Filed: Feb. 25, 2014
Latest Update: Feb. 25, 2014
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge. STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on February 27, 2014. 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until March 27, 2014, and to exclude time between February 27, 2014, and March 27, 2014, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge. STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on February 27, 2014. 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until March 27, 2014, and to exclude time between February 27, 2014, and March 27, 2014, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: ..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.
STIPULATION
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on February 27, 2014.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until March 27, 2014, and to exclude time between February 27, 2014, and March 27, 2014, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery has been either produced directly to counsel or made available for inspection and copying.
b) The parties are currently involved in active plea negotiations. The Government has already extended a formal plea offer to defendant Alfredo Uriel Valencia-Mendoza, and will shortly extend a plea offer to defendant Victor Magana-Figueroa. Counsel for both defendants will need additional time to reevaluate the discovery previously provided by the Government in light of these offers, and make recommendations to their clients regarding acceptance or rejection of the offers.
c) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of February 27, 2014 to March 27, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED.
