Filed: May 07, 2013
Latest Update: May 07, 2013
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT FINDINGS AND ORDER JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge. Plaintiff, United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, JILL THOMAS and defendants, RAMON LEVARIO, by his counsel DANNY D. BRACE, JR., SONNY GONZALESZ by his counsel JASON LAWLEY, and JESSE MONTANEZ, by his counsel KELLY BABINEAU, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on May 7, 2013. 2. By this stipulation, the
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT FINDINGS AND ORDER JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge. Plaintiff, United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, JILL THOMAS and defendants, RAMON LEVARIO, by his counsel DANNY D. BRACE, JR., SONNY GONZALESZ by his counsel JASON LAWLEY, and JESSE MONTANEZ, by his counsel KELLY BABINEAU, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on May 7, 2013. 2. By this stipulation, the d..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT FINDINGS AND ORDER
JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.
Plaintiff, United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, JILL THOMAS and defendants, RAMON LEVARIO, by his counsel DANNY D. BRACE, JR., SONNY GONZALESZ by his counsel JASON LAWLEY, and JESSE MONTANEZ, by his counsel KELLY BABINEAU, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on May 7, 2013.
2. By this stipulation, the defendant now moves to continue the status conference until June 18, 2013 at 9:45 a.m, and to exclude time between May 7, 2013 and June 18, 2013 under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. Counsel for the defendants desire additional time to consult with their clients regarding a resolution to this case.
b. Counsel for the defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
c. The government does not object to the continuance.
d. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of May 7, 2013, to June 18, 2013, at 9:45 a.m. inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
Date: 5-6-13 By: Jason Lawley
Authorized to sign for Mr. Lawley
On May 6, 2013
Jason Lawley, Attorney for
Sonny Gonzalez
5-6-13 By: Kelly Babineau
Authorized to sign for Ms. Babineau
On May 6, 2013
Kelly Babineau Attorney for
Jesse Montanez
Date: 5-6-13 By:/s/Jill Thomas
Authorized to sign for Ms. Thomas
On May 6, 2013
Jill Thomas
Assistant U.S. Attorney
IT IS SO ORDERED:
