The Juvenile Court waived jurisdiction of appellant, who was sixteen years old when he allegedly committed house-breaking and larceny, and he was convicted of these offenses in the United States District Court. Appellant's counsel now moves for disclosure of certain Juvenile Court records as essential in presenting this appeal.

District of Columbia Code § 11-1586(b) (Supp. III, 1964) provides that Juvenile Court social records1 "shall be made available * * * to any court before which the child may appear." Pursuant to this provision, we ordered the Juvenile Court to transmit to this court appellant's social records for in camera inspection. Compare Kent v. Reid, 114 U.S.App.D.C. 330, 334-335, 316 F.2d 331, 335-336 (1963). We also requested from the Juvenile Court "a statement of its views as to what parts of appellant's social records are so confidential that appellant's counsel should be denied access." Order entered Sept. 10, 1964. Chief Judge Miller of the Juvenile Court responded in pertinent part:

"Our statute covering this subject does not use the word "confidential." I am quite aware that there have been frequent references to the necessity for preserving the confidentiality of all social records. This represents, in my opinion, an institutional position which is so broad as to be unrealistic and impractical. On the other hand, turning over of the entire social file to an attorney would encourage "fishing expeditions" and litigation of matters of a quasi-privileged nature elicited from juveniles, their parents and other interested parties. What should be applied in any individual case as to the documents in a social file which may be made available to an attorney for the juvenile and the government is a set of standards against which to measure the particular request of the juvenile's attorney.

* * * * * *

"In the light of the foregoing and consistent with the spirit of Section 11-1586(b), as well as our experiences with such records, any set of standards to be applied should, in my opinion, be confined to these two:

"1. The document must bear on the purpose for which the juvenile's counsel has requested examination.

"2. The document should not be one where secrecy must be preserved as to the source of information supplied to the Juvenile Court in confidence."

In the present case, appellant filed a pre-trial motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the Juvenile Court did not waive jurisdiction until eleven months after appellant had been arrested for the alleged offense and that this delay between arrest and waiver deprived appellant of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Based upon its examination of appellant's Juvenile Court social records, the court ruled that the Juvenile Court's delay in waiving jurisdiction was not improper. Although the court refused to disclose the social records upon which it relied, it did briefly summarize entries made in the social records during the eleven months between the present arrest and waiver. But the court did not summarize any of the social records concerning appellant's Juvenile Court history during the four years prior to his arrest on the present charges.

The trial court found that the Juvenile Court delayed waiver because it sought to exhaust treatment possibilities in its own facilities, and waived jurisdiction only after these resources proved inadequate. For this purpose consideration by the Juvenile Court of appellant's entire past history would have been necessary in deciding between treatment and waiver, and by the District Court in reviewing the propriety of the eleven month delay. Because the request involves all appellant's social records and because appellant necessarily challenges the propriety of the Juvenile Court's waiver, the present request for disclosure is governed by the principles which apply generally to disclosure of social records when waiver of jurisdiction is in issue.

District of Columbia Code § 11-1586(b) (Supp. III, 1964) provides that Juvenile Court social records

"shall be withheld from indiscriminate public inspection, except that they shall be made available by rule or special order of court to such persons, governmental and private agencies, and institutions as have a legitimate interest in the protection, welfare, treatment, and rehabilitation of the child under 18 years of age * * *."

Appellant's counsel says that a "legitimate interest in the protection * * * of the child" exists here. But the Government argues that § 11-1586(a), which allows inspection of certain Juvenile Court records by "duly authorized attorneys," specifically excludes "social records" and that the absence of any reference to attorneys in subsection (b) reveals a statutory scheme to bar attorneys from access to social records.

We disagree with the Government's reading of the statute. Under the express terms of § 11-1586(a) attorneys may see, as of right, all Juvenile Court legal records;2 and we think it clear that subsection (b) allows an attorney to inspect social records in limited circumstances.3 These circumstances are not specified; they must be determined in individual cases according to the purposes of the Juvenile Court Act for the "protection, welfare, treatment, and rehabilitation of the child." Because waiver by the Juvenile Court may be set aside by this court4 or by the District Court,5 either court, in aid of its jurisdiction, may order disclosure of Juvenile Court social records to an attorney.

In this court or the District Court, the attorney's constitutionally sanctioned adversarial role gives him a "legitimate interest" generally in seeing his client's Juvenile Court social records.6 But even if the attorney has such interest, disclosure may not be required in all circumstances. Confidentiality may be justified, for example, where there is genuine need to conceal the identity of informants or where the information would disrupt family relationships or where disclosure would unduly interfere with the treatment or rehabilitation of the child.7 Whether disclosure should be granted in spite of competing considerations will depend upon (a) the importance of the issue, for which disclosure is sought, to the welfare or freedom of the child; and (b) the relevance, generously construed, of the requested records to that issue.

Where, as here, the child's attorney challenges waiver by the Juvenile Court, the need for confidentiality of any parts of the social record must be compelling in order to bar disclosure. In effect, waiver is a judicial determination that the child is beyond the rehabilitative philosophy of the Act.8 Such determination may well discourage adult authorities from expending scarce resources in rehabilitative efforts. And the disabilities resulting from conviction in the District Court are in sharp contrast with the effects of a Juvenile Court commitment which "does not operate to impose any of the civil disabilities ordinarily imposed by conviction, and a child is not deemed a criminal by reason of an adjudication." D.C.CODE § 16-2308 (Supp. III, 1964). Waiver is critically important for the child who may be abandoned as "incorrigible" and for the society which has thus abandoned the child.

All of the social records concerning the child are usually relevant to waiver since the Juvenile Court must be deemed to consider the entire history of the child in determining waiver. The relevance of particular items must be construed generously. Since an attorney has no certain knowledge of what the social records contain, he cannot be expected to demonstrate the relevance of particular items in his request.9

The child's attorney must be advised of the information upon which the Juvenile Court relied in order to assist effectively in the determination of the waiver question, by insisting upon the statutory command that waiver can be ordered only after "full investigation," and by guarding against action of the Juvenile Court beyond its discretionary authority.10

We remand the record in this case to the District Court for supplemental proceedings to determine, pursuant to the standards discussed, the extent to which the social records may be disclosed to appellant's attorney.