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BENKE, J.

Defendant Manoj Chawla (Chawla) appeals a judgment for plaintiff Ashok Israni (Israni). Israni filed a complaint against Chawla alleging numerous causes of action arising from Chawla's failure to pay Israni under a settlement agreement. The trial court entered judgment on special verdicts awarding Israni $724,973 on his fraudulent transfer claim; $624,332 on his claims for breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and money had and received;1 $1 on his breach of fiduciary duty claim;2 and $5,000 in punitive damages. The trial court denied Chawla's motions for new trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), and he appeals.

Chawla contends on appeal that the fraudulent transfer award is improper because it exceeds the amount of the "claim" in violation of Civil Code section 3439.08, subdivision (b)(1)3 and because it imposes an impermissible double recovery on Chawla. Chawla also contends that the special verdict form for the fraudulent transfer claim was fatally defective because it did not require the jury to make a "good faith" finding. Lastly, Chawla contends there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of a "transfer" within the meaning of section 3439.01, subdivision (m).

We conclude the court erred when it allowed the damages award to stand for both the breach of settlement and fraudulent transfer claims.4 We therefore modify the judgment by striking in its entirety the fraudulent transfer damage award and the $5,000 punitive damages award.5 We affirm the judgment as so modified.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Background of Initial Dispute

In 2002, Israni hired his nephew, Chawla, to work in his real estate business. Chawla was eventually promoted to run his own department buying and selling distressed properties. In 2013, Israni discovered Chawla had created a competing business, Oceanic Companies, Inc. (Oceanic), and was cherry-picking the best properties for himself and retaining all the profits. Israni and his other nephew partners fired Chawla and filed suit against him. The lawsuit was resolved in mediation, and the parties signed a settlement agreement.

In pertinent part, the settlement agreement provided:

After signing the settlement agreement, Chawla did not convey to Israni the 20 percent of his net equity interest in the six hotels. Each of the six hotels were owned by limited partnerships formed by Chawla and were managed by Chawla's company, Oceanic. Chawla and the limited partnerships sold four of the six hotels without informing Israni or sharing any of the profits. Each of the limited partnerships paid Oceanic "asset appreciation fees" out of the sale proceeds from the four hotels. The asset appreciation fees totaled approximately $900,000.

B. Present Action

In June 2014, Israni sued Chawla, Oceanic, and others for: (1) breach of settlement agreement; (2) breach of fiduciary duty; and (3) fraudulent transfers in violation of sections 3439.04, subdivision (a), 3439.07, and 3439.08. The claims against the defendants other than Chawla and Oceanic were eventually dismissed. Israni argued that the asset appreciation fees transferred to Oceanic were fraudulent transfers. Israni's damages expert calculated Israni's 20 percent net equity interest at $1,065,249. Chawla's damages expert calculated Israni's 20 percent net equity interest at $70,037 for the four hotels that had been sold, plus $220,110 for the two not yet sold. Both experts agreed that the total amount of the asset appreciation fees paid on the four sold properties was $906,217.

The jury returned a verdict finding Chawla liable on all claims and Oceanic liable on the fraudulent transfer claim. As noted, for breach of settlement agreement, the jury awarded a single sum of $624,332. For breach of fiduciary duty, as also noted the jury awarded Israni $1. The jury also awarded $724,973 against Chawla and $1 against Oceanic for fraudulent transfers. Lastly, the jury found that both Chawla and Oceanic acted with malice, oppression, or fraud. After the verdict was read, Israni dismissed the request for punitive damages against Oceanic. The jury then awarded $5,000 in punitive damages against Chawla only.

Chawla filed motions for new trial and JNOV, arguing that the judgment violated section 3439.08, subdivision (b)(1) by awarding a fraudulent transfer judgment in excess of the "claim" and in addition to the breach of settlement damages and, as such, provided an impermissible double recovery to Israni. The trial court denied both motions, generally stating, "[t]he Court is satisfied that there exists a rational foundation in the evidence to support the award of damages in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant, and the fraudulent transfer amount does not impose an impermissible double recovery against Defendant."

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This appeal primarily involves statutory interpretation that is a question of law. As such, we are not bound by the trial court's decision and we conduct an independent review. (John v. Superior Court (2016) 63 Cal.4th 91, 95 ["We review questions of statutory construction de novo"].) Significant to the issue(s) here is whether a plaintiff is entitled to a particular measure of damages, as opposed to the amount of damages themselves, which is also a question of law subject to our independent review. (Rony v. Costa (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 746, 753.)

