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OPINION

MILLER, Acting P. J.

In a first amended complaint, plaintiff and appellant Erica D. Brumfield (Renter) sued defendant and respondent Kyung Ho Choi (Owner) and Don Investments, Inc., a Nevada Corporation (Don Investments). Intervener and respondent Allied Property and Casualty Insurance Company (Insurer) intervened because Don Investments is a forfeited corporation. Renter brought causes for action for (1) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (2) negligent infliction of emotional distress. Owner and Insurer demurred. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed the case with prejudice. Renter contends the trial court erred by sustaining the demurrer. We affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

The facts in this subsection are taken from Renter's first amended complaint (FAC) and the exhibits attached to the FAC. Owner owned a residential property in Rialto (the residence). Don Investments managed the residence. The residence was leased by Tiesha Easter and Byron Moore. Renter was Moore's girlfriend. Renter lived at the residence. Six children also lived at the residence.

In April 2012, a one-year-old child nearly drowned in a swimming pool located in the backyard of the residence. On April 25, a notice of code violation was served on Owner by the City of Rialto (the City). Pool enclosure violations were included in the notice. Corrections/repairs were not made by Owner.

On June 14, Brayon Jamal Johnson (the child), an 18-month old child, drowned in the swimming pool in the backyard of the residence. Renter was at work at the time of the drowning. Renter had never been entrusted with custody of the child or with caring for the child.

On July 2, Owner was interviewed by a Rialto Police Detective. The facts in this paragraph are taken primarily from a transcript of the interview, which was attached to the FAC as an exhibit. At some point, Owner went to the residence to repair the pool barrier, but he was unable to make repairs due to a gate to the backyard being locked. Owner and Renter spoke about the repairs. Renter told Owner the City had placed the lock on the gate. Owner believed Renter did not have a key to the lock. Owner said, "`I'm gonna get the key or find a way to get in.'" Owner left the residence without making the repairs. The Detective told Owner that Renter had the key to the lock, and, at some point, Renter had removed the lock.

On February 21, 2013, the San Bernardino County District Attorney charged Renter with willful harm or injury to a child (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a)). The complaint was later amended to add an allegation that the victim was under five years old (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (d)). On September 28, 2015, the District Attorney dismissed the charges against Renter (Pen. Code, § 1385).

Renter filed her original complaint on October 27, 2015. In Renter's first cause of action, for intentional infliction of emotional distress, she alleged (1) Owner's intentional refusal to fix the pool barrier and (2) Owner's intentional refusal to take responsibility for the death at the time of the police interview, caused Renter emotional distress because Renter was criminally charged with the child's death. Renter asserted she suffered emotional distress from the 2012 drowning through the time the charges were dismissed in 2015, and therefore the "harm was ongoing."

In Renter's second cause of action, for negligent infliction of emotional distress, she alleged Owner was negligent in failing to repair the pool barrier, and that, but for Owner's negligence, Renter would not have been criminally charged with the child's death. Further, Renter alleged that Owner's failure to take responsibility for the drowning at the time of the police interview caused Renter emotional distress. Renter asserted she "suffer[ed] for more than three years as a defendant in a criminal court."

B. DEMURRER

Owner and Insurer demurred to Renter's FAC. Owner and Insurer asserted (1) Owner had no duty to protect Renter from criminal prosecution; (2) Renter's causes of action were time-barred; (3) Renter failed to allege outrageous conduct; and (4) Renter failed to plead facts sufficient to set forth a negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) claim.

C. OPPOSITION

Renter opposed the demurrer. Renter asserted (1) Owner had a duty to keep the residence in a safe and habitable condition; (2) Renter's causes of action were not time-barred because the harm was ongoing until September 2015 when the criminal charges were dismissed; (3) Owner was reckless in failing to repair the pool barrier; and (4) Renter pled sufficient facts for a NIED claim.

