Filed: Jan. 03, 2014
Latest Update: Jan. 03, 2014
Summary: STIPULATION AND ORDER VACATING DATE, CONTINUING CASE, AND EXCLUDING TIME WILLIAM B. SHUBB, District Judge. STIPULATION The United States, by and through its undersigned counsel, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous Order, this matter was set for a Status Hearing on January 6, 2014. 2. By this Stipulation, the parties now move to continue the Status Hearing until February 24, 2014, at 9:30 a.m. and to exclude time between January 6
Summary: STIPULATION AND ORDER VACATING DATE, CONTINUING CASE, AND EXCLUDING TIME WILLIAM B. SHUBB, District Judge. STIPULATION The United States, by and through its undersigned counsel, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous Order, this matter was set for a Status Hearing on January 6, 2014. 2. By this Stipulation, the parties now move to continue the Status Hearing until February 24, 2014, at 9:30 a.m. and to exclude time between January 6,..
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STIPULATION AND ORDER VACATING DATE, CONTINUING CASE, AND EXCLUDING TIME
WILLIAM B. SHUBB, District Judge.
STIPULATION
The United States, by and through its undersigned counsel, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous Order, this matter was set for a Status Hearing on January 6, 2014.
2. By this Stipulation, the parties now move to continue the Status Hearing until February 24, 2014, at 9:30 a.m. and to exclude time between January 6, 2014, and February 24, 2014, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties and agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The United States has provided discovery to the defendant.
b. Counsel for the defendant needs additional time to review discovery, meet with the defendant, and discuss potential resolution and sentencing mitigation with the United States.
c. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
d. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, within which trial must commence, the time period of January 6, 2014, to February 24, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), (B)(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at the defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
