IRION, J.
These are appeals in a wage and hour class action in which the plaintiff employee class and the defendant employer are both respondents. The appellant is Eric P. Clarke, who appeals from two orders and a judgment of the superior court, following proceedings in which he unsuccessfully tried to intervene, to oppose final approval of the proposed settlement between the class and the employer and to vacate the judgment entered after the trial court gave final approval to the settlement. In each of these proceedings, Clarke was opposed by plaintiffs Bernie Paprock, Teah Nelson, Pamela Hastings and Mancha Overstreet (Plaintiffs) on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated current and former employees of First Transit, Inc., and defendant First Transit, Inc. (First Transit). We will affirm the order denying intervention, dismiss the appeal from the judgment and reverse the order dismissing Clarke's motion to vacate and remand with instructions that the motion be heard on its merits.
In May 2010, Plaintiffs filed a wage and hour class action complaint against First Transit, asserting three causes of action based on alleged violations of the Labor Code, including failures to provide required meal and rest breaks and to pay wages (Paprock v. First Transit Inc. (Super. Ct. San Diego County, 2010, No. 37-2010-55583-CU-OE-NC) (Paprock Class Action)). The complaint alleges that First Transit, a company that provides transportation services, employed Plaintiffs as "non-exempt" bus drivers who transported First Transit's customers. Plaintiffs alleged that they represented a class of "similarly situated former and current employees of First Transit" who "were employed in California[] and suffered damages as a result of First Transit's unlawful employment practices," as described in greater detail throughout the complaint.
After the completion of the bulk of the class discovery and just weeks before the court-ordered deadline by which Plaintiffs were required to file a class certification motion, in August 2011 Clarke filed an ex parte application for an order shortening time to hear a motion for Clarke to intervene
In September 2011, Plaintiffs filed a motion to certify the class. While the motion was pending, Plaintiffs and First Transit attended an unsuccessful mediation in late November 2011.
Based on the settlement, Plaintiffs moved for orders preliminarily certifying the proposed settlement class, preliminarily approving the settlement, authorizing the notice of settlement to the class and scheduling a hearing for determination of fairness and final approval of the settlement. The court granted Plaintiffs' motion by order filed April 19. As requested in Plaintiffs' motion (based on the parties' settlement agreement), the proposed settlement class was defined as: "[First Transit's] employees who were employed as Paratransit Drivers and Fixed Route Drivers during the Class Period in California. . . ."
In mid-July — five months after the successful mediation, three months after the court's preliminary approval of the settlement, over six weeks after the settlement administrator mailed 8,114 notices to the members of the settlement class and seven weeks before the final fairness hearing — Clarke filed a second ex parte application to intervene. First Transit and Plaintiffs each opposed the application. On July 22, the court denied leave to intervene, ruling that Clarke was not a member of the certified class in the Paprock Class Action (Intervention Order). Clarke timely appealed from the Intervention Order.
Plaintiffs then noticed a motion to approve the settlement, the attorney fees and costs, and the incentive awards for Plaintiffs and to enter a final judgment. No class member objected to the proposed settlement; and there was no opposition to the motion — except by Clarke, whom the court had previously ruled was not a class member. The record on appeal contains copies of three sets of oppositions from Clarke, each containing at least a memorandum of points and authorities and a declaration from one of Clarke's attorneys with exhibits: one set was filed July 19, the same date on which Clarke filed his ex parte application to intervene; the second set was filed August 30, two weeks before the hearing on Plaintiffs' motion; and the third set was filed September 11, two days before the hearing on Plaintiffs' motion.
At the same hearing, the court granted Plaintiffs' substantive motion. By separate written order filed September 13, the court approved the parties' written settlement agreement, class counsel and the claims administrator; redefined the settlement class consistent with the terms of the agreement; authorized payment of attorney fees, costs, incentive awards and claims administration compensation; and entered a final judgment under which the court retained jurisdiction for purposes of effectuating the settlement (Judgment).
Within weeks of initiation of the appeal from the Intervention Order and the filing of the Judgment, Clarke filed a motion to vacate and set aside the Judgment on the grounds: (1) the Judgment was "the product of incorrect or erroneous legal basis not consistent with or supported by the facts" (§ 663);
Before we discuss the issues raised by Clarke in his appeals from the Intervention Order, the Judgment and the Dismissal Order, we will provide additional background from other employment litigation against First Transit that is necessary to an understanding of the arguments raised by the parties.
The Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), Labor Code section 2698 et seq., authorizes "an aggrieved employee" to bring an action and recover civil penalties "on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former employees" (id., § 2699, subd. (a)), thereby "allow[ing] a plaintiff employee to collect penalties not only for himself, but also for other current and former employees" (Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 489, 499). The representative action authorized by the PAGA is an enforcement action "designed to protect the public and penalize the employer for past illegal conduct. Restitution is not the primary object of a PAGA action, as it is in most class actions." (Franco v. Athens Disposal Co., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1300.)
In January 2008, Clarke filed an action in Los Angeles Superior Court against First Transit and others (Clark v. First Transit, Inc. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, 2008, No. BC384583) (Clarke PAGA Action)), alleging claims for civil penalties pursuant to the PAGA. The Clarke PAGA Action seeks civil penalties on behalf of a defined group of employee drivers against the defendants based on alleged Labor Code violations dealing with meal breaks, rest breaks, overtime, wage statements and payment of wages on termination.
The Clarke PAGA Action was stayed in February 2009 and remained stayed at least through September.
In March 2010, Angel Alonzo filed a class action complaint in Los Angeles Superior Court against First Transit (Alonzo v. First Transit, Inc. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, 2010, No. BC433932) (Alonzo Class Action)), alleging many of the same violations of the Labor Code asserted by Plaintiffs in the Paprock Class Action, including failures to provide required meal and rest breaks and to pay wages. Class counsel in the Alonzo Class Action described the plaintiff class as First Transit employees who worked as "Community DASH Package 2 and/or 6 bus drivers who claimed that they were not provided legally required meal and rest breaks." The order certifying the class described it as:
Without a record reference, Clarke advises that "DASH is an acronym for `Downtown Area Short Hop' bus routes, some of which were operated during the relevant time period by First Transit under contracts with the City of Los Angeles Department of Transportation."
Clarke was a member of the certified class in the Alonzo Class Action based on his employment by First Transit as a bus driver in Los Angeles during the relevant time period at a "location . . . associated with DASH Package 6." Clarke opted out of the class in the Alonzo Class Action. According to his attorney, Clarke opted out "to preserve his rights to seek PAGA penalties and for his own individual claims."
At the February mediation at which the Paprock Class Action was settled (see pt. I.A., ante), the parties also settled the Alonzo Class Action, subject to court approval.
Once again, Clarke filed his second ex parte application to intervene on July 19 — three months after the court had provisionally approved the settlement in the Paprock Class Action and less than two months before the scheduled hearing on the final approval and judgment. He sought intervention "in order to address numerous, fatal flaws in the proposed settlement," including what Clarke described as: (1) the improper settlement of PAGA claims; (2) an inter-class conflict between the paratransit drivers and fixed route drivers; (3) a conflict of interest between the originally certified class and the pending redefined settlement class; (4) an inadequate class representative for the fixed route drivers; (5) a conflict of interest by, and thus the inadequacy of, class counsel; and (6) the collusion between class counsel and First Transit. Clarke included a memorandum of points and authorities, a declaration from counsel and more than 100 pages of exhibits.
Clarke's proposed complaint in intervention closely tracked Plaintiffs' complaint and its three causes of action — with the addition of "intervention allegations" by which Clarke set forth the bases of his objections to the proposed settlement of the Paprock Class Action. (Capitalization omitted.) In part Clarke alleged that he did not receive notice of the proposed settlement, even though he "is a member of the proposed class in this matter[] and his rights and interests are affected by the proposed settlement preliminarily approved by the Court in this action." (Italics added.) Clarke's objections focused principally on that part of the proposed settlement in the Paprock Class Action by which $10,000 was allocated to PAGA penalties. In support of his application to intervene, Clarke argued that based on the pendency of the Clarke PAGA Action and the proposed settlement of the PAGA violations in the Paprock Class Action, he had "a direct immediate and substantial interest in the [Paprock Class Action] lawsuit." (Capitalization omitted.) In his proposed complaint in intervention, Clarke alleged:
In opposition, Plaintiffs and First Transit together submitted two sets of points and authorities, six declarations, 35 exhibits and a request for judicial notice of another eight exhibits. Plaintiffs and First Transit argued in principal part: (1) because Clarke was not a member of the class, he had no interest in the Paprock Class Action; (2) Clarke's application was untimely; (3) the applicable statute of limitations barred any potential PAGA claim Clarke might assert; and (4) Clarke was not an "aggrieved employee" as required by the PAGA to assert a representative claim.