D. JUDGMENT

A reporter's transcript is not included in the record on appeal. A minute order reflects the trial court issued a tentative ruling on the demurrer. The parties submitted on the tentative ruling without argument. The trial court adopted its tentative ruling. The demurrer was sustained without leave to amend. No reasons for the trial court's ruling are reflected in the record.

DISCUSSION

Renter contends the trial court erred by sustaining the demurrer because her causes of action are not time-barred. We will assume, for the sake of addressing this contention, that the trial court sustained the demurrer due to the causes of action being time-barred.

"On appeal from a judgment dismissing an action after the sustaining of a demurrer, our review is de novo. [Citation.] For the limited purpose of reviewing the propriety of the trial court's ruling, we accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the operative complaint, as well as any facts that may be reasonably implied or inferred from those expressly alleged. [Citation.] We also consider the exhibits attached to the pleading." (Foxen v. Carpenter (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 284, 287-288.) "`In order for the bar of the statute of limitations to be raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint shows merely that the action may be barred.'" (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315-1316.)

Emotional distress causes of action are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. (Code Civ. Proc., § 335.1; Pugliese v. Superior Court (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1450.) "A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, once the plaintiff suffers severe emotional distress as a result of outrageous conduct on the part of the defendant." (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 889.)

"[T]here is no independent tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. [Citation.] The tort is negligence." (Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 984.) For a negligence cause of action, the statute of limitations begins running when the plaintiff is injured by the defendant's breach of his duty. (Wood v. Currey (1881) 57 Cal. 208, 210; San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. W.R. Grace & Co. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1326 (San Francisco).)

"If the last element of the cause of action to occur is damage, the statute of limitations begins to run on the occurrence of `appreciable and actual harm, however uncertain in amount,' that consists of more than nominal damages. [Citations.] `. . . [O]nce plaintiff has suffered actual and appreciable harm, neither the speculative nor uncertain character of damages nor the difficulty of proof will toll the period of limitation.'" (San Francisco, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 1326.)

Owner failed to fix the pool barrier in June 2012. Owner was interviewed by police on July 2, 2012. Renter was charged with willful harm or injury to a child (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a)) on February 21, 2013. Renter filed her original complaint on October 27, 2015. Renter alleged, in both causes of action, that she suffered "severe emotional distress due to the fact that she wrongly faced felony criminal charges."

The alleged outrageous conduct and breach of duty occurred in June and July 2012. The alleged damages occurred in February 2013, when Renter faced criminal charges. Therefore, the statute of limitations began running in February 2013. The two-year statute of limitations expired in February 2015. Renter's case is time-barred because her original complaint was filed in October 2015, which is more than two years after the causes of action accrued. The trial court did not err by sustaining the demurrer.

Renter contends her case is not time-barred because the criminal prosecution was a continuing violation. "[T]he theory of continuous accrual . . . is a response to the inequities that would arise if the expiration of the limitations period following a first breach of duty or instance of misconduct were treated as sufficient to bar suit for any subsequent breach or misconduct; parties engaged in long-standing misfeasance would thereby obtain immunity in perpetuity from suit even for recent and ongoing misfeasance." (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1198.)

Owner's alleged breach and outrageous conduct ended in July 2012. Renter did not allege subsequent acts by Owner. Therefore, the FAC does not reflect Owner will evade suit for ongoing acts of misconduct if the continuous accrual theory is not applied. In sum, Renter has failed to allege facts reflecting the continuous accrual theory is applicable in this case.

Renter asserts the continuous accrual theory applies because her "severe emotional distress was ongoing and continued until September 2015," when the charges against her were dismissed. Contrary to Renter's position, the damages element of a cause of action is sufficiently complete for the statute of limitations to begin accruing when a plaintiff suffers "actual and appreciable harm." (San Francisco, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 1326.) In this case, Renter alleges she suffered severe harm when charges were filed against her in February 2013. Thus, the damages element was complete in February 2013. The allegation that Renter's damages continued accruing does not equate with acts of misconduct continuing to accrue. (See Ibid. [uncertainty of damages does not toll the statute of limitations].)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs on appeal.

SLOUGH, J. and FIELDS, J., concurs.