ORDER

CRAIG M. KELLISON, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff, who is proceeding with retained counsel, brings this action for judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Pursuant to the written consent of all parties, this case is before the undersigned as the presiding judge for all purposes, including entry of final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Pending before the court are plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 20) and defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment (Doc. 21). For the reasons discussed below, the court will deny plaintiff's motion for summary judgment or remand and grant the Commissioner's cross-motion for summary judgment.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

Plaintiff applied for social security benefits in June 2006, alleging an onset of disability on July 15, 2005, due to disabilities including severe depression, severe neck and back pain, and herniated disc in neck. (Certified administrative record ("CAR") 25-26, 85-87, 95-100, 106-13, 441-42, 444-51). Plaintiff's claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing, which was held on April 10, 2008, before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Theodore T. N. Slocum. In a June 10, 2008, decision, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff is not disabled2 based on the following findings:

(CAR 16-25). After the Appeals Council declined review on July 9, 2010, this appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court reviews the Commissioner's final decision to determine whether it is: (1) based on proper legal standards; and (2) supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). "Substantial evidence" is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th Cir. 1996). It is "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971). The record as a whole, including both the evidence that supports and detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion, must be considered and weighed. See Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th Cir. 1986); Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not affirm the Commissioner's decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. See Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a particular finding, the finding of the Commissioner is conclusive. See Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the Commissioner's decision, the decision must be affirmed, see Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002), and may be set aside only if an improper legal standard was applied in weighing the evidence, see Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in two ways: (1) the ALJ failed to accord the appropriate weight to the opinion of plaintiff's treating physician; and (2) the ALJ improperly determined that plaintiff was not credible. Due to these errors, plaintiff alleges the ALJ's determination of her residual functional capacity (RFC) was erroneous, as was his determination that she could perform work existing in significant numbers in the national economy.

A. MEDICAL OPINIONS

The weight given to medical opinions depends in part on whether they are proffered by treating, examining, or non-examining professionals. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1995). Ordinarily, more weight is given to the opinion of a treating professional, who has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual, than the opinion of a non-treating professional. See id.; Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996); Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987). The least weight is given to the opinion of a non-examining professional. See Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1990).

In addition to considering its source, to evaluate whether the Commissioner properly rejected a medical opinion the court considers whether: (1) contradictory opinions are in the record; and (2) clinical findings support the opinions. The Commissioner may reject an uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining medical professional only for "clear and convincing" reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. While a treating professional's opinion generally is accorded superior weight, if it is contradicted by an examining professional's opinion which is supported by different independent clinical findings, the Commissioner may resolve the conflict. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995). A contradicted opinion of a treating or examining professional may be rejected only for "specific and legitimate" reasons supported by substantial evidence. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. This test is met if the Commissioner sets out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, states her interpretation of the evidence, and makes a finding. See Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751-55 (9th Cir. 1989). Absent specific and legitimate reasons, the Commissioner must defer to the opinion of a treating or examining professional. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. The opinion of a non-examining professional, without other evidence, is insufficient to reject the opinion of a treating or examining professional. See id. at 831. In any event, the Commissioner need not give weight to any conclusory opinion supported by minimal clinical findings. See Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 1999) (rejecting treating physician's conclusory, minimally supported opinion); see also Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751.

Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in rejecting the opinion of her treating doctor, Dr. Long, without clear and convincing or specific and legitimate reasons. She argues the reasons the ALJ provided are not supported by the evidence. Specifically, she states the chart notes from Butte County mental health do contain findings to support Dr Long's opinion, and that the ALJ either ignored or mischaracterized the supporting findings. In addition, plaintiff contends that the ALJ's reliance on the consultative examiner's opinion, Dr. Canty, was inadequate as Dr. Canty examined plaintiff two years before the hearing, prior to her receiving mental health treatment from Dr. Long and prior to her hospitalization for suicidal ideation in October 2006.3 Finally, plaintiff suggests there is no inconsistency with her limited daily activities and the limitations assessed by Dr. Long.