At the hearing on Clarke's application, the court first ruled: "I'm going to deny the request. I think there's a record that [Clarke] is not a member of this class. . . ." The court later commented that but for the settlement the case already would have been tried, stating: "And so I think coming in at this point . . . precludes the motion that [Clarke is] bringing today." The July 22 written minute order provides in full: "Ex Parte application of Mr. Clarke for leave to intervene is DENIED. [¶] The Court finds that Mr. Clarke is not a part of this case."
Section 387 allows for either mandatory intervention (id., subd. (b)) or permissive intervention (id., subd. (a)), as follows:
Under mandatory intervention, "[a] prospective intervener must demonstrate both adequate interest in the litigation's outcome and inadequate representation of its interest by either party. [Citation.] If the court determines the [prospective intervener] satisfies both requirements, it must permit intervention." (Estate of Davis (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 663, 667 (Davis), fn. omitted, italics added.)
We agree with Plaintiffs that the appropriate standard of review for the denial of mandatory intervention is subject to dispute. (See Siena Court Homeowners Assn. v. Green Valley Corp. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1425 (Siena Court) [several appellate courts have implicitly applied the de novo standard of review, but at least one appellate court has applied the abuse of discretion standard].) Clarke argues for de novo review on the basis that the resolution of the issue requires our determination whether Clarke is a member of the class in the Paprock Class Action, which necessarily requires the interpretation of the definition of a class member in the order granting preliminary certification of the class. We agree with Clarke that the interpretation of an unambiguous court order, like any other writing, is de novo.
Here, however, our review does not require us to interpret the language of the order certifying the class. Rather, we are called on to determine whether, given the language of the order and the evidence of Clarke's employment with First Transit, the trial court erred in ruling Clarke was not a member of the class. "The applicable standard of review is determined by the nature of the challenged action of the trial court, not by what counsel argues about that action." (El Dorado Meat Co. v. Yosemite Meat & Locker Service, Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 612, 617.) Since the finding that Clarke is not a member of the class is based on the application of a writing to disputed evidence, we will review the finding for substantial evidence. (Axis Surplus Ins. Co. v. Glencoe Ins. Ltd. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1222.)
In reviewing the trial court's factual findings for substantial evidence, we begin with the presumption that the record contains evidence to uphold every finding of fact, and the appellant has the burden to demonstrate there is no substantial evidence to support the findings under attack. (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881 (Foreman).) "`When a finding of fact is attacked on the ground that there is not any substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence contradicted or uncontradicted which will support the finding of fact.'" (Ibid.) We "may not weigh the evidence or consider the credibility of witnesses. Instead, the evidence most favorable to [the respondent] must be accepted as true and conflicting evidence must be disregarded[,] . . .'indulging every legitimate inference which may be drawn from the evidence in [the respondent's] favor.'" (Campbell v. General Motors Corp. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 112, 118.) The issue is not whether there is evidence in the record to support a different finding, but whether there is evidence that, if believed, would support the findings actually made. (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 872-873.)
Under permissive intervention, "[t]he trial court has discretion to permit a nonparty to intervene where (1) the proper procedures have been followed, (2) the nonparty has a direct and immediate interest in the action, (3) the intervention will not enlarge the issues in the litigation, and (4) the reasons for the intervention outweigh any opposition by the parties presently in the action." (Chavez v. Netflix, Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 51 (Chavez).)
The parties agree, and we concur, that the denial of permissive intervention is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion. (Siena Court, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 1428.) A trial court abuses its discretion only if, based on the applicable law and considering all of the relevant circumstances, the decision "`exceeds the bounds of reason.'" (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 566.) As particularly applicable here, given the evidence before the trial court, we must affirm so long as the record contains "sufficient evidence for us to conclude that the action of the trial court was within the permissible range of options set by the legal criteria." (Dorman v. DWLC Corp. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1808, 1815.)
On appeal, Clarke argues the court erred on the basis that he met the requirements for both mandatory and permissive intervention under section 387. We disagree.
