HALLER, Acting P. J. —
Government Employees Insurance Company, GEICO General Insurance Company, GEICO Casualty Company, and GEICO Indemnity Company (collectively, GEICO), as relator,
GEICO issues automobile insurance policies. GEICO investigated Dr. Cruz (a chiropractor) and other defendants (another chiropractor, a doctor of osteopathic medicine, and their related professional corporations and medical practices)
GEICO alleged Dr. Cruz had engaged in insurance fraud both directly and in conspiracy with the other defendants. GEICO asserted Dr. Cruz engaged in "upcoding." According to GEICO, when Dr. Cruz submitted claims for reimbursement using standard insurance industry billing codes — "Current Procedural Technology" or "CPT"codes
GEICO also asserted Dr. Cruz violated the Act by paying unlawful referral fees to defendant Dr. Tomassetti, claiming she masked the referral fees by styling them as percentage rent due under a lease. GEICO further claimed Dr. Cruz conspired with other defendants, as evidenced by billing and marketing materials that identified her as a member of the Thrive medical group. This contradicted her discovery responses, which denied she had any business relationship with Thrive.
Dr. Cruz denied any wrongdoing. With regard to upcoding, she claimed she chose "the best code that describe[d] [her] level of service." She further argued that even if she had inadvertently used an incorrect code, GEICO did not suffer any damages because she had billed the correct amount of payment for the level of treatment she provided. She contended this lack of damages
The trial court granted summary judgment in Dr. Cruz's favor, finding GEICO had not shown it suffered damages or that Dr. Cruz's lease resulted in actual (rather than merely potential) referrals.
In December 2011, GEICO began investigating Dr. Cruz and the other defendants for insurance fraud. GEICO filed a complaint against defendants in January 2013, and filed its operative verified first amended complaint (complaint) in July 2013. The complaint alleged defendants provided chiropractic, diagnostic, referral and/or medical services to individuals injured in automobile accidents involving GEICO policyholders. It further alleged Dr. Cruz, separately and together with the other defendants, had submitted false, misleading, and improper claims on behalf of the claimants.
In September 2013, Dr. Cruz served 99 requests for admissions asking GEICO to admit, for example, that she did not create or submit false claims, billings, or reports on behalf of the claimants, and that she did not conspire with the other defendants to do so. She also served Judicial Council form interrogatory No. 17.1, part of which asked GEICO to "state all facts upon which [it] based" each response to the accompanying requests for admissions that was not "an unqualified admission." After objecting, GEICO outright denied 93 of the requests for admissions and stated it lacked sufficient information to admit or deny the remaining six. As to the outright denials, GEICO responded to the accompanying state-all-facts interrogatory with only objections and the following statement: "Discovery is ongoing and Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement this response."
After an unsuccessful meet-and-confer process, Dr. Cruz moved to compel further responses. GEICO opposed the motion, but also served a "supplemental response to form interrogatories" on January 28, 2014 (the January Responses). (Capitalization omitted.)
In February 2014, the trial court found GEICO's original "discovery responses ... insufficient and without merit," granted Dr. Cruz's motion to compel, and sanctioned GEICO approximately $4,000.
After the hearing, Dr. Cruz's counsel told GEICO's counsel he considered the supplemental January Responses deficient. GEICO's counsel represented that the responses contained all the information GEICO possessed, subject to supporting information an expert would provide in the future. Based on this representation, Dr. Cruz's counsel decided not to pursue further meet-and-confer efforts or move to compel further responses.
In April, GEICO replaced its trial counsel.
In May, Dr. Cruz moved for summary judgment on the basis that GEICO's January Responses established it had no evidence to prove its case against Dr. Cruz. The motion emphasized GEICO's failure to identify or calculate its claimed damages. Dr. Cruz supported her motion with a declaration justifying the services she provided to the claimants and opining her fees were "at or below the customary charges in this locality for the same service...." She also denied billing for medical services that were not medically necessary, knowingly billing for services not performed, knowingly duplicating any charges, or making any improper referrals.
GEICO further asserted that Dr. Cruz had an improper referral agreement with Dr. Tomassetti under which she paid him certain percentages of her collections as rent, which GEICO contended was disproportionate to any alleged rent, services, or other overhead Dr. Tomassetti may have been providing. The response also cited marketing materials identifying Dr. Cruz as "an integral member of" Thrive, which GEICO asserted "shows an intertwining of Dr. Cruz with the other defendants in this case...."
