Appellant, an international vice president of United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America and president of Local No. 9 of that organization, was indicted under a nine-count indictment for contempt of Congress in violation of 2 U.S.C.A. § 192. He was tried by the court, a jury trial having been waived. Count One was dismissed when the United States Attorney was obliged to elect. On Counts Two and Five he was found not guilty. He was convicted on six counts and sentenced. Judgment was stayed pending this appeal.

The indictment charges that on February 28, 1955 and on March 1, 1955, in the District of Columbia, a Sub-committee of the Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives was conducting hearings pursuant to the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Section 121(q), 60 Stat. 828, and to H.Res. 5, 84th Congress, that appellant appeared as a witness before that Sub-committee on the dates and at the place mentioned, that he was asked questions pertinent to the subject matter then under inquiry, and that appellant then and there unlawfully refused to answer those questions.1 The Committee was considering the possible need for legislation to deal with alleged activities of Communists in the field of labor, including methods of infiltration of labor organizations and the dissemination of Communist propaganda. With respect to the foregoing, the Committee deemed it pertinent to its inquiry to ascertain appellant's awareness of the existence thereof, his knowledge of certain named persons as having been active in certain groups and, as well, his connection with and participation in an organization known as the American Peace Crusade, an organization believed by the Committee to be Communist-dominated. Appellant's refusal to respond to the questions noted led to the citation for contempt.

The case was extensively heard in the District Court by Judge Pine (now Chief Judge). Thereafter the trial judge found "that each of the questions involved was pertinent to the question under inquiry, which was authorized by the statute and resolution, and that they were pertinent to a valid legislative purpose." He held the fact that the inquiry resulted in exposure did not defeat its validity.

As to Counts Two and Five, the court held that appellant had given adequate reasons for not answering the questions there involved, including claimed protection under the First Amendment of the Constitution, and that the Committee did not disallow the objection and did not demand an answer, notwithstanding the objection. Therefore, under Quinn v. United States, 1955, 349 U.S. 155, 75 S. Ct. 668, 99 L. Ed. 964, the court found appellant not guilty on Counts Two and Five.

As to Counts Three, Four, Six, Seven, Eight and Nine, the court held there was no express claim that appellant declined to answer under the Fifth Amendment and that none could reasonably be inferred. He further found that the grounds given by appellant were insufficient in law to justify his refusal to answer and that, upon being directed by the Committee to answer, he had refused to do so. The court held that insofar as these counts were concerned they did not come within the Quinn rule, and found that appellant intentionally and unlawfully refused to answer the questions propounded therein, that each and every element of the offense charged had been established beyond a reasonable doubt, and that, consequently, appellant was guilty on Counts Three, Four, Six, Seven, Eight and Nine. This appeal followed.2

There is no serious factual dispute between the parties but two legal points are more seriously pressed than others.

Appellant here relies in large part on the question "whether or not the committee's purpose was non-legislative in character, in the sense that the expressed aim of the hearing was to do injury to appellant and the union which he represented at that time."

We think the finding of Judge Pine that the purpose of the Committee was legislative is amply supported. The record clearly demonstrates that the Committee hearing was one constituting a continued investigation which the Committee was conducting into Communist activities in the labor field, including infiltration into labor organizations and Communist propaganda.3 Hearings in 1955 had been held not only as to the Fort Wayne, Indiana, area (where the hearing in question was originally scheduled) but, as well, in New York City, Newark, New Jersey, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Los Angeles and San Diego, California, and Seattle, Washington. That the dominant purpose of the investigation was legislative is shown by both the 1954 and the 1955 Annual Reports of the Committee on Un-American Activities to the House of Representatives, both of which report on the hearings. These Annual Reports evidence the continued purpose of the Committee of keeping the Congress informed as to actual Communist conspiracy to infiltrate critical areas and activities of our national life as steps in the ultimate effort to destroy our free form of government, and contain the Committee's recommendations for additional legislation, if required. A large collection of material and exhibits is maintained by the Committee in connection with its constituted duties in order to furnish reference service not only to the Committee's own members and staff in its investigations and hearings, but also to every member of Congress who submits a written request for information in that field. More than thirteen hundred such requests were received in 1955.

