STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER

JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was related to United States v. Kuzmenko, 11-210 JAM and reassigned to this court.

2. Prior to reassignment, the court found excludable time up to and including October 30, 2012.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. The government has provided defense counsel with the discovery associated with this case, which includes voluminous records, including mortgage and bank records involving multiple transactions. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying, and/or will be made available.

b. Since October 30, 2012, counsel for defendants have been reviewing these materials, discussing them with their clients, and assessing potential trial and sentencing issues.

c. Additionally, the government has provided proposed plea agreements to defense counsel, which defense counsel have been discussing with their clients and the government.

d. Defense counsel need additional time, taking into account the exercise of due diligence, to review the materials described above and to discuss them with their clients, and otherwise effectively prepare for the disposition of this case. Based on the Court's available calendars and the availability of defense counsel, the parties ask that the Court set this matter for a status conference on January 8, 2013 at 9:45 a.m., and that it find excludable time from November 12, 2012 through and including the January 8, 2013 status conference. Because of the need for additional preparation outlined above, a denial of a continuance to January 8, 2013 would deny the parties the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case and excluding time as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of November 12, 2012 to January 8, 2013 inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.