The following month, Dr. Cruz filed a motion seeking to bind GEICO to the January Responses.
On September 11, GEICO filed an opposition to Dr. Cruz's summary judgment motion. GEICO supported its opposition with a declaration from a chiropractor (Michael J. Stahl, D.C.) who, after addressing Dr. Cruz's claims on a claimant-by-claimant basis, opined the claims contain "material misrepresentations" and "do not accurately reflect the procedures or services that were performed, and/or these services were not adequately documented in the
GEICO also lodged excerpts from Dr. Cruz's deposition transcript; the 2004 and 2006 lease agreements between Dr. Cruz and Dr. Tomassetti; billing and marketing materials showing Dr. Cruz's affiliation with Thrive; and Dr. Cruz's discovery responses denying she had any business relationship with Thrive.
Dr. Cruz filed a reply brief and objected to all of GEICO's opposing evidence on the basis it was barred by the trial court's August 8 order binding GEICO to the January Responses.
On September 19, the trial court sustained Dr. Cruz's evidentiary objections and granted her summary judgment motion. The court explained,
"[Plaintiff was] bound to [the January Responses]. Plaintiff's opposition to the present motion relies, almost completely, on evidence which was within its prior counsel's possession or knowledge at the time of the discovery responses, but was not provided. Plaintiff cannot resuscitate the evidence by re-inquiring of the same information subsequent to the Court's order....
"The Court finds the evidence provided insufficient to establish upcoding by the moving defendant. To the extent admissible, the evidence does not establish Defendant charged more for services provided than she should have. Indeed, the evidence persuasively establishes that she charge[d] the correct amount, or less, for the services provided, and was often paid even less than charged. There is no admissible evidence to establish Fraud or Deceit by Dr. Cruz.
"The Plaintiff's evidence regarding Defendant's lease, and rental payments, even if admitted, was not persuasive. There was no evidence provided of actual referrals, and the potential for referrals, as suggested by the Plaintiff, is not sufficient."
To provide context for our analysis of the trial court's rulings, we begin with an overview of the Act.
Insurance Code section 1871.7, subdivision (b) "prescribes civil penalties and other remedies for violation of either subdivision (a) of that section or Penal Code sections 549, 550, or 551, which target insurance and workers' compensation fraud."
"(1) Knowingly present or cause to be presented any false or fraudulent claim for the payment of a loss or injury, including payment of a loss or injury under a contract of insurance. [¶] ... [¶]
"(5) Knowingly prepare, make, or subscribe any writing, with the intent to present or use it, or to allow it to be presented, in support of any false or fraudulent claim.
"(6) Knowingly make or cause to be made any false or fraudulent claim for payment of a health care benefit. [¶] ... [¶]
"(b) It is unlawful to do, or to knowingly assist or conspire with any person to do, any of the following:
"(1) Present or cause to be presented any written or oral statement as part of, or in support of or opposition to, a claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to an insurance policy, knowing that the statement contains any false or misleading information concerning any material fact.
"(2) Prepare or make any written or oral statement that is intended to be presented to any insurer or any insurance claimant in connection with, or in support of or opposition to, any claim or payment or other benefit pursuant to an insurance policy, knowing that the statement contains any false or misleading information concerning any material fact."
The trial court granted Dr. Cruz's summary judgment motion on the basis GEICO had no evidence to support its case against Dr. Cruz. That basis is supported largely by the trial court's order binding GEICO to the January Responses, which led the trial court to exclude GEICO's opposition evidence. GEICO contends the court erred in binding GEICO to the January Responses because Dr. Cruz did not satisfy the three statutory conditions required to invoke that remedy. We agree.
"Without leave of court, a party may serve an amended answer to any interrogatory that contains information subsequently discovered, inadvertently omitted, or mistakenly stated in the initial interrogatory. At the trial of the action, the propounding party ... may use the initial answer ..., and the responding party may then use the amended answer." (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.310, subd. (a).) However, "[t]he party who propounded an interrogatory to which an amended answer has been served may move for an order that the initial answer to that interrogatory be deemed binding on the responding party for the purpose of the pending action." (Id., § 2030.310, subd. (b).)
