NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

KUHN, J.

The defendant, Jerry Cleveland, was charged by grand jury indictment with aggravated rape, a violation of La. R.S. 14:42 (count one), and armed robbery with use of a firearm (count two), a violation of La. R.S. arts. 14:64 and 14:64.3A.1 He pled not guilty and, following a jury trial, was found guilty as charged on both counts by unanimous verdicts. He filed motions for new trial and postverdict judgment of acquittal, both of which were denied. The trial court sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole on count one, and to ninety-nine years at hard labor without the benefit of parole on count two. Additionally, the defendant was sentenced to an additional five years imprisonment at hard labor, without the benefit of parole, on count two pursuant to La. R.S. 14:64.3 (the firearm enhancement statute). The sentences were made consecutive. The defendant now appeals, designating two assignments of error. For the following reasons, we affirm his convictions and sentences.

FACTS

On March 3, 2012, the defendant and Devon Richard went to Darrel Thomas' home and stated that they were planning a robbery. They decided to check the "scene" out, so Richard knocked on the door of the victim, J.D.'s,2 trailer where she lived with her boyfriend and three-year-old son in Raceland, Louisiana. J.D.'s boyfriend answered the door, and Richard asked if "Byron" was there.3 The defendant, Richard, and Thomas decided that there were too many people inside the trailer to commit the robbery that night.

On March 6, 2012, the victim was inside her trailer alone with her son. Her boyfriend left to pickup dinner. After the defendant, Richard, and Thomas saw the victim's boyfriend leaving the trailer, the defendant knocked on the victim's door and asked for "Calvin."4 Through a window, the victim told the defendant that Calvin was not there. Shortly thereafter, around 10:45 or 11:00 p.m., the three men burst into the trailer, ran up to the victim, pointed a gun at her, and told her to give them all of her money. The victim told the three men that she did not have any money. They forced her into her bedroom, where they grabbed her purse and dumped its contents onto her bed. They took all of the money inside the purse, totaling $30.00, and proceeded to search through the room. The men continued to scream at the victim to give them money, and she continued to tell them that she did not have any money to give them. As they forced her back toward the front of the trailer, they stopped at her son's room, pointed the gun at the victim and her son, and threatened to shoot if she did not give them money.

Once they reached the front of the trailer, each of the three men forced J.D. to perform oral sex on them and held a gun to her head the entire time. The defendant threatened to kill the victim and her son. The victim indicated that her boyfriend would be home soon and that the men should leave, but the defendant said, "I'll shoot him, too. I'll kill him, too." Each of the men then forced the victim to have vaginal sexual intercourse with them. The gun was pointed at the victim the entire time.

All three men then began taking items from the victim's trailer, including a PlayStation, a tablet computer, a pair of shoes, and her cellular telephone. The men asked for a bag in which to put the items. After bagging the items, Richard and Thomas fled and told the defendant to hurry.

The defendant pointed the gun at the victim and told her to come into the kitchen. The victim begged the defendant to take whatever he wanted, to leave, and not to hurt her. The defendant ordered her to get on her knees and pointed the gun straight to her head. He started laughing and said, "I ain't gonna kill you." The defendant then ran out of the trailer.

Because the three men stole her telephone, the victim had to go to her neighbor's house to call for help. She contacted her boyfriend, and once he arrived, the victim used her boyfriend's telephone to call 911.

The victim went to the hospital where a rape kit was conducted. She then went to the Lafourche Parish Sheriff's Office, spoke with detectives there, and gave a statement. Investigation led to the defendant, whom the victim was able to identify, as he was unmasked throughout the entire incident. Richard and Thomas were also identified as suspects. The stolen PlayStation was located in the home of the defendant's sister. DNA samples were taken from the defendant, Richard, Thomas, the victim, and the victim's boyfriend. Stains on the dress that the victim was wearing on the night of the incident tested positive for seminal fluid, and the defendant could not be excluded as a contributor to the stains on the dress.

EXCESSIVE SENTENCE

In his first assignment of error, the defendant argues that the sentences imposed were constitutionally excessive. Specifically, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in ordering the sentences to run consecutively and imposing a life sentence without the benefit of parole.

A thorough review of the record indicates that the defendant did not make or timely file a motion to reconsider sentence following the trial court's imposition of the sentences. Under La. C.Cr.P. arts. 881.1E and 881.2A(1), the failure to make or file a motion to reconsider sentence shall preclude the defendant from raising an objection to the sentence on appeal, including a claim of excessiveness. See State v. Mims, 619 So.2d 1059 (La. 1993) (per curiam). The defendant, therefore, is procedurally barred from having this assignment of error reviewed because of his failure to file a motion to reconsider sentence after being sentenced. See State v. Duncan, 94-1563 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/15/95), 667 So.2d 1141, 1143 (en banc; per curiam).

This assignment of error is without merit.

