ORDER RE: MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

WILLIAM B. SHUBB, District Judge.

Plaintiffs Reverge Anselmo and Seven Hills Land and Cattle Company ("Seven Hills") have brought this suit against defendants Ross Mull, Leslie Morgan, Les Baugh, Glen Hawes, County of Shasta ("Shasta County"), and the Board of Supervisors of the County of Shasta ("Board") related to defendants' actions surrounding the issuance of a Williamson Act contract and enforcement of a grading ordinance. Plaintiffs allege violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and seek injunctive relief through a writ of mandate. (Notice of Removal Ex. B ("TAC") (Docket No. 1-2).) Presently before the court are plaintiffs' motions for partial summary judgment. (Docket Nos. 120, 121.)1

The legal bases for plaintiffs' motions are unclear. In one motion, plaintiffs request that the court find that the defendant owed Seven Hills a "duty to approve a Williamson Act contract" and breached that duty or, alternatively, that Board's vote on December 16, 2008 "constituted approval of execution of such a Contract as of that date." (Pls.' Mot. for Partial Summ. J. Re: Williamson Act ("Williamson Act MSJ") at 6:12-22 (Docket No. 121-2).)2 Seven Hills contends that, should the court find that defendants owed it a duty to grant a Williamson Act contract, "the question of whether the failure to comply with this duty by the County and its officers amounts to a violation of 42 U.S.C. [§] 1983 will still remain for the jury and Court to resolve." (Id. at 6:15-17.)

In the other motion, plaintiffs "seek[] to eliminate a defense likely to be asserted by the County and individual defendants that their actions or inactions were not violative of the constitutional rights of plaintiffs." (Pls.' Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Partial Summ. J. Re: Grading Ordinance ("Ordinance MSJ") at 2:5-7 (Docket No. 128).) Specifically, plaintiffs request partial summary judgment barring defendants from asserting, as a defense to a § 1983 claim, that plaintiffs violated a grading ordinance when conducting work on plaintiffs' property. (Ordinance MSJ at 1:25-2:4 (Docket No. 120-1).)

With regard to the Williamson Act MSJ, plaintiffs' briefs sometimes imply that Seven Hills' Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were infringed when it was deprived of a constitutionally protected property interest. (Williamson Act MSJ at 7:18-21, 10:1-4.) At other points plaintiffs appear to contend that the motion is based on deprivation of a Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection. (See id. at 10:6-8, 14:19-28; Pls.' Reply in Supp. of Williamson Act MSJ at 6:5-6, 12:5-7). Likewise with regard to the Ordinance MSJ, the court cannot determine what constitutional right plaintiffs allege was infringed by defendants' actions regarding the grading ordinance. Without a clear statement of the constitutional right at issue, the court cannot even begin to analyze whether defendants' hypothetical defense to plaintiffs' § 1983 claim fails as a matter of law.

The Third Amended Complaint's ("TAC") § 1983 claim alleges both due process an equal protection violations, (Third Am. Compl. ("TAC") ¶¶ 60.0(1) & (4)). Yet, plaintiffs' briefs do not cite a single §1983 case by a federal court to guide this court's analysis.3 Plaintiffs fail to explain whether they are asserting an independent claim for a writ of mandate under sections 1085 and the William Act statute—if such a claim is even cognizable in federal courts, see Hill v. County of Sacramento, 466 F. App'x 577, 579 (9th Cir. 2012) ("[Section] 1085 authorizes only state courts to issue writs of mandate.")— or whether they are simply seeking prospective injunctive relief under § 1983. The TAC fails to clarify the issue, as plaintiffs' second claim is entitled "Writ of Mandate and Injunction to Prohibit Future Violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and to Enforce Other Statutory Requirements." (Docket No. 1-2.)

"Section 1983 `is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides `a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). "The first step in any such claim is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed." Id. (citations omitted). Evaluating plaintiffs' motions under the standard set forth in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), because plaintiffs have failed to identify a specific constitutional right forming the bases of the § 1983 claims upon which they seek partial summary judgment, their motions for partial summary judgment must accordingly be denied.4

Without a clear explanation of the constitutional rights at the base of plaintiffs' motions, the court would simply be speculating as to the specific issues to be resolved, which would likely lead to later argument that the court misunderstood plaintiffs' motions. Furthermore, the dispositive motion deadline is still six weeks away. (Docket No. 117.) Even if the court granted plaintiffs the relief they seek, plaintiffs might then file another motion seeking summary judgment on the remaining issues in their § 1983 claims. Thus, addressing plaintiffs' specific arguments regarding the Williamson Act statutory scheme and the statute of limitations for a grading ordinance violation at this time would not "be conducive to the conservation of judicial resources and of benefit to the parties." Bruschini, 911 F. Supp. at 106.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs' motions for partial summary judgment be, and the same hereby are, DENIED.