WOODS, Acting P. J.
Annette Borzakian appeals from her conviction for failure to stop at a red traffic light at an intersection equipped with an automated traffic enforcement system (ATES). (Veh. Code, §§ 21453, subd. (a), 21455.5.) In our prior opinion filed on January 23, 2012, we found the trial court had erred in admitting the evidence against Borzakian and reversed her conviction. Shortly thereafter, in a similar appeal of a red light camera violation, Division Three of this district affirmed the motorist's conviction, and our Supreme Court then granted review in both cases (People v. Goldsmith, review granted, May 9, 2012, S201443; People v. Borzakian (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 525, review granted May 9, 2012, S201474), with further action in this matter deferred pending consideration and disposition of the related issue in People v. Goldsmith.
The California Supreme Court has now decided People v. Goldsmith (2014) 59 Cal.4th 258 (Goldsmith) and transferred the matter to this court, with directions to vacate our prior decision and reconsider the cause in light of Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th 258. Upon remand, Borzakian filed a supplemental brief, arguing that Goldsmith does not compel a different result, while the People contend Goldsmith fully disposes of the questions raised in this appeal. In light of Goldsmith, we now affirm.
Annette Borzakian was cited for failing to stop at a red light at the intersection of Beverly Drive and Wilshire Boulevard in the City of Beverly Hills on June 3, 2009, in violation of Vehicle Code section 21453, subdivision (a).
Borzakian's trial on this infraction took place on January 21, 2010, before Commissioner Carol J. Hallowitz. The People's case was presented through the testimony of Officer Mike Butkus of the Beverly Hills Police Department and the automated enforcement evidence, comprised of three digital photographs with data box text, maintenance logs, a certificate of mailing and notice to appear. No prosecutor was present. Borzakian (representing herself) moved to exclude the People's evidence but was unsuccessful; she cross-examined Officer Butkus but did not testify on her own behalf.
Borzakian was found guilty of violating Vehicle Code section 21453, subdivision (a), and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $435 and to attend a 12-hour traffic school.
On January 26, Borzakian filed a notice of appeal, indicating she wished to proceed with a record of the oral proceedings in the trial court in the form of a statement on appeal.
In her proposed statement, Borzakian submitted the following summary of Officer Butkus's initial testimony with respect to all trials scheduled that day (as bullet points): Officer Butkus "testified that he was employed by the Beverly Hills Police Department[; h]e had been so employed for 25 years[; h]e had 5 years experience in photo enforcement[; h]e had undertaken 40 hours of training in photo enforcement[; h]e reviewed the photos [and] videos and determined whether a citation should issue[; h]e testified [to] Vehicle Code section requirements, including each element that was necessary for the People to prove their case[; r]egarding the requirement that the equipment be calibrated and maintained regularly, he stated that the Beverly Hills Police Department contracts with a [c]ompany called Red[]flex Systems[ and t]hat they are in charge of maintaining and servicing the equipment used for photo enforcement[;h]e testified briefly regarding the triggering mechanism which causes the camera to take pictures and video[; and h]e took questions from the audience seated in court." Borzakian also set out her argument of her motion in limine, objecting to the People's exhibit on foundation and hearsay grounds as well as violation of her right of confrontation under Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, supra, 557 U.S. 305 [129 S.Ct. 2527], and included her cross-examination of Officer Butkus in question-and-answer format.
Borzakian said the officer did not testify to qualifications to lay a foundation for the exhibits he wished to enter, citing evidence including the following testimony: A company by the name of Redflex Traffic Systems prepared the job maintenance sheet which contained the description of maintenance and the party responsible for maintaining and calibrating the equipment which caused the photographs and video to be recorded; Officer Butkus was not employed by Redflex nor was he its custodian of records; he did not perform the maintenance or calibration of the machines himself; he was not present when the calibration was performed; he did not inspect the photo enforcement unit in this case; he was not present when the inspection was supposed to have taken place; it was not part of his job duties to inspect or to calibrate the photo enforcement unit; he did not take the photos or video in the case and was not present when they were taken; he had no independent knowledge that the information on the maintenance log was true and accurate; he was only reading what was written; his testimony was based "not on [his] observation but on this sheet of paper."