Under its duty to keep the Congress continually advised as to Communist activities, the Committee, on February 9, 1955, had announced hearings to be held at Fort Wayne, Indiana, at which, according to newspaper accounts, appellant would be a witness. At the time of the announcement neither the Chairman of the Committee, Mr. Francis E. Walter (who did not preside at the hearing at which Gojack testified), nor the Committee counsel, nor the members of the Subcommittee had any knowledge that an N.L.R.B. election was pending at the Magnavox plant in Fort Wayne and had been set for February 24, 1955. It was not until February 10, 1955, that that fact was first made known to any of these persons. On that date Mr. Walter, in Washington, D. C., received from appellant a telegram,4 the contents of which need not be characterized.

Thereafter, on February 14, 1955, one George Goldstein, a Washington representative of the union, sought an interview and asked for a continuance of the hearing until after the election scheduled for February 24. Mr. Walter requested that Mr. Goldstein's application for a continuance be made under oath, which Mr. Goldstein refused to do. Appellant urges that the colloquy which developed in this interview is evidence that the Committee was not engaged in furthering a legislative purpose but bent upon attempting exposure. The material parts of that interview relied on are set forth in the margin.5

Appellant also relies on the testimony of a newspaper reporter who authored a story in a newspaper to the effect that at the meeting of February 14, 1955, the "House Un-American Activities Committee members frankly stated that they were out to break the alleged Communist-led Independent United Electrical Workers Union." This reporter, however, admitted the accuracy of the stenographically reported conference between Mr. Walter and Mr. Goldstein on February 14 (footnote 5), and testified that he "thought" something more was said by Mr. Walter or another representative of the Committee. From the stenographic record of the conference of Mr. Walter and Mr. Moulder, Chairman of the subcommittee, and Mr. Goldstein, it can be gleaned that Mr. Walter showed some displeasure which, under the circumstances, and having in mind the abusive and insulting telegram (see footnote 4), can be understood and as readily be excused. Congressmen are more fortunate than judges in at least this respect, that when attacked unjustly, they are at liberty to defend themselves and to express themselves forcefully and vigorously.

At first the continuance of the scheduled hearing was denied. Notwithstanding the telegram and the other events we have noted, later a continuance was granted, the hearing was set for February 28, 1955, in Washington, D. C., and a new subpoena was issued and served. On that date Mr. Gojack appeared with his attorney, Mr. Donner, who also represented two other witnesses testifying.6 At the opening of the session on February 28, Representative Moulder of Missouri, a member of the Sub-committee, made the following announcement as to the purpose of the meeting:

"This subcommittee was appointed pursuant to the rules of the House as ordered by Francis E. Walter, chairman of the full committee, and it is composed of three members, the Hon. Clyde Doyle, of California, on my right, the Hon. Gordon H. Scherer, of Ohio, and myself as chairman of the subcommittee. Mr. Scherer, of Ohio, is absent and will be present within the next few minutes.

"There will be considered at this hearing testimony relating to Communist Party activities within the field of labor, the methods used by the Communist Party to infiltrate labor organizations, and the dissemination of Communist Party propaganda.

"We had expected to hear at this time the testimony of David Mates, an international representative of the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America. His appearance before this committee was continued twice at his own request. At this time the inability of the United States marshal to effect service of process strongly indicates an effort on the part of Mr. Mates to evade service. This matter will be investigated and, if the facts warrant, the House of Representatives will be requested to cause the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and production before this committee as a witness.

"In the course of the investigation conducted by this committee at Dayton in September 1954, information was obtained indicating that one or more of the witnesses to be heard today should have first-hand knowledge of Communist Party activities in the area of Dayton and elsewhere."

Attorney Donner, representing the three witnesses, at the time of the calling of the first witness, one Julia Jacobs, presented a motion, entitled "Statement of Objections to Hearing and Motion to Vacate Subpoenas," which is set forth in the margin.7 The motion was not formally acted on until the following day, when it was formally denied. That it was in fact denied is clear from the fact that the witnesses represented by Mr. Donner were called, sworn and queried. It is to be noted that Mr. Donner was present throughout the hearing and was given the privilege of conferring with his clients at any time, and did from time to time confer with them.