Even if GEICO's amendment of the January Responses six months later prejudiced Dr. Cruz, the trial court also erred by finding the prejudice could not have been cured with a continuance. When GEICO served the June Responses, trial was set for March 2015 — nine months later. Dr. Cruz does not suggest this was insufficient time to address the newly disclosed information. Rather, she argues "[a] continuance would only benefit [GEICO]'s efforts to avoid Union Bank v. Superior Court [(1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 573, 580-581 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 653] (summary judgment motion may be based on discovery responses indicating plaintiff lacks evidence to support its claims) and D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners [(1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 22-23 [112 Cal.Rptr. 786, 520 P.2d 10] (a party's evidence submitted in opposition to a summary judgment motion must be disregarded to the extent it contradicts the party's prior clear and unequivocal admissions of fact)." Contrary to Dr. Cruz's claim, rewarding GEICO has no bearing on whether she suffered incurable prejudice. And Dr. Cruz has not identified any "clear and unequivocal admissions of fact" in the January Responses that were "contradict[ed]" by the June Responses.
Because Dr. Cruz failed to establish she was prejudiced by the June Responses or that any such prejudice could not have been cured by a continuance or use of the January Responses at trial, the trial court erred by binding GEICO to the January Responses.
On appeal, GEICO does not challenge the trial court's rulings regarding the common law claims. Instead, GEICO maintains it presented evidence sufficient to show triable issues of fact exist regarding whether Dr. Cruz violated the Act, but the trial court erroneously excluded that evidence, which, in turn, resulted in the trial court erroneously granting Dr. Cruz's
A defendant moving for summary judgment "bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that [the defendant] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493] (Aguilar).) To meet this burden, the defendant must show one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action. (Ibid.) The defendant may make this showing by relying on the plaintiff's "factually devoid discovery responses." (Union Bank v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 590.) If the defendant does not present sufficient evidence to meet its initial burden, the court must deny the summary judgment motion. (Aguilar, at p. 850.)
Once the defendant satisfies its burden, "`the burden shifts to the plaintiff... to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.'" (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 849.) The plaintiff may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of her pleadings to show a triable issue of material fact exists. (Ibid.)
We review a summary judgment de novo. (Buss v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 35, 60 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 366, 939 P.2d 766].) "In practical effect, we assume the role of a trial court and apply the same rules and standards which govern a trial court's determination of a motion for summary judgment." (Lenane v. Continental Maritime of San Diego (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1073, 1079 [72 Cal.Rptr.2d 121].) Thus, we apply the same three-step analysis trial courts use: "First, we identify the issues framed by the pleadings. Second, we determine whether the moving party has established facts justifying judgment in its favor. Finally, in most cases, if the moving party has carried its initial burden, we decide whether the opposing party has demonstrated the existence of a triable issue of material fact." (Serri v. Santa Clara University (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, 858-859 [172 Cal.Rptr.3d 732].) In doing so, "`[w]e liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.'" (Wilson v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 713, 717 [68 Cal.Rptr.3d 746,
If a trial court erroneously grants summary judgment when a factual dispute exists but affects fewer than all causes of action, the appellate court may direct the trial court to enter an order granting summary adjudication of the unaffected causes of action if the moving party alternatively moved for summary adjudication. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(2); Troyk v. Farmers Group, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1354-1355 [90 Cal.Rptr.3d 589].)
Dr. Cruz objected to all of GEICO's opposition evidence (other than Dr. Stahl's declaration, discussed below) on the grounds it was barred by the court's order binding GEICO to its January Responses and was irrelevant. Because the court erred by binding GEICO to its January Responses, the court also erred by excluding GEICO's evidence based on that ruling. GEICO's opposition evidence related to Dr. Cruz's billings, alleged referral agreement, and her relationship with her alleged coconspirators. This evidence was clearly relevant to GEICO's claims. Thus, the trial court erred by excluding the evidence.
Dr. Cruz also objected to Dr. Stahl's declaration on the grounds his opinions lacked foundation and constituted improper legal conclusions. We disagree. Dr. Stahl described his educational and professional credentials. He also stated he reviewed the following materials: two volumes of Dr. Cruz's deposition; "[m]edical records of treatment performed by [Dr. Cruz] for patients Shawna B., Gabriel C., Irene D., Rosa H., Benjamin L., and Meghan S."; and Dr. Cruz's billing records for these patients. Together, this information provides sufficient foundation upon which Dr. Stahl could base his opinions that Dr. Cruz upcoded and presented false claims to GEICO. The trial court's ruling to the contrary is in error.