Borzakian argued Officer Butkus was not qualified to authenticate the People's evidence. "Underlying all this [evidence] are the maintenance logs," but Officer Butkus was not able to lay a foundation as he was not the individual who made or kept the records. "Without the maintenance log there is no evidence that the camera and video were working properly." "The officer himself stated that the logs were a necessary element of the People's case in chief showing that the equipment was regularly inspected, correctly installed and calibrated, and operating properly," but failed to lay the necessary foundation for this evidence with the Redflex custodian of records or the person who calibrated and inspected the machines, and it should have been excluded. "Furthermore, the Court placed the burden on the Defendant," by telling her that "instead of complaining that the custodian of records was not present in court, she should have subpoenaed the witness herself."
On February 22, the trial court filed its "Order Concerning Appellant's Proposed Statement on Appeal." According to the "[s]ummary of [t]estimony" in the trial court's (proposed and ultimately certified) settled statement (CR-144), "Officer Mike Butkus of the Beverly Hills Police Department was sworn and testified.
"Once Officer Butkus completed his initial testimony, motorists were called up individually for the balance of their trial. When [Borzakian] came forward she indicated that she understood the charge in her citation and that she was ready for the balance of her trial. However, she did want to make an oral Motion in Limine to exclude the People's evidence. The Court allowed [Borzakian] to make the motion [on the grounds of lack of foundation and hearsay, citing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, supra, 557 U.S. 305 [129 S.Ct. 2527] in support of her position] and subsequently denied it.
"With respect to [Borzakian's] citation, Officer Butkus testified that her alleged violation occurred at approximately 7:08 p.m. on Wednesday, June 03, 2009, as [Borzakian] travelled northbound on Beverly Drive in the number two lane at Wilshire Boulevard in the City of Beverly Hills. Officer Butkus further testified that he reviewed the technicians' logs and that the cameras were working properly on the date and at the time of [Borzakian's] alleged violation. Officer Butkus stated that he also reviewed the video and the photographs taken by the cameras installed at the particular intersection and concluded that the light had been yellow for 3.15 seconds before it turned red which is legally sufficient when the speed limit is 25 miles per hour as it is at this intersection. The officer also testified that the light had been red for .28 seconds when [Borzakian] traversed the limit line at a speed of 29 miles per hour. He also testified that the photograph of the driver appeared to be a photograph of [Borzakian]. He then played the video of the alleged violation two times: first in real time and then again in slow motion. [Borzakian] confirmed that she did see the video both times. The photographs and documents that supported Officer Butkus'[s] testimony were marked as People's #1 for identification and offered into evidence.
"[Borzakian] objected to the introduction of People's #1 into evidence on the same grounds she had argued with respect to her Motion in Limine. She asked to take Officer Butkus on voir dire and was allowed to do so. [T]here was no official recording of the proceedings, so the Court can[]not explain how [Borzakian] purports to be reproducing a verbatim account of what was said. Without an explanation for this from [Borzakian], the Court suspects [she] either surreptitiously recorded the proceedings in violation of California Rule of Court 1.150(d) or that she is simply making things up and using quotation marks to make the statements appear authentic.
On March 2, Borzakian filed her objection to the court's order and requested a hearing before a court reporter, asserting "a factual dispute about material aspect[s] of the trial proceeding." Citing People v. Jenkins (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d Supp. 55 [127 Cal.Rptr. 870], she said the court's proposed statement was a prohibited "conclusionary statement" and did not comply with the duty to set forth the evidence "`fairly and truly.'" In particular, she said, "the dialogue of the voir dire [of Officer Butkus] is an essential part of the trial record," but the "Proposed Statement makes no mention of the testimony of Officer Butkus admitting that he did not work for Redflex, that he is not employed by them, that he was not the custodian of records for them, that he did not inspect the photo enforcement unit in this case, that he was not there when the inspection was purportedly done, that it was not a part of his job duty to inspect or calibrate the unit, that he did not prepare the logs that he sought to admit, that he did not make the entries in the maintenance log, that the person who made the entries did not work at the Beverly Hills Police Department, that [Officer Butkus] did not calibrate[] the machines, that he does not know the qualifications of the person who inspected the machine, that he was not present when the photos were taken, that he did not take the photos, etc." Borzakian said she had taken "great care to create this record during trial" as her motion in limine was "read from written form prepared before trial" so she was able to provide a record of it and she "recorded ... Officer Butkus's responses contemporaneously in her notes, which contained each question[] she asked in Court."
