EDMUND F. BRENNAN, District Judge.
Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The defendants initially filed a motion to dismiss on April 14, 2011. Electronic Case Filing (hereafter "ECF") No. 333. The court issued findings and recommendations to grant the motion in part (ECF No. 345), but then vacated those findings and recommendations in light of the recent decision of Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2012) (ECF No. 350). After vacating the findings and recommendations, the court directed defendants to re-file and re-serve their motion, along with the notice to plaintiff required by Woods. ECF No. 350. On August 30, 2012, defendants re-filed and re-served their motion as instructed.
This action proceeds on plaintiff's October 7, 2009 second amended complaint against the sixteen defendants named above. See ECF Nos. 319, 323, 332. The complaint asserts claims based on twelve distinct incidents:
ECF No. 352 at 4-5.
Defendants move to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim and for failure to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(6) and 12(b). ECF No. 352.
To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain more than a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action"; it must contain factual allegations sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). "The pleading must contain something more. . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action." Id. (quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004)). "[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Dismissal is appropriate based either on the lack of cognizable legal theories or the lack of pleading sufficient facts to support cognizable legal theories. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).
In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trs., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and resolve all doubts in the pleader's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, reh'g denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969). The court will "`presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.'" Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 256 (1994) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). The court may consider facts established by exhibits attached to the complaint. Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987). The court may also consider facts which may be judicially noticed, Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Ct., 828 F.2d at 1388, and matters of public record, including pleadings, orders, and other papers filed with the court. Mack v. South Bay Beer Distribs., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986).
Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985). However, the court's liberal interpretation of a pro se litigant's pleading may not supply essential elements of a claim that are not plead. Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992); Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Furthermore, "[t]he court is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged." Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994). The court need not accept unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). A pro se litigant is, however, entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an opportunity to amend, unless the complaint's deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987).
The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") provides that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions [under section 1983 of this title] until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). "Prison conditions" subject to the exhaustion requirement have been defined broadly as "the effects of actions by government officials on the lives of persons confined in prison . . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2); Smith v. Zachary, 255 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Lawrence v. Goord, 304 F.3d 198, 200 (2d Cir. 2002). To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a grievance must alert prison officials to the claims the plaintiff has included in the complaint, but need only provide the level of detail required by the grievance system itself. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218-19 (2007); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002) (purpose of exhaustion requirement is to give officials "time and opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case").
Prisoners who file grievances must use a form provided by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, which instructs the inmate to describe the problem and outline the action requested. The grievance process, as defined by California regulations, has three levels of review to address an inmate's claims, subject to certain exceptions. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.7. Administrative procedures generally are exhausted once a plaintiff has received a "Director's Level Decision," or third level review, with respect to his issues or claims. Id. § 3084.1(b).
Proper exhaustion of available remedies is mandatory, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001), and "[p]roper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's deadlines and other critical procedural rules[.]" Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006). For a remedy to be "available," there must be the "possibility of some relief . . . ." Booth, 532 U.S. at 738. Relying on Booth, the Ninth Circuit has held:
Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 935 (9th Cir. 2005).
In the Ninth Circuit, motions to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies are normally brought under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Albino v. Baca, 697 F.3d. 1023, 1029 (9th Cir. 2012). Nonetheless, it remains well established that credibility of witnesses over material factual disputes cannot be resolved on paper. Thus, when ruling on an exhaustion motion requires the court to look beyond the pleadings in the context of disputed issues of fact, the court must do so under "a procedure closely analogous to summary judgment." Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119, n.14 (9th Cir. 2003). Doing so ensures that a process is followed to test whether disputes over facts pertaining to whether plaintiff actually exhausted available remedies are truly genuine and material and therefore warrant live testimony, or whether the dispute(s) may be disposed of by unrefuted declarations and exhibits. Therefore, following the suggestion in Wyatt, and because care must be taken not to resolve credibility on paper if it pertains to disputed issues of fact that are material to the outcome, the undersigned applies the Rule 56 standards to exhaustion motions that require consideration of materials extrinsic to the complaint.
Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense in the sense that defendants bear the burden of proving plaintiff did not exhaust available remedies. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119. To bear this burden:
Brown, 422 F.3d at 936-37 (citations omitted).
Defendants argue that the claims predicated on the allegations summarized above in paragraphs 1-8, 10, and 12, should be dismissed because they are unexhausted. Defendants also argue that the claims predicated on the allegations summarized above in paragraphs 1, 3, 5, 7, 10, and portions of 4, 8, and 9 should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
First, plaintiff contends that defendants have waived the defense of nonexhaustion by failing to timely raise it. ECF No. 355 at 24-26. To further this argument, plaintiff identifies a June 10, 1999 order issued in this case which informed plaintiff that he "need not exhaust his claims for monetary damages" because "[m]onetary relief cannot be afforded through the California Department of Corrections inmate grievance procedure." ECF No. 12 at 2. Plaintiff acknowledges that this ruling has subsequently been overruled by intervening case law clarifying that prisoners must exhaust administrative remedies even when the prisoner's suit seeks monetary damages that are unavailable through the prison's grievance process. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 734-35, 741 (2001). Nevertheless, plaintiff seems to argue that the change in case law should not apply to him because, in his view, both the court and the defendants should have promptly notified him of this change because of his limited access to legal resources. ECF No. 355 at 25. Plaintiff cites no authority for this proposition. Moreover, this court is bound by controlling Supreme Court precedent and there is simply no basis to conclude that defendants waived their affirmative defense of failure to exhaust.
