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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
OPINION
THE COURT*
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Luis Antonio Sanchez was 16 years old when he participated in a carjacking, robbery, and first degree special circumstance murder. In 1996, he was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. In 2014, a writ of habeas corpus was granted and resentencing was ordered in light of Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. ___ [132 S.Ct. 2455] (Miller). At the resentencing hearing, a term of life without parole was again imposed. Sanchez appeals the sentence. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
On September 13, 1994, Sanchez and five codefendants talked about targeting "white boys" for a carjacking. Later that same day, Sanchez and the others carjacked a small truck and kidnapped 18-year-old Manuel Toste, a college student who was on his way home. After holding Toste at gunpoint and driving around, Toste was shot. Sanchez was sentenced to life without parole in 1996 for first degree special circumstances murder.
In consolidated case Nos. F024557 and F025403, this court affirmed Sanchez's conviction for murder with special circumstances and affirmed his sentence of life without parole. (People v. Lopez et al. (Dec. 31, 1998, F024557) [nonpub. opn.].)1 Our opinion noted that to find the special circumstances set forth in Penal Code section 190.2, subdivision (d)2 true, the jury had to find Sanchez was a major participant and had a reckless indifference to human life. In affirming the life without parole sentence, our opinion stated:
"Considering first the nature of the offense, Sanchez's participation in the crimes cannot be considered minor. Although the evidence indicated he was drinking alcohol and using marijuana and methamphetamine prior to the carjacking and murder of Toste, there is no evidence he did not understand or appreciate the nature of the offenses. After [codefendant] J. Lopez was initially unsuccessful in stopping a car at the intersection, it was Sanchez that urged [codefendants] Nava and Herrera to try. After Toste's car was taken, Sanchez held a gun on him while [codefendant] Loya took his wallet and watch. After the truck stopped and Toste attempted to run away, it was Sanchez who pointed a gun at him and ordered him to stop. Sanchez drove the truck away from the scene of Toste's murder and discussed with Loya and [codefendant] R. Lopez accomplishing another carjacking that evening. When Herrera said he wanted to get out of the truck, Sanchez stated `No, everyone is going.'
"Focusing on the offender, Sanchez's callous comment that Toste shot himself evidences a total lack of remorse. Further, notwithstanding the report of his psychologist, the psychologist who examined him as part of the amenability determination concluded he had a `criminal personality,' with no strong desire to change. That report also concluded that Sanchez's `criminal behavior is so firmly established that there is little likelihood that he can be changed by a commitment to the California Youth Authority.' This conclusion is supported by Sanchez's previous criminal record. Although he did not have any adult convictions when he committed the crimes for which he was sentenced, at the age of 16 he had amassed quite an impressive juvenile record. He had prior juvenile adjudications for misdemeanor burglary, felony burglary, and possession of brass knuckles and a knife. At the time Sanchez committed the crimes for which he was being punished, rehabilitative efforts in the form of wardship, three separate occasions of formal probation, foster/group home placement, and a commitment to a local county facility for 180 days had been attempted—none of which had any apparent positive effect on him."
In 2014, Sanchez's writ of habeas corpus was granted by the superior court and resentencing ordered in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Miller.
The resentencing hearing was held on May 20, 2015. Prior to the hearing, Sanchez submitted a 150-page sentencing memorandum; the People submitted a 33-page sentencing memorandum. The People's sentencing memorandum summarized the circumstances of the offense and the offender, Sanchez. The superior court indicated it had read both sentencing briefs and reviewed an updated probation office report.
Sanchez urged the superior court to impose a sentence other than life without the possibility of parole; the People urged that a sentence of life without parole be imposed. The superior court acknowledged that under recent case law interpreting section 190.5, there was no presumption in favor of life without parole for a special circumstance murder by a juvenile. The superior court heard extensive argument from Sanchez's counsel and the People. At the conclusion of argument, the superior court recessed to consider the matter.