As a preliminary issue, Plaintiffs rely on Doe v. California Dept. of Justice (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1115, and argue that, by failing to challenge the court's oral finding that he did not timely seek intervention, Clarke forfeited appellate review of the Intervention Order. Under either mandatory or permissive intervention, the application must be brought "timely." (§ 387, subds. (b), (a).) According to Plaintiffs, the court found that Clarke did not timely file his application, yet Clarke failed to discuss timeliness in his opening brief. We agree in concept with Plaintiffs' legal argument under Doe, but the record on appeal does not fully support one of the predicates for forfeiture — namely, a finding by the trial court that Clarke failed to timely file his application. Although the court orally found at the hearing that Clarke's application was untimely, the written order does not mention timeliness. The Intervention Order contains only a finding that Clarke was not a member of the class. Because a trial court may properly issue a written order that differs from its oral ruling (In re Marriage of Drake (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1170), we decline to base our review exclusively on the court's oral statements — especially where, as here, the court's written finding fully supports the denial of Clarke's application.
As introduced ante, under mandatory intervention, a prospective intervener must establish in part an "adequate interest in the litigation's outcome" (Davis, supra, 219 Cal.App.3d at p. 667); and under permissive intervention, a prospective intervener must establish in part a "direct and immediate interest in the action" (Chavez, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 51). Under either mandatory or permissive intervention, therefore, if Clarke is not a member of the class, then he has neither an "adequate" nor a "direct and immediate" interest in the outcome of the action and the court did not err in denying intervention.
The order provisionally certifying the class — i.e., the order defining the class at the time the Intervention Order was entered — describes the class as "[First Transit's] employees who were employed as Paratransit Drivers and Fixed Route Drivers during the Class Period in California." Clarke contends that he is a member of the class, because (1) Clarke was a DASH driver during the relevant time period, (2) DASH drivers are fixed route drivers, and (3) the class includes fixed route drivers. In part, Clarke argues:
The problem with Clarke's full presentation in his opening brief is that it contains no record references to any evidence in support of the statements quoted immediately above.
In any event, we are satisfied that the record contains substantial evidence that Clarke is not a member of the class in the Paprock Class Action: Clarke worked exclusively as a DASH route driver at locations in Los Angeles County known as "location #55512 and/or #5512" — locations specifically associated with the "DASH Package 6"; the certified class in the Alonzo Class Action included First Transit drivers with "routes associated with Community DASH Packages 2 and/or 6 in Los Angeles County"; Clarke was a member of the class in the Alonzo Class Action; and the drivers who worked at the Los Angeles County locations covered by the settlement in the Alonzo Class Action are excluded from the settlement class in the Paprock Class Action.
In affirming the finding that Clarke is not a member of the class in the Paprock Class Action, we are necessarily affirming the ruling the court did not err in denying mandatory intervention — regardless whether such ruling is reviewed de novo or for an abuse of discretion. (See Siena Court, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 1425.)
Finally, Clarke argues that even if he is not a class member, the court erred in denying permissive intervention (§ 387, subd. (a)), because he has an interest in the Paprock Class Action. According to Clarke, since the settlement of the Paprock Class Action included payment for, and a release of, the class's potential PAGA claims, Clarke's claim for PAGA penalties in the Clarke PAGA Action will be adversely affected, if not extinguished altogether. We disagree. Clarke is not a member of the class in the Paprock Class Action; thus, the settlement and releases in the Paprock Class Action will not affect his claims in the Clarke PAGA Action. Only an "`aggrieved party' "— namely, an employee "against whom one or more of the alleged [Labor Code] violations was committed" (Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (c)) — may recover a PAGA penalty (id., subd. (g)(1)).
Only the aggrieved employees of First Transit who were represented in the Paprock Class Action are bound by the settlement and related Judgment. (Villacres v. ABM Industries, Inc. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 562, 591-592 (Villacres) [preclusive effect of class action judgment bars later claims from class members only]; 7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Judgment, § 468, pp. 1131-1132 [a person who is neither a party nor in privity with a party is not bound by a judgment in an action, even if the person is interested in and directly affected by the outcome of the action].)
Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying permissive intervention.
Plaintiffs and First Transit both argue that, because Clarke was denied the right to intervene on the basis he is not a member of the class in the Paprock Class Action, he lacks standing to appeal from the Judgment. We agree.
