PITMAN, J.
Defendant-Appellant Natosha L. Mann appeals the trial court's judgment in favor
On February 13, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a petition for mandatory injunctions alleging that they and Ms. Mann are owners of lots located in Ranchland Acres Subdivision in DeSoto Parish. These lots are subject to restrictions ("the Restrictions"), including the following:
Plaintiffs alleged that Ms. Mann resided in a mobile home
On April 11, 2014, Ms. Mann filed a peremptory exception of nonjoinder for failure to join indispensable party. She stated that, on May 31, 2013, R.H. Lending, Inc. ("R.H. Lending") was granted a mortgage and security interest on the Property, including the land and the residence, and that it should be joined as a party so it can protect its financial and security interest in the Property, which would be "virtually wiped out" if the trial court granted the injunction.
On April 28, 2014, Plaintiffs filed an answer to peremptory exception, alleging that R.H. Lending's security interest in the Property is a personal right and obligation effective only between it and Ms. Mann. They argued that, because of the absence of rights or obligations between Plaintiffs and R.H. Lending, R.H. Lending has no cause of action and should not be joined as a party in this case.
During a hearing on April 28, 2014, Plaintiffs filed an amended petition for mandatory injunction to include R.H. Lending as a party. The trial court determined that R.H. Lending should receive Mennonite notice and found that the exception of nonjoinder was moot. On November 10, 2014, Plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion to dismiss codefendant R.H. Lending.
On November 17, 2014, Ms. Mann filed an answer to Plaintiffs' petition, alleging that, if any of the Restrictions applied to the Property, they have been abandoned or waived. She stated that Plaintiffs failed to mitigate damages and are not entitled to relief as a result of their failure. She also contended that the Restrictions are vague and ambiguous and, thus, unenforceable.
On November 19, 2014, Ms. Mann filed a peremptory exception of nonjoinder for failure to join indispensable party. She stated that R.H. Lending as mortgagee
A trial was held on November 19, 2014. The trial court denied the exception of nonjoinder, noting that First Guaranty had sufficient notice and that its absence would not impair or impede its ability to protect its interest. Plaintiffs testified during the trial on their petition for an injunction. Mr. Treadway testified that he purchased property in Ranchland Acres in 1976 and is very familiar with the Restrictions. He stated that Ms. Mann lives in a trailer on a lot that is subject to the Restrictions that forbid trailers. He testified that he became aware of the violation of the Restrictions in March 2013 when he noticed a portion of the Property had been cleared and a trailer had been placed thereon. He stated that he approached the owner of Apee, LLC ("Apee"), the company that placed the trailer on the Property and then sold it to Ms. Mann, and advised him that a trailer could not be placed on that lot. He later noticed that electricity had been connected to the trailer and a truck was parked on the Property. He stated that he never met Ms. Mann, but that she was sent a demand letter less than a month after he noticed the violation of the Restrictions. He further stated that trailers are allowed on some specific lots in the subdivision and that trailers are also permissible provided they are not lived in. Mr. Flippo testified that he purchased land in Ranchland Acres Subdivision in 1972 and is aware of the Restrictions. He stated that he had never met Ms. Mann, but believes she is in violation of the Restrictions. He further stated that he became aware of the violation when "they started clearing the property and moving in." He noted that trailers are allowed on certain lots, but that the Property is not one of those lots. The trial court found that Plaintiffs proved there was a violation of the Restrictions and directed Ms. Mann to cure the violation by removal of the trailer within 30 days.
On November 21, 2014, the trial court filed a judgment, determining that Ms. Mann was in violation of the Restrictions and ordering her to remove the trailer from the Property within 30 days of the ruling.
Ms. Mann appeals.
In her first assignment of error, Ms. Mann argues that the trial court erred in denying her peremptory exception of nonjoinder of the mortgagee of her property. She contends that First Guaranty should have been joined as a party because the granting of the injunction would destroy all or most of the value of its security interest in the Property. She notes that the trial court's denial of the peremptory exception regarding First Guaranty is inconsistent with the previous joinder of the prior mortgagee, R.H. Lending. She argues that the judgment requiring her to remove the mobile home from the Property is an absolute nullity and requests that this court on appeal declare the trial court's judgment a nullity.
