In Section 207(b) of the 1970 Clean Air Act amendments, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 7541(b) (Supp. V 1981) (the Act), Congress first required vehicle manufacturers to warrant that their vehicles will perform in accordance with applicable emission standards throughout their useful lives. For any vehicle that does not comply, the performance warranty requires the manufacturer, instead of the vehicle owner, to pay for such repairs as will bring the vehicle into compliance with applicable emission standards. In 1977 Congress revised Section 207(b) to offset the anticompetitive effects this warranty would have on the aftermarket parts industry.1 Congress instructed the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to promulgate any regulations necessary for effective implementation of this revised performance warranty scheme. The Administrator promulgated such regulations in 1980.

In this case we review a consolidated set of petitions brought by various segments of the automotive industry challenging the Administrator's regulations.2 After careful study of the statute, the legislative history, and the record, we find that the Administrator's regulations reasonably construe the statute, save in one respect.3 Therefore, we affirm the performance warranty regulations in their entirety, except as they apply to uncertified parts.

In 1970 Congress substantially amended Title II of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 7521 et seq. (Supp. V 1981),4 to ensure that motor vehicles would maintain compliance with emission standards throughout their useful lives.5 As part of this new enactment,6 Congress established a performance warranty program which would require vehicle manufacturers to repair, at no cost to the owner, any vehicle that failed to comply with applicable emission standards during the vehicle's useful life.7 See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 7541(b). Vehicle manufacturers would be liable whenever vehicle owners were subject to sanctions because their vehicles had failed state and local emission inspection and maintenance (I/M) tests.8 In this fashion the performance warranty program serves as an essential component of Congress' comprehensive regulatory scheme to reduce the nation's air pollution.9

In the 1970 amendments to the Act, Congress did not consider that an extended performance warranty might have anticompetitive effects on the automotive aftermarket parts industry.10 In 1974, however, a subcommittee of the House Permanent Select Committee on Small Business conducted extensive hearings on the monopolistic tendencies of the performance warranty provisions. This subcommittee found that the five-year/50,000-mile warranty provisions could harm the automotive aftermarket parts industry if vehicle manufacturers were to condition their warranties on use of their own parts and services or if vehicle owners were to perceive some benefit under the warranty from exclusive use of original equipment parts and repair facilities. Either circumstance, the subcommittee concluded, could create "a psychological and financial tie-in between the new carowner and the vehicle manufacturer's parts and franchised service outlets for 5 years and 50,000 [miles]" that might drive independent parts manufacturers out of the industry, leaving vehicle manufacturers with a monopoly on repair parts. Monopolistic Tendencies of Auto Emission Warranty Provisions, Report of Subcommittee on Environmental Problems Affecting Small Business, House Permanent Select Committee on Small Business, H.R.Rep. No. 93-1628, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1974), Joint Appendix (JA) 547. To combat these tendencies, the subcommittee advised EPA to "[p]ursue all administrative remedies [that would] minimize the anticompetitive effects of the warranty," and recommended that Congress consider reducing the period of the warranty to 12 months or 12,000 miles, the normal commercial warranty for new cars at that time. Id. at 33, JA to No. 81-1047 at 217. Reducing the length of the warranty, the subcommittee concluded, would reduce the potential for development of any psychological or financial ties between vehicle owner and manufacturer. Id.

EPA was, however, without statutory authority to undertake an effective program,11 and Congress could not reach agreement on what measures to enact.12 Finally, in 1977, Congress did act to offset the potential anticompetitive effects of the performance warranty. First, it prohibited vehicle manufacturers from voiding warranties for use of aftermarket parts "certified" as equivalent to original equipment parts, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 7541(b)(2), and provided a $10,000 penalty against those manufacturers who conditioned their warranty coverage upon the use of original equipment parts. Id. Sec. 7522(a)(4)(C).13 Second, Congress limited the scope of the performance warranty after the first 24 months or 24,000 miles so that it applied only to certain emission control parts. Id.14 Finally, Congress expanded the Administrator's authority to regulate the manufacturers' instructions for vehicle maintenance and use, id. Sec. 7541(c)(3),15 and added Section 207(g) to require vehicle owners "to replace and to maintain, at [their] expense * * *, [vehicle components which are] related to emission control (but are not designed for emission control * * * ) * * *." Id. Sec. 7541(g).

