NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

MANELLA, P. J.

Appellant Norma Duval appeals the denial of her petition to be appointed administrator of the estate of David Lee Stevens. The probate court instead appointed respondent Richard B. Ashworth, the nominee of Stevens's aunt. Appellant, who had been in a relationship with Stevens for many years, contends she established that she and Stevens had entered into a valid domestic partnership in the state of Minnesota. We conclude that the evidence she presented did not establish the existence of a legal domestic partnership in either Minnesota or California. Accordingly, we affirm the order appointing respondent administrator.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 4, 2017, appellant filed a petition for administration under Probate Code section 8461, claiming to be the domestic partner of Stevens, who died on April 21, 2017.1 In her amended petition, appellant stated she and Stevens had been together since 2007.2 They lived in California throughout their relationship. In 2010, they became engaged. She helped him with his jewelry business, paying for half the hotel bills and gas for him to attend shows. She helped Stevens put his brother's house in order after his brother's suicide, and assisted Stevens in caring for his elderly parents before they died. When Stevens fell ill in 2015 and suffered a head injury in 2016, appellant acted as his intermediary with medical personnel, made medical decisions for him, took care of his household expenses while he was incapacitated, and provided care for him when he returned home. The couple began introducing each other as husband and wife, but Stevens's tax attorney recommended they wait to marry until 2017, after his parents' estate settled.

In late 2016, Stevens asked to be placed on appellant's medical insurance. Appellant worked for UnitedHealth Group (UHG), which, according to appellant, has its principal place of business in Minnetonka, Minnesota. Appellant inquired of UHG's human resources department whether that might be possible and received from the company a form entitled "[UHG] Affidavit of Domestic Partnership" (UHG Affidavit). The couple completed the UHG Affidavit, had it notarized, and submitted it to UHG. It was accepted, and Stevens was added to appellant's insurance effective January 1, 2017. When completed, the UHG Affidavit stated: "We certify that David Stevens is a Domestic Partner of Norma Duval in accordance with the following eligibility criteria," and "We certify we met the . . . eligibility criteria for establishing Domestic Partnership as of 11/21/2016."3

Shortly before Stevens's death, he and appellant hired a realtor in Arizona and began looking for a retirement home. They planned to sell both of their homes in California and purchase a single residence together in Arizona. When Stevens suffered his final illness, the hospital accepted the UHG Affidavit as providing appellant the right to his medical information.

Respondent opposed appellant's petition and filed a separate petition seeking appointment as the nominee of Stevens's aunt.4 The court requested that the parties brief the issue of the validity of appellant's domestic partnership with Stevens. The parties submitted briefs and the court took the matter under submission.5 The court ruled in favor of respondent, finding that appellant was not a "Registered Domestic Partner [of Stevens] under California law," and that respondent, as the nominee of Stevens's aunt, had the higher priority to serve as personal representative of the estate. Appellant moved for reconsideration, which the court denied. The court issued an order appointing respondent administrator of Stevens's estate, granting him "[f]ull authority . . . to administer the estate under the Independent Administration of Estates Act" and instructing him to file "a petition for final distribution [by] December 10, 2018." This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Section 8460 provides: "If a decedent dies intestate, the court shall appoint an administrator as personal representative." (See 14 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (11th ed. 2017) Wills and Probate, § 454, p. 521 ["An `administrator' is a person appointed by the court to manage the estate when the deceased dies intestate."].) Section 8461 provides that a "[s]urviving spouse or domestic partner as defined in Section 37" is entitled to first priority to appointment as administrator.6 Uncles and aunts of the deceased are in the middle of the priority list, after children, siblings, issue of siblings, parents and grandparents. As Stevens had no survivors in any of those categories, there is no dispute that his aunt was entitled to priority if appellant's claim failed. Under probate law, appointment of the person with the highest priority (or his or her nominee) is mandatory, and unless such person is incompetent or disqualified, the court has no right to appoint another. (Estate of Garrett, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 867; Estate of Cummings (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 617, 622.)

The Domestic Partner Act, codified in the Family Code, provides that a domestic partnership is established when the couple "file[s] a Declaration of Domestic Partnership with the Secretary of State pursuant to this division." (Fam. Code, § 297, subd. (b); see Fam. Code, § 298 [directing Secretary of State to prepare form entitled "`Declaration of Domestic Partnership' . . . to meet the requirements of this division"].) From the plain language of the statute, it is clear that to establish a legal domestic partnership, "a declaration of domestic partnership must be filed with the Secretary of State." (Burnham v. Public Employees' Retirement System (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1576, 1583; see also S.D. Myers, Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco (9th Cir. 2003) 336 F.3d 1174, 1178 ["The [Domestic Partner Act] governs the creation and registration of domestic partnerships by imposing detailed requirements and procedures that two individuals must follow before obtaining recognition of their union by the state of California."].)

Although appellant asserted that she and Stevens met the criteria under Family Code section 297 to become domestic partners — neither was married to someone else or in a domestic partnership with someone else, the two were not related by blood or in another way that would prevent them from being married to each other, and both were over 62 years of age (a requirement for opposite sex couples) — she did not contend that they filed a declaration of domestic partnership with the California Secretary of State. Indeed, on appeal she concedes they did not. Accordingly, they failed to meet the explicit requirements of the statute.

Nonetheless, appellant contends that she and Stevens became domestic partners under Minnesota law when they executed the UHG Affidavit provided by her employer, and that the "full faith and credit" clause of the United States Constitution requires California courts to recognize this domestic partnership. She is mistaken. Article IV, section 1 of the United States Constitution provides: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State." The UHG Affidavit executed by appellant and Stevens was a private corporate document, whose sole purpose was to permit unmarried couples to obtain employment benefits voluntarily provided by UHG. It was not a "Public act[], Record[], [or] judicial Proceeding[]," and there is no indication it was created for a governmental purpose or filed with any governmental entity.

Moreover, as appellant acknowledges, the state of Minnesota has no laws providing for, permitting or recognizing domestic partnerships.7 Although California generally recognizes domestic partnerships "validly formed in another jurisdiction" and gives them legal effect here, the legal union at issue must be "substantially equivalent to a domestic partnership as defined [in California]." (Fam. Code, § 299.2; see In re Marriage of G.C. and R.W. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1, 17, 18 [parties' date of union was date they married in California, not date they registered as domestic partners in New Jersey; a New Jersey domestic partnership "is not `substantially equivalent' [citation] to a California domestic partnership for purposes of dissolution" because that state does not afford domestic partners "comparable rights with respect to property division, debt liability, or partner support as California law"].) As Minnesota does not recognize domestic partnerships, it cannot be said that it gives them a legal effect substantially equivalent to a domestic partnership as defined in California.8

Because appellant did not present evidence to establish she had a registered domestic partnership with Stevens in any jurisdiction, the court did not err in denying her petition to be named administrator of Stevens's estate.9

DISPOSITION

The court's order is affirmed. Respondent is awarded his costs on appeal.

WILLHITE, J. and MICON, J.*, concurs.