The right to appeal is statutory. (Dana Point Safe Harbor Collective v. Superior Court (2010) 51 Cal.4th 1, 5; Conservatorship of Gregory D. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 62, 67.) In a case like the present one, "[a]ny party aggrieved may appeal. . . ." (§ 902.) "`The test is twofold — one must be both a party of record to the action and aggrieved to have standing to appeal.'" (Gregory D., at p. 67.) This rule is jurisdictional. (Ibid.)
As we explain, Clarke is neither a party nor aggrieved.
Clarke argues that, because he is a member of the class, he has standing to appeal.
Generally, "only parties of record may appeal" (County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 736 (Carleson)), and unnamed class members lack standing to appeal (Eggert v. Pac. States S. & L. Co. (1942) 20 Cal.2d 199, 201). Clarke relies on Consumer Cause, Inc. v. Mrs. Gooch's Natural Food Markets, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 387, 395-396, for the following exception to the general rule: "A class member who appears at a fairness hearing and objects to a settlement affecting that class member has standing to appeal an adverse decision notwithstanding the fact that the member did not formally intervene in the action." (Id. at p. 395.)
For at least two reasons, this authority does not help Clarke. First, he did not appear at the fairness hearing and object to the settlement. The court denied Clarke's application to intervene for this purpose and struck the pleadings in support of his objections.
For these reasons, Clarke is not a party of record to the Paprock Class Action.
Clarke argues that he is aggrieved by the Judgment, because he has an immediate, pecuniary and substantial interest in the case. More specifically, he argues that because the Judgment in the Paprock Class Action will bar the claims in his Clarke PAGA Action on the basis of res judicata, he has standing to appeal from the Judgment.
However, Clarke's premise for his position is faulty. As we explained at part II.A.3.a., ante, because Clarke is not a class member in the Paprock Class Action, the Judgment will not bar or extinguish the claims in the Clarke PAGA Action. (Villacres, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at pp. 591-592; see Arias, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 984, fn. 6.)
Accordingly, because Clarke is not aggrieved by the Judgment, his appeal from the Judgment is dismissed.
The Judgment was filed on September 13, Plaintiffs gave notice of its filing on September 16
While the motion was pending, Clarke noticed his appeal from the Judgment on November 13.
In response to Clarke's motion to vacate the Judgment (noticed for hearing on Dec. 13) Plaintiffs filed written opposition on or around November 19, and First Transit filed written opposition on or around December 3.
By pleadings dated December 5 — 80 days after Clarke filed his motion to vacate the Judgment — Plaintiffs prepared an ex parte application (with points and authorities and a declaration) to "dismiss" Clarke's motion for lack of jurisdiction on two independent grounds: (1) section 663a sets a 60-day limit on the trial court's power to vacate a judgment and more than 60 days had passed since Clarke filed the motion;
The court entertained oral argument on December 9, taking the matter under submission to review again what the parties had filed in light of counsel's comments at the hearing. Filing a written order later on December 9, the court granted Plaintiffs' ex parte application and "dismissed forthwith" Clarke's motion to vacate the Judgment. The court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction on both grounds pleaded: (1) Clarke did not obtain a ruling on his motion within 60 days of the filing of his motion; and (2) Clarke's appeal from the Judgment divested the court of jurisdiction to vacate the Judgment.
A section 663 motion to vacate may be used to set aside a judgment based on a court's decision, where the moving party is able to demonstrate an "[i]ncorrect or erroneous legal basis for the decision, not consistent with or not supported by the facts. . . ." (§ 663, subd. (1).) A section 663 motion must be decided within 60 days of its filing, or "the effect shall be a denial of the motion without further order of the court." (§ 663a, subd. (b).)
Even where relief is no longer available under statutory provisions, a trial court generally retains the inherent power to vacate a judgment on equitable grounds where the adversely affected party establishes that the judgment resulted from extrinsic fraud. (County of San Diego v. Gorham (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1228-1229; see Villarruel v. Arreola (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 309, 317 ["`A person, not a party to the action in which the extrinsic fraud is perpetrated, who is adversely affected by the judgment, may bring'" "a motion [to vacate the judgment] in the action in which the judgment was entered"].) We review the court's denial of a motion for equitable relief to vacate a judgment for an abuse of discretion, "determining whether that decision exceeded the bounds of reason in light of the circumstances before the court." (Gorham, at p. 1230.)