Following passage of these amendments, the Administrator attempted to implement the revised performance warranty program. Though extensive comments had already been received and proposed regulations already promulgated, see 42 Fed.Reg. 26759 (May 25, 1977), JA 001, the Administrator issued a second notice of proposed rulemaking so that interested persons could more fully comment on the effects of the 1977 amendments on the performance warranty program. See 45 Fed.Reg. 6960 (January 31, 1980), JA to No. 80-1829 at 062. After receiving and considering extensive comments the Administrator concluded that "short tests," as well as the equipment and facilities needed to perform such tests, were "available." 45 Fed.Reg. 34802, 34840 (May 22, 1980), JA 410, 482. On May 22, 1980, having made these statutorily required findings, see 42 U.S.C. Sec. 7541(b), the Administrator promulgated the final emission warranty regulations. 45 Fed.Reg. 34829, JA 409.

These final warranty regulations include sundry provisions that greatly expand the vehicle manufacturers' responsibilities for post-sale emissions control. See 45 Fed.Reg. 34802-34843 (May 22, 1982), JA to No. 80-1829 at 224-266. For example, the regulations stipulate that for the first 24 months or 24,000 miles, whichever comes first, vehicle manufacturers must warrant all components that affect vehicle emissions. 40 C.F.R. Sec. 85.2103 (1982). Then, for the remaining useful life of the vehicle,16 the regulations require the manufacturer to warrant those components installed for the sole or primary purpose of reducing vehicle emissions and to remedy all nonconformities which keep those components from working properly. Id. Sec. 85.2107. In addition, the regulations set forth the requirements for maintenance and use instructions upon which the vehicle manufacturers may condition their warranties. Id. Sec. 85.2102(a)(13). Finally, the regulations prohibit a vehicle manufacturer from denying a warranty claim on the basis that a part certified as equivalent was used, id. Sec. 85.2105(a), or from avoiding any of their warranty responsibilities because of certain acts of their dealers, id. Secs. 85.2104(h)(1), 85.2106(f), 85.2107(d), and 85.2111(b).

The Automotive Parts Rebuilders Association (APRA)17 filed its petition for judicial review of particular aspects of the emissions performance warranty regulations on July 14, 1980. The Automotive Service Industry Association (ASIA) was allowed to intervene by order of this court on August 25, 1980.18 Finally, on July 21, 1980 the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association (MVMA), et al., also sought judicial review of several of the regulations.19 This court consolidated petitioners' and intervenors' challenges on August 13, 1980.20

Section 207(b) provides that when the Administrator makes certain findings:

(1) he shall establish [short tests] by regulation, and

(2) at such time as he determines that inspection facilities or equipment are available for purposes of carrying out [short tests] established under paragraph (1), he shall prescribe regulations which shall require manufacturers to warrant the emission control device or system of each new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle engine to which a regulation under section applies and which is manufactured in a model year beginning after the Administrator first prescribes warranty regulations under this paragraph (2). The warranty under such regulations shall run to the ultimate purchaser and each subsequent purchaser and shall provide that if --

(A) the vehicle or engine is maintained and operated in accordance with instructions under subsection (c)(3) of this section,

(B) it fails to conform at any time during its useful life * * *, and

(C) such nonconformity results in the ultimate purchaser (or any subsequent purchaser) of such vehicle having to bear any penalty or other sanction * * *,

then such manufacturer shall remedy such nonconformity under such warranty with the cost thereof to be borne by the manufacturer. No such warranty shall be invalid on the basis of any part used in the maintenance or repair of a vehicle or engine if such part was certified as provided under subsection (a)(2) of this section.

42 U.S.C. Sec. 7541(b) (emphasis added). Subsection (c)(3), referred to in Section 207(b)(2)(A), in turn provides that:

The manufacturer shall furnish with each new motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine written instructions for the proper maintenance and use of the vehicle or engine by the ultimate purchaser and such instructions shall correspond to regulations which the Administrator shall promulgate. * * *

42 U.S.C. Sec. 7541(c)(3) (emphasis added). Section 207(a)(2), referred to at the end of Section 207(b)(2), provides that:

In the case of a motor vehicle part or motor vehicle engine part, the manufacturer or rebuilder of such part may certify that use of such part will not result in a failure of the vehicle or engine to comply with emissions standards promulgated under section . Such certification shall be made only under such regulations as may be promulgated by the Administrator to carry out the purposes of subsection (b) of this section. The Administrator shall promulgate such regulations no later than [August 7, 1979].

