffman, 96-0629, p. 2 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/11/96), 685 So.2d 597, 598.

Assuming the plaintiffs have standing, I also dissent from the majority's holding that the trial court did not err in denying the plaintiffs' objection to Mr. Davenport's candidacy. Mr. Davenport's Notice of Candidacy included August 20, 2014, as the primary election date and certified that he was "a duly qualified elector of" St. John the Baptist Parish. Finally, Mr. Davenport certified that "[a]ll the statements contained herein are true and correct."

Unlike the majority, I do not find that Williams v. Fahrenholtz, 08-0961 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/25/08), 990 So.2d 99, 101; writ denied, 08-1680 (La.7/30/08), 986 So.2d 671, is distinguishable. Both Fahrenholtz and the present matter involve the integrity of the information provided by candidates and sworn to, in regards to the truthfulness, on the qualification forms. Five judges of this Court affirmed the trial court in Fahrenholtz, finding that Mr. Fahrenholtz should be disqualified based on the false certifications contained in his "Notice of Candidacy." Fahrenholtz, 08-0961, p. 8, 990 So.2d at 105.

It is undisputed that Mr. Davenport was not a candidate in a primary election on August 20, 2014. It is also undisputed that Mr. Davenport is a registered voter of Jefferson Parish, as opposed to St. John the Baptist Parish. Accordingly, I find that Mr. Davenport should be disqualified from being a candidate in the election of the United States Representative for the Second Congressional District, as sufficient evidence established a prima facie case for disqualification based on a false certification in the "Notice of Candidacy" filed by Mr. Davenport. Therefore, unlike the majority, I find that the petition states a cause of action as to the false certifications as opposed to creating additional qualifications as a candidate.

Furthermore, Mr. Davenport's exception of insufficiency of service of process fails based upon the provisions contained in La. R.S. 18:1407, which states:

La. R.S. 18:1408 provides, in pertinent part, that:

It is undisputed that Arthur Morrell, Clerk of Court for Orleans Parish Criminal District Court, was served with the plaintiffs' Objection to Candidacy and Petition to Disqualify Candidate on August 29, 2014, pursuant to La. R.S. 18:1407. Therefore, Mr. Davenport's exception of insufficiency of service of process lacks merit.

JENKINS, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

I respectfully dissent and find that the trial court should have allowed the plaintiffs to introduce evidence to controvert the court's objection to the plaintiffs' standing. The trial court found that the plaintiffs had not proven their right to bring the action objecting to the candidacy of Mr. Davenport and that the issue of standing was dispositive of the entire matter. As the majority notes, the trial court had the right to notice an exception of no right of action on its own motion. However, prior to the final judgment, these parties were not aware that the plaintiffs' standing was in question. "If the peremptory exception has been pleaded after the trial of the case, the court may rule thereon at any time unless the party against whom it has been pleaded desires and is entitled to present evidence thereon." La. C.C.P. art. 929(B). "On an exception of no right of action (as opposed to an exception of no cause of action), evidence may be admitted to either rebut or support the exception." Eubanks v. Hoffman, 96-0629, pp. 5-6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/11/96), 685 So.2d 597, 600 citing Teacher's Retirement System v. La. State Employees Retirement System, 456 So.2d 594, 597 (La.1984); see also, La. C.C.P. art. 931. If the trial court had raised this exception of no right of action during the hearing on September 2, 2014, or at any time prior to submission of the case for decision, the plaintiffs would have had notice and opportunity to present evidence of standing. In Eubanks, this Court found that the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure provides the procedural opportunity to the plaintiff to controvert an objection to the right of action and that the plaintiff should be allowed the opportunity to present evidence to prove his right of action. 96-0629, p. 7, 685 So.2d at 600. This Court vacated the judgment insofar as it dismissed the plaintiff's claim due to no right of action and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on that exception of no right of action. Id., p. 9, 685 So.2d at 601-02. As in Eubanks, the trial court judgment, in this case, hinged on the finding that the plaintiffs had no standing to sue in this matter and the trial court did not provide plaintiffs the opportunity to rebut the exception of no right of action. Further, as the Court found in Eubanks, I find that the trial court erred by not affording the plaintiffs the opportunity to present evidence to rebut the objection to plaintiffs' standing or right of action. Consequently, I would vacate the trial court's judgment and remand this matter for an evidentiary hearing on the exception of no right of action and for such further proceedings to determine the merits of the remaining issues in this matter.