Further as evidence that the object of the Committee was not "exposure" is the conduct of the members of the Subcommittee during the course of the hearing. For instance, when Gojack objected to the several questions relating to his membership in the Communist Party on the ground that these questions were put to him "to judge me guilty without benefit of trial," Mr. Doyle, member of Congress from California and a member of the Subcommittee, used this language:

"We are not adjudging anybody guilty. No, Mr. Gojack. Of course, if you think it is a matter of criminal intent and participation in a conspiracy to be a member of the Communist Party, then I understand why you might conclude that you are being found guilty without a trial. But we are not here finding anybody guilty. We are here as a group of Congressmen trying to find out the extent to which Communists have infiltrated your union, if they have — the union of which you are the executive vice president. That is what we are here for, young man; not to find you guilty of anything, but to find out the extent to which you know of Communist domination or control in your union, if there is such domination and control or infiltration."

With regard to the discussion of Gojack's connection with the American Peace Crusade, the following excerpt from the hearing is of interest:

"Mr. Tavenner [counsel for the Committee]: I want to make it clear, Mr. Gojack, that I am not interested in what your beliefs or opinions were about those matters. What I am interested in is the extent to which the Communist Party was engaged in manipulating peace moves in this country in behalf of a foreign power. That is what I am interested in. My questioning of you is to determine what knowledge or information you had on the subject.

"Mr. Moulder. May I say, Mr. Tavenner, in connection with your statement, that the so-called peace moves on the part of the Soviet Union were being instigated over here as propaganda so as to prevent any opposition to their aggression and domination of the free world.

"Mr. Doyle. Mr. Chairman, may I add to those two fine statements that I am also interested in knowing what the witness knows about the extent to which the American Communist Party, in connection with these peace moves or otherwise, was using the leadership of American labor unions, especially any labor union that the witness might have been a member of at that time or had any connection with. The question is the extent to which the Communist Party had infiltrated American labor unions, if you know anything about it, the extent to which they were using it then and are using it now for their conspiratorial purposes."

Exposure no doubt resulted from the inquiry. But no one can fairly read the record without perceiving that the dominant purpose of the Committee was a legislative one, namely, to learn the extent of Communist infiltration or domination of labor unions. The court found:

"* * * that each of the questions involved was pertinent to the question under inquiry, which was authorized by the statute and resolution, and that they were pertinent to a valid legislative purpose, and that the committee was engaged in a valid legislative purpose. The fact that the inquiry resulted in exposure does not defeat the validity of the inquiry." No specific findings in addition to those just recited were requested by appellant. Fed.R.Crim.P. 23(c), 18 U.S.C.A. Accordingly, we rest on the general finding of guilty, which necessarily comprised a finding against appellant on all essential issues.

The second question pressed by appellant is whether the rule of the Watkins case8 applies and, if it does apply, whether it was followed in this case. It will be recalled that Watkins decided that a witness, having been summoned before a congressional committee, is entitled under appropriate circumstances to a statement of the purpose of the interrogation and an explanation of pertinency.

We think the Watkins rule was fully complied with. First, the subject matter of the hearing appeared "with undisputable clarity"; second, there was no "objection of the witness [or his counsel] on grounds of pertinency;" and, finally, the explanation of the Chairman not only was meaningful, but adequately and correctly described the topic under inquiry. It is not to be supposed that every question when put must be accompanied by "connected reasoning whereby the precise question[s] asked relate to it [i. e., the explanation]." The word "pertinency" or its equivalent nowhere appears in the objections. Appellant's attorney presented his objections to the hearing; no question of pertinency was raised.