Nor does the "law of the case" doctrine
In addition, plaintiff argues that defendants intentionally delayed raising their failure to exhaust defense by initially responding to plaintiff's complaint with a motion for a more definite statement. But a motion for a more definite statement is an authorized response to a pleading, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e), and plaintiff fails to show that the motion was frivolous or improper for any reason. Plaintiff thus fails to demonstrate that by filing a Rule 12(e) motion, defendants unnecessarily delayed raising the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies, or that they otherwise waived it.
Plaintiff argues further that a dismissal without prejudice of his claims as unexhausted will be tantamount to a dismissal with prejudice because his claims would now be barred by the statute of limitations. ECF No. 355 at 26. Regardless of whether plaintiff will be successful in bringing any dismissed claim in a new lawsuit, if he did not properly exhaust a claim, under controlling case law it must be dismissed. Plaintiff's contention that he will be prejudiced by any dismissal of his claims as unexhausted is not an adequate basis for denying defendants' motion.
Plaintiff is also adamant that defendants' motion must be denied on the grounds that their evidence is incomplete, false, and unreliable. See Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1116-17, 1119-20 (an incomplete record is inadequate to establish nonexhaustion). Plaintiff points to numerous discrepancies between the records provided by defendants and those he has provided with his opposition. See, e.g., ECF No. 355 at 31-34 (identifying instances in which some of defendants' records do not reflect receipt of plaintiff's appeals, lack certain stamps or signatures, omit some of the prison's responses to plaintiff's appeals, or omit some of plaintiff's attachments). As noted, administrative appeals go through various levels of review and bounce back and forth between the complaining inmate and prison officials. Minor inconsistencies between the parties' copies, without a showing as to how any particular inconsistency undermines defendants' contention that plaintiff failed to exhaust, do not demonstrate that defendants' evidence is false, unreliable, or incomplete for purposes of meeting the initial burden on their motion. Where plaintiff argues that a specific discrepancy or omission is significant, the court will address it when discussing the claim to which it relates.
Lastly, plaintiff argues that defendants have failed to meet their burden of proving nonexhaustion because their administrative record does not include any group appeals that plaintiff may have joined in during the relevant period of time. Plaintiff contends that to meet their burden, defendants must "comb[ ] through" the files of other inmates to determine whether plaintiff joined in any of their appeals. ECF No. 355 at 35, 94 (¶ 21). Aside from the group appeal discussed below regarding the claims alleged in paragraph 2, plaintiff does not contend that any particular group appeal would have satisfied the exhaustion requirement in this case. Mindful that "[a] defendant's burden of establishing an inmate's failure to exhaust is very low," the court declines to require that defendants undertake such an onerous task to meet their initial burden. See Albino, 697 F.3d at 1031 ("A defendant need only show the existence of remedies that the plaintiff did not use.").
The court next addresses the arguments set forth in defendants' motion to dismiss.
Paragraph 1 includes plaintiff's allegations that (1) he was deprived of his personal property in January 1997 upon his arrival to High Desert State Prison, (2) in February 1997, defendant Singletary filed a false declaration claiming plaintiff had received all of his property, and (3) that defendants Castro, D. Peterson, McClure, Diggs, Jennings, Wright, and Runnels failed to properly train or supervise the unnamed staff that disposed of plaintiff's property.
Defendants have submitted copies of the twenty grievances pursued by plaintiff. The court has carefully reviewed each of the twenty and finds that only one of them would have alerted prison officials to any of the allegations made in paragraph 1. See ECF No. 352, Exs. G-Z; see also id., Ex. F (including a chart that briefly summarizes the issues raised in each of the twenty grievances). In grievance number 97-0817, dated February 17, 1997, plaintiff complained that officials at California State Prison, Sacramento had failed to transfer all of his personal property to High Desert State Prison and that officials had not followed through with statements to plaintiff that his property would be returned. ECF No. 352, Ex. G. Defendants' evidence shows that this grievance was denied at the second-level of review and returned to plaintiff on September 10, 1997. Id. Their evidence also shows that plaintiff did not subsequently seek Director's level review. Id., Ex. B ¶¶ 4-7, Ex. A. Thus, defendants have shown that administrative relief remained available to plaintiff for the claims alleged in paragraph 1.
