Judge Rosemary Ledet.

This is a suit for damages. The plaintiff, Joycelyn Freeman, commenced this suit against her former boss, Joseph Zara, and employer, Zara's Food Store, Inc. (collectively "Defendants"). Ms. Freeman alleged an on-the-job sexual battery, sexual harassment, and retaliatory firing.1 From the trial court's amended August 27, 2015 judgment in Ms. Freeman's favor, Defendants appeal. For the reasons that follow, we vacate both the trial court's amended August 27, 2015 judgment and its May 28, 2014 judgment and remand for further proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1989, Ms. Freeman began working as a cashier at Zara's, a supermarket in New Orleans, Louisiana. Following Hurricane Katrina, which struck the New Orleans area in August 2005, Ms. Freeman evacuated to Albuquerque, New Mexico. In June 2011, she returned to New Orleans. During the following month, she returned to work at Zara's. She continued to work at Zara's until October 2012. According to Ms. Freeman, Mr. Zara was the owner and manager of Zara's and her boss during the entire eighteen years she worked at Zara's.

The incident in question occurred on October 5, 2012, while Ms. Freeman was at the cash register working. When she bent over to get something in the drawer beneath the cash register, she felt Mr. Zara swipe her from behind. By swipe her, she clarified that she meant "[f]rom my vagina to my butt, swiped me." In response, she "popped" — punched — Mr. Zara as he walked quickly away. Both Mr. Zara and Ms. Freeman called the police. Mr. Zara was cited and charged with battery. He eventually pled guilty and was sentenced to a thirty-day suspended sentence. Following the incident, Ms. Freeman initially was suspended for three days. Ultimately, she was fired.

On August 6, 2013, Ms. Freeman filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against Mr. Zara and Zara's.2 On February 19, 2014, the federal court issued reasons for judgment and an order reflecting the court's intent to dismiss only Ms. Freeman's employment discrimination claims with prejudice; the federal court's February 19, 2014 ruling stated as follows:

Contrary to its earlier ruling, the federal court rendered judgment on February 24, 2014 dismissing all Ms. Freeman's claim; the federal court's judgment stated as follows:

On February 25, 2014, the day after the federal court rendered its judgment dismissing the matter in its entirety, Ms. Freeman filed the instant suit in state court.4 Defendants failed to answer the petition. On May 21, 2014, Ms. Freeman filed a Motion for Preliminary Default, which was entered. On May 28, 2014, a hearing was held before the duty judge to confirm the default judgment. At that hearing, Ms. Freeman was the sole witness. At the end of the hearing, the duty judge signed the following judgment:

At the duty judge's request,5 the names and addresses of both defendants were typed below the trial court judge's signature on the bottom left corner of the judgment as follows:

On that same day, Ms. Freeman recorded the May 28, 2014 judgment with the Orleans Parish Mortgage and Conveyance Office against any property owned by Defendants. The mortgage inscription relating to Mr. Zara's property, a copy of which is contained in the record, reads as follows:

On June 30, 2014, Defendants filed a "Motion to Dismiss Based upon the Peremptory Exceptions of Prescription and Res Judicata." In support, Defendants relied on the federal district court's February 24, 2014 judgment, which dismissed Ms. Freeman's federal court suit with prejudice. Based on that judgment, Defendants contended that Ms. Freeman's state court suit was barred by both res judicata and prescription. Defendants further contended that their peremptory exceptions were timely filed because "neither the judgment issued by the trial court nor the transcript therefrom indicate[s] that there is a judgment lodged against any defendant."6 Opposing the Motion to Dismiss, Ms. Freeman contended that the May 28, 2014 judgment was a final judgment and that Defendants' exceptions thus were untimely filed.

On August 11, 2014, the trial court, finding merit to Defendants' exceptions, rendered judgment granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. On August 14, 2014, Defendants filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus seeking an order that the May 28, 2014 judgment be removed from the mortgage records. In their Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Defendants cited the trial court's August 11, 2014 judgment granting their Motion to Dismiss.

Meanwhile, Ms. Freeman returned to federal court and filed a Motion to Amend Judgment. On August 4, 2014, the federal court issued an amended judgment.7 In its amended judgment, the federal court ruled in Defendants' favor dismissing with prejudice Ms. Freeman's federal Title VII claims and state LEDL claims; however, the federal court "dismissed without prejudice Plaintiff's remaining state law claims."

On August 25, 2014, Ms. Freeman filed a Motion for New Trial from the trial court's ruling dismissing the case. In support, she attached the federal court's August 4, 2014 amended judgment. On September 30, 2014, the trial court granted Ms. Freeman's Motion for New Trial and, reversing its prior ruling, denied Defendants' Exceptions of Prescription and Res Judicata. Also, on September 30, 2014, the trial court denied Defendants' Petition for Writ of Mandamus. In its reasons for judgment, the trial court stated as follows:

From the trial court's September 30, 2014 judgment granting Ms. Freeman's Motion for New Trial, Defendants filed a writ application with this court, which was denied. Freeman v. Joseph Zara, et al., 14-1330 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/1/14) (unpub.).