On this subject of pertinency, it is scarcely possible to imagine a case more closely akin to Barenblatt than the present one. There, as here, and contrary to the situation in Watkins, the question under inquiry was disclosed in an illuminating manner; there, as here also, contrary to the situation in Watkins, the questions were not amorphous on their face, nor were they "clearly foreign to the alleged subject matter of the investigation — `Communism in labor.'" There, as here, the motion filed by appellant's counsel "at best * * * constituted but a contemplated objection to questions still unasked, and buried as they were in the context of petitioner's general challenge to the power of the Subcommittee they can hardly be considered adequate, within the meaning of what was said in Watkins, supra, 354 U.S. at 214-215, 77 S.Ct. at pages 1193-1194, to trigger what would have been the Subcommittee's reciprocal obligation had it been faced with a pertinency objection." Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at page 124, 79 S.Ct. at page 1091.

We think that, with the change of names, the following quotation from the Supreme Court's opinion in Barenblatt disposes of the contention of Gojack on the pertinency issue:

"We need not, however, rest decision on petitioner's failure to object on this score, for here `pertinency' was made to appear `with undisputable clarity.' [Watkins, 354 U.S. at 214, 77 S.Ct. at page 1193.] First of all, it goes without saying that the scope of the Committee's authority was for the House, not a witness, to determine, subject to the ultimate reviewing responsibility of this Court. What we deal with here is whether petitioner was sufficiently apprised of `the topic under inquiry' thus authorized `and the connective reasoning whereby the precise questions asked relate[d] to it.' [Id., 354 U.S. at 215, 77 S.Ct. at page 1193.] In light of his prepared memorandum of constitutional objections there can be no doubt that this petitioner was well aware of the Subcommittee's authority and purpose to question him as it did * * *. In addition the other sources of this information which we recognized in Watkins, supra, [354 U.S.] at 209-215 [77 S.Ct. at pages 1190-1194], leave no room for a `pertinency' objection on this record. The subject matter of the inquiry had been identified at the commencement of the investigation as Communist infiltration into the field of education. Just prior to petitioner's appearance before the Subcommittee, the scope of the day's hearings had been announced as `in the main communism in education and the experiences and background in the party by Francis X. T. Crowley. It will deal with activities in Michigan, Boston, and in some small degree, New York.' Petitioner had heard the Subcommittee interrogate the witness Crowley along the same lines as he, petitioner, was evidently to be questioned, and had listened to Crowley's testimony identifying him as a former member of an alleged Communist student organization at the University of Michigan while they both were in attendance there. Further, petitioner had stood mute in the face of the Chairman's statement as to why he had been called as a witness by the Subcommittee. And, lastly, unlike Watkins, id., at 182-185 [77 S.Ct. at pages 1176-1178], petitioner refused to answer questions as to his own Communist Party affiliations, whose pertinency of course was clear beyond doubt.

"Petitioner's contentions on this aspect of the case cannot be sustained."

In sum, nowhere does it appear that appellant was without knowledge of the real purpose of the hearing or of the pertinency of the questions. The subject matter of the hearing was made to appear "with undisputable clarity" in the statement of Mr. Moulder, Chairman of the Subcommittee, and in the course of the questioning.

The trial judge found, as above stated, that the grounds given by appellant were insufficient in law to justify his refusal to answer and that, upon being directed to answer, he had refused to do so; that the counts on which appellant was found guilty, namely, Counts Three, Four, Six, Seven, Eight and Nine, did not come within the Quinn rule and that he had intentionally and unlawfully refused to answer the questions comprising those counts. We agree.

Not only did appellant refuse to answer questions propounded but, as well, his attitude before the Subcommittee was abusive, insulting and contemptuous of the Committee and its members. The record of the hearing is replete with examples of that attitude but a few will suffice: He accused the Committee of using paid liars with which to "frame" witnesses; "I do not know what `paid liars' and `forgers' that you may have"; "I do not know what paid liar you have here to do a Matusow job on me"; "I haven't had the opportunity to vote myself a $10,000 raise"; "My answer to the question is when you have paid liars like Matusow, paid liars like Strunk, and paid liars like this lunatic Cecil Scott, around —." "Witch-hunting" by the Subcommittee was likewise charged by Gojack.

We have examined the other grounds urged for reversal and find them likewise without merit.9

Affirmed.