42 U.S.C. Sec. 7541(a)(2) (emphasis added). Petitioners argue that, read together, these provisions require EPA to satisfy four statutory prerequisites before it may impose performance warranty liability on vehicle manufacturers. EPA must: (1) establish vehicle short tests; (2) determine that facilities and equipment exist to administer those tests; and (3) promulgate owner maintenance and use instruction regulations; and (4) promulgate replacement parts certification regulations. Petitioners concede that EPA has met the first two requirements, but claim that EPA's failure to promulgate timely21 parts certification regulations and any maintenance and use instruction regulations renders the performance warranty program unenforceable.22 This argument, however, misreads the plain language of the statute.

On its face, Section 207(b) imposes two specific prerequisites to performance warranty regulation promulgation: the establishment of short tests and the determination that facilities and equipment exist to administer those tests. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 7541(b)(2). Once these specific prerequisites are satisfied, the statute commands that the Administrator "shall prescribe regulations which shall require manufacturers to warrant [their cars] * * *." Id. The statutory directive is straightforward: once the Administrator makes the required findings, he must issue applicable regulations. This is precisely what the Administrator did when he promulgated regulations applicable to all model year 1981 and subsequent model year vehicles.23

Section 207(b) does, as petitioners assert, make reference to parts certification regulations. It states that no performance warranty shall be invalid on the basis of a part certified under Section 207(a)(2), and Section 207(a)(2) requires the Administrator to promulgate certification regulations "to carry out the purposes" of the performance warranty program. But neither Section 207(a) nor Section 207(b) directly makes promulgation of the certification regulations a prerequisite to promulgation of the performance warranty regulations. By contrast, Congress did set out other specific prerequisites in Section 207(b); Congress easily could have included the certification regulations in this list had it intended them to be necessary prerequisites as well. Indeed, viewing the certification program as an absolute prerequisite to the performance warranty program does not make practical sense: The absence of certification regulations does not change the rights or obligations of any party--vehicle manufacturers, parts manufacturers, or vehicle ownersWIth respect to the performance warranty.24 No vehicle manufacturer can incur performance warranty liability due to the use of certified parts until certification regulations are promulgated and parts manufacturers actually begin certifying their parts; likewise, parts manufacturers are still free to sell, and vehicle owners free to buy, uncertified parts until such regulations exist.25 Petitioners would have us read the statute so as to require a meaningless prerequisite that would serve no rational purpose. This we cannot do.

Petitioners also argue that Section 207(b) requires EPA to promulgate new maintenance and use instruction regulations prior to promulgating performance warranty regulations.26 Maintenance and use instruction regulations have been codified at 40 C.F.R. Sec. 86.079-39 (1982), but these existing regulations were promulgated in accordance with the original "reasonable and necessary" language of Section 207(c)(3).27 The 1977 amendments altered the statute to provide that maintenance and use instructions "shall correspond to regulations which the Administrator shall promulgate," 42 U.S.C. Sec. 7541(c)(3), and petitioners assert that the performance warranty regulations did not correspondingly change the standard for maintenance and use instructions. In fact, all the Administrator did in the performance warranty regulations was reaffirm that the "reasonable and necessary" standard still applied, see 40 C.F.R. Sec. 85.2102 (1982); 45 Fed.Reg. 34831 (May 22, 1980), and reserve the right to promulgate additional regulations.28 Id. But the Administrator was not required to do more. A viable set of maintenance and use instruction regulations is necessary to implement the statute, but nothing in the statute or its legislative history indicates that Congress thought the existing regulations were inadequate. All the 1977 amendment did was give the Administrator more authority to regulate maintenance and use instructions; it did not condition the viability of the performance warranty on a change in those regulations. The "reasonable and necessary" standard adequately instructs manufacturers as to the preparation of maintenance and use instructions. All parties potentially affected by the maintenance and use instruction regulations have been and are now aware of their rights and obligations under this standard, and any claims of uncertainty are therefore totally unwarranted.29

Section 207(b) requires the vehicle manufacturers to warrant the "emission control device or system" of each vehicle for its full useful life. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 7541(b). However, the Act limits the meaning of the term "emission control device or system" after the first 24 months or 24,000 miles. Id. Accordingly, the performance warranty regulations define the warranty's scope differently for the periods before and after 24 months or 24,000 miles.