On April 23, 2015, Ms. Freeman filed a Motion to Amend the May 28, 2014 judgment to clarify that it was rendered against Mr. Zara and Zara's. Defendants opposed the Motion to Amend. At the hearing on the Motion to Amend, the trial court orally reasoned that she was merely correcting the May 28, 2014 judgment to reflect the intent of the duty judge who rendered it. The trial court noted that, in reading the transcript of the default judgment hearing, when the duty judge instructed Ms. Freeman's counsel to put Defendants' names on the judgment, it was clear that the duty judge's intent was to cast Defendants in judgment. The transcript from the August 7, 2015 hearing on the Motion to Amend, reflects the following colloquy between Defendants' counsel and the trial court judge on this issue:

On August 27, 2015, the trial court thus rendered an amendment judgment, which stated:

On September 4, 2015, Defendants filed a Motion for New Trial. Ms. Freeman opposed the Motion for New Trial on the procedural basis that it was untimely and on the substantive basis that it was without merit. On December 8, 2015, the trial court denied the Motion for New Trial, but expressly ruled that it was timely filed. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Defendants assign four errors, which are as follows:

Because we find the third assignment of error dispositive, we pretermit addressing the other three.

Timeliness of the appeal

Ms. Freeman contends that Defendants appeal was untimely filed. In support, she cites the jurisprudence holding that when an amended judgment makes only non-substantive changes, the motion for new trial must be filed timely as to the original judgment. See Bodenheimer v. Bodenheimer, 97-1118, 97-1119, p. 5 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/11/98), 709 So.2d 306, 308; Woodward v. J & M Seafood Restaurant, 413 So.2d 536, 537 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982); see also 1 Frank L. Maraist and Harry T. Lemmon, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE: CIVIL PROCEDURE § 13:1 (2015) ("Maraist & Lemmon") (noting that "the delay for appealing a final judgment is not affected by the filing or the pendency of a motion to amend, or by the signing of an amended judgment."). She contends that, in this case, the amendment was non-substantive and thus the time to file a motion for new trial — and likewise the appeal delay — ran from the date of the May 28, 2014 judgment.

Defendants counter that the trial court, on the record at the November 13, 2015 hearing on Defendants' Motion for New Trial, stated that the amendment to the May 28, 2014 judgment "was a substantive amendment." Relying on this classification of the amendment, the trial court rejected Ms. Freeman's argument that Defendants' Motion for New Trial was not timely filed. As discussed elsewhere in this opinion, we find that the amendment was substantive. Thus, we find, contrary to Ms. Freeman's contention, that Defendants' motion for new trial and their appeal were timely filed.

Standard of Review

The question of whether the Motion to Amend was properly granted, as Defendants note, is a question of law. "Pure questions of law are reviewed under a de novo standard `without deference to the legal conclusions of the courts below.'" Bates v. City of New Orleans, 13-1153, 2013-1157, p. 8 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/26/14), 137 So.3d 774, 780 (quoting Durio v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 11-0084, p. 14 (La. 10/25/11), 74 So.3d 1159, 1168); see also Burnette v. Stalder, 00-2167, p. 5 (La. 6/29/01), 789 So.2d 573, 577 (noting that a de novo review standard applies to issues of statutory construction); Ohm Lounge, L.L.C. v. Royal St. Charles Hotel L.L.C., 10-1303, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/21/11), 75 So.3d 471, 474 (noting that "the standard of review of an appellate court is simply whether the court's interpretive decision is legally correct.").8

Motions to amend judgments are governed by La. C.C.P. Art 1951, which provides as follows:

By its terms, La. C.C.P. Art. 1951 applies only to a "final judgment." Thus, the first issue we must address is whether the May 28, 2014, as reinstated on September 30, 2014, is a final judgment to which La. C.C.P. Art. 1951 applies.

Final judgment requirement

The jurisprudence construing the limitation on the application of La. C.C.P. Art. 1951 to final judgments has focused on the distinction between interlocutory and final judgments.9 This distinction is made in La. C.C.P. Art. 1841, which defines a judgment as "the determination of the rights of the parties in an action;" and divides judgments into two categories — interlocutory judgments, which are those that do not determine the merits, but only preliminary matters; and final judgments, which are those that determine the merits, either in whole or in part. La. C.C.P. Art. 1841.