Plaintiff responds by claiming that he did, in fact, pursue appeal number 97-0817 to the Director's level, that prison officials failed to timely respond to the appeal, and that defendants' copy of the appeal is false and unreliable.
In claiming that he pursued the appeal to the Director's level, plaintiff points to the appeal itself, which shows that on May 23, 1997, he filled out the section requesting Director's level review. See ECF No. 352, Ex. G. Plaintiff states that when he filled this section out, the appeal had already been denied at the second level. ECF No. 355 at 57. It is apparent from the appeal, however, that it was not even assigned to the second level until May 29, 1997. See ECF No. 352, Ex. G (also showing that the April 1, 1997 first level response was supplemented on May 6, 1997). Had plaintiff submitted this appeal to the Director's level on May 23, 1997, as he contends he did, it would have been properly rejected because review at the second level had not yet begun, and was most certainly not complete. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.5(c) (1997). Moreover, evidence that plaintiff filled out the section of the appeal requesting Director's level review is not evidence that plaintiff properly filed the appeal at the Director's level. After the appeal was denied at the second level in September of 1997, plaintiff was required to seek further relief. Plaintiff failed to do so.
Plaintiff also argues that prison officials failed to timely respond to the appeal, and that this should prevent defendants from raising the exhaustion defense. ECF No. 355 at 56-57. In general, courts have responded to a prisoner's allegation of an untimely response to his administrative appeal by examining the circumstances under which such a response ought to excuse the prisoner's failure to exhaust. The court in Womack v. Bakewell, No. Civ. S-09-1431 GEB KJM P, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93346 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2010), discussed these circumstances, including whether a tardy response should render administrative remedies "unavailable." See Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1224, 1226 (9th Cir. 2010) (failure to exhaust may be excused where "circumstances render administrative remedies effectively unavailable").
Womack, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93346, at *10-15. Plaintiff claims he submitted his appeal to the second level on April 23, 1997, and that prison officials failed to respond within 20 working days as required. It is undisputed that prison officials responded at the second level by September 10, 1997, over four months after plaintiff claims to have submitted it, but over one year before plaintiff commenced this action. See ECF No. 1 (original complaint, filed Oct. 28, 1998). Unlike the cases discussed in Womack, plaintiff actually received a response to his appeal, and further administrative relief was available to him for many months prior to commencing this action. The fact that prison officials may have missed the deadline to respond to plaintiff's appeal does render plaintiff's administrative remedies "unavailable per se." Womack, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93346, at *13; see also Rice v. Milson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127427, at *7-8 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2010) (rejecting plaintiff's claim that he "constructively exhausted" when he failed to pursue further relief after an "unfortunate but unintended delay in receiving the second-level appeal ruling" on his appeal).
Plaintiff also claims that the administrative record for grievance number 97-0817 is false and unreliable because two of the dates appearing on the grievance have been crossed out and replaced with later dates. ECF No. 355 at 56-57. The dates refer to when the grievance was assigned to the second level of review, and when the second level response was due to plaintiff. For reasons that are not clear from the record, it appears that the grievance was initially assigned to the second level of review on May 29, 1997. That date was later changed to August 18, 1997. In addition, it appears that the second level response was initially due to plaintiff by June 16, 1997, but was later extended to September 16, 1997. See ECF No. 352, Ex. G. Plaintiff does not contend that these dates bear on whether he properly pursued all available remedies for the appeal or whether he should be excused from the exhaustion requirement. Instead, he argues that the changed dates demonstrate that defendants' evidence is "falsified" and "unreliable." ECF No. 355 at 57. However, the changed dates suggest that there may have been delays in processing the grievance, that responses at various levels of review may have been modified or supplemented, or that other administrative reasons caused certain deadlines to be extended. Nothing about the changed dates suggests that defendants' copy of the grievance is falsified or otherwise unreliable.
Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he satisfied the pre-filing exhaustion requirement for the allegations in paragraph 1. Nor has he shown that additional administrative remedies were unavailable following receipt of the second level response to his appeal in September 1997. Accordingly, claims based on the allegations in paragraph 1 must be dismissed without prejudice as unexhausted.
Paragraph 2 includes plaintiff's allegations that between August 1997 and December 1999, defendants Castro and D. Peterson wrongfully maintained lockdown conditions. See ECF No. 319, ¶¶ 67, 70, 122, 124.
The court has carefully reviewed each of plaintiff's grievances and finds that none of them would have alerted prison officials to the claims raised in paragraph 2. See ECF No. 352, Exs. G-Z; see also id., Ex. F (including a chart that briefly summarizes the issues raised in each of the twenty grievances). Defendants' evidence shows that plaintiff had not exhausted the claims raised by paragraph 2 at the time he filed his amended complaint on May 11, 1999. See ECF No. 10 (dated May 7, 1999) ¶ 146 (alleging that "since August 12, 1997," prison officials at High Desert State Prison had kept plaintiff on lockdown); see also McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1199-1201 and Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004-07 (9th Cir. 2010) (together holding that claims must be exhausted prior to the filing of the original or supplemental complaint).
