NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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OPINION

THE COURT*

Minor Austin R. contends insufficient evidence supported the juvenile court's finding that he engaged in a motor vehicle speed contest. We affirm.

PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

On February 29, 2016, a juvenile wardship petition was filed on behalf of minor, alleging he was a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 in that he engaged in a motor vehicle speed contest (Veh. Code, § 23109, subd. (a), a misdemeanor). Following a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found the allegation true on April 12, 2016. At the dispositional hearing held the same day, the court found minor a ward of the court, stating that his maximum confinement time was three months. The court granted minor probation for a period not to exceed six months, ordered him to complete 40 hours of juvenile court work, suspended his driver's license for six months, and released him to the custody of his parents.

FACTS

On December 31, 2015, at about 4:15 p.m., Officer Matthew Rowland was on patrol duty in Ridgecrest working radar light operations in a marked patrol vehicle. He was using a LiDAR device to check vehicle speeds, but he had also been trained to visually inspect speed. His visual inspections had matched the LiDAR device several hundred times. On this particular day, as he sat in the parking lot from which he was shooting his LiDAR device at passing cars, he heard two cars approaching at an accelerated speed on Inyokern Road, also known as State Route 178. He could hear their motors revving as they approached. He saw two vehicles, a blue Ford Mustang and a silver Subaru, travelling parallel to each other in the two eastbound lanes. He visually estimated their speed at 65 to 70 miles per hour in the 45-mile-per-hour zone. He was unable to lock their speed on his LiDAR device.

Officer Rowland waited for the two cars to pass, then pulled onto the road and followed them. Initially, he saw no other vehicles. He accelerated to 85 miles per hour to close the gap between him and the two cars. He estimated that the two cars drove at the accelerated speed for about six blocks. As the Subaru approached a car in its lane (the right lane), the Subaru made a sharp, drastic turn and pulled behind the Mustang in the left lane, then shot back into the right lane when it passed the car. The Subaru accelerated and passed the Mustang. The Mustang pulled into the right lane behind the Subaru.

Officer Rowland activated his emergency light bar and drove next to the two cars, intending to pull in between them. But before he could, the two cars made a right turn on Triangle Drive and pulled over on the shoulder. Officer Rowland turned around and followed them. He had initiated the traffic stop for unsafe speed. He contacted minor and asked him why he had been racing the Subaru. Minor said he did not know. Officer Rowland cited him.

Officer Rowland explained that he believed the two cars were in a speed contest, not just independently speeding, because they were the only cars around and they were driving in close proximity to each other at a high rate of speed, and because of their actions he observed while he was behind them.

Defense Evidence

Minor testified on his own behalf. He explained that he was driving home on Inyokern Road and was going to turn on Triangle Drive. His Mustang had a V6 engine that was not modified in any way for racing. The Subaru turned onto Inyokern Road from Norma Street. Minor passed him at about 55 miles per hour and noticed a car club sticker on the back window. The Subaru got next to him, then it "launched," accelerating past him at 70 or 80 miles per hour. Minor held his speed at 50 or 55 miles per hour. The Subaru cut behind him, then cut back into its original lane. Minor did not squeal his tires. The two cars turned and pulled over. Minor did not know the Subaru driver, but he believed he was involved with a racing car club because of the sticker on his back window. That particular car club was known for having car meets and racing around town. Minor denied telling Officer Rowland he did not know why he had been racing. He was nervous after being pulled over, was digging through his glove compartment for his license and registration, and was just saying no. He testified that he was not racing.

Minor testified that he had a friend involved with the car club who had gotten in a lot of trouble. Minor had witnessed a car meet in a parking lot, but he had never participated in any of the car club races.

DISCUSSION

Minor contends the evidence was insufficient to show he was engaged in a speed contest rather than simply speeding independently.

On appeal, we review the juvenile court's findings under the substantial evidence standard. The findings of the juvenile court will not be disturbed on appeal if there is any substantial evidence to support them. (In re John S. (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 285, 293-294; In re Harvill (1959) 168 Cal.App.2d 490, 492 (Harvill).)

"In addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, the reviewing court must examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The appellate court presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citations.] The same standard applies when the conviction rests primarily on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.] [I]t is the jury, [or the juvenile court in this case,] not the appellate court that must be convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] `"If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment."'" (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053-1054; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) We must accept all logical inferences that the juvenile court might have drawn from circumstantial evidence. (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 396.) Before we can set aside a judgment for insufficiency of the evidence, it must clearly appear that upon no hypothesis whatever was there substantial evidence to support the verdict. (People v. Conners (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 443, 453.)

Vehicle Code section 23109, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part:

In Harvill, supra, 168 Cal.App.2d 490, the court explained that "[t]here is no case authority or statutory definition as to what is meant by `speed contest' . . . in this particular section of the Vehicle Code. Webster's New International Dictionary, 2d edition, defines contest as: `Earnest struggle for superiority, victory, defense, etc.; competion; . . . .'" (Id. at p. 492.) The Harvill court concluded: "While there is a conflict in the evidence as to the speed of the cars involved and as to whether there was a speed contest or exhibition of speed, there was sufficient substantial evidence presented by the traffic officer from which the court could reasonably infer that appellant by `revving up' his engine and by speeding at a rate of 55-60 miles per hour was exhibiting or displaying the speed of his car to the female occupants of the Buick. The testimony of the officer that he saw the cars running `neck and neck' at a speed of 50-55 miles per hour in a 35-mile zone and that appellant's car caught up with and passed the Buick, and other circumstances, are sufficient to support the `speed contest' charge." (Id. at p. 493; see Tischoff v. Wolfchief (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 703, 706 [vehicles traveling side by side at 70 miles per hour in a 30-mile-per-hour zone "reasonably supports a conclusion they were either racing or indulging in a bit of automotive skylarking, goading each other to excessive speed"].)

Here, Officer Rowland testified he heard both engines revving as they approached him, and he observed the two cars alone on the road running neck and neck at a speed of 65 to 70 miles per hour in a 45-mile-per-hour zone for about six blocks. He saw the Subaru dart out of its lane and shoot back again to get around a slower vehicle in its way, then accelerate and pass the Mustang. Minor testified he was aware the Subaru driver was affiliated with a racing club when he saw the sticker as the car entered the road. These circumstances together provided substantial evidence that defendant was engaged in a race with the Subaru, rather than merely speeding independently at the same time and place as the Subaru.

DISPOSITION

The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.