"A motion to vacate a judgment for extrinsic fraud is not governed by any statutory time limit, but rather is addressed to the court's `"`inherent equity power'"' to grant relief from a judgment procured by extrinsic fraud." (Department of Industrial Relations v. Davis Moreno Construction, Inc. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 560, 570.)
Extrinsic fraud "`is a broad concept that "tend[s] to encompass almost any set of extrinsic circumstances which deprive a party of a fair adversary hearing."' [Citations.] The clearest examples of extrinsic fraud are cases in which the aggrieved party is kept in ignorance of the proceeding or is in some other way induced not to appear. [Citation.] In both situations the party is `fraudulently prevented from presenting his claim or defense.'" (Estate of Sanders (1985) 40 Cal.3d 607, 614; see City and County of San Francisco v. Cartagena (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1061, 1067 ["The essence of extrinsic fraud is one party's preventing the other from having his day in court."].)
As a general rule, "the perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the trial court upon the judgment or order appealed from or upon the matters embraced therein or affected thereby, including enforcement of the judgment or order, but the trial court may proceed upon any other matter embraced in the action and not affected by the judgment or order." (§ 916, subd. (a).) "The purpose of the automatic stay provision of section 916, subdivision (a) `is to protect the appellate court's jurisdiction by preserving the status quo until the appeal is decided. The [automatic stay] prevents the trial court from rendering an appeal futile by altering the appealed judgment or order by conducting other proceedings that may affect it.'" (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 189 (Varian).)
For purposes of the section 916, subdivision (a) stay, in determining whether a postjudgment trial court proceeding is "embraced" in or "affected" by the appeal (ibid.), if the postjudgment proceeding "`would have any effect on the "effectiveness" of the appeal[,]'" then the proceeding is stayed, and if not, then it may continue. (Varian, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 189.) That is because jurisdiction over the appealed matter shifts to the appellate court and is terminated in the trial court — including the trial court's power to vacate the judgment on appeal. (Id. at pp. 189-190.) Under such circumstances, the trial court's power to vacate a judgment on appeal "`is suspended while the appeal is pending.'" (Id. at pp. 189-190, italics added.) More than a century ago, our Supreme Court explained the effect of this suspension of jurisdiction: "By the appeal, the jurisdiction of the lower court in regard to all matters relating to the correctness or validity of the judgment or order appealed from is suspended, with the result that the lower court is without power to take any action in regard thereto during the pendency of the appeal." (Parkside Realty Co. v. MacDonald (1914) 167 Cal. 342, 347 (Parkside Realty), italics added.)
There is no question but that Clarke has "party" status for purposes of standing to appeal from that part of the Dismissal Order denying his section 663 motion to vacate. Whereas "one who is denied the right to intervene in an action ordinarily may not appeal from a judgment subsequently entered in the case[,] . . . one who is legally `aggrieved' by a judgment may become a party of record and obtain a right to appeal by moving to vacate the judgment pursuant to . . . section 663." (Carleson, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 736, citation and fn. omitted.)
However, the language in Carleson is very specific: the aggrieved nonparty may move to vacate the judgment "pursuant to . . . section 663." (Carleson, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 730, italics added.) Here, Clarke also seeks appellate review of that part of the Dismissal Order denying his nonstatutory motion to vacate based on extrinsic fraud.
In re Marriage of Burwell (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1 interprets Carleson "as merely identifying one type of motion to vacate that will confer `party' status on the movant for purposes of appellate standing" and allowed an aggrieved nonparty to have "party" status to appeal from the denial of a motion to vacate the trial court's decision and order a new trial under section 657. (Id. at p. 14 [recognizing "the general rule that doubts as to standing are resolved in favor of the right to appeal"]; see also Shaw v. Hughes Aircraft Co. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1342-1343 [aggrieved nonparty had standing to appeal under §§ 629 (judgment notwithstanding the verdict) and 657 (new trial)].) Although we have not found authority granting "party" status to an aggrieved nonparty following a nonstatutory motion to vacate, we agree with those courts that apply an expansive application of standing and see no reason to treat an appellant's standing from a statutory motion to vacate differently from a nonstatutory motion to vacate.
