STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER

JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.

STIPULATION

Plaintiff, United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, Gennadiy Yurkevich by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on January 7, 2014.

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until January 28, 2014 at 9:45 a.m., and to exclude time between January 7, 2014 and January 28, 2014, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. The government has provided defense counsel with the discovery associated with this case, which includes voluminous records, including mortgage and bank records involving multiple transactions. Additionally, defense counsel has recently provided discovery to the government, and both parties need time to review the relevant documents. Moreover, there are significant immigration issues which remain outstanding and which are the subject of ongoing review and analysis.

b. Based on the foregoing, counsel need additional time, taking into account the exercise of due diligence, to review the discovery, and defense counsel needs additional time to consult with the defendant to assess potential trial and sentencing issues and otherwise effectively prepare for the disposition of this case. Based on the Court's available calendars and the availability of the parties, the parties ask that the Court set this matter for a status conference on January 28, 2014, at 9:45 a.m. and that it find excludable time from January 7, 2014 through and including the January 28, 2014 status conference. Because of the need for additional preparation outlined above, a denial of a continuance to January 28, 2014 would deny the parties the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

c. The government agrees to the continuance.

d. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of January 7, 2014 to January 28, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

Based on the Stipulation of the parties, the status conference is continued to January 28, 2014. IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED this 6th day of January, 2014.