The only opinions at issue here are Dr. Long's and Dr. Canty, related to plaintiff's mental health. The ALJ's determination related to plaintiff's physical disabilities and limitations are not challenged. Dr. Canty examined plaintiff on September 18, 2006. Prior to Dr. Canty's examination, plaintiff had not received mental health treatment, which is indicated in Dr. Canty's report wherein he stated there were no psychiatric records to review, but that he did review her records from her primary care doctor which commented on her mental state. Dr. Canty's mental status examination revealed plaintiff was well groomed, but arrived slightly late to the appointment. Her speech was clear and she was cooperative. Her thoughts were clear, logical and goal-directed. She denied psychosis, suicidal or homicidal ideation, and she had not participated in self abuse. Plaintiff described her typical mood as always changing, and that her mood could vary from minute to minute. She described an undercurrent of chronic irritability. During the interview, she appeared happy with a full affect. She was oriented to day, month and year. She could immediately recall six digits forward and four in reverse; she could recall three out of three objects at five minutes. Her fund of knowledge was good. She was able to complete serial 3's from 20, but did it very slowly. She was able to follow directions to draw a specific picture and did so while continuing with the examination. Dr. Canty's diagnosis was pain disorder with psychological and physical factors versus mood disorder not otherwise specified. (CAR 371-72). Dr. Canty found plaintiff:

(CAR 373. His medical source statements included the following:

(CAR 373).

The ALJ summarized4 Dr. Long's treatment notes as follows:

(CAR 19-20).

Dr. Long completed a Mental Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire on January 17, 2008. Dr. Long opined that plaintiff was seriously limited, but not precluded in her abilities to remember and carry out short and simple instructions, work in coordination with or proximity to others, be aware of normal hazards, interact appropriately with the general public, and maintain socially appropriate behavior; was unable to meet competitive standards related to remembering work-like procedures, making simple work-related decisions, asking simple questions or requesting assistance, getting along with co-workers, responding appropriately to changes in a routine work setting, and adhering to basic standards of neatness and cleanliness; and had no useful ability to function related to maintaining attention for two hour segments, maintaining regular attendance, sustaining an ordinary routine without special supervision, completing a normal workday and workweek, accepting instructions and responding appropriately to criticism, dealing with normal work stress, traveling to unfamiliar places, and using public transportation. (CAR 191-92). Dr. Long based these limitations on plaintiff's inability to organize herself. (CAR 192). He also noted plaintiff "is almost catatonic. Limited ability to engage with others. Profoundly depressed and blunted [with] psychomotor retardation." (CAR 191). Finally, Dr. Long opined that plaintiff's functional limitations are markedly related to activities of daily living and maintaining social functioning; extreme related to maintaining concentration, persistence or pace; and that plaintiff had one or two episodes of decompensation within a 12-month period, each of at least two weeks duration. (CAR 192).

After setting forth a full summary of the medical evidence in the record, the ALJ determined:

(CAR 22).

Plaintiff's arguments that the ALJ failed to provide proper reasons for rejecting Dr. Long's opinion are not supported by the evidence. While the undersigned agrees that the ALJ's summary of Dr. Long's treatment notes may not have been exhaustive, the summary is a decent representation of the treatment Dr. Long provided and the symptoms plaintiff presented at the time. The undersigned finds no error with the ALJ's determination that Dr. Long's opinion, that plaintiff is almost catatonic and severely limited in all abilities, is not supported by his treatment notes. The record indicates that plaintiff has had times where she has had thoughts about suicide, including her hospitalization in 2006, and has had ups and downs in her treatment especially when her medication has been altered, but there is no support for the opinion that plaintiff is catatonic. As Dr. Long's opinion is contradicted by that of the examining physician, Dr. Canty, the ALJ had to resolve that conflict, which was done without legal error. The reasons the ALJ provided for discounting Dr. Long's opinion were specific and legitimate, and supported by the record.