Further, she said, the court's proposed statement did not include the specifics of the People's evidence which she had sought to exclude, a "necessary element of the [a]ppeal." "The officer sought to admit photographs, maintenance logs prepared by an Australian company and [v]ideo taken by the video maintained by the Australian company.
On March 3, the trial court filed its response, overruling Borzakian's objection, denying her request for a hearing before a court reporter, and certified the court's previously submitted statement on form CR-144 and dated February 22, 2010, as a complete and accurate summary of trial court proceedings in the matter.
The Appellate Division of the Los Angeles Superior Court affirmed the trial court's decision.
Borzakian then filed a petition to transfer the case to this court "to secure uniformity of opinion or to settle an important question of law," citing the decision in People v. Khaled (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1 [113 Cal.Rptr.3d 796] (Khaled) in which the Appellate Division of the Orange County Superior Court reversed a conviction in a "photo enforcement" citation trial "on the exact same facts."
On January 5, 2011, we granted Borzakian's petition. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1002.)
Like the cited motorist in Goldsmith, Borzakian argues the trial court erred in admitting the ATES photographic and video evidence over her foundation and hearsay objections. For the reasons addressed in Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th 258, Borzakian's argument fails.
Photographs and video recordings with imprinted data are "writings" within the meaning of the Evidence Code. (Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 266, citing Evid. Code, § 250 [all further statutory references are to the Evidence Code unless otherwise indicated].) To be admissible, a writing must be relevant and authenticated (§§ 305, 1401); it must be an original or otherwise admissible secondary evidence of the writing's content (§§ 1520, 1521); and it must not be subject to any exclusionary rule. (Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 266.)
We review challenges such as Borzakian's to a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion, and we will not disturb the trial court's ruling "`except on a showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.' [Citation.]" (Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 266.)
"Authentication" is statutorily defined as "the introduction of evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that it is the writing that the proponent of the evidence claims it is" or "the establishment of such facts by any other means provided by law." (§ 1400.) The "proof that is necessary to authenticate a photograph or video recording varies with the nature of the evidence that the photograph or video recording is being offered to prove and with the degree of possibility of error." (Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 267.) Here, just as in Goldsmith, the ATES evidence was "offered to show what occurred at a particular intersection in [a particular city] on a particular date and time when the traffic signal at the intersection was in its red phase. The ATES evidence was offered as substantive proof of defendant's violation, not as demonstrative evidence supporting the testimony of a percipient witness to her alleged violation." (Ibid.)
Ordinarily, a photograph or video recording is authenticated "by showing it is a fair and accurate representation of the scene depicted. [Citations.]" (Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 267.) This foundation may—but need not be—supplied by the photographer or by a person who witnessed the event being recorded; in addition, authentication "may be supplied by other witness testimony, circumstantial evidence, content and location" and "also may be established `by any other means provided by law' (§ 1400), including a statutory presumption. [Citation.]" (Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 268.)
Here, as in Goldsmith, the People argue sections 1552 and 1553 provide such a presumption of authenticity for ATES images and data. Under Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th 258, these statutory presumptions "partly, but not completely, supply the foundation for admission of ATES evidence." (Id. at p. 268.)
As relevant here, subdivision (a) of section 1553 provides that "[a] printed representation of images stored on a video or digital medium is presumed to be an accurate representation of the images it purports to represent. . . . If a party to an action introduces evidence that a printed representation of images stored on a video or digital medium is inaccurate or unreliable, the party introducing the printed representation into evidence has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of evidence, that the printed representation is an accurate representation of the existence and content of the images that it purports to represent." Similarly, subdivision (a) of section 1552 provides such a presumption for "[a] printed representation of computer information or a computer program."
