NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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OPINION

RAMIREZ, P. J.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Michael Alan Woolever of two counts of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1))1 and further found that he personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victims (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). Defendant was granted five years' probation with one of the terms requiring him to serve 365 days in county jail for which he was given credit for time served. (§ 1203, subds. (e)(2), (f).) Defendant appeals, contending the record lacks substantial evidence supporting either conviction because the prosecution failed to prove he was not acting in lawful self-defense. Specifically, defendant contends the record lacks substantial evidence that the force used by him was excessive in relation to the threatened harm.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

On February 24, 2016, Stein and her boyfriend Jackson, who were both transient, were standing outside of a gas station in Victorville waiting to meet a friend. Defendant and a friend of his, who were both transient too, were also at the gas station. Jackson and defendant knew each other from the previous year when they "were camped together."

Defendant approached Jackson and Stein while they were standing on the side of the gas station.2 Defendant and Jackson began arguing about something that had occurred a year earlier. The argument was heated. Defendant threatened to kill Jackson. Stein suggested that Jackson and defendant move into the desert. She believed the two men were going to start physically fighting and did not want the altercation to occur at the gas station, a "public place."

In an attempt to extricate themselves from the argument, Jackson and Stein walked away. They walked toward the back of the gas station. Defendant verbally attacked Jackson and Stein as they were walking away by threatening to kill Jackson, whom he referred to as a "fucking nigger," and threatening to have "his old lady beat [Stein] up." Stein testified that defendant "insist[ed]" on a fight occurring "right then and there." Jackson and Stein sat down at a table located at the back corner of the gas station. They separately estimated they were either 15 or 30 feet away from defendant. Jackson wanted to leave the gas station altogether and head in the direction of a restaurant, which was not in the same parking lot as the gas station. Stein, however, did not want to leave because her friend had not yet arrived. Though Jackson initially started heading toward the restaurant, he aborted departing and rejoined Stein in the area behind the gas station. The argument persisted with defendant threatening to kill both of them.

Defendant verbally threatened Stein and Jackson with a knife. It is unclear when defendant displayed the knife.3 Stein, however, didn't believe the threats to be serious until after a physical altercation ensued.

Due to defendant's continued threats, Stein believed defendant was going to harm Jackson. She testified both that she was "angry and terrified" and that she was just "very angry." Stein, who weighed 93 pounds, then instigated a physical fight with defendant. She got up and started walking toward defendant, who also started heading toward her. Stein then ran toward defendant and threw her plastic cup of soda at him. Jackson was right on Stein's heels. He followed Stein toward defendant, wielding a trash can lid he had grabbed from behind the gas station.4 After Stein threw the cup of soda, defendant turned in Jackson's direction and headed toward him, positioning himself to attack Jackson. Defendant's attack was thwarted by Stein, who was standing behind him. Stein grabbed onto defendant and started pulling on his hooded shirt so that it started coming over his head in what looked to be a possible attempt to impair his vision and possibly immobilize his arms. She testified that she was "trying to pull him down," not pull his shirt over his head. Jackson then began hitting defendant in the back and head with the trash can lid. Because Stein initially had a hold of defendant's shirt, holding it over his head, defendant's body was hunched, facing away from Jackson when the blows with the trash can lid first struck. While in the midst of swinging the lid toward defendant, the lid flew out of Jackson's hands and fell to the ground. Jackson had already landed a couple of blows with it.

After the lid fell out of Jackson's hands, defendant pursued Jackson and started swinging the knife in Jackson's direction, causing Jackson to retreat by taking a few steps backward. The shirt's hood was still on defendant's head when he started to go after Jackson, though it appeared to not be covering his face entirely. While defendant was pursuing Jackson, Stein ran toward defendant and grabbed at his right arm, which was holding the knife. Defendant pulled the hood off of his head. Defendant then turned toward Stein and swung his right arm out to the side of his body and toward Stein. Defendant stabbed Stein twice on the side of her chest. Stein did not have a weapon. Stein did not initially realize she was stabbed, but, rather, thought she had been "socked in the ribs." She instantly disengaged from the fight and eventually sat on the ground.

Immediately after Stein was stabbed, Jackson, who was unarmed, rushed toward defendant. Defendant then swung his knife toward Jackson and stabbed him in the back. Jackson fell to the ground. He kneeled down in front of defendant and held onto defendant. Defendant continued swinging his knife at Jackson and stabbed Jackson again. Jackson let go of defendant and fell to the ground.

Defendant ran away from the gas station. The whole incident from the time Jackson and Stein first interacted with defendant to defendant fleeing the gas station lasted less than four minutes. The entire physical altercation lasted less than 20 seconds.

San Bernardino County Sheriff's deputies and detectives were dispatched. They found defendant approximately a quarter mile away from the gas station. As the deputies and detectives exited their vehicles and were identifying themselves to defendant, defendant reached into his pocket, pulled something out, and threw it to the ground. The deputies retrieved a knife with blood on it and a pink rag from the ground.