Another pertinent provision is La. C.C.P. Art. 1918, which provides that "[a] final judgment shall be identified as such by appropriate language." The jurisprudence has construed La. C.C.P. Art. 1918 to mean that a final, appealable judgment is required to include decretal language, including the name of the party cast in judgment. See Bd. of Sup'rs of Louisiana State Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Mid City Holdings, L.L.C., 14-0506, pp. 2-3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/15/14), 151 So.3d 908, 910.10 Although Defendants contend that the May 28, 2014 judgment is not a final judgment subject to amendment because it lacks decretal language,11 the requirement that judgment contain decretal language generally has been addressed in the context of determining whether there is a final, appealable judgment. The issue here, albeit similar, is not whether the May 28, 2014 judgment is a final, appealable one; rather, the issue is whether the trial court could properly amend the judgment that was rendered by another judge (the duty judge),12 reinstated by yet another judge,13 and the subject of a motion to amend before a third judge. Defendants also emphasize that the judgment was "recorded like a final judgment but in fact is not a final judgment." Nonetheless, Defendants, in their appellants' brief, note that "for the purpose of this appeal, the Zaras [Defendants] proceed as if the [May 28, 2014] judgment was a final judgment and capable of amendment."

Given the unusual procedural conundrum presented here, we find this is the appropriate approach. We thus, as Defendants suggest, consider the May 28, 2014 judgment as a "final judgment" for purposes of applying La. C.C.P. Art. 1951.

Application of La. C.C.P. Art. 1951

In Bates, this court outlined the following well-settled parameters regarding a court's authority to amend a final judgment pursuant to La. C.C.P. Art. 1951:

Bates, 13-1153 at pp. 14-15, 137 So.3d at 784-85 (internal citations omitted).

Generally, the dispute regarding whether a final judgment can be amended under Article 1951 turns on whether the amendment to the judgment is a permissible alteration of phraseology or whether it is an impermissible alteration of substance. "The jurisprudence distinguishing between `phraseology' and `substance' has been inconsistent." Maraist & Lemmon, § 13:1. Nonetheless, "an amendment generally is permissible if it `takes nothing from or adds nothing to the original judgment.'" Id. (quoting Villaume v. Villaume, 363 So.2d 448, 450 (La. 1978)).

The jurisprudence on the issue of whether it is permissible to amend a judgment to correct an error in the name of the party cast in judgment is "unsettled." Id. The general rule is that an amendment to add a party to a judgment is a change of substance, not of phraseology, that can only be accomplished by motion for a new trial or on appeal. Derouen v. Quintana Petroleum, 626 So.2d 1181 (La. 1993) (Lemmon, J., concurring) (noting that "[t]he amended judgment substituted one party defendant for another and this violated La.Code Civ.Proc. Art. 1951."). See also Teague v. Barnes, 519 So.2d 817 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988). In cases involving only one defendant, however, the jurisprudence has recognized that "when the identity of the defendant is fixed with certainty, the amendment of the judgment to correctly reflect the name of the defendant is not a substantive change." Dubose v. Plant Depot, 05-1149, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/17/06), 933 So.2d 814, 817.

In multiple defendant cases, the general rule is that failure to name the particular defendant cast in judgment results in the invalidity of the judgment. Gail S. Stephenson, Drafting Lucid, Unmistakable (and Valid) Judgments, 56 La. B.J. 181 (Oct./Nov. 2008) (citing Reaux v. City of New Orleans, 01-1585 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/20/02), 815 So.2d 191, 194; Scott v. State of Louisiana, 525 So.2d 689, 691 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1988); and Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Whitlow Truck Ctr., 508 So.2d 857, 859 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1987)). The cited line of jurisprudence stands for the proposition that "[t]he failure to name the defendant against whom the judgment is rendered in a case with multiple defendants makes the judgment fatally defective, because one cannot discern from its face against whom it may be enforced." Jenkins v. Recovery Tech. Inv'rs, 02-1788, p. 3 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/27/03), 858 So.2d 598, 600 (citing Scott, 525 So.2d at 691)).14 Moreover, such a judgment "does not determine the rights of the parties because it does not cast any defendant in judgment and it does not express the degree of fault of each defendant as a percentage." Scott, 525 So.2d at 691.15

Applying these principles, we find, as Defendants contend, that the amendment adding Defendants' names — Joseph Zara and Zara's Food Store, Inc. — was a substantive amendment. We further find, contrary to Ms. Freeman's contention, that Cross v. Timber Trails Apartments, 06-1037 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/7/07), 949 So.2d 616, does not support a contrary result. Nonetheless, given Ms. Freeman's contention that Cross is directly on point coupled with the extensive analysis in Cross of the issue presented here regarding an amendment to add multiple defendants, we find it appropriate to first summarize Cross and then distinguish it from the instant case.