When the superior court reconvened, it noted that it also had reviewed the sentencing transcript from Sanchez's trial. The superior court stated that it had to consider circumstances in mitigation and aggravation and had "some level of empathy or sympathy for a young man who grew up in adverse circumstances, and certainly those circumstances contributed to his criminality and participation in the crime." The superior court also stated, however, that while it was a "tragedy" that Sanchez had grown up in difficult circumstances, "a significant percentage of those who grow up in those tragic circumstances" do not "participate in conduct anything like what is before this court." The superior court queried whether Sanchez was that "rare, irredeemable juvenile" and noted the varying verdicts reached by the jury as to the multiple defendants.
Factors noted by the superior court in reaching its decision included that Sanchez was present and participated in the decision to carjack Toste; Sanchez was present when the decision was made to retrieve weapons, which assured the potential for great violence; Sanchez was the participant who held the gun on Toste and said "freeze" when Toste attempted to flee; Sanchez made sure Toste was unable to flee and then allowed another participant to take the gun in order to shoot Toste in the head; and Sanchez exhibited no remorse after the crime, laughing and claiming Toste shot himself. The superior court rejected the notion that the circumstances had just "spiraled out of control" after Sanchez used alcohol, marijuana, and methamphetamine.
The superior court opined that to "execute" Toste "in the middle of nowhere and leave him for dead on the side of the road" was "unthinkably cruel." The superior court found the circumstances of the crime to reflect a disrespect for human life. The superior court noted that Sanchez's "protection of his coparticipants" and "dispassionate, cruel description of the crime," demonstrated a lack of remorse. The superior court concluded "the circumstances of the offense and [Sanchez's] involvement in it demonstrate the kind of irredeemable corruption that the Miller case speaks to."
The superior court further found that "the circumstances that led him to be connected with these individuals on this date and in this situation are not consistent" with someone "who is behaving in a manner that is indicative of youthfulness and a lack of perspective." The superior court characterized Sanchez "at the time and circumstances of this crime, a product of his criminality, his criminal mindset, and his cruel and depraved heart." The superior court stated that:
"The crime involves great violence and an extraordinary degree of cruelty, viciousness, and callousness. He was armed during the commission of this crime personally, and handed the weapon to the person who used it to kill [Toste]. The victim was rendered vulnerable, both by his being jumped by a number of youths, armed with firearms, and then by being taken to a remote location. And while we can't say that Mr. Sanchez necessarily induced others to participate, he certainly occupied some position of leadership as compared to others in the group."
The superior court noted that Sanchez had a juvenile record prior to the murder; his crimes were increasing in seriousness; he was on probation at the time the murder was committed; and there was no provocation whatsoever for the murder. The superior court emphasized that a life without parole (LWOP) sentence was not being imposed because of any presumption, but because Sanchez's "youthfulness was really an insignificant factor" in the crime and Sanchez's level of participation and cruelty during the crime warranted imposition of a sentence of life without parole.
Sanchez timely filed a notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Sanchez's sole contention on appeal is that imposition of a term of life without parole for an offense he committed as a juvenile violates the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, he contends it is cruel and unusual and the superior court failed to consider the Miller factors. We review the superior court's sentencing determination for abuse of discretion. (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847; People v. Palafox (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 68, 91 (Palafox).)
I. Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment. Embodied in the Eighth Amendment is the concept of proportionality; in other words, punishment for the crime should be proportional to the offense and sentences that are grossly disproportionate violate the Eighth Amendment. (In re Coley (2012) 55 Cal.4th 524, 538.) In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held that mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for juveniles convicted of murder violates the Eighth Amendment. (Miller, at p. ___ [132 S.Ct. at p. 2469].)
In Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 718, 734 (Montgomery), the United States Supreme Court stated "it will be the rare juvenile offender who can [be sentenced to LWOP.]" The court in Montgomery went on to state that if a juvenile's offense reflects "transient immaturity" as opposed to "irreparable corruption," then imposition of an LWOP sentence violates the Eighth Amendment. (Id. at p. 735.)
Section 190.5, subdivision (b), which specifies the penalty for a juvenile convicted of murder with special circumstances as life without parole, or at the discretion of the court, 25 years to life, confers discretion on the trial court at sentencing. (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1360, 1379-1380.) The trial court has discretion to sentence a 16- or 17-year-old juvenile convicted of special circumstance murder to LWOP or 25 years to life, with no presumption in favor of LWOP. (Ibid.)