"Because sections 1552 and 1553 provide a presumption for both `the existence and content' of computer information and digital images that the printed versions purport to represent (§§ 1552, subd. (a), 1553, subd. (a)), the presumptions operate to establish, at least preliminarily, that errors in content have not been introduced in the course of printing the images and accompanying data." (Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 269, italics added; and see People v. Hawkins (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1428, 1450 ["the presumptions essentially operate to establish that `a computer's print function has worked properly"].) As applicable here, just as in Goldsmith, "the presumptions provided by sections 1552 and 1553 support a finding, in the absence of contrary evidence, that the printed versions of ATES images and data are accurate representations of the images and data stored in the ATES equipment."
The Goldsmith court emphasized "the presumptions in sections 1552 and 1553 do not in themselves fully supply the necessary foundation for admission of ATES evidence." (59 Cal.4th at p. 271.) Authentication is still required. (Ibid., citing People v. Skiles, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1187; and see § 1401, subd. (b) ["Authentication of a writing is required before secondary evidence of its content may be received in evidence."].) However, in Goldsmith, the testimony of a single witness (an investigator with the Inglewood Police Department) was sufficient—even though the City's ATES was maintained by Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc. (Redflex), just as in this case. Like Borzakian, Goldsmith argued "it was necessary for the prosecution as part of its foundational showing to additionally present the testimony of a Redflex technician regarding the operation and maintenance of the system that generated the ATES evidence. . . ." (Id. at p. 272.) Our Supreme Court expressly rejected the argument. "We disagree that the testimony of a Redflex technician or other witness with special expertise in the operation and maintenance of the ATES computers was required as a prerequisite for authentication of the ATES evidence." (Ibid.) "Contrary to [Goldsmith]'s assertion," the court observed, "the record contains no evidence that the ATES evidence was materially altered, enhanced, edited or otherwise changed; rather it consisted of entirely automatically produced photos and video and contemporaneously recorded data. No elaborate showing of accuracy is required. (See 2 [Broun,] McCormick [on Evidence (7th ed. 2013)] § 227, p. 111 [accuracy of an individual computer's basic operations will not be scrutinized unless specifically challenged, and even perceived errors go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility].) We decline to require a greater showing of authentication for the admissibility of digital images merely because in theory they can be manipulated. [Citation.]" (Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 272.)
In Goldsmith, the court determined the police investigator's testimony was adequate to show the ATES photographs were from Inglewood's ATES equipment at the particular intersection where the defendant motorist's violation had occurred. (59 Cal.4th at p. 271.) "From his explanation regarding the independent operation of the ATES camera system, it can be reasonably inferred that the ATES system automatically and contemporaneously recorded the images of the intersection and the data imprinted on the photographs when it was triggered." (Ibid.) The Goldsmith court noted that the investigator "was asked when the `photo system' was last calibrated" and "answered that `there is no calibration of this [photo] system.'" (Id. at p. 271, fn. 6.) The motorist argued such testimony revealed Inglewood's "failure to comply with the statutory requirements that the ATES equipment be regularly inspected and certified to have been properly installed and calibrated and to be operating properly. (Veh. Code, § 21455.5, subds. (c)(2)(B), (C), (d).)" (Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 271, fn. 6.) Rejecting the argument, our Supreme Court stated: "In context, it appears [the investigator] understood that question and the followup question regarding calibration to ask only about the connection between the ATES camera and the traffic signal. He responded that the systems operate independently and that the only connection is an electrical connection that lets the camera know that the light is in its red phase." (Ibid.) The court noted defense counsel "did not clarify or pose further followup questions regarding calibration of the ATES system" and "did not ask any questions concerning Inglewood's or the police department's oversight of Redflex's maintenance and certification of the installed ATES equipment at this intersection." (Ibid., italics added; id. at p. 271 [the investigator "was not asked anything about the city's or the police department's records or supervision of Redflex's maintenance or certification of the equipment"].)