Stein was hospitalized for nearly two weeks. She had two open heart surgeries. Jackson also underwent surgery and was hospitalized for eight days.

II. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

Defendant contends that the record lacks substantial evidence that he used excessive force defending himself against the victims' attack and, therefore, that the record lacked substantial evidence that the People carried its burden of disproving defendant acted in lawful self-defense. We disagree.

Under the substantial evidence standard of review, "we are required to review the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, reach all reasonable inferences and deductions presented by the evidence, and resolve all conflicts in favor of the judgment." (People v. Duran (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1375.) The right to act in self-defense is limited to using only "such force as is reasonable under the circumstances." (People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 966, disapproved on another ground in People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 459; People v. Enriquez (1977) 19 Cal.3d 221, 228, disapproved on another ground in People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 898-901 [an assault with fists does not justify using a deadly weapon in self-defense].) When the force used is excessive in relation to the threatened harm, the use of force is not excused. (People v. Hardin (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 625, 629-630.) Whether the force used is excessive is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury to decide. (People v. Young (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 641, 646.) If we can find a reasonable inference that the force used was excessive in relation to the threatened harm, we can conclude substantial evidence supports the jury's verdict finding defendant did not act in lawful self-defense.

The jury could reasonably infer that defendant's use of a knife was excessive. Defendant did not need a knife to defend himself against Stein and Jackson, who were not in possession of any weapons when they were stabbed. Responding to the attack without a weapon likely would have been sufficient and the jury could have reasonably inferred that it would have been reasonable force for defendant to use in response to being attacked by two unarmed assailants. For instance, when Stein ran at defendant and started grabbing at him, she could have been dispatched by being pushed away; she was all of 93 pounds at the time and did not have a weapon. Stein, in fact, was unarmed the moment she threw her plastic cup—that is, to the extent a plastic cup full of soda can be considered a weapon at all. The harm threatened by Stein (with a plastic cup or without) could have been easily warded off with simple brute force.

Moreover, since the trash can lid that Jackson was using to strike defendant had fallen to the ground before defendant began swinging his knife, Jackson too was unarmed when defendant stabbed him. Defendant could have responded to Jackson rushing him by pushing, shoving, or striking Jackson with his fists. We assume without deciding that all of these would be reasonable, proportionate, and nonexcessive responses to the threatened harm. A knife was not.

It is of no avail to defendant that at one point in the altercation his vision was obstructed by Stein pulling the hood of his shirt over his head. By the time defendant stabbed Stein and then Jackson, the hood was not on his head at all, so his vision was unobstructed and a reasonable inference could be drawn that his perception of the threatened harm also was not obstructed. Yet, defendant responded with a knife to being attacked by assailants he could see did not have weapons.

Based on this evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that defendant's use of a knife in response to an attack by unarmed assailants was excessive in relation to the threatened harm.

Defendant's focus on Jackson's use of a "large, metal trash can lid" as a weapon is also of no help to him. We assume without deciding that a trash can lid can be considered a deadly weapon in the right (or, wrong) circumstances. (See In re D.T. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 693, 699 ["When deciding whether an object that is not inherently deadly is nonetheless likely to produce great bodily injury or death, `the trier of fact may consider the nature of the object, the manner in which it is used, and all other facts relevant to the issue.'"].) Here, it is irrelevant since Jackson no longer had possession of the trash can lid when defendant stabbed Jackson, which occurred after he stabbed Stein and after Jackson dropped the lid. Based on this sequence of events, the jury could have reasonably inferred that whatever threat existed from the lid had passed. (See People v. Pinholster, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 966 ["[T]he right of self-defense does not extend beyond the time of real or apparent danger. . . ."].) The jury further could have concluded that a trash can lid and a knife were not equivalent weapons in this fight and consequently that using a knife was excessive in response to the threatened harm. We cannot say this conclusion by the jury was an unreasonable one.

Finally, contrary to defendant's contention, whether, and if, Stein and Jackson lied while testifying is not relevant to our analysis because we cannot reweigh the credibility of the witnesses; that is exclusively the function of the jury. (People v. Sanchez (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 325, 329-330.) The jury was allowed to believe all or part of the testimony of both Stein and Jackson. (People v. Robinson (1964) 61 Cal.2d 373, 389.) Furthermore, since video of the incident was presented as evidence, the jury could have disbelieved all of their testimony and still could have reasonably concluded defendant used excessive force in responding to the physical attack with a knife.5

We conclude that the jury could reasonably infer that defendant's use of a knife constituted excessive force in relation to the threatened harm of being attacked by unarmed assailants and, therefore, that there was substantial evidence disproving that defendant acted in lawful self-defense.

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

McKINSTER, J. and SLOUGH, J., concurs.