EPA's emission performance warranty regulations provide that for the first 24 months or 24,000 miles:

(a) The manufacturer's obligation under the emission performance warranty shall be to make all adjustments, repairs or replacements necessary to assure that the vehicle complies with applicable emission standards of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, that it will continue to comply for the remainder of its useful life (if proper maintenance and operation are continued), and that it will operate in a safe manner. The manufacturer shall bear all costs incurred as a result of the above obligation * * *.

40 C.F.R. Sec. 85.2107(a) (1982). Petitioners claim that EPA exceeded the authority Congress granted it by requiring, in this regulation, that vehicle manufacturers warrant all components affecting emissions for the first 24 months or 24,000 miles. But we think EPA's regulation is a perfectly reasonable interpretation of the statute.

When EPA first proposed the warranty regulations, in March 1977, it suggested that the performance warranty cover "any system, assembly, device, or other component thereof which can affect emissions." 42 Fed.Reg. 26761 (May 25, 1977), JA to No. 80-1829 at 20. The aftermarket parts industry reacted adversely to this suggestion because such broad warranty coverage might well leave vehicle manufacturers with a monopoly in the aftermarket parts market.30 Congress agreed, but rather than uniformly reducing the warranty's scope, it responded by limiting the warranty's coverage after the first 24 months or 24,000 miles.31

Petitioners offer a different interpretation of the statute than does EPA. They argue that Section 207(b) places the more limited burden on manufacturers to warrant only those components that are "integral," as opposed to "related," to emission control. Joint brief of petitioners and intervenor at 36. They derive this interpretation from Section 207(g), which provides that

the owner of any motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine warranted under this section is responsible in the proper maintenance of such vehicle or engine to replace and to maintain at his expense * * *, such items as spark plugs, points, condensers, and any other part, item, or device related to emission control (but not designed for emission control under the terms of the last three sentences of subsection (a)(1)32 of this section, unless such part, item, or device is covered by any warranty not mandated by this Act.

42 U.S.C. Sec. 7541(g). According to petitioners, the Administrator's interpretation of the warranty provision would render Section 207(g) meaningless while their interpretation would not.

But petitioners read Section 207(g)'s scope and intended purpose too broadly. That section is designed to deal only with who is responsible for performing "scheduled maintenance"--that maintenance which the vehicle manufacturer designates as necessary for the proper performance of the vehicle.33 If an owner does not maintain his vehicle properly, the manufacturer is free, under Section 207(g), to deny emission performance warranty coverage. But if the vehicle fails an I/M test for other reasons--for example, if components mentioned in Section 207(g) fail prior to the end of their standard design life--then the performance warranty properly covers them during the first 24 months or 24,000 miles. Section 207(g) addresses only the scope of the emission warranty coverage as it relates to scheduled maintenance, and not to services performed and parts replaced under a valid warranty claim.

Petitioners' proposed interpretation of Section 207(b) would read the 24-month/24,000-mile limitation right out of the statute. Under petitioners' reading the vehicle manufacturers are responsible only for components "integral" to emission control. But these are precisely the components that are specified in Section 207(b)(2) as covered for the period after 24 months or 24,000 miles.34 Thus, if petitioners are correct, the performance warranty would cover the same components both before and after 24 months or 24,000 miles. Such a conclusion is incompatible with congressional intent. Congress intended for the warranty coverage to differ before and after the first 24 months or 24,000 miles. The Administrator's interpretation of the statute, not petitioners', properly implements that intention.

Because Congress was also deeply concerned with the anticompetitive effects such broad warranty coverage might have on the aftermarket parts industry,35 it substantially contracted the vehicle manufacturers' responsibility after the first 24 months or 24,000 miles to cover the "catalytic converter, thermal reactor, or other component installed * * * for the sole or primary purpose of reducing vehicle emissions." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 7541(b). EPA's regulations similarly limit the manufacturers' responsibilities after the first 24 months or 24,000 miles to cover only "those nonconformities resulting from the failure of components which have been installed in or on the vehicle for the sole or primary purpose of reducing vehicle emissions * * *." 40 C.F.R. Sec. 85.2103(a)(3) (1982). But in defining the remedy that would make this warranty effective, EPA also makes the manufacturer responsible for:

All other components which must be adjusted, repaired or replaced to enable a component repaired or replaced under paragraph (a)(1) of this section to perform properly.

