STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER

LAWRENCE K. KARLTON, District Judge.

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and all co-defendants, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. Status conferences were held on January 29, 2013, March 19, 2013 and April 23, 2013. All parties were present at both conferences.

2. At the January 29, 2013 status conference, the parties agreed to set an additional status conference on March 19, 2013, excluding time under Local Code T4 up to and including that latter date. At the March 19, 2013 status conference, the parties agreed to set an additional status conference on April 23, 2013, excluding time under Local Code T4 up to and including that latter date. At the April 23, 2013 status conference, the parties agreed to set an additional status conference on May 29, 2013, excluding time under Local Code T4 up to and including that latter date.

3. Counsel for defendants desire additional time to consult with their clients and conduct additional investigation, as well as to conduct negotiations with the government and prepare for a possible jury trial.

4. Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

5. The government joins in the request for the continuance.

6. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

7. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of January 29, 2013 to May 29, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), (B)(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at the defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

8. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN, IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.