We agree with the parties that, once Clarke noticed his appeal from the Judgment, the trial court no longer had jurisdiction to hear the motion to vacate. In Varian, the Supreme Court expressly identified a motion to vacate the judgment as one type of trial court proceeding that is "embraced" in or "affected" by an appeal from the judgment such that the trial court is divested of jurisdiction to rule on the motion. (Varian, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 189-190; see Copley v. Copley (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 248, 298 (Copley) ["During the pendency of an appeal, the trial court is without power to hear a motion to vacate judgment from which an appeal has been taken. . . ."]; Beresh v. Sovereign Life Ins. Co. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 547, 552 (Beresh) ["`the appeal removed from the jurisdiction of the superior court the subject matter of the judgment'"].) The issue then becomes what to do with Clarke's motion once the appeal from the Judgment divested the court of jurisdiction to rule on the motion.
Plaintiffs contend that the lack of jurisdiction required the trial court to dismiss the motion, whereas Clarke contends that the automatic stay (§ 916, subd. (a)) required the trial court to suspend the motion until jurisdiction reinvested in the trial court. We agree with Clarke.
Plaintiffs cite Copley and Beresh for the proposition that "when the court lacks jurisdiction to rule on a [section] 663 motion, the motion must be denied or dismissed, not `stayed.'"
In contrast, we have consistent Supreme Court authority from at least 1914 through at least 2005 which tells us that, during the pendency of an appeal from a judgment, the superior court is "without power to take any action" in regard to the motion to vacate the judgment (Parkside Realty, supra, 167 Cal. at p. 347, italics added), because all power "`is suspended while the appeal is pending'" (Varian, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 189-190, italics added). To the extent the Courts of Appeal opinions in Copley and Beresh are inconsistent with the Supreme Court opinions in Parkside Realty and Varian (and the 90 years of consistent authority in between), we must follow the Supreme Court precedent. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)
Varian goes on to explain that where a trial court is without jurisdiction, it "has no power `to hear or determine [the] case'" and any order rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction is "`void on its face.'" (Varian, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 196, 200, italics added.) More specifically, if the superior court is without jurisdiction to issue an order because the matter under consideration is "embraced" in or "affected" by a pending appeal — e.g., an order dismissing a motion to vacate a judgment while an appeal from the judgment is pending — any such order is void:
(Id. at p. 198, italics added.) Accordingly, the Dismissal Order here is void.
In dismissing Clarke's motion to vacate the Judgment at a time when the court was divested of jurisdiction over the Judgment (and matters embraced in or affected by the pending appeal) and the motion was suspended, the trial court performed a judicial act in excess of its jurisdiction. While we agree with Plaintiffs that a court always has the jurisdiction to determine whether it has jurisdiction (Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 267), once the court here determined that it did not have jurisdiction to rule on Clarke's motion to vacate the Judgment, the court erred in dismissing the motion.
The Dismissal Order is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the superior court with instructions to address forthwith the issues raised in Clarke's motion to vacate the Judgment and Plaintiffs' and First Transit's oppositions to the motion.
The July 22, 2013 order denying Clarke leave to intervene is affirmed. Clarke's appeal from the September 13, 2013 judgment is dismissed. The December 9, 2013 order dismissing Clarke's motion to vacate the judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to address forthwith the issues raised in Clarke's October 2013 motion to vacate and Plaintiffs' and First Transit's oppositions to the motion. In the interests of justice, the parties shall bear their respective costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(3), (5).)
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J. and O'ROURKE, J., concurs.
Curiously, the register of actions does not reflect any filings by Clarke on or around July 19 or August 30, and only counsel's declaration on or around September 11. Because of our disposition of Clarke's appeal from the Judgment in part II.B., post, this discrepancy is irrelevant.
Clarke also cites to declarations in other actions for which he asked the trial court here to take judicial notice. However, those declarations are not evidence for at least two reasons: (1) there is no indication whether the trial court took judicial notice of them; and (2) more fundamentally, while taking judicial notice might properly be taken of the existence of the declarations, it cannot be taken of the facts asserted in the declarations (Intengan v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1057).
Finally, Clarke's factual assertions that begin with the clause "There is no disagreement" are not evidence either. To the contrary, without a record reference, such an introduction suggests there may well be a disagreement. Moreover, the burden is on Clarke to cite to evidence (Foreman, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 881), not on Plaintiffs or First Transit to deny an unsupported recitation of supposed facts.