40 C.F.R. Sec. 85.2107(a)(2) (1982).36 Petitioners claim that this remedy goes beyond the remedial power Congress has authorized and assert that the net result will be to reduce, not increase, competition in sales of aftermarket repair parts.

We think EPA's interpretation is consistent with the statute, and therefore should be upheld. If the warranty is to mean anything, it must cover secondary parts which fail because of a failed primary part.37 Similarly,

[i]t makes no sense to replace a failed part, such as a catalyst, which fails as a result of a second component, such as a spark plug, and not to replace the second component to prevent the replaced part from failing promptly for the same reason its predecessor did.

45 Fed.Reg. 34837 (May 22, 1980), JA 417.38 No emission control device operates in a vacuum, and often mere replacement of a device or system will not be enough to prevent a vehicle from polluting.39 Congress previously confronted this dilemma and left it to EPA to determine what repairs would be necessary to make the performance warranty an effective component of its comprehensive pollution control program.40 0] While Congress wanted EPA to reduce the anticompetitive effects of the warranty after 24 months or 24,000 miles,41 it did not intend for EPA to render the warranty obligation completely meaningless. Congress understood the distinction between the scope of the warranty and the scope of necessary repairs,42 and EPA has properly implemented this congressional understanding by requiring all repairs necessary to make parts installed primarily for emission control work effectively.43

Furthermore, EPA has responded--and we think adequately--to criticisms that this expansive repair obligation is inconsistent with the goal of reducing the anticompetitive potential of the performance warranty. First, EPA quite reasonably indicated that the lack of warranty coverage, in all likelihood, would not benefit the independent aftermarket parts industry.44 45 Fed.Reg. 34838 (May 22, 1980), JA 418. Second, it indicated that the provision could be "procompetitive" if it discouraged warranty outlets from performing unnecessary repairs, and thus fraudulently increasing their sales. Id. Both responses are theoretically plausible ones, and they indicate that EPA has properly considered and responded to claims that its regulation is inconsistent with the thrust of the 1977 amendments. We therefore affirm.45

At the time EPA published the performance warranty regulations, it also published, as an appendix, a list advising the public of which parts it believed were "installed in or on a vehicle solely or primarily for the purpose of reducing vehicle emissions, except those components which were in general use prior to the model year 1968."46 45 Fed.Reg. 34842, 34843 (May 22, 1980), JA 422-423. The list was explicitly advisory,47 and neither expanded nor narrowed the legal obligations of any party. The list was merely EPA's attempt to be responsive to industry's request for guidance in the area.48

Petitioners complain that EPA issued its parts list without giving prior notice and opportunity for comments to the public; accordingly, they suggest that this court vacate the parts list and remand it to EPA for a full rulemaking proceeding. But rulemaking procedures are not required here. Section 307(d)(1)(N) of the Clean Air Act states that rulemaking procedures are not necessary for rules or circumstances qualifying for exemption under Section 553(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act.49 That section specifically exempts general statements of agency policy--like this nonbinding parts list--from normal rulemaking procedures.50 Hence, petitioners' procedural complaint is groundless.

Petitioners also make general challenges to the substance and length of the parts list. But they do not assert any specific grievances, nor do they indicate how this advisory parts list burdens them in any way.51 Since 40 C.F.R. Sec. 85.2103 (1982) continues to be the exclusive source for all warranty obligations, we can find no legal basis upon which to upset the parts list. Vehicle manufacturer obligations derive from the Act and its implementing regulations, not from this advisory list.

Besides defining which of the vehicle manufacturers' parts must be warranted, the regulations require the manufacturer to take responsibility, at least in the first instance, for short test failures that result from their dealers' acts and from the use of their competitors' parts. Petitioners challenge various aspects of these regulations as exceeding EPA's statutory grant of authority.

To begin with, petitioners challenge the sundry regulations that hold vehicle manufacturers responsible for ensuring that warranty repairs are properly and timely made. These regulations require vehicle manufacturers to honor warranty claims, valid or not, if the repair facility does not finish or reject (in writing) such claims within 30 days. See 40 C.F.R. Secs. 85.2106(f), 85.2107(d) (1982). Similarly, they prohibit vehicle manufacturers from denying claims on the basis of any work performed by an authorized facility, id. Sec. 85.2104(h), and subject these manufacturers to fines of up to $10,000 per offense for warranty work that cannot reasonably be expected to allow the vehicle to meet applicable emission standards, id. Sec. 85.2111(b).