GEICO's erroneously excluded evidence and expert opinions show the existence of triable issues of fact that preclude summary judgment on GEICO's statutory claim.
As noted, GEICO's complaint asserts a statutory cause of action for violation of the Act, and common law claims for conversion, fraud, intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, constructive trust, equitable lien, and restitution. Because GEICO does not address the common law causes of action on appeal, it has forfeited any challenges to the trial court's summary disposition of them. (See Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852 [57 Cal.Rptr.3d 363] ["When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived."].) However, GEICO has established that factual disputes preclude summary judgment on its statutory claim.
A triable issue of fact exists about whether Dr. Cruz violated Insurance Code section 1871.7, subdivision (a) by maintaining an unlawful referral agreement with Dr. Tomassetti. Dr. Cruz's 2004 and 2006 lease agreements specified that her "flat fee" payment to Dr. Tomassetti for use of office space and support services was a varying percentage of her monthly gross collections.
Triable issues of fact also exist regarding whether Dr. Cruz violated Penal Code section 550 by knowingly presenting false claims to GEICO with the intent to defraud. For example, Dr. Cruz used CPT codes that inaccurately identified returning patients as new patients; she billed for reviewing seven x-rays when she took only five; and she presented claims using CPT codes for "level four" and "level five" services, when she admitted in her deposition that those services are "beyond the scope of [her] practice." GEICO's expert,
We are unpersuaded by Dr. Cruz's argument that GEICO's evidence failed to show she "committed `upcoding' as defined by law." (Italics added, capitalization omitted.) The cases she cites do not demonstrate that there is a single, established, "legal" definition of upcoding. (See U.S. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., (C.D.Cal. 2004) 343 F.Supp.2d 922, 924-925 [definition based on allegations of complaint]; In re Quesada (Bankr.D.P.R., Apr. 1, 2014, No. 13-02057 BKT) 2014 WL 1329264, p. *5 [same]; Hoover v. Mercy Health (Mo. 2013) 408 S.W.3d 140, 142, fn. 1 [defining upcoding in the context of a motion to dismiss by quoting U.S. ex rel. Bledsoe v. Community Health Systems, Inc. (6th Cir. 2003) 342 F.3d 634, 638, which cited Bonnie Schreiber et al., Health Care Fraud (2002) 39 Am. Crim. L.Rev. 707, 750, fn. 331]; Kifle-Thompson v. State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 518, 530 [145 Cal.Rptr.3d 627] [definition based on trial testimony of Dr. Stahl].) Kifle-Thompson is the only case Dr. Cruz cites in which the definition of upcoding was based on evidence — Dr. Stahl's testimony — rather than pleadings or a law review article. Dr. Stahl's proffered definition here — "bill[ing] for more work, judgment and risk than was truly performed (via CPT coding)"; "[b]illing for services never rendered"; and "represent[ing] via CPT coding ... a higher level of service for reimbursement" than is warranted by the service provided — is sufficient to survive summary judgment.
We are similarly unpersuaded by Dr. Cruz's argument that she cannot be liable under the Act because GEICO has not established it incurred any damages. As noted above, the Act does not require that a fraudulent claimant's scheme be successful to establish her liability; she need only knowingly present a false claim with the intent to defraud. (See People v. Cohen, supra, 12 Cal.App.3d at p. 321; CALCRIM No. 2000.) Dr. Cruz's reliance on cases involving alleged upcoding violations under the federal False Claims Act (12 Stat. 696 (Mar. 2, 1863)) to support a contrary conclusion is misplaced. "To state a claim under the False Claims Act, a plaintiff must prove ... `... the [defendant's] statement or conduct caused the government to pay out money or to forfeit money due.'" (U.S. v. Kernan Hospital (D.Md. 2012) 880 F.Supp.2d 676, 685; see U.S. ex rel. Hendow v. University of Phoenix (9th Cir. 2006) 461 F.3d 1166, 1174.) California law does not require this showing.
The judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded with directions that the trial court vacate its order granting Dr. Cruz's motion for summary judgment and enter a new order denying summary adjudication of GEICO's statutory claim and granting summary adjudication of GEICO's claims for conversion, fraud, intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, constructive trust, equitable lien, and restitution. GEICO is entitled to its costs on appeal.
McIntyre, J., and Aaron, J., concurred.