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OPINION

McKINSTER, J.

Defendant and appellant Gilberto Lopez-Valencia appeals from the trial court's denial of his motion to reduce his felony conviction to a misdemeanor, pursuant to Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b).1 We reverse and remand.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 6, 2014, the San Bernardino County District Attorney's Office filed a felony complaint charging defendant with cultivating marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11358, count 1) and manufacturing a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379.6, subd. (a), count 2).

On November 12, 2014, the complaint was orally amended to add a charge of being an accessory after the fact. (§ 32, count 4.)2 Defendant pled guilty to count 4. In exchange, the court dismissed the remaining counts, withheld pronouncement of judgment, and placed him on probation for 36 months, under specified terms, including a credit for time served of 84 days.

On March 11, 2015, the Superior Court of San Bernardino County transferred defendant's case to Riverside County. Defendant was committed to the care and custody of the Riverside County Probation Department.

On May 25, 2016, defendant filed a motion to reduce his felony conviction to a misdemeanor under section 17, subdivision (b)(3) (motion to reduce). He alleged that he had dutifully fulfilled his conditions of probation, paid all fines, and had not suffered any further arrests or convictions since his arrest date of October 2, 2014. He alleged that he had accepted responsibility and displayed remorse for his criminal conduct, as evidenced by him entering the plea agreement. He further argued there was nothing in the plea agreement that prohibited him from seeking a reduction of his offense, and that the Superior Court of Riverside County had the jurisdiction to rule on the motion. Thus, based on his "exceptional performance on probation and lack of any further law contacts," defendant requested the court to reduce his conviction for a violation of section 32 from a felony to a misdemeanor. He also requested "that the suspended sentence be stricken and [the record] reflect a sentence of Defendant being granted credit for actual time served of 42 days." Defendant attached a declaration to the motion, stating that he currently worked as a house painter and wanted to start his own business, which would require a valid contractor's license and insurance; however, he would be unable to obtain either with a felony on his record.

The People filed an opposition to the motion requesting that the court deny relief under section 17, subdivision (b), because defendant had not completed probation.

The court held a hearing on the motion on June 22, 2016. At the outset, the court asked defense counsel why it should grant the motion before probation was completed. Defense counsel responded that it had been 18 months since defendant's conviction without any violations, and defendant had paid all his fines. He noted that there was nothing in section 17, subdivision (b), that said he had to wait until probation was completed. Defense counsel cited People v. Feyrer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 426 (Feyrer), which stated that the plea agreement in that case did not deprive the trial court of discretionary authority under section 17, subdivision (b), to declare a wobbler offense to be a misdemeanor when probation was granted without imposition of sentence. Thus, defense counsel argued that the court should grant the motion, based on defendant's exemplary performance on probation. The prosecutor replied that defendant had not been on probation long enough to say he was exemplary. He also argued that People v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921 applied to state that a court cannot modify a negotiated-for disposition. In the alternative, the prosecutor argued that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to undermine a bargained for disposition by reducing it to a misdemeanor before the bargained for period.

The court stated that there were several issues. The first issue concerned section 17, subdivision (b). The court stated that defendant could bring a section 17, subdivision (b) motion at any time, and the plea form did not prevent that. The second issue was whether the court had the authority to "do something that is contrary to the plea agreement," and the court said it did. The third issue the court cited was that since defendant made his agreement in San Bernardino and then had the case transferred to Riverside for probation supervision, it did not have all the details of the case. The court noted that probation was set to expire on November 12, 2017, and that it looked like defendant "made a pretty good deal with the D.A. in San Bernardino." The court concluded, "since we don't have all the details, because it's from another county, and we don't have privy [sic] to everything like we would have to a case that's here, and because I don't see any good reason for granting the motion—you know, I might have a different opinion on November 13, 2017, but right now [the] motion is denied." Defense counsel then clarified for the record that the court was denying the motion on all three grounds discussed, and the court confirmed that it was.

On August 9, 2016, defendant filed a notice of appeal, alleging that the appeal was "based on the sentence or other matters occurring after the plea that do not affect the validity of the plea," and based on the denial of the motion to reduce his conviction to a misdemeanor pursuant to section 17, subdivision (b)(3). He filed a certificate of probable cause, which the court denied.

ANALYSIS

I. The Motion to Dismiss is Denied

The People filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, which we reserved for determination with the appeal. The People argue that the appeal should be dismissed because: (1) the denial of the motion to reduce is an unappealable order since it did not affect defendant's substantial rights under section 1237, subdivision (b); and (2) defendant pled guilty and failed to obtain a certificate of probable cause. (§ 1237.5.) We conclude that the motion to dismiss should be denied.