As noted, defendants' evidence regarding plaintiff's administrative grievance history does not extend past May 1999. Defendants concede that for this reason, they have not carried their burden of proving the absence of exhaustion for the wrongful imposition of a lockdown between May 7, 1999 and December 8, 1999. ECF No. 358 at 12. Therefore, this portion of plaintiff's claim survives defendants' motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff contends that defendants have also failed to carry their burden for the portion of his claim regarding the lockdown from August 1997 and May 6, 1999. Plaintiff contends that he joined a group appeal that was filed by inmate Frank Garcia on March 18, 1999. ECF No. 355 at 42-43, 94 (¶ 21), Ex. 7. Defendants argue that the substance of the group appeal would not have put prison officials on notice of plaintiff's claim that the prison maintained a lockdown without good cause. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 204 (explaining that the PLRA's exhaustion requirement is intended to give "prison officials an opportunity to resolve disputes concerning the exercise of their responsibilities before being haled into court."). The group appeal complained that the prison had changed it policies to (1) deny or delay delivery of packages, (2) cause non-aggressors to be placed in administrative segregation, and (3) wrongfully classify inmates and discriminate against inmates with a "C-status" designation. See ECF No. 355, Ex. 7 (explaining that inmates are assigned C-status if they refuse to work). While the appeal notes that the prison had been on lockdown since August of 1997, it did not complain that the lockdown had been wrongfully imposed or request that the lockdown be lifted. See id. (requesting that packages be provided, that documents relating to C-status be expunged from inmate files, and that canteen and yard be allowed during C-status placement). Thus, the group appeal would not have put prison officials on notice of plaintiff's claim that defendants Castro and D. Peterson had wrongfully maintained a lockdown since August of 1997. See Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 824 (9th Cir. 2010) (grievance does not suffice to exhaust a claim if it does not put the prison on adequate notice of the problem for which the prisoner seeks redress). Therefore, claims based on the lockdown prior to May 7, 1999, must be dismissed as unexhausted.
Paragraph 3 includes plaintiff's allegation that on August 12, 1997, defendant Wright wrongfully deprived plaintiff of his legal property. According to plaintiff, Wright saw plaintiff "almost daily," and plaintiff was recognized as a "jailhouse lawyer" who always carried a fishnet laundry bag holding legal envelopes, and was known for assisting other inmates draft grievances. ECF No. 319 ¶¶ 40, 42-43. Plaintiff alleges that despite his warning to Wright that he had important legal materials in his laundry bag, Wright allowed other inmates "to pillage and plunder" plaintiff's property, without any penological justification. Id. ¶¶ 43, 72. Plaintiff claims this resulted in the loss of important legal research and other property. Id.
In their reply, defendants withdraw their argument to dismiss this claim as unexhausted. ECF No. 358 at 13. They also concede that the allegations are sufficient to state a retaliation claim under the First Amendment. Id. However, defendants maintain that the allegations fail to state a cognizable due process claim. ECF No. 352 at 15, 18.
Where a prisoner alleges the deprivation of a liberty or property interest in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, caused by the unauthorized negligent or intentional action of a prison official, the prisoner cannot state a constitutional due process claim where the state provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). California provides such a remedy for prisoners. See Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (citing California Government Code §§ 810-895). Thus, plaintiff's allegation regarding Wright's unauthorized deprivation of his property fails to state a cognizable due process claim.
Nor are the allegations sufficient to establish a sufficiently serious violation for purposes of the Eighth Amendment, which protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and from inhumane conditions of confinement. See Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) ("only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation").
To the extent plaintiff contends that his allegations should be construed as an access to court claim, the claim lacks merit. See ECF No. 355 at 74-75 (arguing that "inmates are entitled access to the tools required to litigate"). Prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). Prisoners also have a right "to litigate claims challenging their sentences or the conditions of their confinement to conclusion without active interference by prison officials." Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1103 (9th Cir. 2011). An inmate alleging a violation of this right must show that he suffered an actual injury. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349-51 (1996). That is, plaintiff must allege that the deprivation actually injured or impaired his litigation efforts, in that the defendant hindered his efforts to bring, or caused him to lose, an actionable claim challenging his criminal sentence or conditions of confinement. See id. at 351; Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 412-15 (2002). As defendants point out, a plaintiff does not state an access to court claim merely because an alleged property deprivation included legal property. While plaintiff claims that he was deprived of legal property, his second amended complaint does not allege that he was prevented from accessing the court or that he suffered any cognizable injury because of Wright's conduct. See ECF No. 319 ¶¶ 43, 72. Plaintiff, who was previously notified of the requirements for alleging a violation of a Constitutional right, see ECF No. 306, does not state an access to court claim in his second amended complaint.
