STIPULATION REGARDING CONTINUANCE AND EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL AC; FINDINGS AND ORDER

LAWRENCE J. O'NEILL, District Judge.

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for trial on November 5, 2013, at 8:30 a.m.

2. By this stipulation, the parties now move to continue the trial to February 12, 2013, at 8:30 a.m. and to exclude time between November 5, 2013, and February 12, 2013.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. The attorney for the government is required to appear at oral argument at the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on November 5, 2013. The argument was set on August 28 in United States v. Lieng, a criminal matter that was tried before this Court. In addition, both parties require additional time to conduct investigation in this matter and to continue mutually beneficial plea negotiations.

b. Counsel for the government and the defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them availability of counsel and reasonable time necessary for effective potential resolution, further investigation and trial preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

c. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of November 5, 2013, to February 12, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at the request of counsel for the government and defense on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial and would ensure continuity of counsel.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

THE COURT FINDS GOOD CAUSE TO CONTINUE THE TRIAL ONE DAY, TO NOVEMBER 6, 2013 DUE TO THE OBLIGATION AT THE NINTH CIRCUIT. ONCE A TRIAL IS SET, IT IS FIRM. COUNSEL HAVE AN OBLIGATION ONCE THE TRIAL IS SET TO MEET ITS OBLIGATIONS TO BE PREPARED. OTHERWISE, THE REQUEST TO CONTINUE THE TRIAL DATE IS DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.