B. Governing Law

Under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA) (amended in 2015 to the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (UVTA);7 § 3439 et seq.), a transfer made by a debtor is voidable as to a creditor if the debtor made the transfer with the intent to defraud the creditor or without receiving reasonably equivalent value in exchange. (§ 3439.04, subd. (a).)

The UVTA makes a number of remedies available. A successful plaintiff may void the fraudulent transfer "to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim"; obtain an "attachment or other provisional remedy against the asset transferred or other property of the transferee"; or seek any "other relief the circumstances may require." (§ 3439.07, subd. (a).) A successful plaintiff may also "recover judgment for the value of the asset transferred . . . or the amount necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim, whichever is less." (§ 3439.08, subd. (b)(1), italics added.) The judgment may be entered against either "[t]he first transferee of the asset or the person for whose benefit the transfer was made." (§ 3439.08, subd. (b)(1)(A).)

"A creditor who successfully attacks a transfer under the UFTA is not automatically entitled to a money judgment against the person for whose benefit the transfer was made." (Renda v. Nevarez (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1231, 1237 (Renda).) Key to the instant case, a "plaintiff is entitled to only a single recovery for a distinct harm suffered, and double or duplicative recovery for the same harm is prohibited." (Ibid.) "The UFTA does not impose on the debtor any liability additional to or distinct from the existing claim of the creditor; it simply allows the creditor to obtain `[a]voidance of the transfer . . . to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim.'" (Id. at p. 1238, italics added.) "A `defrauded creditor is not entitled to an enhancement of position beyond what it was before the fraud.'" (Ibid.)

C. Analysis

The above rules teach that the UVTA does not impose on Chawla any liability additional to or distinct from Israni's existing underlying claim; it simply allows the creditor to obtain "[a]voidance of the transfer . . . to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim." (§ 3439.07, subd. (a)(1); see Renda, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1238.) This is because the UVTA further teaches that the "`primary remedy' "under the statutory scheme "`is a declaration that the fraudulent conveyance is void as to the judgment creditor. In other words, the remedy sought is to return the property fraudulently conveyed to its prior status of ownership thereby bringing it within reach of the judgment creditor of the fraudulent transferor.'" (Renda, at p. 1238, italics added, citing Miller v. Kaiser (1967) 164 Colo. 206, 211-212 [interpreting a parallel provision of the UVTA].)

Interpreting the UVTA independently, we conclude the trial court incorrectly allowed the damages awarded to Israni under his fraudulent transfer claim to stand because Israni was fully compensated under his breach of settlement claim for the single harm caused by Chawla's conduct: the failure to convey to Israni the 20 percent of Chawla's net equity interest in the six hotels, as required under the settlement. Quite simply, Israni was not entitled to any damages in addition to those for his breach of settlement agreement as a result of Chawla's fraudulent transfers. As such, we independently conclude the additional damages awarded to Israni under his fraudulent transfer claim constituted a double recovery in clear violation of the UVTA. (See § 3439.08, subd. (b)(1).)

Separate and apart from the UVTA, it is a well-established principle that a plaintiff "is not entitled to more than a single recovery for each distinct item of compensable damage supported by the evidence. [Citation.] Double or duplicative recovery for the same items of damage amounts to overcompensation and is therefore prohibited." (Tavaglione v. Billings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1150, 1158-1159.)

Here, the record shows Israni was awarded damages for the harm suffered from Chawla's breach of the settlement agreement. There is no indication in the record that the $624,332 awarded to Israni for breach of the settlement agreement did not constitute a full and complete recovery of the 20 percent of the asset appreciation fees that he was entitled to through that agreement. Because Israni was fully compensated by the jury under his breach of settlement claim, he was not entitled to additional compensation on his fraudulent transfer claim, particularly in light of the fact that Chawla did not increase his liability as to Israni merely by transferring monies to Oceanic; by statute, the amount of monetary liability remains the same. (See § 3439.08, subd. (b)(1) [noting a successful plaintiff such as Israni here may also "recover judgment for the value of the asset transferred . . . or the amount necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim, whichever is less" (italics added)]; see also Renda, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1237 [noting a "plaintiff is entitled to only a single recovery for a distinct harm suffered, and double or duplicative recovery for the same harm is prohibited"].)