As for the allegations in paragraph 3, therefore, this action should proceed only on the First Amendment retaliation claim, and the other purported claims must be dismissed with prejudice.
Paragraph 4 includes plaintiff's allegations that on August 21, 1997, Wright retaliated against plaintiff by falsely accusing him of participating in a riot in Rules Violation Report number 97-08-066, and that in 1998, Wright, Reyes, and C. Peterson wrongfully caused Rules Violation Report number 97-08-066 to be reissued. ECF No. 319 ¶¶ 43, 58, 72(b)(c), 73(b), 89-91, 96, 120.
In their reply brief, defendants withdraw their argument to dismiss the claim based on Wright's alleged retaliatory conduct on August 21, 1997. ECF No. 358 at 14. As for the claim that Wright, Reyes, and C. Peterson wrongfully caused the rules violation report to be reissued, however, defendants maintain that plaintiff failed to exhaust. Id. at 14-15.
Defendants' evidence includes a copy of grievance number 98-1662, in which plaintiff complained about C. Peterson's re-issuance of the Rule Violation Report. ECF No. 352, Ex. R (dated August 8, 1998).
In Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004-07 (9th Cir. 2010) the Ninth Circuit clarified that the rule of Vaden and McKinney
Jones v. Felker, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13730, 2011 WL 53755 *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2011). Plaintiff's repetition in the second amended complaint of claims that were not exhausted when he filed his previous complaints, does not convert those unexhausted claims into properly exhausted claims, even if they were subsequently addressed at the Director's level of review. See McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1199-1201 and Rhodes, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004-07 (9th Cir. 2010) (together holding that claims must be exhausted prior to the filing of the original or supplemental complaint). Defendants' evidence thus shows that plaintiff failed to properly exhaust administrative remedies for the claim regarding re-issuance of the rules violation report.
In opposition, plaintiff contends that he recently located an unprocessed appeal that he submitted on May 15, 1998, regarding re-issuance of the rules violation report. ECF No. 355 at 46, 95 (¶ 24), Ex. 8. According to plaintiff, prison officials never responded to it. Id. This fact, however, is immaterial in light of plaintiff's successful filing of the August 8, 1998 appeal. Assuming that plaintiff previously submitted an appeal on May 15, 1998, but never received a response, the fact remains that the August 8, 1998 appeal was processed. Plaintiff has not shown that his pursuit of the August 8, 1998 appeal was "thwarted" or that his remedies were otherwise made unavailable. See Sapp, 623 F.3d at 823-24. In addition, there is no indication from plaintiff's copy of the May 18, 1998 grievance that it was ever received for administrative review. See ECF No. 355, Ex. 8 (containing plaintiff's writing only, and showing no time stamps or other signs of receipt). Plaintiff's mere production of this grievance, without more, is not sufficient to either satisfy or excuse him from the exhaustion requirement. Accordingly, the claim that Wright, Reyes, and C. Peterson wrongfully caused Rules Violation Report number 97-08-066 to be reissued, must be dismissed without prejudice as unexhausted.
Paragraph 5 includes the allegations that on August 27, 1997, defendant Babich violated plaintiff's due process rights by failing to provide plaintiff with notice of a hearing, at which plaintiff's job assignment was changed from paid to unpaid. ECF No. 319 ¶ 103. Again, the undersigned has carefully reviewed each of plaintiff's grievances and finds that none of them would have alerted prison officials to the claims raised in paragraph 5. See ECF No. 352, Exs. G-Z; see also id., Ex. F (including a chart that briefly summarizes the issues raised in each of the twenty grievances). Plaintiff's bare assertion that "he filed an appeal regarding the matter," is not supported by the record, and is not sufficient to demonstrate that he either satisfied or should be excused from the exhaustion requirement. See ECF No. 355 at 48, 96 (¶ 26). Accordingly, this unexhausted claim must be dismissed without prejudice.
Paragraph 6 includes the allegation that between February 1998 and March 1999, defendant Park failed to provide plaintiff with dental care. ECF No. 319 ¶¶ 82, 102. Careful review of each of plaintiff's grievances likewise shows that none of them would have alerted prison officials to the claims raised in paragraph 6. See ECF No. 352, Exs. G-Z; see also id., Ex. F (including a chart that briefly summarizes the issues raised in each of the twenty grievances).
In opposition, plaintiff argues that his claim against Park should be deemed exhausted because administrative remedies became "effectively unavailable" with respect to an appeal he filed on September 11, 1997. ECF No. 355 at 49, 89 (¶ 8), Ex. 2. Despite several stamps showing that the appeal had been "received" for administrative review on several different dates, the appeal does not bear a log number, which shows that plaintiff never properly filed it at any level of review.
Accordingly, this claim is unexhausted and must be dismissed without prejudice.