In our view, these regulations simply ensure that vehicle manufacturers assume the responsibilities the Act places upon them. In Section 207(b) Congress identified the vehicle manufacturer as being responsible for a broad performance warranty. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 7451(b). In Section 203(a)(4)(D) Congress prohibited these manufacturers from failing or refusing to comply with the terms of the warranty with respect to any vehicle. Id. Sec. 7522(a)(4)(D). And in Section 207(d) Congress specifically prohibited such manufacturers from transferring any of their warranty cost to their dealers. Id. Sec. 7541(d). In these sections of the statute Congress made clear that it wanted vehicle manufacturers to assume full responsibility for the performance warranty. The regulations implement this congressional intent. They do not impose vicarious liability on the vehicle manufacturers or make them responsible for activities they cannot control. Rather, they ensure that the vehicle manufacturers will not be able to escape their performance warranty obligations by delegating the repair work to others.52 So long as vehicle manufacturers choose to authorize others to perform their obligations, they must also be prepared to accept responsibility for the inadequate performance of their delegates.53 These regulations simply ensure that consumers do not face unreasonable hurdles in bringing their warranty claims and that, when performed, the performance warranty work is adequate.54 The Act clearly gives EPA authority to make the vehicle manufacturers responsible for their authorized dealers' acts.

In addition to ensuring that vehicle manufacturers remain responsible for warranty service provided by their authorized dealers, EPA attempted to implement Congress' mandate, in Section 207(b), that vehicle manufacturers not be allowed to deny warranty claims where a competitor's certified replacement part was used.55 In this effort EPA published "replacement part" regulations, which provide, in pertinent part:

(a) No emission performance warranty claim shall be denied on the basis of the use of a properly installed certified part in the maintenance or repair of a vehicle.(b) Except as provided in Sec. 85.2104(h), a vehicle manufacturer may deny an emission performance warranty claim on the basis of an uncertified replacement part used in the maintenance or repair of a vehicle if the vehicle manufacturer presents evidence that the uncertified replacement part is:

(1) Either defective in materials or workmanship, or not equivalent from an emissions standpoint to the original equipment part; and

(2) The owner is unable to rebut the evidence. * * *

40 C.F.R. Sec. 85.2105(a) & (b) (1982) (emphasis added).56 These regulations thus make the vehicle manufacturers responsible, at least in the first instance, for all warranty claims arising from use of their competitors' parts.

Petitioners first challenge that aspect of the replacement parts regulations that makes the vehicle manufacturers responsible for warranty claims in which uncertified parts were used in the maintenance or repair of the vehicle. This portion of the regulations effectively shifts the parts manufacturers' burden of demonstrating equivalency--a prerequisite to certification--to the vehicle manufacturers when an uncertified part is alleged to have been relevant to the vehicle's failure to comply with the emission standards.57 Petitioners claim that EPA reaches beyond its statutory authority in forcing them to carry this burden of proof before they may deny a warranty claim. We agree.

On its face, Section 207(b) prohibits vehicle manufacturers from denying warranty claims if certified parts were used in a vehicle's repair. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 7541(b). The statute says nothing about requiring vehicle manufacturers to accept warranty claims where uncertified parts were used, or of requiring vehicle manufacturers to demonstrate that uncertified parts were defective or not equivalent to original equipment parts before a claim can be denied. Indeed, the fairest implication from the language of the statute is that if an uncertified part is relevant to the failure to comply with the emission standards, then the manufacturer may deny the warranty claim.

When Congress was considering Section 207(b), it obviously was aware of existing law that governed the vehicle manufacturers' responsibilities to consumers.58 That law--the Magnuson-Moss Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 2301 et seq. (1982)--specifically prohibits manufacturers from conditioning their warranties on the consumers' use of articles identified by brand, trade, or corporate name. Id. Sec. 2302(c). But that law did not prohibit manufacturers from conditioning their warranties on the use of the equivalent of original equipment parts because Congress recognized that the manufacturers' reputation and customer goodwill were at stake in warranty work and that manufacturers should be able to protect their interests by requiring reputable and effective repairs. Cf. id. Sec. 2307 (manufacturer can designate facilities for performing warranty repairs).

