KYZAR, Judge.
The plaintiffs, Veronica Billeaudeau, individually and as curatrix of Brandi Billeaudeau, and Joseph Doyle Billeaudeau, appeal the trial court judgment granting partial summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Opelousas General Hospital Authority, ordering that during the trial fault would be allocated according to claims and parties. For the following reasons, we affirm.
The Billeaudeaus initially filed a claim under the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act (MMA), La.R.S. 40:1231.1, et seq., and later filed suit alleging medical malpractice and general negligence against Opelousas General Hospital Authority (OGH), among other defendants, for serious injuries allegedly sustained by their daughter, Brandi, while she was being treated in the emergency department at OGH on June 20, 2010. Also named as a defendant was Nautilus Insurance Company (Nautilus), OGH's general liability insurer. The facts of this matter were set forth in detail by this court in Billeaudeau v. Opelousas General Hospital Authority, 15-1034 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/6/16), 189 So.3d 561, writ granted, 16-846 (La. 6/28/16), 192 So.3d 781, wherein we held that the Billeaudeaus' negligent credentialing claim sounded in general negligence, as opposed to medical malpractice which would be pursued under the MMA. The supreme court reviewed the case and affirmed. Billeaudeau v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp. Auth., 16-846 (La. 10/19/16), 218 So.3d 513.
The Billeaudeaus have settled their medical malpractice claims against Dr. Zavala and OGH, while reserving their right to seek damages in excess of $200,000.00 against the Louisiana Patient's Compensation Fund and Oversight Board (PCF), for Dr. Zavala's and OGH's medical malpractice, according to the provisions of the MMA. The Billeaudeaus also reserved their claim for negligent credentialing against OGH, which was carved out of the medical malpractice claim, and is currently set for trial.
Following the decisions by this court and the supreme court, holding that the Billeaudeaus' negligent credentialing claim falls outside the scope of the MMA, OGH filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Need to Allocate Fault to Claims (Not Parties). In the motion, OGH asked that the trial court require the jury to allocate a percentage of fault to each party, Dr. Zavala and OGH, and to further assign a particular percentage of fault for both theories of liability asserted against OGH: medical malpractice and negligent credentialing. The motion was heard on May 5, 2017, after which the trial court granted the motion and later issued a written judgment on July 26, 2017, stating:
It is from this judgment that the Billeaudeaus appeal.
On appeal, the Billeaudeaus raise one assignment of error:
The issue presented by this appeal rests entirely on statutory interpretation. "Questions of law, such as the proper interpretation of a statute, are reviewed by [an appellate] court under the de novo standard of review." Land v. Vidrine, 10-1342, p. 4 (La. 3/15/11), 62 So.3d 36, 39. "On legal issues, the appellate court gives no special weight to the findings of the trial court, but exercises its constitutional duty to review questions of law and renders judgment on the record." State, Through La. Riverboat Gaming Comm'n v. La. State Police Riverboat Gaming Enf't Div., 95-2355, p. 5 (La.App. 1 Cir. 8/21/96), 694 So.2d 316, 319. "Appellate review of a question of law involves a determination of whether the lower court's interpretive decision is legally correct." Johnson v. La. Tax Comm'n, 01-964, p. 2 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/16/02), 807 So.2d 329, 331, writ denied, 02-445 (La. 3/8/02), 811 So.2d 887.
The Billeaudeaus argue that in granting OGH's motion for partial summary judgment, the trial court failed to interpret La.Civ.Code art. 2323 and La.Code Civ.P. art. 1812(C) properly in ruling that the factfinder must apportion fault between the Billeaudeaus' two causes of action against OGH, in addition to allocating fault between it and Dr. Zavala.
Louisiana Civil Code Article 2323 provides, in part, as follows:
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1812 further provides:
The question presented herein is whether these statutes, individually or in combination, permit or prohibit a factfinder from assigning a percentage of fault to an individual defendant on each theory of liability allegedly committed by that defendant, while still assigning percentages of fault to other defendants or liable parties. While the comparative fault system in Louisiana requires the assignment of percentages of fault to each individual person, firm, or entity, including the plaintiff, that may have played a role in causing the harm complained of, the statute does not prescribe how this should be accomplished.
Watson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 469 So.2d 967, 971 (La.1985) (footnotes omitted).
Interestingly, in Dumas v. State ex rel. Department of Culture, Recreation & Tourism, 02-563 (La. 10/15/02), 828 So.2d 530, the supreme court applied the comparative fault scheme to the plaintiff's negligence claim against the state for injuries he suffered as a result of negligence, to require the trier of fact to consider the subsequent medical malpractice of the hospital who treated the plaintiff for the injuries suffered in the accident and assign percentages of fault to each. Later amendments to La.Civ.Code art. 2323 made clear that the allocation of fault to the various parties is to occur regardless of whether there are differing theories of liability as to these parties. The supreme court stated:
Id. at 531.