Paragraph 7 includes the allegations that on May 5, 1998, defendant Reyes denied plaintiff's request for a transfer because plaintiff had a pending rules violation hearing. ECF No. 319 ¶¶ 73(a), 101(a). Once more, the undersigned has carefully reviewed each of plaintiff's grievances and finds that none of them would have alerted prison officials to the claims raised in paragraph 7. See ECF No. 352, Exs. G-Z; see also id., Ex. F (including a chart that briefly summarizes the issues raised in each of the twenty grievances).
Plaintiff contends that administrative remedies for this claim were unavailable, again pointing to the grievance that he completed on May 15, 1998. ECF No. 255 at 51, Ex. 8. Plaintiff attests that "more than 14 years have lapsed and prison officials have failed to respond to my appeal." Id. at 95 (¶ 24). As noted, an inmate's failure to exhaust may be excused where "circumstances render administrative remedies effectively unavailable." See Nunez, 591 F.3d at 1224, 1226 (finding that the plaintiff was excused from exhausting administrative remedies where he took "reasonable steps" to exhaust his claim, but was precluded from exhausting because of a mistake made by the warden). Plaintiff does not claim to have taken any further action with respect to this appeal, or otherwise demonstrate that he made "every effort to make full use of the prison grievance process" for this appeal. See Nunez, 591 F.3d at 1226. Plaintiff's mere production of this unprocessed grievance, without more, cannot excuse him from the exhaustion requirement. See Godoy v. Wadsworth, No. CV 05-02913 NJV, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5836, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2010) ("The record is not sufficient to excuse exhaustion where Plaintiff hasn't shown that administrative procedures were unavailable, that prison officials obstructed his attempt to exhaust or that he was prevented from exhausting because procedures for processing grievances weren't followed.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Davis v. Evans, Case No. C 05-4678 JF (PR), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108352, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2008) (no exhaustion where "Plaintiff admits that after receiving no response from his initial documentation and letter . . . for five months, he simply filed the instant complaint. It is clear at the very least that Plaintiff has not pursued his appeal through the director's level of review.").
Accordingly, this claim must also be dismissed without prejudice as unexhausted.
Paragraph 8 includes plaintiff's allegations that in June 1998, Rule Violation Report 98-06-009 was wrongfully issued, and that plaintiff received an unfair hearing. ECF No. 319 ¶¶ 70-71, 74, 93, 111, 112. In grievance number 98-1273, dated July 21, 1998, plaintiff appealed the related finding of guilt. ECF No. 352, Ex. P. Defendants' evidence shows that this grievance was denied at the second-level of review on September 9, 1998, and that plaintiff did not seek Director's level review. Id., Ex. P, Ex. B ¶¶ 4-7, Ex. A.
Plaintiff contends that Exhibit P, on which defendants' rely, is an incomplete copy of grievance number 98-1273, because it includes only page one of the two-page September 9, 1998 response to plaintiff's appeal at the second level. ECF No. 355 at 22. Plaintiff submits a copy of the second page, which informed plaintiff that "[a] second level review shall constitute the department's final action of appeals of disciplinary actions classified as `administrative.'" Id. at 22, 97 (¶ 31), Ex. 11 (emphasis added). Plaintiff argues that by receiving this response, he fulfilled his duty to exhaust. Id. Plaintiff also cites to then existing CDCR regulation § 3084.7(b)(1), which stated that as an exception to the regular appeals process, "[a] second level review shall constitute the department's final action on appeals of disciplinary actions classified as [Administrative Rule Violations]."
Defendants also contend that the allegations in paragraph 8 fail to state a claim against defendants Castro, Jennings, and D. Peterson.
According to plaintiff, his claims against Runnels and Jennings should proceed because his administrative appeal made them aware of his due process claim against C. Peterson, yet they denied his appeal, thereby "exten[ding]" the violation. ECF No. 355 at 68-69. Plaintiff further contends that they denied his appeal on behalf of defendant Castro. Id. An individual defendant, however, is not liable on a civil rights claim unless the facts establish the defendant's personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or a causal connection between the defendant's wrongful conduct and the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978). That is, plaintiff may not sue any official on the theory that the official is liable for the unconstitutional conduct of his or her subordinates. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662. Because respondeat superior liability is inapplicable to § 1983 suits, "a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution." Id. Plaintiff may not hold defendants Castro, Runnels, or Jennings liable for C. Peterson's alleged violation of plaintiff's rights, as there are no allegations that any of them personally participated in that violation and there is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983. Moreover, the prison grievance procedure does not confer any substantive rights upon inmates and actions in reviewing and denying inmate appeals cannot serve as a basis for liability under section 1983. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). Thus, the allegations that Castro, Runnels, and Jennings became aware of C. Peterson's alleged violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights through the grievance process, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The deficiencies in these claims cannot be cured by amendment, and should therefore be dismissed with prejudice.