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court did not err in denying Ms. Mann's peremptory exception of nonjoinder because First Guaranty received notice of the suit from their counsel and because its mortgage does not extend to Ms. Mann's trailer. Plaintiffs contend that, because Ms. Mann did not comply with the procedure to immobilize her home pursuant to La. R.S.
La. C.C.P. art. 641 states:
This court notes that, although Plaintiffs' arguments regarding whether First Guaranty's mortgage extends to the mobile home may have merit, we decline to examine this issue because that decision is not necessary to determine whether the mortgagee is an indispensable party. Assuming that First Guaranty's mortgage extends to both the Property and the mobile home,
Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.
In her second assignment of error, Ms. Mann argues that the trial court erred in declining to find that Plaintiffs operated with unclean hands. She contends that, because Plaintiffs did not take action against Apee when they initially observed violations of the Restrictions, they have unclean hands and are not entitled to injunctive relief.
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court did not err in rejecting Ms. Mann's argument that they acted with "unclean hands." They contend that they did inform Apee that the Property was a non-trailer lot and that their counsel promptly sent a demand letter to Ms. Mann after she moved into the trailer.
La. C.C. art. 781 sets forth the time period to file an action for injunction on account of a violation of a building restriction and states:
Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.
In her third assignment of error, Ms. Mann argues that the trial court erred in finding that the Property violated the Restrictions. She notes that she lives in a new, well-maintained mobile home on a street where there are numerous other mobile homes. She distinguishes mobile homes from trailers and states that modern, immobilized mobile homes are not temporary. She also points out Plaintiffs' "ludicrous" construction of the Restrictions, i.e., that she may have a mobile home on her lot if she does not live in it, but she may not have a mobile home on her lot if she lives in it. She contends that this absurd construction illustrates why the Temporary Structures Restriction is inapplicable. She also argues that the Dwelling Size Restriction is inapplicable because it conflicts with the Temporary Structures Restriction. She states that the Dwelling Size Restriction does not except any lots from its provision; and, therefore, all of the lots that permissibly have mobile homes placed on them are in violation of the provision. She also argues that, because the Restrictions are inapplicable in this case, the trial court's judgment should be reversed.
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court did not err in finding that Ms. Mann violated the Restrictions. They contend that she does not persuasively argue that her mobile home is neither a temporary structure nor a trailer within the meaning of the Restrictions. They state that she did not present any evidence regarding the nature of the structure or the degree to which the structure was immobilized; and, therefore, she failed to preserve this issue for appellate review. They further argue that Ms. Mann's trailer, the main structure located on the Property, was moved onto, rather than constructed on, the Property, which violates the Dwelling Size Restriction. They contend that her argument that the Dwelling Size Restriction and Temporary Structures Restriction conflict is misplaced because the lots on which trailers are allowed are also excepted from the Dwelling Size Restriction.
Building restrictions are governed by Louisiana Civil Code articles 775 through 783. Building restrictions are charges imposed by the owner of an immovable in pursuance of a general plan governing building standards, specified uses and improvements. La. C.C. art. 775. Doubt as to the existence, validity or extent of building restrictions is resolved in favor of the unrestricted use of the immovable. La. C.C. 783. The words of a contract must be given their generally prevailing meaning. La. C.C. art. 2047. Words of art and technical terms must be given their technical meaning when the contract involves a technical matter. Id. Each provision in a contract must be interpreted in light of the other provisions so that each is given the meaning suggested by the contract as a whole. La. C.C.
In the case sub judice, the trial court did not err in determining that Ms. Mann violated the Restrictions. The Dwelling Size Restriction clearly states that "[a]ll main structures shall be constructed in the subdivision, and no main structures shall be moved to a lot therein." The evidence presented at trial demonstrates that Ms. Mann's mobile home was moved onto the Property and was not constructed on the Property. Mr. Treadway testified that the trailer was "brought in" and that Apee "put" the trailer on the Property. He stated that Ms. Mann's trailer violated the Restrictions because the main structure cannot be moved onto the Property and "has to be built on site, new materials." Mr. Flippo also testified that the trailer was moved onto the Property.