The Cross case

The Cross case was a personal injury suit for injuries a tenant sustained when he slipped on the steps outside his apartment. The plaintiffs, the Crosses, filed suit naming four defendants as the owners or operators of the apartment. Throughout the litigation, the four defendants were referred to collectively as "the defendants." Following a bench trial, judgment was rendered allocating 100% of the fault to "the defendants" and awarding damages. The final judgment awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs and "ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendants are cast with all costs of court." Cross, 06-1037 at p. 3, 949 So.2d at 618. The defendants appealed the judgment, and the appellate court affirmed. Cross v. Timber Trails Apartments, 04-1623, p. 1 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/6/05), 899 So.2d 853, 854. Thereafter, as part of their efforts to collect the judgment, the Crosses filed a motion to amend the original judgment to insert the actual names of the four defendants into the judgment. The defendants objected arguing the amendment would be substantive. The same trial judge who presided over the trial granted the motion to amend. The defendants then filed a motion for new trial. Denying that motion, the trial judge reasoned that "the defendants named in the amended judgment were the parties that had `been in the case since day one.'" Cross, 06-1037 at p. 5, 949 So.2d at 619. The trial judge further reasoned that the changes "were merely clarifications." Cross, 06-1037 at p. 6, 949 So.2d at 619.

Affirming, the appellate court in Cross held that the amendment was not substantive for multiple reasons, including the following:

Finally, the appellate court in Cross analogized the facts before it to those in the Dubose case in which this court held that "when the identity of the defendant is fixed with certainty, the amendment of the judgment to correctly reflect the name of the defendant is not a substantive change." Dubose, 05-1149 at p. 5, 933 So.2d at 817. As in Dubose, the appellate court in Cross concluded that "the names of the four defendants were fixed with certainty throughout the litigation" and that "[t]he amendment of that judgment by the trial court has clearly done nothing to change the substance of the judgment that we ruled upon in that case." Cross, 06-1037 at pp. 16-17, 949 So.2d at 625.

Unlike in Cross in which the judgment reference "the defendants" collectively, in this case no defendant was cast in the May 28, 2014 judgment. Here, Defendants' names and addresses simply were listed on the judgment below the judge's signature. Unlike in Cross in which the defendants were allocated 100% of the fault,16 here there was no finding by the duty judge that Defendants were equally responsible for Ms. Freeman's damages. Stated otherwise, the duty judge in this case neither indicated any division of responsibility for the damages, nor allocated fault.17 Nor does Ms. Freeman's petition allege either joint or solidary liability between Defendants.18 Thus, to amend the judgment to name both Zara's and Mr. Zara, as if they were joint or solidary obligors, is a substantive amendment of the judgment. See Dietz v. Dietz, 13-186, p. 6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/6/13), 128 So.3d 1215, 1219 (noting that "[t]he determination of the trial court to apply either La.Civ.Code Art. 2323, requiring a determination of fault as between the parties, or La.Civ.Code Art. 2324, which imposes solidary liability on the parties to a conspiracy, is substantive in nature"). For all these reasons, Ms. Freeman's reliance on the Cross case is misplaced.

Nor was the trial court's amendment of the judgment to reflect the duty judge's intent authorized by La. C.C.P. Art. 1951. As the Louisiana Supreme Court explained in Hebert v. Hebert, 351 So.2d 1199, 1200 (La. 1977), "the notion that the substance of the judge's oral remarks should govern instead of the substance of the written judgment could not have been the legislative intent [in enacting La. C.C.P. Art. 1951] because it would destroy the integrity of written judgments as evidence and public record of the court's decree." Id. "It is well established that the substance of a judgment can be altered only by a timely motion for new trial, nullity action, or appeal." Johnson v. Tulane Univ. Hosp. & Clinic, 14-1410, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/1/15), 174 So.3d 91, 94, writ denied, 15-1480 (La. 11/6/15), 180 So.3d 307 (citing Bates, 13-1153, 13-1587 at p. 14, 137 So.3d at 784).

Given the unique circumstances presented here coupled with the pending separate nullity action, we find it inappropriate to impose the remedy generally granted by an appellate court when it finds an improper substantive amendment has been made to a final judgment — vacate the amending judgment, reinstate the original judgment, and remand. Bates, 13-1153 at p. 15, 137 So.3d at 785. Instead, we find the appropriate remedy here is to vacate not only the amending judgment but also the original judgment and remand for further proceedings. See Barnes v. L.M. Massey, Inc., 612 So.2d 120, 122 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1992) (noting that "[e]very party involved in this litigation has committed various errors and/or omissions which contributed to the procedural anomaly, which is the record before us. LSA-C.C.P. art. 2164 commands us to "render any judgment which is just, legal, and proper upon the record on appeal.").

DECREE

For the forgoing reasons, both the amended August 27, 2015 judgment and the May 28, 2014 judgment are vacated; and this matter is remanded for further proceedings.

AMENDED AUGUST 27, 2015 AND MAY 28, 2014 JUDGMENTS VACATED AND REMANDED