Defendants also argue that plaintiff's allegations again D. Peterson are insufficient because they are "premised solely upon [plaintiff's] conclusory assumption that D. Peterson asked her husband, C. Peterson, to wrongfully find Plaintiff guilty." ECF No. 353 at 19. While the complaint is hardly a model of clarity, plaintiff has alleged (and maintains in his opposition brief), that D. Peterson, a captain, directed C. Peterson, a subordinate officer (lieutenant), to find plaintiff guilty of an "unlawful charge" for an improper purpose. ECF No. 355 at 71. Liberally construed, the complaint alleges that Captain D. Peterson set in motion the due process violation allegedly committed by Lieutenant. C. Peterson. See id.; see also ECF No. 319, ¶ 93 (alleging C. Peterson denied plaintiff due process of law). As noted, defendants do not seek dismissal of the due process claim against C. Peterson. While it may be true that these allegations rest on a false premise and perhaps could not survive a motion brought under Rule 56 or might otherwise fail at trial, this motion is brought under Rule 12(b)(6) and the allegations of the complaint must be taken as true. Assuming the truth of the allegation that Captain D. Peterson ordered or set in motion the conduct of a subordinate who allegedly violated plaintiff's due process rights, plaintiff may hold D. Peterson liable as a supervisor who set in motion the act of another. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011).
Paragraph 9 includes plaintiff's allegations that on January 5, 1999, defendants Babich, Baughman, and Diggs wrongfully failed to reduce plaintiff's classification score and that on January 28, 1999, defendant Reyes retaliated against plaintiff by wrongfully raising his classification score by twelve points. Paragraph 9 also includes the allegations that in reviewing plaintiff's administrative grievance, defendants Runnels and Jennings "rubber-stamped" Reyes' decision to lower plaintiff's score. ECF No. 319 ¶¶ 101(b), 111-112.
Defendants argue that the allegations against Jennings and Runnels must be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim. According to the complaint, Reyes' "clear violations were rubber-stamped by defendants Jennings and Runnels, [a]nd overturned only after [his] appeal went beyond HDSP. Those acts were unlawful, lack penological justifications, were intended to harass, and were arbitrary and capricious." ECF No. 319 ¶ 101(b). Once again, plaintiff seeks to hold Runnels and Jennings liable for an alleged violation of plaintiff's rights, even though Runnels and Jennings did not personally participate in that violation. Like the allegations in paragraph 8, these allegations fail to state a claim because they are premised upon a theory of respondeat superior, and because the alleged failure to properly address a grievance cannot serve as a basis for liability. These deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment, and therefore the claims must be dismissed with prejudice.
Paragraph 10 includes the allegations that on February 1, 1999, inmate-Garcia gave Reyes some of plaintiff's legal documents, and Reyes wrongfully refused to return the property to Garcia. ECF No. 319 ¶ 46. The court has carefully reviewed each of plaintiff's grievances as to these allegations and again finds that none of them would have alerted prison officials to the claims raised in paragraph 10. See ECF No. 333, Exs. G-Z; see also id., Ex. F (including a chart that briefly summarizes the issues raised in each of the twenty grievances).
In opposition, plaintiff states that he "timely submitted an appeal," but that it "was never returned." ECF No. 355 at 96 (¶ 29). Plaintiff does not claim to have taken any further steps to pursue this appeal after not receiving an initial response. Like the claims alleged in paragraph 7, the court cannot conclude, from this record, that plaintiff's administrative remedies for the claim alleged in paragraph 10, were rendered "effectively unavailable." See Nunez, 591 F.3d at 1224, 1226. Accordingly, this claim must also be dismissed without prejudice as unexhausted.
Paragraph 11 includes plaintiff's allegations that on February 25, 1999, Haas falsely identified plaintiff as a "shot caller." ECF No. 319 ¶ 47. Defendants do not seek dismissal of the claims alleged in paragraph 11.
Paragraph 12 includes plaintiff's allegations that on March 16, 1999, McClure, Diggs, Wright, and South-Gilliam retaliated against plaintiff by unlawfully placing him on C-status. ECF No. 319 ¶¶ 43(f), 72(d), 75, 76(c), 77(c), 79, 97, 105, 107, 108. Careful review of each of plaintiff's grievances reveals that none of them would have alerted prison officials to the claims raised in paragraph 12. See ECF No. 333, Exs. G-Z; see also id., Ex. F (including a chart that briefly summarizes the issues raised in each of the twenty grievances).