To the extent plaintiff argues the opinion of Dr. Canty, and the State Agency physicians' opinions which relied thereon, were stale and unreliable, the undersigned does not agree. Dr. Canty completed an examination of plaintiff, and relied on the results of that examination to render his opinion. His opinion was based on independent clinical evidence. Plaintiff's argument is essentially that the ALJ had a duty to develop the record further. The duty to develop the record is triggered where the evidence is ambiguous or the ALJ finds the record is inadequate. See Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). Neither is evident in the record before the court. The evidence is neither ambiguous nor inadequate. Rather, the ALJ had sufficient, albeit contradictory, medical opinions to rely on, and adequately resolved the conflict.

The court determines that the reasons ALJ provided for rejecting plaintiff's treating psychiatrist's contradicted opinion were specific and legitimate, and were supported by substantial evidence. Thus, the ALJ did not err in his treatment of the medical opinions in the record.

B. PLAINTIFF'S CREDIBILITY

The Commissioner determines whether a disability applicant is credible, and the court defers to the Commissioner's discretion if the Commissioner used the proper process and provided proper reasons. See Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1996). An explicit credibility finding must be supported by specific, cogent reasons. See Rashad v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990). General findings are insufficient. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995). Rather, the Commissioner must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the testimony. See id. Moreover, unless there is affirmative evidence in the record of malingering, the Commissioner's reasons for rejecting testimony as not credible must be "clear and convincing." See id.; see also Carmickle v. Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Lingenfelter v Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1936 (9th Cir. 2007), and Gregor v. Barnhart, 464 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 2006)).

If there is objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment, the Commissioner may not discredit a claimant's testimony as to the severity of symptoms merely because they are unsupported by objective medical evidence. See Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 347-48 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). As the Ninth Circuit explained in Smolen v. Chater:

80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to the test established in Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1986)).

The Commissioner may, however, consider the nature of the symptoms alleged, including aggravating factors, medication, treatment, and functional restrictions. See Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 345-47. In weighing credibility, the Commissioner may also consider: (1) the claimant's reputation for truthfulness, prior inconsistent statements, or other inconsistent testimony; (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment; (3) the claimant's daily activities; (4) work records; and (5) physician and third-party testimony about the nature, severity, and effect of symptoms. See Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284 (citations omitted). It is also appropriate to consider whether the claimant cooperated during physical examinations or provided conflicting statements concerning drug and/or alcohol use. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002). If the claimant testifies as to symptoms greater than would normally be produced by a given impairment, the ALJ may disbelieve that testimony provided specific findings are made. See Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1161 (citing Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 1989)).

Here, the ALJ found plaintiff's allegations regarding her functional limitations not fully credible due to the following:

(CAR 21).

The ALJ then again summarized plaintiff's treatment notes from Butte County mental health, similar to that set forth above, and those from Del Norte Clinics. Based on the above, the ALJ found "her mental complaints partially credible." (CAR 22).

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in finding her mental complaints only partially credible. Plaintiff claims the ALJ used only isolated medical records to determine credibility, and that her limited daily activities are an insufficient basis to support that determination. Defendant counters that the ALJ may properly rely on medical evidence and plaintiff's activities of daily living in assessing plaintiff's credibility.

The undersigned agrees that the ALJ provided sufficient reasons for discounting plaintiff's credibility. Specifically, the ALJ found an inconsistency between the symptoms alleged and the treatment received. The ALJ supported this reason with a summary of the mental health treatment plaintiff received, not isolated medical records as plaintiff contends. In addition, the ALJ found an inconsistency between the limitations alleged and plaintiff's daily activities, including, inter alia reading, watching television and movies, preparing meals, driving, paying bills, shopping, and visiting. As stated above, the court defers to the Commissioner's discretion if proper reasons are provided. Given the proper deference, the court finds no error in the ALJ's credibility determination.

As the court determines the ALJ did not err in relying on the consultative examiner's opinion nor in his credibility determination, there is no basis for finding an error with the ALJ's RFC or determination that plaintiff can perform work existing in the national economy.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the Commissioner's final decision is based on substantial evidence and proper legal analysis. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: