The motion before us presents a novel question of law: namely, does18 U.S.C. 205 (1970), which prohibits a federal employee from appearing as an 'agent or attorney' on behalf of anyone in a proceeding to which the United States is a party, bar a federal employee enrolled in part-time legal studies from entering an appearance under Rule 20 of the rules of this court?

The statutory language is clear, and reads in relevant part:

Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States in the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government or in any agency of the United States, including the District of Columbia, otherwise than in the proper discharge of his official duties--

. . . .ies

(2) acts as agent or attorney for anyone before any department, agency, court, court-martial, officer, or any civil, military, or naval commission in connection with any proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy, charge, accusation, arrest, or other particular matter in which the United States is a party or has a direct and substantial interest--

Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both. Rule 20 permits participation by 'eligible law students' in appellate representation of indigents and provides for their supervision by a member of the bar.1

Movants are both employees of the federal government. One is a captain in the United States Air Force assigned to non-legal duties editing an Air Force publication. The other is employed in the Office of the General Counsel of the Environmental Protection Agency, where he does legal research and writing and investigative work in the field of environmental law. Both are students in good standing of the evening division of Georgetown Alw School, and are enrolled in the Appellate Litigation Seminar. As part of their academic work, both movants have already participated in investigation and drafting of legal memoranda in this case,2 and both represent that their employers are aware of their activities in the seminar. With the exception of U.S.C. 205, neither movant considers he has a conflict of interest which would preclude his appearance under the terms of Rule 20.

Movants make two principal arguments for their eligibility to appear in this case. The first is that the terms of the statute do not apply to such appearances. They argue that the role of a law student appearing in this court is neither that of an 'attorney' nor that of an 'agent' for the appellant. Movants cite Harrison v. United States, 128 U.S.App.D.C. 245, 387 F.2d 203 (1967) for the proposition that 'the bedrock minimum' attribute of an attorney is his membership in a bar, and therefore the term 'attorney' cannot be used to apply to an 'eligible law student.' The attorney in this case, movants argue, is the supervising member of the bar, and the students are merely assistants or 'legal interns.'

We do not find the citation of Harrison compelling. The issue in that case was whether testimony elicited from a defendant during one trial by his attorney, an imposter posing as a member of the bar, could be admitted in a subsequent trial. The court held it could not, because, where effective assistance of counsel had been denied, 'The proceeding is void, the occurrences therein are vitiated . . ..' 128 U.S.App.D.C. 245, 254, 387 F.2d 203, 212. Here, however, a special rule of court permits movants to act as agents for criminal appellants.

Movants also contend that in participating as 'eligible law students' they are not 'agents' for the appellant, because acts of theirs do not bind him as the principal. All services performed by student advocates are subject to the control of the supervising attorney. At all times, movants contend, it is the attorney who retains the exclusive right to act as the appellant's agent.

However, this interpretation of the function of 'eligible law students' ignores the scope of the authority delegated under our student advocacy program. Substantial responsibility for investigation, drafting and argument may be given to students by the attorney. Such duties and continuous evaluation and supervision by the supervising attorney bring students within the definition of 'subagents' appointed by agents with the consent of the principal.3 As such, they are clearly within the scope of the ban contained in 18 U.S.C. 205. See Restatment (Second) of Agency 5 (1957).

Finally, movants contend that permitting them to appear will not frustrate the legislative intent of 18 U.S.C. 205, which was designed primarily to deal with corruption and abuses of inside information by government employees. While situations might arise in which federal employees would have access to See Restatement (Second) of Agency 5 interest between their official duties and participation as 'eligible law students' in appellate advocacy before this court, movants assert that they have no such conflicts. Neither has access to any investigative or prosecutorial information, and there is no connection between their official duties and the instant criminal appeal.

We must reject movant's attempts to narrow and distinguish the prohibition of 205. We need not address legislative intent when the statutory 'legal interns' language is clear and unambiguous on its face. While 'legal interns' who were employed by the government and were also acting as agents principally for criminal appellants charged by the government was not one of the problems that led Congress in the first place to prohibit federal employees from so acting4 in court and other proceedings, the clear wording of the statute unmistakably compels that result.5 Moreover, the principal intent of the act is to avoid conflicts of interest between an employee's duty to his employer and his duty to his client or principal. In the ordinary situation contemplated by the act, it would be the government that would be the victim, but criminal cases could pose special problems where the defendant might also suffer, or claim to suffer, from his agent or attorney occupying a dual role, especially one where his motives might be questioned. We thus see no basis for construing the act contrary to its express wording.

The motion for leave to enter appearances under Rule 20 is denied.

So ordered.