THERIOT, J.
The defendant, Gary J. Leblanc, III, was charged by bill of information on count one with intimidating a witness, a violation of La. R.S. 14:129.1, on count two with home invasion, a violation of La. R.S. 14:62.8, and on count three with second degree battery, a violation of La. R.S. 14:34.1. He originally pled not guilty on all counts. The defendant later withdrew his former pleas of not guilty and entered pleas of guilty as charged on counts one and two, and guilty of the responsive offense of simple battery on count three.
Because the defendant pled guilty, the facts were not fully developed at trial. At the
Pevey advised that she received a text message from the defendant, her ex-boyfriend, just before his arrival. As she did not reply to the text message, the defendant called her. Pevey answered and told the defendant that he needed to stop calling her, but after she hung up the phone, the defendant kept texting her. She called the defendant back and told him that if he did not stop harassing her, she would call the police. The defendant warned Pevey that if she called the police, "it would be the last phone call that she made." Pevey told the defendant that someone was with her at her residence sleeping on her sofa, and that she had called the police, further explaining that the police were in close proximity, hoping to discourage the defendant from coming to her residence. Pevey was unaware that the defendant was already outside of her residence until she heard a loud crash. The defendant kicked the front door in, punched her in the face several times, choked her, and made several threats against her life. As he fled from the apartment, the defendant pushed down Long as she was approaching Pevey's apartment to investigate the noises she heard coming from the apartment.
Herbert advised that prior to the offense, Pevey asked him to be on the lookout for the defendant's vehicle, a four door Toyota with license plate AYSD46, indicating that she feared the defendant would come to her residence. Herbert observed the vehicle fitting the description arrive at Pevey's residence and, a short time later, heard a noise coming from the apartment. Herbert observed the defendant run out of the residence, at which point, Herbert stopped the defendant and began to question him. The defendant became aggressive and a physical altercation ensued, causing Herbert to suffer the bite marks and lacerations. Herbert pursued the defendant as he fled on foot. Herbert lost sight of the defendant in a field that led to a wood line. Long and Cheatwood observed the altercation that the defendant had with Herbert. Pevey, Herbert, Long, and Cheatwood provided Deputy Conner with voluntary statements detailing the incident. Detective Jenkins received a copy of surveillance footage from Pevey's apartment complex and observed the defendant arriving at Pevey's apartment and forcing entry, the defendant running into Long as he fled from the apartment, and the defendant's engaging in a physical altercation with Herbert.
In three related assignments of error, the defendant argues that he did not waive the right to appeal the sentence imposed by the trial court; that the guilty pleas were not entered freely and voluntarily; and that the sentence imposed on count two was excessive. The defendant argues that the guilty plea colloquy in this case is the same as the colloquies reviewed by the courts in
A guilty plea is a conviction and, therefore, should be afforded a great measure of finality. A defendant may not withdraw a guilty plea simply because the sentence imposed is heavier than anticipated.
In order for a guilty plea to be used as a basis for actual imprisonment, enhancement of actual imprisonment, or conversion of a subsequent misdemeanor into a felony, the trial judge must have informed the defendant that by pleading guilty he waives: (a) his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination; (b) his right to trial and jury trial where applicable; and (c) his right to confront his accuser. The judge also must have ascertained that the accused understands what the plea connotes and its consequences.
A guilty plea is constitutionally infirm if it was not entered freely and voluntarily, if the
As noted, the defendant argues that the guilty plea colloquy in the instant case is analogous with the colloquies in
Here, the trial court did not tell the defendant that he had a right to appeal his sentence. At the outset, the State read the agreed upon guilty pleas and the sentences that would be imposed on each count, including the sentence of thirteen years and four months imprisonment on count two, and that there would be no habitual offender bill of information filed. The trial court then questioned the defendant's attorney as to whether the agreement read by the State was the agreement that counsel understood and that the client was willing to take, and counsel responded affirmatively. The trial court then addressed the defendant personally, inquiring as to his full name, address, date of birth, and education. The trial court instructed the defendant to stop the court and ask questions if he did not understand any portion of the proceeding at any point. The defendant confirmed that he understood the proceedings and stated that he had fourteen years of education.
The trial court read the statutory elements of the offenses and the statutory sentencing ranges under each statute and informed the defendant of the possibility of sentencing enhancements. The trial court, in part, advised the defendant of his right to plead not guilty, of the State's burden of proof, of his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, of his right to trial and jury trial where applicable, and of his right to confront his accusers. The trial court further stated and inquired, "You also have the right to appeal the various decisions of this Court. Do you understand each and every one of these rights?" The defendant responded, "Yes, ma'am." The trial court then stated, "Do you understand by entering a plea today you're giving up or waiving — specifically waiving the right to go to trial, to confront your accusers, to maintain your innocence, to call witnesses on your own behalf, as well as giving up the other rights that I've read to you. Do you understand you're giving that up?" The defendant again responded, "Yes, ma'am." The defendant confirmed that he wished to plead guilty.
The defendant denied that he had been threatened or coerced into entering the pleas or that he had been promised any leniency other than the plea agreement that he and his attorney worked out with the State. The defense counsel agreed that he advised the defendant of his constitutional rights and that the defendant fully understood the advice. The trial court again asked the defendant if he was confused about anything or had any questions or concerns. After the defendant consulted with his counsel, the defense counsel informed the court that their only request was that the defendant be considered for any type of Vo-tech program, rehabilitation program, and/or anger management and that his conviction not prevent him from continuing to teach GED classes to other inmates while incarcerated. The trial court, unopposed by the State, agreed to such recommendations. After the defendant confirmed that he had no other questions or concerns and stated that he was "[d]efinitely" satisfied with the legal representation provided by his attorney, the trial court accepted the guilty pleas. The defendant waived any delay in sentencing, the trial court heard a victim impact statement, and the trial court imposed the agreed upon sentences.
The record establishes that the defendant voluntarily and with assistance of counsel accepted the plea agreement to avoid the possibility of a harsher sentence if convicted at trial. The defendant had every right to reject the plea agreement and face the risk of a harsher result, and chose not to do so. His choice appears reasoned, considering that he was facing a charge of second degree battery on count three and pled guilty to the responsive offense of simple battery, significantly reducing his sentencing exposure. The record reflects that the defendant did not claim actual innocence, but only objects to the length of his sentence. It is well-settled that dissatisfaction with a sentence is not a basis for withdrawing a guilty plea.
We find the pleas were knowingly and intelligently entered, that they were not forced or coerced, and were within constitutional dimensions. A plea agreement was offered to the defendant, it was accepted, and the terms were kept. The pleas were not rendered involuntary because of any communication to the defendant of the risk that he could receive a longer sentence if he proceeded to trial and was convicted. The facts show that the sentences imposed herein were in conformity with the plea agreement that was set forth in the record at the time of the plea. Thus, the defendant is precluded from appellate review of the sentence.