MOTION FOR MISTRIAL

In his second assignment of error, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial. Specifically, the defendant argues that a mistrial should have been granted when the prosecutor, during rebuttal closing argument, referred to the defense's ability to "subpoena and call any witnesses." The defendant claims this remark was an impermissible reference to the defendant's failure to testify on his own behalf.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 770 provides that "[u]pon motion of a defendant, a mistrial shall be ordered when a remark or comment, made within the hearing of the jury by the . . . district attorney . . . during the trial or in argument, refers directly or indirectly to . . . [t]he failure of the defendant to testify in his own defense." Article 770(3) prohibits both direct and indirect references to the defendant's failure to testify. When the prosecutor makes a direct reference to the defendant's failure to take the stand, a mistrial should be declared. In the case of such a direct reference, the reviewing court will not attempt to determine the effect that the remark had on the jury. Where the reference to the defendant's failure to testify is not direct, the reviewing court will inquire into the intended effect of the remark upon the jury in order to distinguish indirect references to the defendant's failure to testify (which are impermissible) from general statements that the prosecution's case is unrebutted (which are permissible). State v. Moser, 588 So.2d 1243, 1247 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991), writ denied, 594 So.2d 1314 (La. 1992).

In ascertaining the intention of a prosecutor's reference to the unrebutted nature of the State's case, the jurisprudence does not envision the impossible task of reading what was actually in the prosecutor's mind at the time the reference was made. In cases where the prosecutor simply emphasized that the State's evidence was unrebutted, and there were witnesses other than the defendant who could have testified on behalf of the defense but did not do so, the Louisiana Supreme Court has concluded that the prosecutor's argument does not constitute an indirect reference to the defendant's failure to testify. On the other hand, where the defendant is the only witness who could have rebutted the State's evidence, a reference to the testimony as uncontroverted or unrebutted focuses the jury's attention on the defendant's failure to testify and mandates a mistrial. Moser, 588 So.2d at 1247 (citing State v. Johnson, 541 So.2d 818, 822 (La. 1989)). In order to support the granting of a mistrial, the inference must be plain that the remark was intended to focus the jury's attention on the defendant's failure to testify. State v. Mitchell, 00-1399 (La. 2/21/01), 779 So.2d 698, 701.

In the instant case, during closing argument, defense counsel stated:

Defense counsel then made an issue of the State's failure to call various witnesses, including the victim's boyfriend and the doctor who performed the victim's rape kit, as well as the State's failure to admit the rape kit into evidence.

In its rebuttal closing argument, the State explained that the victim's boyfriend was not called to testify because he was not at the trailer at the time of the incident. The prosecutor went on to explain:

Defense counsel immediately objected to the State's comment and moved for a mistrial. After an in-chambers discussion, the trial court sustained the defendant's objection and admonished the jury to disregard any comment that the State made regarding the defense's decision not to present evidence.

The challenged statement, reviewed in context, indicates that rather than alluding to the defendant's failure to testify, the State was responding to defense counsel's arguments made during his closing statement. The defense, with its closing argument, opened the door for this line of rebuttal by the State. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 774.

A mistrial is a drastic remedy that should be granted only when the defendant suffers such substantial prejudice that he has been deprived of any reasonable expectation of a fair trial. Determination of whether a mistrial should be granted is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the denial of a motion for a mistrial will not be disturbed on appeal absent abuse of that discretion. State v. Berry, 95-1610 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/8/96), 684 So.2d 439, 449, writ denied, 97-0278 (La. 10/10/97), 703 So.2d 603.

Even assuming arguendo that the comments were improper, we do not find that they rose to the level of preventing a fair trial and warranting a mistrial. In response to the defense's objection, the trial court admonished the jury to disregard the comment. Additionally, in its general jury charge, the trial court specifically instructed the jurors that the defendant was not required to call any witnesses, produce any evidence, or testify. The trial court further stated that no presumption of guilt may be raised, and no inference of any kind may be drawn from the fact that the defendant did not testify. Thus, the defendant has not shown that the jury was influenced by the prosecutor's comments or that the comments, contributed to the verdict in any way.

This assignment of error lacks merit.

REVIEW FOR ERROR

In reviewing the record pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 920(2), we have discovered that the trial court did not wait the required twenty-four hours after denial of the defendant's motions for new trial and postverdict judgment of acquittal before imposing sentence. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 873. However, after the denial of the motions, the trial court announced that it was "getting ready to have a sentencing hearing." The State addressed the court, and both defense counsel and the defendant declined the opportunity given to address the court. The trial court then proceeded to sentence the defendant. The defendant did not object to the sentencing. Thus, the defendant implicitly waived the waiting period by failing to enter a contemporaneous objection when the trial court indicated that it would sentence him and by indicating a readiness for sentencing. See State v. Lindsey, 583 So.2d 1200, 1206 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991), writ denied, 590 So.2d 588 (La. 1992); State v. Hilton, 99-1239 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/31/00), 764 So.2d 1027, 1038, writ denied, 2000-0958 (La. 3/9/01), 786 So.2d 113. Moreover, the defendant has not shown any prejudice resulting from the trial court's failure to delay sentencing, nor have we found any indication that he was prejudiced. Therefore, any error that occurred is not reversible. State v. Steward, 95-1693 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/27/96), 681 So.2d 1007, 1019.

CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.