In opposition, plaintiff contends that exhaustion in "waived" because prison officials did not timely respond to the group appeal he filed with inmate Frank Garcia on March 18, 1999. ECF No. 355 at 52-54, Ex. 7. Plaintiff claims that the response to his appeal was due on April 19, 1999, but not provided until May 4, 1999. See id. Plaintiff fails to demonstrate circumstances showing that through this short delay, prison officials "sufficiently thwarted the process so as to render it unavailable." Ellis, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37346, at *14. In addition, plaintiff's assertion that the response was untimely is not supported by his evidence. It is apparent from the appeal that while dated by plaintiff on March 18, 1999, it was not received by the appeals department until April 27, 1999. ECF No. 355, Ex. 7. Prison officials then had 30 working days — until June 9, 1999, to respond. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6(b)(3) (1998). It appears that the appeals coordinator responded early, on May 4, 1999, by partially granting the appeal at the second level of review. ECF No. 355, Ex. 7. Thus, plaintiff's contention that his obligation to exhaust administrative remedies was waived because of an untimely response, lacks merit. The claims alleged in paragraph 12 must therefore be dismissed without prejudice as unexhausted.
Plaintiff requests the appointment of counsel. ECF Nos. 359, 360. District courts lack authority to require counsel to represent indigent prisoners in section 1983 cases. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In exceptional circumstances, the court may request an attorney to voluntarily to represent such a plaintiff. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990). When determining whether "exceptional circumstances" exist, the court must consider the likelihood of success on the merits as well as the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009). Here, there are no such exceptional circumstances in this case. Accordingly, plaintiff's request for counsel is denied.
In light of the above, this action should proceed on plaintiff's claims that: (1) defendants Castro and D. Peterson violated plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights by maintaining a lockdown from May 7, 1999 through December 8, 1999; (2) defendant Wright retaliated against plaintiff in violation of the First Amendment when he deprived plaintiff of his legal property on August 12, 1997 and when he issued a false rules violation report on August 21, 1997; (3) defendants Holmes, C. Peterson, and D. Peterson violated plaintiff's due process rights with respect to rules violation report number 98-06-009; (4) defendants Babich, Baughman, and Diggs' calculation of plaintiff's classification score violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments; (5) defendant Reyes' calculation of plaintiff's classification score violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments; and (6) that Haas retaliated against plaintiff in violation of the First Amendment by falsely accusing plaintiff of being a shot caller on February 26, 1999.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that plaintiff's request for appointment of counsel (ECF Nos. 359, 360) is denied.
Further, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
1. Defendants' August 30, 2012 motion to dismiss (ECF No. 352) be granted as follows:
(a) that the claims encompassed by paragraphs 1, 5, 6, 7, 10, and 12 be dismissed without prejudice as unexhausted;
(b) that the claims encompassed by paragraph 2 based on the alleged lockdown in place before May 7, 1999, be dismissed without prejudice as unexhausted;
(c) that the claims encompassed by paragraph 3, except for those alleging retaliation by Wright, be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim;
(d) that the claims encompassed by paragraph 4, except for those alleging retaliation by Wright, be dismissed without prejudice as unexhausted;
(e) that the claims encompassed by paragraph 8, except for the due process claims against Holmes, C. Peterson, and D. Peterson, be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim; and
(f) that the claims against Runnels and Jennings encompassed by paragraph 9 be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim; and
2. That this action proceed solely on the claims identified above, against defendants Castro, D. Peterson, Wright, Holmes, C. Peterson, Babich, Baughman, Diggs, Reyes, and Haas, and that they be ordered to file an answer to the complaint within the time provided in Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations." Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
The court has thoroughly reviewed plaintiff's prolix, 36 page, single-spaced, complaint. With its length, and repetition of factual allegations, which are not in chronological order, the document is very difficult to follow. While the complaint sets out ten "causes of action," its organization is confusing, and the underlying allegations are convoluted. See, e.g., ECF No. 319 at 15 ("THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION: Defendants . . . subjected me to malicious prosecution by issuing . . . false charges, doing so with malice and without probable cause . . . for the purpose of denying me equal protection, and my First, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights . . . [and] [b]y subjecting me to Double-Jeopardy . . . denying court access."). Nonetheless, the court has summarized the factual allegations as coherently as possible based upon the twelve distinct incidents giving rise to plaintiff's claims.
The Wagner declaration states that even appeals that were screened out would be entered into the prison's tracking system. ECF No. 353, Ex. C ¶ 2. With his declaration, Wagner submits reports from the tracking system, which show that plaintiff filed twenty appeals between January 1, 1997 and May 1999. Id. ¶ 5, Exs. G-Z. Plaintiff is correct that his September 11, 1997 appeal, discussed above, is not included among the appeals that Wagner found through the prison's tracking system. However, the court will not make an adverse credibility finding against Wagner on this basis. For an unknown reason, the appeal may not have been entered into the tracking system sixteen years ago. There are no grounds for inferring that Wagner deliberately excluded this appeal from his reports. As for the Grannis declaration, the court notes that Grannis did not purport to account for appeals submitted, but rejected, by the Inmate Appeals Branch, prior to 2000. See ECF No. 355, Ex. B ¶ 5, Ex. A at MTD-004 (listing appeals received but rejected between the years of 2000 and 2004). Thus, there is also no basis for viewing the Grannis declaration as untrustworthy.