II. No Eighth Amendment Violation
As for Sanchez's contention that imposition of an LWOP sentence is cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, we summarily reject such a contention. The court in Miller stated the Eighth Amendment did not categorically bar imposition of an LWOP sentence on juveniles in homicide cases; it requires a sentencing judge to "take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison." (Miller, supra, 132 S.Ct. at p. 2469.) Neither the Eighth Amendment nor California law categorically precludes imposition of an LWOP term on a juvenile offender. (Palafox, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 90.)
Prior to imposition of an LWOP sentence pursuant to section 190.5, subdivision (b), a trial court is required to consider aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in the Penal Code and in the California Rules of Court, as well as the Miller factors. (Palafox, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 89.) Miller factors a superior court should consider when sentencing a juvenile for a homicide offense include: (1) the juvenile's age and its impact on his or her culpability; (2) the juvenile's family and social circumstances; (3) the circumstances of the homicide, including the juvenile's role in the offense; (4) the impact of the juvenile's youth on his or her ability to deal with law enforcement and assist in a defense; and (5) the possibility of rehabilitation. (Miller, supra, 132 S.Ct. 2468; People v. Chavez (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 18, 30.)
Sanchez contends the superior court had to state each Miller factor on the record and discuss the evidence applicable to each factor. The law imposes no such requirement. The superior court is deemed to have considered all relevant sentencing criteria in the absence of evidence to the contrary. (People v. King (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1322.) Here, there is no evidence the superior court failed to weigh the relevant criteria; the evidence discloses a thoughtful weighing of all factors relevant in the case.
The record indicates the superior court considered the relevant sentencing factors at resentencing in Sanchez's case. The superior court noted that it had reviewed the extensive briefing submitted by the parties. Sanchez's brief was 150 pages and thoroughly discussed all the Miller and other sentencing factors. After hearing lengthy argument, the superior court noted there was no presumption under section 190.5 for an LWOP term. The superior court weighed the Miller factors, found that Sanchez's family circumstances and youth played a limited role in the crime, and found the circumstances of the offense demonstrated cruelty and irreparable corruption warranting an LWOP term.
The record discloses the superior court's decision was not an abuse of discretion. Moreover, our independent review of the factors, including Sanchez's youth and its hallmark characteristics; information on Sanchez's family life and background; the circumstances of the murder and role of substance abuse; Sanchez's ability to assist in his defense; and the possibility of rehabilitation, support the superior court's conclusion that Sanchez's youth was an insignificant factor in the crime. (Palafox, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at pp. 91-92.)
As the Miller court indicated, the hallmark characteristics of youth are "immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences." (Miller, supra, 132 S.Ct. at p. 2468.) Here, Sanchez exhibited sophistication and coordination in a well-planned carjacking and attack on Toste with his codefendants, prior to which Sanchez and his codefendants made sure to arm themselves with weapons. Sanchez exhibited an appreciation of the consequences when he prevented Toste from fleeing by holding a gun on Toste and ordering him to stop; then later claimed that Toste somehow shot himself in an attempt to escape consequences for his actions.
Sanchez had amassed a significant criminal record by the time of the murder, engaging in criminal activity that was increasing in seriousness. Multiple attempts at rehabilitation had been tried prior to the murder, all to no avail. He was on probation at the time of the murder. Sanchez exhibited no remorse after the murder, falsely attempting to claim that Toste somehow shot himself. Sanchez's psychological evaluation showed he had a criminal mentality, with no real desire to change.
The circumstances of the crime were found by the superior court to be cruel and callous. An 18-year-old college student was surrounded by several teenagers with weapons, carjacked, kidnapped with a gun to his head, and prevented from escaping by Sanchez, who held the gun at Toste's head and then allowed a codefendant to use the gun to shoot Toste in the head. After Toste was murdered, he was abandoned by the side of the road while Sanchez and his codefendants discussed whether to go to the Tulare County Fair or commit another carjacking.
As required by Miller, the superior court considered all relevant factors attendant to Sanchez's status as a juvenile offender, in addition to aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in the Penal Code and in the California Rules of Court. (Palafox, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 89, 92.) The sentence the superior court imposed at resentencing, life without the possibility of parole, does not violate the state or federal Constitution. (Id. at p. 92.)
DISPOSITION
The sentence is affirmed.