The Temporary Structures Restriction forbids a "structure of temporary character" or "trailer" from "be[ing] used on any lot at any time as a residence either temporarily or permanently." Throughout these proceedings, Ms. Mann's residence was referred to as both a "mobile home" and a "trailer." In Head v. Gray, 41,290 (La.App.2d Cir. 8/23/06), 938 So.2d 1084, writ denied, 06-2353 (La. 12/15/06), 945 So.2d 690, this court discussed Louisiana jurisprudence regarding disputes over building restrictions containing the exact or closely similar language of the Temporary Structures Restriction. This court examined whether the term "trailer" includes the concept of a "mobile home" and stated:
(Emphasis added).
This court in Head, supra, also emphasized the importance of considering the entire framework for the subdivision's "general plan," as set forth in La. C.C. art. 775, and determined that the residence at issue was not a temporary structure. The case sub judice is distinguishable from Head, supra, because of the inclusion of the Dwelling Size Restriction, which is not included in the restrictions at issue in Head, supra. The case at bar is more akin to Mitchell, supra, which was discussed and distinguished supra in Head. The restrictions at issue in Mitchell, supra, prohibited the use of temporary structures as residences and prohibited any existing buildings from being moved onto a lot in the subdivision. This court in Mitchell, supra, determined that "the placing of the house trailer or mobile home on their lot ... constituted a violation of a `building' restriction and the occupation of the structure as a dwelling ... violated a `use' restriction."
When considering the general plan of the Restrictions, it is clear that the placement of the mobile home/trailer on the Property and Ms. Mann's residing in the home violated the Restrictions. The Temporary Structures Restriction notes that trailers may be used as residences on specified lots. This exception to the Restrictions emphasizes the intent of the Restrictions to govern the use of the lots in the subdivision. The fact that the Property is not one of the lots specifically excepted from the Restrictions reinforces the intent of the Restrictions that a main structure not be moved on to the Property and that a temporary structure such as a trailer or mobile home not serve as a residence. The remedy of an injunction requiring the removal of the mobile home from the Property also emphasizes the temporary and mobile nature of the residence. La. C.C. art. 779. Additionally, no evidence of the mobile home/trailer's permanency was introduced at trial.
Further, the Dwelling Size Restriction does not conflict with the Temporary Structure Restriction. Prior to listing specific provisions, the Restrictions state:
This list of excepted lots is repeated in the Temporary Structures Restriction as follows:
Therefore, the lots excepted from the Temporary Structure Restriction are generally excepted from the Restrictions as a whole, including the Dwelling Size Restriction.
The trial court did not err when determining that the presence of the mobile home/trailer on the Property violates the
In her fourth assignment of error, Ms. Mann argues that the trial court's judgment erroneously requires removal of the mobile home from the Property. She contends that the removal of the mobile home is not required to comply with the Restrictions because a mobile home is permissible as long as no one resides in it.
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court did not err in ordering Ms. Mann to remove the trailer from the Property. They contend that Ms. Mann's argument that she does not violate the Restrictions if she does not live in the trailer ignores her violation of the Restrictions, specifically the Dwelling Size Restriction. Therefore, they assert that the trial court did not err in ordering that she remove the trailer from the Property.
Building restrictions may be enforced by mandatory and prohibitory injunctions without regard to the limitations of Article 3601 of the Code of Civil Procedure. La. C.C. art. 779. This court in Mitchell, supra, explained:
Although Ms. Mann's argument that removal of the mobile home is not necessary may have some merit regarding the Temporary Structure Restriction, see Head, supra, this argument is not persuasive regarding the Dwelling Size Restriction, which requires that all main structures be constructed in the subdivision and that none be moved onto a lot. See Mitchell, supra. As discussed supra, the evidence presented demonstrates that Ms. Mann's mobile home was moved onto the Property and was not constructed on the Property. Therefore, the presence of the mobile home on the Property violates the Restrictions, and the trial court did not err in granting the injunction and ordering that the mobile home be removed from the Property.
Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in favor of Plaintiffs-Appellees Roy L. Flippo and Robert C. Treadway and against Defendant-Appellant Natosha L. Mann. Costs of this appeal are assessed to Defendant-Appellant Natosha L. Mann.