Congress faced this same concern when it addressed the performance warranty issue under the Clean Air Act. It recognized that the performance warranty exposed vehicle manufacturers to

such vast liability that these companies have a legitimate interest in limiting the scope of their liability by conditioning the validity of their performance warranties on the proper care and maintenance of the vehicle. * * * [T]his interest carries with it the ability to establish criteria to protect the vehicle manufacturer from liability which it, in no way, caused, but which resulted solely from the owner's negligence or the installation of independently produced inferior parts or improper nonfranchised service.

[Congress further recognized] the legal and economic considerations[,] as well as the inability to establish effective quality control measures [, which] prohibit the vehicle manufacturer from publicly identifying non-OEM equivalent parts and nonfranchised service outlets. * * *

H.R.Rep. No. 93-1628, supra, at 30, JA 547 (emphasis added).

Thus Congress enacted a scheme whereby EPA was to shoulder responsibility for establishing the criteria for equivalency--the parts certification scheme. Congress was concerned that vehicle owners, because of the duration of the warranty, would use only original equipment parts in maintenance or repair of their motor vehicle emission systems in order to avoid disputes about the "equivalence" of their parts. Congress feared that these psychological and financial incentives would adversely affect the competitive position of aftermarket parts manufacturers.59 It therefore directed EPA to establish a system whereby all parts manufacturers could, through a relatively simple and inexpensive procedure,60 certify that their parts were equivalent" to those of the vehicle manufacturer.61 See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 7541(a)(2). This system was to become effective within two years. Id. Thus, if a vehicle owner had installed a certified aftermarket part, the vehicle manufacturer could no longer assert that the part was not "equivalent" and so refuse to honor the owner's warranty repair claim. But at no time did Congress indicate it wanted vehicle manufacturers to bear the burden of proving nonequivalence for parts not so certified.62

To the contrary, Congress understood what a delicate task it had assumed in balancing the needs of vehicle manufacturers, parts manufacturers, and consumers. It clearly wanted to mitigate the potential anticompetitive impact of the performance warranty on parts manufacturers and, to that end, directed EPA to establish a certification scheme that would minimize the warranty's anticompetitive impacts. But this scheme also sought to provide certain quality control assurances to both vehicle manufacturers and consumers about the equivalency of independent manufacturers' parts. Thus EPA had to establish a scheme whereby parts manufacturers could establish such equivalency. 40 C.F.R. Sec. 85.2105(a)(2) (1982) undermines this balance by shifting to the vehicle manufacturers the responsibility for establishing nonequivalency, thereby making them potentially liable for aftermarket parts that have not been processed and checked through EPA's certification scheme. The regulation clearly exceeds EPA's statutory grant of authority and must be invalidated.63

Petitioners further challenge that aspect of the "replacement parts" regulations that prohibits vehicle manufacturers from denying a performance warranty claim on the basis that a certified part was defective, decertified, or otherwise not equivalent to the original equipment part. Joint brief of petitioners and intervenor at 21; see 40 C.F.R. Sec. 85.2105(a) (1982); 45 Fed.Reg. 34840, JA 420; 40 C.F.R. Sec. 85.2121(f) (1982); 45 Fed.Reg. 78462 (Nov. 25, 1980), JA 519.64 We must reject this challenge because EPA's regulations track the clear language of the statute65 and fulfill the overriding purpose of the parts certification program.66

Section 207(b) flatly prohibits invalidation of any performance warranty "on the basis of any part used in the maintenance or repair of a vehicle or engine if such part was certified * * *." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 7541(b). By its very terms, this provision covers any part that is certified, and there is no indication whatever that Congress meant to create any exception for defective, decertified, or nonequivalent parts.67 To the contrary, Congress wanted to protect consumers from being caught in the middle of disputes between vehicle and parts manufacturers and to make it less risky for them to buy less expensive, nonoriginal equipment parts.68 Consumers would be spared such disputes and encouraged to use independent manufacturers' parts only if the vehicle manufacturers were required to honor all consumers' claims on parts that were certified when bought.69 For that reason Congress enacted Section 207(b) requiring vehicle manufacturers to honor any claim based on a certified part, whether equivalent or not.70