The Goldsmith court emphasized that the defendant motorist did not argue the police investigator's testimony was "insufficient to demonstrate that the evidence was properly received in the normal course and manner of Inglewood's operation of its ATES program." (59 Cal.4th at p. 271, italics added; see Grail Semiconductor, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Electric & Electronics USA, Inc. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 786, 797-798 [foundational evidence need not be presented by custodian of record or employee who personally prepared it for admission of exhibit as business record under section 1271].) Moreover, the Goldsmith court observed, "the content of the photographs themselves may be considered and here the content supplied further support for a finding that the images were genuine." (Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 271.) "Specifically, given [the police investigator]'s testimony regarding how the ATES system operates, the fact that in this case it produced a photograph showing defendant driving her vehicle at or before the limit line with the signal light in its red phase and then another photograph of defendant driving her vehicle in the intersection with the signal light in its red phase, as well as a 12-second video showing defendant's vehicle crossing the intersection and the transition of the traffic signal light phases, including a four-second yellow light, is circumstantial evidence that the system was working properly." (Id. at p. 271, fn. 7.) On the record presented, the Goldsmith court concluded that, "in conjunction with the operation of the presumptions of sections 1552 and 1553, sufficient evidence was submitted to the court to sustain a finding (§ 403, subd. (a)(3)) that the ATES evidence `is the writing that the [prosecution] claim[ed] it is' (§ 1400) and the trial court properly exercised its discretion to admit the evidence." (59 Cal.4th at p. 272.)
Here, Borzakian argues Officer Butkus's testimony was inadequate to authenticate the ATES evidence because he admitted the system was maintained by Redflex, he admitted he was not an employee of or custodian of records for Reflex who prepared the maintenance log and "[w]ithout the maintenance log there is no evidence that the camera and video were working properly." Under Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th 258, on this record and in the absence of any evidence the ATES was materially altered in any way, Borzakian's argument is unavailing.
According to the certified statement on appeal, not only did Officer Butkus "testif[y] that he reviewed the technicians' logs and that the cameras were working properly on the date and at the time of [Borzakian's] violation," but he also testified he "reviewed the video and the photographs taken by the cameras installed at the particular intersection and concluded that the light had been yellow for 3.15 seconds before it turned red which is legally sufficient when the speed limit is 25 miles per hour as it is at this intersection. [He] also testified that the light had been red for .28 seconds when [Borzakian] traversed the limit line at a speed of 29 miles per hour. He also testified that the photograph of the driver appeared to be a photograph of [Borzakian]. He then played the video off the alleged violation two times: first in real time and then again in slow motion. [Borzakian] confirmed that she did see the video both times."
Officer Butkus testified to his background, training and experience and explained "what the City had to do before being allowed to operate the red light camera ticket system, how the system works and how it is maintained." He "testified about the data boxes imprinted on the photographs and the letters and numbers contained in them" and "explained what the letters and numbers mean, how they are generated and how they relate to the citation." In her own proposed statement, Borzakian acknowledged Officer Butkus testified regarding the "triggering mechanism which causes the camera to take pictures and record video." Just as in Goldsmith, "it can be reasonably inferred that the ATES system automatically and contemporaneously recorded the images of the intersection and the data imprinted on the photographs when it was triggered." (59 Cal.4th at p. 271.) Under Goldsmith, "in the absence of contrary evidence," the presumptions set forth in section 1552 and 1553 support a finding the printed versions of ATES images and data are accurate representations of the data stored in the ATES equipment, and errors in content have not been introduced in the course of printing the images and accompanying data. (Id. at p. 269.) Just as in Goldsmith, the "content of the photographs themselves may be considered and here the content supplied further support for a finding that the images were genuine." (Id. at p. 272.) Moreover, the photographs and video depicting the violation "in real time" constitute "circumstantial evidence that the system was working properly." (Id. at p. 271, fn. 7.)
It follows that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Borzakian's objection of lack of foundation. (Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 273.)
Like the defendant motorist in Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th 258, Borzakian also argues the ATES evidence should have been excluded on hearsay grounds. Again, for the reasons stated in Goldsmith, we disagree. (Id. at pp. 273-275.)
