SIGGINS, P. J.—
Petitioner and defendant Ryze Claim Solutions LLC (Ryze) seeks writ relief from an order of the trial court denying its motion to dismiss or stay the lawsuit filed by its former employee real party in interest and plaintiff Jerome Nedd on improper forum grounds. We shall issue the writ.
Ryze's headquarters and principal place of business was in Noblesville in Hamilton County, Indiana, north of Marion County, Indiana, where Indianapolis is the county seat. On May 5, 2014, Ryze hired Nedd, a California resident, to work for the company in El Cerrito in Contra Costa County. On March 28, 2017, Ryze terminated Nedd's employment.
On August 1, 2018, Nedd filed a wrongful termination suit against Ryze in Contra Costa County Superior Court. His complaint alleged eight causes of action, five of them under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, Government Code section 12900 et seq. (FEHA). On September 10, 2018, Ryze moved to dismiss or stay Nedd's case because it was filed in an improper forum.
When Nedd was first employed by Ryze, the parties had entered into a written employment agreement (Employment Agreement), which contained the following forum selection clause: "
The Employment Agreement further stated: "The term of this contract shall be for a period commencing on May 5, 2014, and continuing for a period of
On November 6, 2018, the trial court denied Ryze's motion and declined to stay or dismiss the case in favor of the Indiana forum specified in the Employment Agreement. The trial court observed that forum selection clauses will not be enforced when contrary to California public policy and found that enforcing the forum selection clause would "go against the state's public policy expressed in at least two statutes," specifically citing Labor Code section 925 and Government Code section 12965.
Ryze now seeks a peremptory writ of mandate from this court to direct the trial court to vacate its November 6, 2018 order and to enter a new and different order granting Ryze's motion to dismiss or stay the action.
On December 7, 2018, we stayed the trial court proceedings pending further order of this court, requested opposition to the writ petition, and issued notice under Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 180 [203 Cal.Rptr. 626, 681 P.2d 893], that we may issue a peremptory writ in the first instance.
"When a court upon motion of a party or its own motion finds that in the interest of substantial justice an action should be heard in a forum outside this state, the court shall stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just." (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.30, subd. (a).)
"There is a split of authority regarding the appropriate standard of review on whether a forum selection clause should be enforced through a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens." (Quanta Computer Inc. v. Japan Communications Inc. (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 438, 446 [230 Cal.Rptr.3d 334].) "The majority of cases apply the abuse of discretion standard, not the substantial evidence standard." (Korman v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 206, 214, fn. 6 [243 Cal.Rptr.3d 668].) We need not resolve that dispute here because the trial court erroneously denied Ryze's motion under either standard.
Here, the trial court declined to enforce the Employment Agreement's forum selection clause as a matter of public policy expressed in Labor Code section 925 and Government Code section 12965. But the public policy statements in the two statutes are in no way at odds with the forum selection clause in the Employment Agreement, nor do they make enforcing the forum selection clause unreasonable.
Government code section 12965, subdivision (b), which governs venue in FEHA cases, establishes: "The superior courts of the State of California shall have jurisdiction of [civil lawsuits under FEHA], and the aggrieved person may file in these courts. An action may be brought in any county in the state in which the unlawful practice is alleged to have been committed, in the county in which the records relevant to the practice are maintained and administered, or in the county in which the aggrieved person would have worked or would have had access to the public accommodation but for the alleged unlawful practice, but if the defendant is not found within any of these counties, an action may be brought within the county of the defendant's residence or principal office." (Gov. Code, § 12965, subd. (b).)
The trial court concluded this section "reveals the Legislature's policy for allowing persons who bring FEHA actions a wide choice of venues." It noted the Supreme Court's recognition of this policy in Brown v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 477 [208 Cal.Rptr. 724, 691 P.2d 272], that plaintiffs in FEHA employment discrimination suits often face barriers in bringing suit due to the substantial costs of litigation, and thus are afforded "a wide choice of venue." (Brown, at p. 486.) Nedd, too, emphasizes the "broad choice of venue" the Legislature affords FEHA plaintiffs under Government Code section 12965, subdivision (b) to make it easier for financially stressed litigants to bring actions in locations that are less costly.
Olinick v. BMG Entertainment (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1286 [42 Cal.Rptr.3d 268] illustrates the point. There, Olinick sued his New York-based employer in Los Angeles Superior Court for wrongful termination under FEHA. (Olinick, at p. 1292.) His employer moved to stay or dismiss the case on the ground of inconvenient forum. (Ibid.) The court expressly rejected Olinick's argument that a clause requiring him to litigate FEHA causes of action in New York was unenforceable and held that "[e]mployment discrimination claims have been held subject to forum selection clauses, provided the selected forum affords an adequate remedy." (Olinick, at p. 1301, italics omitted.) The court found no merit in Olinick's contention that the forum selection clause was unenforceable on public policy grounds, noting "FEHA has no express prohibition on parties selecting a forum . . . other than California's." (Id. at p. 1304.)
We turn to the public policy expressed in the Labor Code. Labor Code section 925, enacted in 2016, provides: "An employer shall not require an employee who primarily resides and works in California, as a condition of employment, to agree to a provision that would . . . [¶] [r]equire the employee to adjudicate outside of California a claim arising in California." (Lab. Code, § 925, subd. (a).) The statute also expressly states: "This section shall apply to a contract entered into, modified, or extended on or after January 1, 2017." (Lab. Code, § 925, subd. (f).)
Here, the Employment Agreement between Ryze and Nedd was entered into on May 5, 2014, and by its terms, was last extended before his termination on May 5, 2016. Nedd was terminated on March 28, 2017, before the operative date for a 2017 automatic extension. There is nothing in the
The record does not support affirming the trial court order on any other grounds.
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing respondent superior court to vacate its order denying Ryze's motion to dismiss or stay the action due to improper forum, and to enter a new order granting Ryze's motion. We leave it
Our decision is immediately final as to this court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).) The parties shall bear their own costs.
Fujisaki, J., and Petrou, J., concurred.