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U.S. v. CALLES, 1:13-CR-00362 AWI-BAM (007). (2013)

Court: District Court, E.D. California Number: infdco20131028666 Visitors: 12
Filed: Oct. 24, 2013
Latest Update: Oct. 24, 2013
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT:;FINDINGS AND ORDER BARBARA A. McAULIFFE, Magistrate Judge. STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on 10/15/2013. During an arraignment of co-defendants, after defendant's status conference had been set, the court set a status conference
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT:;FINDINGS AND ORDER

BARBARA A. McAULIFFE, Magistrate Judge.

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on 10/15/2013. During an arraignment of co-defendants, after defendant's status conference had been set, the court set a status conference for the co-defendants in this case on 10/28/2013 at 1:00 p.m. due to the availability of counsel for co-defendants.

2. By this stipulation, defendant Calles now moves to exclude time between 10/15/2013, and 10/28/2013, under Local Code T4. The previous status conference date has already been vacated by the court.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a) The government has represented that the initial discovery associated with this case includes three thousand pages of discovery. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying. b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to review discovery, consult with his client, review the current charges, and conduct investigation and research related to the charges. c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. d) The government does not object to the continuance. e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of 10/15/2013 to 10/28/2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

FINDINGS AND ORDER

The Court finds that the time period of 10/15/2013 to 10/28/2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Source:  Leagle

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