Here, as in Goldsmith, "the evidence before the trial court reflects that the digital photographs were taken automatically by the ATES. Admittedly, the ATES must be programmed to activate when certain criteria are met, but it is undisputed that at the time any images are captured by the digital image sensors in the ATES cameras, there is no . . . city employee, law enforcement officer or Redflex technician present watching the intersection and deciding to take the photographs and video.[] The ATES routinely monitors the intersection without human presence at the site. When the camera is activated and takes the video and the three digital photographs of the intersection, the computer also records various data regarding the captured incident, including the date, time, location, and length of time since the traffic signal light turned red. The information is imprinted on a data bar on the photographs. The photographs, video and data bar information are entirely computer produced." (59 Cal.4th at p. 273, fn. omitted.)
Under the Evidence Code, "[h]earsay" is defined as "evidence of a statement that was made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated" (§ 1200, subd. (a)), and "[s]tatement" is defined to mean an "oral or written verbal expression or . . . nonverbal conduct of a person intended by him as a substitute for oral or written verbal expression."
The Goldsmith court determined the "ATES-generated photographs and video introduced . . . as substantive evidence of defendant's infraction are not statements of a person as defined by the Evidence Code. (§§ 175, 225.) Therefore, they do not constitute hearsay as statutorily defined. (§ 1200, subd. (a).) Because the computer controlling the ATES digital camera automatically generates and imprints data information on the photographic image, there is similarly no statement being made by a person regarding the data information so recorded. Simply put, `[t]he Evidence Code does not contemplate that a machine can make a statement.' [Citations.]"
We recognize, as Borzakian argues, there was no mention in Goldsmith of any maintenance logs created by a Redflex employee submitted as evidence by the City of Inglewood. The evidence in Goldsmith consisted of the three photographs and 12-second video generated by the ATES. (Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 262 ["[Goldsmith] was found guilty of the traffic infraction based on evidence of several photographs and a 12-second video"], 264-265 [investigator testified photos and video images recorded and produced by the ATES consisted of three photographs (the first, the "previolation" photograph showing the vehicle at or before the crosswalk or limit line for the intersection with the traffic signal shown in the background during its red phase; the second, the "postviolation" photograph showing the vehicle within the intersection either in the process of making a right turn or going straight through the intersection; and the third, showing the vehicle's license plate), plus a 12-second video].) Nevertheless, the Goldsmith court affirmed the motorist's conviction. (Id. at p. 262.)
The thrust of Borzakian's argument is that there is no evidence the cameras were working properly without the maintenance logs. Yet, the Goldsmith court concluded, given the law enforcement testimony regarding how the ATES operates, the fact the system produced a photograph showing the defendant driving her car at or before the limit line with the signal light in its red phase and then another photograph of her driving through the intersection with the signal light in its red phase, as well as a 12-second video of these events, including the transition of the traffic signal's light phases showing the duration of the yellow light, constituted "circumstantial evidence the system was working properly." (Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 271, fn. 7.) Because the Supreme Court has upheld a conviction without evidence of maintenance records, any error in the admission of the maintenance logs in this case is harmless under Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th 258. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
The judgment is affirmed. The requests for judicial notice of documents never presented to the trial court are denied.
ZELON, J. and FEUER, J.
We note that, in Goldsmith, our Supreme Court also addressed the claim traffic court defendants "appear almost universally in propria persona and . . . they lack the motive, means, or opportunity to engage in discovery prior to trial or to spend thousands of dollars on expert fees" so the presumptions stated in sections 1552 and 1553 deny traffic court defendants a fair opportunity to "repel" the presumptions. The court responded, "We will not speculate that traffic defendants lack motivation to contest their tickets. And, contrary to defendant's claim, traffic defendants have sufficient means and opportunity to contest their alleged violation because individuals charged with infractions are accorded the same rights as individuals charged with misdemeanors to subpoena witnesses and documents, to present testimony and other evidence, and to cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses." (Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 270, fn. 5, citing Pen. Code, § 19.7 ["Except as otherwise provided by law, all provisions of law relating to misdemeanors shall apply to infractions...."].)