Our conclusion is further supported by the amount of damages the jury attempted to award Israni on his fraudulent transfer claim: we note $724,973 is exactly 80 percent of the total amount of asset appreciation fees Chawla transferred to Oceanic, as confirmed by Israni in the trial court.8 Clearly, under the settlement agreement Israni was not entitled to 80 percent of the asset appreciation fees, but rather only 20 percent, which amount, as we have determined, was already awarded in connection with his breach of settlement agreement claim. As such, we conclude Israni is not entitled to an additional award of 80 percent under his fraudulent transfer claim, as an award of such damages not only violated the terms of the settlement but also would create an impermissible double recovery in clear violation of the UVTA (see § 3439.08, subd. (b)(1)) and our common law (see Tavaglione v. Billings, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 1158-1159).

Israni argues that Chawla should be separately liable because he should not be permitted to "profit from his own wrongdoing." The plaintiff in Renda made an identical argument that was soundly rejected by this court. (See Renda, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1241 [rejecting the policy argument that the UVTA should be amended to provide additional liability and monetary damages against debtors].) Indeed, if Israni "believes the result is unfair and additional remedies under the UFTA are needed to deter debtors from transferring assets to avoid paying prior judgments, he must address his concerns to the Legislature, not to this court." (See Renda, at p. 1241.)

Israni further argues that Chawla has waived or otherwise forfeited his objections to the judgment because he did not request a jury instruction about how to compute damages under the UVTA, an instruction on duplicative damages, or a special verdict form with factual findings identifying duplicative damages.9 However, Chawla's failure to direct the jury on duplicative damages does not allow Israni to circumvent the rule against double recovery and violate the explicit provisions of the UVTA.

In Shell v. Schmidt (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 279, 291-294 (Shell), the court held the plaintiff could not recover damages through both fraud and breach of contract theories of recovery, stating as follows: "[N]o matter how many theories of recovery were stated or proved, respondents were entitled to but one recovery. . . . Double recovery could not be secured lawfully for the same identical plans and specifications. Once they have been reimbursed for their damages, regardless upon what theory such reimbursement is made, they have no lawful right to any more damages." (Id. at p. 291.)

Shell informs our decision in the instant case. The jury in Shell, pursuant to misleading instructions from the trial court, awarded the plaintiff damages on both the fraud and the breach of contract counts. (Shell, supra, 126 Cal.App.2d at pp. 292-294.) The court held "[t]his was error of a most serious nature." (Id. at p. 292.) Similarly, Israni was not entitled to an award for breach of the settlement agreement and a separate compensatory award under a fraudulent transfer theory.

In sum, when a trial court makes a clear, uncontroverted, and prejudicial error of law in the formulation or award of damages, the appellate court may, to avoid subjecting the parties to any further delay or expense, modify the judgment and affirm it, rather than remand it for a new determination. (Maughan v. Correia (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 507, 523; Orthopedic Systems, Inc. v. Schlein (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 529, 547; see Code Civ. Proc., § 43 [the courts of appeal may modify any judgment or order appealed from and may direct the proper judgment or order to be entered].) Here, the trial court erred when it found Israni was entitled to damages on both his breach of settlement and his fraudulent transfer claims, as this amounted to a double recovery in excess of Israni's claim as a creditor under the UVTA. We thus will modify the judgment by striking in its entirety the award of damages for fraudulent transfer.

Further, because Israni is not entitled to any damages for fraudulent transfers and because the jury only awarded him $1 on his breach of fiduciary duty claim, we conclude the $5,000 punitive damage award is improper. First, it is settled that punitive damages are not recoverable in a contract action. (§ 3294, subd. (a); Frazier v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 90, 106 [holding punitive damages cannot be awarded based on a breach of contract even when the defendant's breach was willful or fraudulent].)

Second, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits punitive damages awards that are "grossly excessive." (BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore (1996) 517 U.S. 559, 568.) To determine if an award of punitive damages is grossly excessive, the court must consider, among other factors, whether the "measure of punishment is both reasonable and proportionate to the amount of harm to the plaintiff" by comparing the amount of compensatory damages to the amount of punitive damages. (State Farm Mut. Ins. v. Campbell (2003) 538 U.S. 408, 426.) "Absent special justification, ratios of punitive damages to compensatory damages that greatly exceed 9 or 10 to 1 are presumed to be excessive and therefore unconstitutional." (Nickerson v. Stonebridge Life Ins. Co. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 363, 367.) According to this analysis, we conclude the jury award of $5,000 in punitive damages, when compared to the $1 award for breach of fiduciary duty, is grossly excessive and thereby unconstitutional, and we therefore will strike the entire punitive damages award.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is modified by striking (1) the $724,973 damages awarded for the fraudulent transfer claim and (2) the $5,000 award of punitive damages. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed. Each party is to bear his own costs on appeal.

McCONNELL, P. J. and NARES, J., concurs.