Thus, our comparative fault scheme allows the assignment of percentages of fault among all culpable parties, regardless of the theory of liability asserted as to each. The question becomes whether the comparative fault statute permits or excludes the further breakdown of a particular actor's fault, by percentage, based upon the asserted theories of liability against that individual actor. Indeed, in most cases, that distinction is unimportant to the overall recovery of the injured or damaged party. Here, on the other hand, it is extremely important given that the damages recoverable for one theory of liability, medical malpractice, are subject to a certain damage cap as imposed by the MMA, while the other theory of recovery, negligent credentialing, is subject to a different damage cap or no cap at all, depending on whether the hospital is a private healthcare provider or a public healthcare provider. La.R.S. 13:5106.
We first look to the wording of the comparative-fault statute itself to determine if the assignment of separate percentages of fault for multiple theories of liability to a single tortfeasor is permissible. Louisiana Civil Code Article 2323(A) provides, without question, that the "degree or percentage of fault of all persons causing or contributing to the injury, death, or loss shall be determined." As the supreme court expressed in Watson, 469 So.2d at 973-74 (footnote omitted), the statute does not prescribe the manner in which this is to be done:
While the law does not prescribe the method for which liability is to be apportioned, that nevertheless does not render the law invalid or unenforceable. Similarly, while the law provides for the apportionment of fault by percentage among the parties, it does not prohibit the further breakdown of a percentage of fault for one party to account for different theories of liability. Obviously, the total of the percentages cannot exceed 100%, although this too is not spelled out in the statute. As Article 2323 is silent, we are permitted to "explore the article's purpose" to determine if it allows the requested action. Miller v. LAMMICO, 07-1352, p. 19 (La. 1/16/08), 973 So.2d 693, 706. "It is a familiar rule of statutory construction that the general purpose and object of the law must be kept in mind and the statute given such fair and reasonable interpretation as will effect the purpose and object for which it was enacted." J.M. Brown Constr. Co. v. D & M Mech. Contractors, Inc., 275 So.2d 401, 404 (La.1973).
Miller, 973 So.2d at 706 (footnote omitted).
Determining multiple theories of liability as they apply to a single party, among others, is certainly not a novel practice in our courts. Multiple theories of liability often must be reviewed and determined independently by the jury or factfinder in reaching a verdict. This requires the factfinder, within the verdict form, to render a decision as to whether the plaintiff has proven a particular theory of liability as a cause-in-fact of his/her injury and whether it was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm complained of, as reflected below:
Scott v. Dauterive Hosp. Corp., 02-1364, pp. 19-22 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/23/03), 851 So.2d 1152, 1166-67, writ denied, 03-2005 (La. 10/31/03), 857 So.2d 487 (alteration in original).
The logical extension of this function is the assessment of the percentage of fault assigned to a single tortfeasor as per each theory of fault in appropriate cases. Applying the Watson factors to aid in assessing percentages of fault, a trier of fact can determine whether each claimed theory of liability as to a given tortfeasor is a cause-in-fact of the harm complained of and assign a percentage of fault to each theory. A hypothetical case illustrates this application: Plaintiff A sues Hospital X, a private, qualified healthcare provider covered by the MMA, for claims in malpractice and a claim arising from negligent credentialing, and further includes a medical malpractice claim against Dr. Z, a qualified healthcare provider covered under the MMA; the trier of fact finds that Hospital X is 50% at fault as a result of its negligent credentialing, that Hospital X is not at fault for medical malpractice, thus 0% for medical negligence; and that Dr. Z is 50% at fault for medical negligence. The trier of fact then awards a total of $2,000,000.00 in general damages (assuming past and future medicals are inapplicable for purposes of illustration). Applying this allocation of fault, the verdict would require Dr. Z to pay $500,000.00 ($1,000,000.00 less the MMA cap of $500,000.00), and Hospital X would be required to pay $1,000,000.00 since the MMA cap does not apply to the negligent credentialing liability of the private hospital.
Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting OGH's motion to permit the jury questionnaire to query as to whether each cause of action has been established by the Billeaudeaus and to assign a percentage of fault to each theory of liability, if the answer is in the affirmative. This is within the wide discretion given the trial court "in determining and framing questions to be posed as special jury interrogatories." Wiltz v. Bros. Petroleum, L.L.C., 13-332, 13-333, 13-334, p. 20 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/23/14), 140 So.3d 758, 773, writs denied, 14-1252, 14-1298 (La. 10/10/14), 151 So.3d 581, 583. In consideration hereof, we are mindful of the standard of review for jury instructions. In Nicholas v. Allstate Insurance Co., 99-2522, p. 8 (La. 8/31/00), 765 So.2d 1017, 1023, the Louisiana Supreme Court explained:
Based on the wide discretion afforded trial courts in framing and formulating special verdicts and jury instructions, we find no merit in this assignment of error.
For the reasons assigned herein, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Costs of this appeal are assessed to the plaintiffs, Veronica and Joseph Billeaudeau.