Petitioners contend that two other pieces of legislative history--a 1976 House Report71 and a 1977 House Committee Report72--demonstrate that Congress did not intend for the warranty obligation to apply so broadly and that EPA's regulations are contrary to congressional intent. Both of these reports explained that use of a certified part could "not be considered as a basis for voiding the performance warranty, unless the actual part in question [was] proven by the vehicle manufacturer to be defective in workmanship or materials." But neither of the bills these reports accompanied was enacted into law. H.R. 10498 (which the 1976 report accompanied) died in the 1976 Congress.73 H.R. 6161 (which the 1977 report accompanied) was a starting point for the legislation ultimately enacted, but contained language very different from that actually included in the final bill.74 In the final version Congress chose the wording offered in S.252,75 and this Senate bill (and its language)76 contained no such exception for defective, decertified, or nonequivalent parts.77

In describing the final compromise, the Conference Committee concluded that "no warranty shall be invalidated by the use of any part certified under regulations promulgated by the Administrator not to result in failure of an engine to comply with emission standards." H.R.Rep. No. 95-564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 548 (1977), JA 557. The Committee understood that a certified parts warranty could be invalidated in only one circumstance: where the manufacturer showed that the owner had not performed the required maintenance or repair as set forth in the owner's manual or had abused the vehicle in its operation. Id. Thus the Conference Committee could not have intended that vehicle manufacturers escape initial responsibility for allegedly defective, but certified, parts. Nor could the Committee have intended that vehicle manufacturers escape initial responsibility for nonequivalent or decertified parts, since the very purpose of creating a certification program was to allow consumers to insure against such charges. Thus, EPA's program seems entirely consistent with the Committee's understanding of the final compromise.

Petitioners object to EPA's reading of the statute (and the legislative history) because it imposes what they term "vicarious liability" on the vehicle manufacturers.78 But EPA's interpretation does no such thing. Rather, it merely commands vehicle manufacturers to make or authorize repairs and then to obtain reimbursement from the parts manufacturers. Contrary to petitioners' intimations,79 this is the only interpretation of the statute that the agency has suggested:

[T]he Agency believes that Congress intended that the vehicle manufacturer honor claims involving certified parts, even if the parts are defective, provided the vehicle manufacturer may be reimbursed for the expenses of such activities by the aftermarket part manufacturer.

45 Fed.Reg. 34835 (May 22, 1980), JA 415. Furthermore, this interpretation is entirely consistent with Congress' desire to protect consumers from excessive prices and to minimize the difficulties that consumers might face in obtaining their warranted repairs, provided an acceptable reimbursement scheme is in place.80 Thus we can find no basis for describing EPA's scheme as one that imposes "vicarious liability" or for finding the interpretation inconsistent with congressional intent.

Because we find EPA's interpretation of the statute to be a reasonable one, our decisions in Chrysler Corp. v. EPA, 600 F.2d 904 (D.C.Cir.1979),81 and Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 543 F.2d 270 (D.C.Cir.1976),82 are completely inapposite. Both of these cases involved regulations that imposed liability (without reimbursement) on one party for the acts of another. In each case the court found that EPA lacked statutory authority to do so. See 600 F.2d at 916-917; 543 F.2d at 275-276. By contrast, this case involves a statute that fully authorizes EPA to shift primary liability from one party to another, provided an acceptable reimbursement scheme accompanies the shift.83

Since 1970 Congress has wanted vehicle manufacturers to bear the cost of repairing emission control devices through a performance warranty program. The 1977 amendments were enacted to minimize the anticompetitive effects of the pollution control program. In 1980 the Administrator finally developed the technology to put this program into effect. His regulations make the vehicle manufacturer broadly responsible for repair of emission control parts early in the life of the vehicle, and then shift that responsibility to the vehicle owner as the car ages. Furthermore, the regulations create a simple scheme whereby the manufacturer is primarily liable for repair failures resulting from dealers' acts and competitors' parts, but can then turn to the responsible party for appropriate reimbursement.

The driving public has waited over a decade for the implementation of this program, and the success of our nation's mobile-source pollution control program depends, at least in part, on it. EPA has steadily overcome the technological roadblocks that stood in its way, and is now ready to put the performance warranty into effect. We think the regulations it has promulgated effectuate Congress' intent, and therefore, with the exception of the uncertified parts provisions, we affirm EPA's efforts.

Affirmed in part and vacated in part.