REVISED STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER

LAWRENCE K. KARLTON, District Judge.

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on November 27, 2012.

2. By this stipulation, the parties ask that the status conference be continued to January 8, 2013 and to exclude time between November 27, 2012 and January 8, 2013 under Local Code T4 and T2.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes investigative reports and related documents in electronic form, voluminous records related to a state agency's purchase of equipment and services during a multi-year timespan, and multiple boxes of related agency records. All of this discovery in the Government's possession has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying. The Court has previously found this case to be complex within the meaning of Local Code T2.

b. Counsel for defendants have made additional discovery requests and counsel for the Government needs additional time to respond to those requests. Additionally, defendant Shirazi had brain surgery in late August and she is still recovering. Due to her condition, additional time is needed to allow her to meaningfully consult with counsel and assist in preparation for trial.

c. For these reasons, denial of a continuance would deny the parties the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

d. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of November 27, 2012 to January 8, 2013 inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

This time period is also deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), (B)(ii) and Local Code T2.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.