ORDER

LAWRENCE K. KARLTON, Senior District Judge.

This case was originally filed by plaintiff in Placer County Superior Court. The original complaint alleged both state and federal claims arising from a loan transaction and subsequent initiation of foreclosure proceedings on plaintiff's property. Defendants removed the case to this court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction only.

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on October 20, 2010, alleging both state and federal claims. ECF No. 23. Defendants Paramount, Chase, and MERS filed motions to dismiss the amended complaint, which this court granted in part and denied in part. The court granted plaintiff leave to amend the complaint, and plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint. The Second Amended Complaint does not allege any violations of federal law. No party has asserted any other basis for federal court jurisdiction over this case. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), district courts shall remand a removed case "[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction." This court issued an order to show cause why the case should not be remanded to the state court. ECF No. 73.

Defendants JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. submitted a response to the order to show cause stating that they do not object to an order remanding the action to state court. ECF No. 74.

Plaintiff Dumas and defendant Paramount Residential Mortgage each submitted responses requesting that the court exercise its discretion to retain jurisdiction over the action despite the fact that the federal claims no longer exist.

Defendant Paramount argues that the court should dismiss the claims against Paramount before remanding the case to state court. In support of this request, Paramount asserts that the court should consider plaintiff's state-law claims "from a federal statutory purview." From what the court can gather from Paramount's nearly incomprehensible response, Paramount believes that a federal issue remains because Dumas' claims against Paramount could be dismissed under the federal pleading standards.

Similarly, plaintiff Dumas, although he originally filed this action in state court, asks the court to exercise it discretion to retain jurisdiction over plaintiff's state-law claims. Plaintiff asserts that doing so is warranted in the interest of judicial economy.

"If the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well . . . There may, on the other hand, be situations in which the state claim is so closely tied to questions of federal policy that the argument for exercise of pendent jurisdiction is particularly strong." United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-727 (1966). This pendant jurisdiction doctrine is "designed to enable courts to handle cases involving state-law claims in the way that will best accommodate the values of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity." Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 351 (1988). Pendant jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right, and when federal-law claims have dropped out of the an action in its early stages, the balance of these factors indicates that the case properly belongs in state court. Id. (quoting Gibbs). Where remand, rather than dismissal of a case will better accommodate these values, remand is appropriate. Id. This is usually the case when the court "relinquish[es] jurisdiction over a removed case involving pendent claims." Id.

In this case, the court declines to exercise pendant jurisdiction over plaintiff's action, which contains only state-law claims. The contract, tort, and state statutory claims in this foreclosure case are not closely tied to questions of federal policy, and the court finds it appropriate for the claims to be litigated in state court.

Accordingly, this action is REMANDED to the state court for further proceedings. The Preliminary Injunction issued by this court shall remain in place unless and until the state court determines it to be inappropriate.

IT IS SO ORDERED.