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U.S. v. McCRAY, CR-S-11-394-GEB. (2012)

Court: District Court, E.D. California Number: infdco20121203512 Visitors: 16
Filed: Nov. 29, 2012
Latest Update: Nov. 29, 2012
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER GARLAND E. BURRELL, Jr., Senior District Judge. The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, William S. Wong, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Alar McCray, John R. Manning, Esq., hereby stipulate the following: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference on November 30, 2012. 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER

GARLAND E. BURRELL, Jr., Senior District Judge.

The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, William S. Wong, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Alar McCray, John R. Manning, Esq., hereby stipulate the following:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference on November 30, 2012.

2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until January 18, 2013 and to exclude time between November 30, 2012 and January 18, 2013 under the Local CodeT-4 (to allow defense counsel time to prepare).

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request the Court find the following:

a. Counsel for Alar McCray was appointed to represent the defendant on September 10, 2012 and the Federal Defender was relieved. b. This case currently contains 41 pages of discovery as well as numerous of medical (mental health) records and related documents received from defendant's previous attorney. c. Counsel for the defendant needs additional time to review the discovery, conduct investigation, and interview potential witnesses. d. Defendant is currently housed at the Butte County Jail. Counsel needs additional time to meet with defendant to review the discovery and discuss the case. e. Counsel for defendants believe the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. f. The Government does not object to the continuance. g. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. h. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv) within which trial must commence, the time period of November 30, 2012 to January 18, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv), corresponding to Local Code T-4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.

Source:  Leagle

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