The People first claim that the court's denial of defendant's motion to reduce his conviction is not appealable, since it did not affect his substantial rights. Section 1237, subdivision (b), provides that a defendant may appeal "[f]rom any order made after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the party." The People reason that the court, in effect, denied defendant's motion without prejudice, since it allegedly informed him "he could file his motion again in the future." The People cite to the court's comment that it did not see any good reason for granting the motion, but it could "have a different opinion on November 13, 2017." Thus, the People claim the court's order was "an interim order that did not affect [defendant's] `substantial rights' or render it appealable." The People's logic is perplexing. They appear to be arguing that the court's denial order did not affect defendant's substantial rights because he can file his motion again, at the end of his probation term. However, just because defendant may be able to file another motion does not mean the current order is not appealable. Moreover, the People fail to provide any case law stating that a denial of a section 17 motion is a nonappealable order. Rather, the People make inapposite comparisons of cases where courts have held a defendant's "substantial rights" were affected.

"[A]n order suspending imposition of sentence and granting probation is considered a final judgment (§ 1237, subd. (a)), with the consequence that orders made after the grant of probation are generally appealable by the defendant as `[f]rom any order made after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the party.'" (People v. Douglas (1999) 20 Cal.4th 85, 91 [the Supreme Court held that a § 17, subd. (b)(3) order was made "`after'" the judgment granting probation, and it was therefore appealable by the People under § 1238, subd. (a)(5)].) Moreover, the decision to reduce a wobbler offense from a felony to a misdemeanor under section 17, subdivision (b), rests with the court's discretion, and such decision is reviewable for abuse of discretion. (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 976-977 (Alvarez); see Feyrer, supra, 48 Cal.4th 426 & People v. Tran (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 877 (Tran).)

As to the People's claim that defendant cannot appeal the denial since he failed to obtain a certificate of probable cause, we disagree. "Generally, under section 1237.5, a defendant may not appeal from a judgment of conviction following a guilty or no contest plea, unless he files with the trial court a written, sworn statement `showing reasonable, constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings,' (§ 1237.5, subd. (a)), and the trial court executes and files `a certificate of probable cause for such appeal with the county clerk' (§ 1237.5, subd. (b))." (People v. Cole (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 850, 859.) The exception to section 1237.5 is that "[t]he defendant may take an appeal without a statement of certificate grounds or a certificate of probable cause if he does so solely on noncertificate grounds, which go to postplea matters not challenging his plea's validity and/or matters involving a search or seizure whose lawfulness was contested pursuant to section 1538.5." (People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1096.)

The People specifically argue that defendant is "seek[ing] to invalidate the very terms of his plea agreement that he negotiated as part of the plea bargain"; therefore, he is challenging the validity of his guilty plea. In support of this claim, they assert that, as part of the plea agreement, defendant agreed to wait until the end of his probationary period to file a motion to reduce his conviction. However, the record does not reflect any such agreement. The People also cite the provision in the written plea form which states that defendant would "waive and give up any right to appeal from any motion [he] may have brought or could bring and from the conviction and judgment in [his] case since [he was] getting the benefit of [his] plea bargain." This provision, read in the context of the plea agreement, appears to be referring to those motions he could have brought with regard to the original proceedings. Moreover, defendant entered the agreement, the court placed him on probation, and he subsequently requested the court to reduce his conviction to a misdemeanor, which the court denied. He is now challenging the trial court's exercise of discretion under section 17, subdivision (b); thus, it is a postplea matter extraneous to the plea agreement. In other words, his challenge does not attack the validity of the plea, but rather an asserted error in the proceeding held subsequently to determine whether to reduce his crime to a misdemeanor. Therefore, a probable cause certificate is not required.

Furthermore, to impose the requirements of section 1237.5 would deny defendant an appeal in a situation in which an appeal is permitted. (See Feyrer, supra, 48 Cal.4th 426.) The primary purpose of section 1237.5 is to prevent the taking of frivolous appeals based on the asserted invalidity of guilty pleas. This purpose should not be confused with the separate procedure of determining whether to reduce a wobbler under section 17, subdivision (b), in a subsequent hearing. (See People v. Ward (1967) 66 Cal.2d 571, 576-577 ["The primary purpose of [section 1237.5], to prevent the taking of frivolous appeals based on the asserted invalidity of pleas of guilty, must not be confused with the entirely separate and settled procedure relating to the determination of asserted errors occurring in subsequent hearings to ascertain the degree of a crime and the penalty to be imposed."].)

II. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Denying Defendant's Motion to Reduce His Felony Conviction to a Misdemeanor

Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to reduce his felony conviction to a misdemeanor under section 17, subdivision (b). He argues that the court relied upon improper bases to deny the motion, such as the "negotiated for disposition" theory, the contention that the motion to reduce was contrary to the plea agreement, the fact that the case was transferred from San Bernardino, and the conclusory finding that the court did not "see any good reason for granting the motion." Defendant thus requests this court to remand the matter. We conclude that the court failed to exercise its discretion properly and will order a remand.3

Section 17, subdivision (b)(3), provides that "[w]hen a crime is punishable, in the discretion of the court, either by imprisonment in the state prison or imprisonment in a county jail . . . it is a misdemeanor for all purposes. [¶] . . . [¶] When the court grants probation to a defendant without imposition of sentence and at the time of granting probation, or on application of the defendant or probation officer thereafter, the court declares the offense to be a misdemeanor." (Italics added.) In other words, section 17, subdivision (b)(3), empowers the trial court to declare a wobbler offense a misdemeanor, in that situation, upon application of the defendant. (§ 17, subd. (b)(3).) The decision to reduce a wobbler offense rests with the trial court's discretion. (Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th 968, 977.) The burden falls upon the defendant to demonstrate that the trial court's decision is arbitrary or unreasonable. (Ibid.) "[A] trial court will abuse its discretion . . . if it relies upon circumstances that are not relevant to the decision or that otherwise constitute an improper basis for decision. [Citations.] A failure to exercise discretion also may constitute an abuse of discretion. [Citations.]" (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847-848.)

"An application by a defendant to have the trial court declare a `wobbler' a misdemeanor may be made at any time, even after probation is terminated [citation], and in permitting this application, section 17, subdivision (b)(3) does not distinguish between convictions obtained by guilty pleas and those obtained after trials." (People v. Wood (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1267, fn. 3 (Wood); see Meyer v. Superior Court (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 133, 136 [a defendant may request the court reduce a felony offense to a misdemeanor during or after his probationary period]; Feyrer, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 439-440 [probation statutes confer jurisdiction upon trial court to reclassify offense during the term of probation].)

Factors that the court should consider in its exercise of discretion regarding section 17, subdivision (b) offenses include "`the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant's appreciation of and attitude toward the offense, or his traits of character as evidenced by his behavior and demeanor at the trial.'" (Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 978.) The facts and circumstances of the offense "are weighed against other circumstances, including the defendant's conduct on probation, postprobation behavior, efforts at rehabilitation, and the longevity and duration of his or her rehabilitation." (Tran, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 892.) "When appropriate, judges should also consider the general objectives of sentencing such as those set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 410." (Ibid.)4 "The balancing of these facts and circumstances is within the discretion of the trial court." (Ibid.)

Here, defendant's probation was transferred from Superior Court of San Bernardino County to Superior Court of Riverside County, which gave the latter jurisdiction over the entire case. (§ 1203.9, subd. (b).) Thus, the court had jurisdiction to rule on defendant's motion. However, the record demonstrates that the court did not rely on the proper factors in denying the motion. The court stated that there were several issues in this case. The first "issue" it addressed was "the 17(b) issue on the case." The court noted that the case was a wobbler, and stated that defendant could bring a section 17 motion "at any time." The court specifically stated that the plea form did not prohibit that. The court delineated the second issue as being the prosecutor's argument that allowing defendant to bring the motion was "inappropriate because everybody made an agreement." The court then asserted the following: "And we often do cases where the D.A. will say, after one year of successful probation, you can bring a 17(b). But absent that, it has to be a situation like where you override the D.A.'s objection saying we made a deal and now you're trying to unwind it." Next, the court stated: "The other issue is . . . does the judge have the authority to do something that is contrary to the plea agreement. And the answer is yes." The court then listed the last issue as, "it's not a Riverside case. We don't have all the details. He made his agreement in San Bernardino County, and then the case was transferred here for probation supervision." The court concluded: "[S]ince we don't have all the details, because it's from another county, and we don't have privy [sic] to everything like we would have to a case that's here, and because I don't see any good reason for granting the motion — you know, I might have a different opinion on November 13, 2017 [after defendant's probation expired], but right now your motion is denied."

The court's decision is confusing, at best. It first identified two issues, but then appeared to resolve them, stating that defendant could bring a section 17, subdivision (b) motion at any time, and that it had the authority to do something that was contrary to the plea agreement (although it did not specify what it was referring to). Then, it appears the court simply decided that, since the case was from another county and it did not have all the details of the case, it did not see "any good reason for granting the motion." The court seems to be stating that because it did not have any details, such as the nature and circumstances of the case, it did not have "any good reason" for granting the motion. While the nature and circumstances of the case are proper factors to consider (Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 978), the court confusingly added that it "might have a different opinion on November 13th, 2017." If the court was denying the motion because the facts and circumstances of the case were important and they were not before the court, then it begs the question as to why the court suggested its opinion may be different at the close of probation. The court offered no explanation as to why the case or its opinion could change at that time. Furthermore, the record indicates that the court did not consider other required factors, such as defendant's appreciation of and attitude toward the offense, the general objectives of sentencing, defendant's conduct on probation, his efforts at rehabilitation, and the longevity and duration of his rehabilitation. (Tran, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 892; Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 978.)

We note the People do not suggest that the trial court articulated any proper reason for its denial. They claim that the trial court "reasonably concluded that by waiting until [defendant] finished his probation term before granting the motion, the sentencing objectives would be met." However, the record does not reflect that the court made this conclusion. The People then concede that the court did not discuss the Alvarez factors, and they simply assert that "the reviewing court can presume that the trial court considered them." As discussed ante, the record demonstrates otherwise.

We conclude that the court's decision to deny defendant's motion to reduce his conviction to a misdemeanor was not based on proper factors and was irrational and arbitrary. Thus, we reverse the order and remand the matter for a proper exercise of discretion.

DISPOSITION

The motion to dismiss is denied. Furthermore, the court's order denying defendant's motion pursuant to section 17, subdivision (b)(3), is reversed and the matter is remanded for a proper exercise of discretion.

RAMIREZ, P. J. and CODRINGTON, J., concurs.